A Gap‐Filling Theory of Corporate Debt Maturity Choice

We argue that time variation in the maturity of corporate debt arises because firms behave as macro liquidity providers, absorbing the supply shocks associated with changes in the maturity structure of government debt. We document that when the government funds itself with more short‐term debt, firms fill the resulting gap by issuing more long‐term debt, and vice versa. This type of liquidity provision is undertaken more aggressively: (1) when the ratio of government debt to total debt is higher and (2) by firms with stronger balance sheets. Our theory sheds new light on market timing phenomena in corporate finance more generally.     

The determinants of debt maturity in Australian firms

We examine the determinants of debt maturity in the Australian capital market with the Top 400 firms listed on the Australian Securities Exchange for the period 1989–2006. We find that Australian firms not only exhibit a positive leverage–maturity relationship but also use short‐term debt to signal their high quality to the market. Our results are robust to different estimation methods that control for endogeneity and error‐dependence. We also find that ignoring the interaction between leverage and maturity can lead to erroneous conclusions about the support for the matching principle, the agency costs hypothesis and the transaction costs hypothesis.     

Debt Maturity and the Effects of Growth Opportunities and Liquidity Risk on Leverage

I test the hypothesis that short debt maturity attenuates thenegative effect of growth opportunities on leverage. Using simultaneousequations with leverage and maturity endogenous, I find strongsupport for an economically significant attenuation effect.The negative effect of growth opportunities on leverage forfirms with all shorter-term debt is less than one-sixth as largeas the effect for firms with all longer-term debt. Short maturityalso increases liquidity risk, however, which negatively affectsleverage. The results suggest that firms trade off the costof underinvestment problems against the cost of liquidity riskwhen choosing short maturity.     

Sources of Capital Market Segmentation: Empirical Evidence from Finland

Because Finland has experienced profound economic changes and financial deregulation since the mid‐1980s, we use it as a laboratory to explore issues related to time‐varying global equity market integration. Using a Finnish perspective, we construct two different portfolios of Finnish firms and a conditional one‐factor international asset pricing model. We examine whether the segmentation varies over time and across assets. We use time‐series variables for changing market integration (lagged foreign equity ownership, difference between Finnish and German short‐term interest rates, and a portfolio‐specific liquidity measure) and crosssectional variables (size and book‐to‐market ratios and industry sector) to show variation in integration.     

Systematic risk,debt maturity,and the term structure of credit spreads

We document several facts about corporate debt maturity: (1) debt maturity is pro-cyclical, (2) higher-beta firms tend to have longer maturity, and (3) shorter maturity amplifies the sensitivity of credit spreads to aggregate shocks. We present a dynamic capital structure model that explains these facts. In the model, leverage and maturity choices are interdependent, which reflect the tradeoffs of liquidity discounts of long-term debt, repayment risks of short-term debt, and the benefit of short-term debt as a commitment device for timely leverage adjustments. Additionally, the model helps quantify the effects of maturity dynamics on the term structure of credit spreads.     

How Entrenchment, Incentives and Governance Influence REIT Capital Structure

Although recent literature has confirmed the importance of viewing a firm??s capital structure choices of leverage and debt maturity as jointly determined, to date there has been little analysis of the importance of traditional governance variables on a firm??s capital structure decisions using a simultaneous equations approach. We examine the influence of managerial incentives, traditional managerial monitoring mechanisms and managerial entrenchment on the capital structure of Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs). Using panel data, we estimate a system of simultaneous equations for leverage and maturity and find that firms with entrenched CEOs use less leverage and shorter maturity debt. This is consistent with the expectation that managers acting in their own self interest will choose lower leverage to reduce liquidity risk and use short maturity debt to preserve their ability to enhance their compensation and reputations by empire building. We also find evidence that traditional alignment mechanisms such as equity and option ownership have an offsetting effect; and that firms where the founder serves as CEO choose higher leverage and longer maturity debt. The results also provide evidence that leverage and maturity are substitutes, firms with high profitability and growth opportunities use less leverage and firms with liquid assets use more leverage and longer maturity debt.     

Innovation,Growth, and Asset Prices

We examine the asset pricing implications of a production economy whose long‐term growth prospects are endogenously determined by innovation and R&D. In equilibrium, R&D endogenously drives a small, persistent component in productivity that generates long‐run uncertainty about economic growth. With recursive preferences, households fear that persistent downturns in economic growth are accompanied by low asset valuations and command high‐risk premia in asset markets. Empirically, we find substantial evidence for innovation‐driven low‐frequency movements in aggregate growth rates and asset market valuations. In short, equilibrium growth is risky.     

