上市公司信息披露对债务融资的影响分析

信息披露是上市公司向投资者和社会公众沟通的桥梁,银行借款是现阶段我国企业债务融资的主要途径。对上市公司而言,提高信息披露质量能否使企业在债务融资中获得实质性收益,这一问题的探讨有助于发掘信息披露的激励作用,达到促使上市公司自愿提高信息披露质量的目的。     

碳信息披露、内控质量与企业债务融资成本

高质量发展背景下，碳信息披露日渐成为影响企业债务融资成本的重要因素。基于“十四五”时期我国“制造强国”战略的降本减负政策，选取2017-2021年沪深A股制造业企业数据，在对碳信息披露综合评价的基础上，实证分析了碳信息披露对债务融资成本的影响以及内控质量在其中的调节作用。结果表明：碳信息披露对债务融资成本的影响呈显著“倒U型”，内控质量在其中起到负向调节效应，在倒U型拐点两侧分别表现出抑制和补充效果。异质性分析发现：碳试点市场地区的倒U型关系显著，非试点市场不存在倒U型关系；国有企业碳信息披露已率先越过拐点，民营企业仍处于碳信息披露初期阶段。研究结论为规范碳市场信息披露制度、提高企业碳信息披露主动性、降低债务融资成本提供理论依据。     

环境信息披露影响银行的信贷决策吗?——来自重污染行业的经验证据

本文全面分析了环境信息披露对债务融资额、债务融资期限结构和债务融资成本的影响,并在对环境信息披露水平进行适度披露、过度披露和不足披露的划分基础上,深入探讨了不同程度的环境信息披露对债务融资的影响差异。研究表明:企业的环境信息披露行为有助于改善银企双方的信息不对称程度,降低银行的信贷风险,进而帮助企业获取更多的债务融资额、长期融资额和更加优惠的贷款。但企业无须"过度粉饰"其环境信息,因为只有适度的环境信息披露才能传递真实的企业信号,帮助银行对企业的环境管理和经营运作进行正确判断,有效解除银行对其融资约束。因此,企业要想通过环境披露缓解银行的融资约束,就应该规范其环境披露行为,多披露"具体的、易验证的"环境信息,少披露"空泛的、说明性的"环境信息。     

放松卖空管制与债务融资成本——基于融资融券制度的准自然实验

本文利用我国证券市场推出融资融券制度这一准自然实验,基于放松卖空管制的经济后果这一研究基础,进一步研究放松卖空管制如何影响企业的债务融资成本。从卖空机制对公司信息披露质量、公司现金价值及对公司会计稳健性的治理作用来看,放松卖空管制通过这一系列治理作用降低了公司的债务融资成本。进一步在不同产权性质条件下,对其进行分组回归,发现卖空机制在民营企业中对债务融资成本的降低作用更为显著,并且在股权集中度高的样本中,债务融资成本的降低作用更为显著。     

企业债务融资影响因素：文献综述与展望

债务融资是我国企业最重要的外部融资渠道。本文系统梳理了企业债务融资相关文献，从企业特征、公司治理、信息披露、宏观经济和政策、制度环境五个方面总结了企业债务融资成本和规模影响因素。在企业特征方面，良好的财务状况、国有产权性质有利于企业增加债务规模，降低债务成本；在公司治理方面，较低的股权集中度、独立性较高或规模较大的董事会、严格的内部控制、高管部分个人特征能够促进企业债务融资；在信息披露方面，较高的会计信息质量、会计稳健性、审计均有利于提升企业债务融资能力；宏观层面的经济周期、财政政策、货币信贷政策对企业债务融资具有显著影响；在制度环境方面，保护债权人权益的法律环境、作为正式制度替代机制的政治关系以及银行关联均对企业债务融资具有促进作用。未来研究可以关注各种因素相对重要性的比较、债务资金供给因素的影响、银行贷款融资和债券融资的区别等方面。     

提高信息披露质量能降低企业债务违约风险吗？

债务违约风险对企业的生产经营和资本市场的良好发展都会产生不利影响，如何防范化解企业的债务违约风险引起广泛重视。本文以2007-2021年A股上市企业为样本，采用上市企业信息披露考评结果衡量信息披露质量，运用面板固定效应模型系统考察信息披露质量对企业债务违约风险的影响。研究发现：一是信息披露质量与企业债务违约风险显著负相关，即信息披露质量越高，企业债务违约风险越低，且进行一系列稳健性检验后，该结论仍然成立；二是分析师关注和内部控制质量分别作为外部监督和内部监督机制，对信息披露质量与企业债务违约风险之间的关系发挥负向调节作用；三是信息披露质量通过缓解融资约束和降低非效率投资两条路径降低债务违约风险。本文基于信息披露视角，为防范化解企业债务违约风险提供了一定的政策启示。     

会计信息可比性与债务融资——基于中国上市公司的实证分析北大核心

会计信息质量影响着公司契约。可比性作为重要的会计信息质量特征,是否影响企业债务融资合