Real asset liquidity,cash holdings,and the cost of corporate debt

We study the impact of the interplay between cash holdings and asset sales on the corporate debt spread. We allow cash holdings and asset sales to assist with both debt repayment and sequential investments. The interplay between cash holdings and asset sales leads to a convex relationship between credit spreads and the liquidity of the market for real assets. We use the 2008 financial crisis as a natural experiment and find that post-2008, the nonlinearity of the link between credit spreads and asset liquidity is pronounced, closely matching analytical predictions. This is especially acute for highly leveraged and low profitability firms.     

Are target leverage ratios stable? Investigating the impact of corporate asset restructuring

If firms balance the benefits and costs of leverage, then we might expect corporate asset shocks to trigger a change in corporate target leverage. We investigate the impact of corporate asset restructuring and find that target leverage after restructuring is reduced for downsizing firms and increased for upsizing firms. Changes in target leverage are stabilized by the second year after the restructuring event and are monotonic relative to the degree of restructuring. Decomposition analysis shows that corporate asset restructuring directly and significantly affects target debt ratios. Compared to control firms, downsizing firms adjust claims by repurchasing debt while upsizing firms issue debt securities. As expected, debt repurchases are associated with lower tax liabilities while debt issuance decisions correspond to lower growth proxies and are consistent with a higher adverse selection cost of issuing equity, positive leverage deficit, higher tax liabilities, and lower bankruptcy risk.     

Access to bank financing and the collateral channel: The case of Tunisian firms before and after the revolution

This article is aimed to study the impact of collateral liquidity on debt-access. Such an effect is proven with regard to the difficult economic conditions which ensued from the Tunisian revolution in 2011. The results show that the previously acquired liquid assets enhance debt access. This result is realized by a first measure through the positive relationship between inventories and short term debt and between fixed assets and long term debt. A second measure highlights the positive effect of lands, buildings, machineries and equipments and the negative effect of other fixed assets on debt-access. After the revolution, the creditors lowered their lending to firms to deal with liquidity shocks in the monetary market. Also, they became more selective through their excessive demand for liquid collateral. This result is justified by the intensive effect of real estate assets (lands and buildings) and by the regressive effect of the movable assets (machineries, equipments and other fixed assets).     

土地财政抑制了企业创新吗?——基于信贷错配视角的分析

基于一般均衡框架,考量房价、土地财政与企业创新之间的关系。研究发现：金融市场存在摩擦时,土地作为重要的抵押资产,房价波动和土地财政会扭曲创新资源的配置,在短期和长期对创新产生不同的影响。短期房价上升通过土地财政推动政府支出增加和总产出扩张,同时带动了企业的研发投入。当面临新的投资机会时,企业可以通过出售房产,缓解流动性约束。但在长期,土地财政引致的政府债务挤出了企业信贷,部门间信贷错配抑制了企业研发投入,同时高房价会导致企业转移部分资源投资房产,部门内资源错配进一步抑制了企业创新,从而降低了长期经济增长率,政府增加土地供给,则会弱化政府债务对企业创新要素的挤出效应。     

Corporate Bankruptcy in Korea: Only the Strong Survive?

We analyze whether the build‐up of financial vulnerabilities led listed Korean companies to bankruptcy. We find that pre‐crisis leverage is systematically high for both poor performing/slow growing firms and for profitable/fast‐growing firms. Pre‐crisis leverage raises the probability of bankruptcy, which is lower for firms: (1) relying more on (renegotiable) bank credit; (2) with less inter‐firm debt; and (3) having higher interest coverage ratios. Finally, none of these liquidity variables help predict bankruptcies for chaebol‐firms, suggesting that liquidity constraints are more stringent for non‐chaebol. Thus, in a systemic crisis it is not only the strong/healthy that survive.     

杠杆率变动、固定资产投资与研发活动——兼论金融赋能高质量发展

本文通过构建一个包含企业固定资产投资与研发投资的理论模型,分析得出企业杠杆率变动与投资行为的非线性关系。实证结果表明,低杠杆下,杠杆率的增大会使企业增加固定资产和研发投资的规模。对于财务柔性更强、发展前景更好的企业,杠杆率的提升能够增大此类企业的研发投入占比,即企业开展更多能够提升技术水平的研发活动。进一步研究发现,短期杠杆与商业信用杠杆的提升有助于财务柔性较好的企业提高研发投资占比,而对于发展前景不佳的僵尸企业,长期杠杆和银行杠杆的提升反而会使其扩大固定资产投资,加剧产能过剩问题。本文的政策含义在于,要在保持宏观杠杆率基本稳定的前提下,引导金融资源更多投入到创新型经济上,给予优质及前景较好的企业一定杠杆率调整空间和自由度,使其能够更好地利用社会资金,激励其开展研发活动,促进金融更好地服务实体经济,赋能高质量发展。     

Balance Sheet Management: The Case of Short-Term Obligations Reclassified as Long-Term Debt

We investigate potential management of balance sheet ratios by a sample of firms that reclassify short-term obligations to long-term debt and subsequently declassify that debt (return it to the current liability section). Although aggregate measures of liabilities and equity remain unchanged when firms reclassify (declassify), the practice does increase (decrease) reported measures of liquidity, such as the current ratio, and long-term leverage. Our results suggest that firms reclassify and declassify to smooth reported liquidity and leverage, relative to the prior year and to industry benchmarks. Our evidence is also consistent with firms working around restrictive debt covenants.     

Rollover Risk and Credit Risk

Our model shows that deterioration in debt market liquidity leads to an increase in not only the liquidity premium of corporate bonds but also credit risk. The latter effect originates from firms' debt rollover. When liquidity deterioration causes a firm to suffer losses in rolling over its maturing debt, equity holders bear the losses while maturing debt holders are paid in full. This conflict leads the firm to default at a higher fundamental threshold. Our model demonstrates an intricate interaction between the liquidity premium and default premium and highlights the role of short‐term debt in exacerbating rollover risk.     

Why Have Debt Ratios Increased for Firms in Emerging Markets?

I study trends in capital structure between 1980 and 2004 in a sample of over 11,000 firms from 34 emerging markets. The average firm's market‐value debt ratio rose by 15 percentage points over this quarter century. I study how this rise in leverage was influenced by firm‐level factors and by the availability of debt financing at the country level. The central finding is that the increase in debt ratios can largely be attributed to changes in the characteristics of emerging market firms over this period. For the average firm, the most prominent determinants of capital structure – size, profitability, asset tangibility, and growth opportunities – all shifted in the direction implying a higher optimal level of debt. At the country level, increased financial development within the country is associated with lower debt ratios, but increased financial openness to foreign markets is associated with higher debt ratios.     

融资流动性与债券资产流动性的互动特征——基于MS-VAR模型的时变分析

依据2015-2021年货币市场和债券市场的时间序列数据,运用MS-VAR探究了不同违约风险环境下融资流动性与债券资产流动性间的互动关系。研究发现：无论是利率债还是信用债,其资产流动性与货币市场的融资流动性存在互为正反馈的流动性螺旋。此外,两类流动性间的互动特征存在非对称性和异质性,在风险时期,融资流动性与利率债资产流动性互动特征比较明显,而在平稳时期,融资流动性与信用债资产流动性互动特征比较明显。     

Bank Debt,Flexibility, and the Use of Proceeds from Asset Sales

In the theory of financial intermediation, bank debt is often characterized as being more readily renegotiable than public debt. Banks are also conjectured to gain valuable non-public information through closer monitoring. Given these features, bank debt can theoretically be more flexible than public debt and can lead to better investment/liquidation decisions. We investigate this possibility using a sample of firms facing the important decision of whether to reinvest the proceeds from asset sales or whether to distribute the proceeds to debtholders. While higher levels of leverage are associated with an increased probability of distributing proceeds to creditors, this relationship is significantly muted for bank debt as opposed to public debt. This finding is consistent with the conjecture that bank debt provides enhanced flexibility when compared to public debt. Further we find that asset sale announcement period abnormal stock returns are increasing in firms’ use of bank debt, but not public debt. This suggests that market participants believe that banking relationships are leading to better decision making for this particular type of investment/liquidation decision. We find no significantly different effects of bank vs. public debt on the initial decision to undertake an asset sale in the first place. Thus, in the context of asset sales, the main observable difference arises in the use of proceeds decision, rather than the initial asset sale decision.     

Industry Structure and Corporate Debt Maturity

We examine how industry competition affects firms’ choice of short‐term debt. We find that the percentage of short‐term debt is positively related to industry concentration at low levels of concentration, and inversely related to industry concentration at higher levels of concentration. This nonlinear relation is stronger in industries where firms are either more homogeneous or compete more aggressively. Moreover, we find that firms with shorter‐maturity debt are less aggressive than their rivals in the product market. The overall evidence suggests that although financial contracts alleviate agency problems, they exacerbate the risk of predation.     

How Persistent Is the Impact of Market Timing on Capital Structure?

This paper examines the capital structure implications of market timing. I isolate timing attempts in a single major financing event, the initial public offering, by identifying market timers as firms that go public in hot issue markets. I find that hot‐market IPO firms issue substantially more equity, and lower their leverage ratios by more, than cold‐market firms do. However, immediately after going public, hot‐market firms increase their leverage ratios by issuing more debt and less equity relative to cold‐market firms. At the end of the second year following the IPO, the impact of market timing on leverage completely vanishes.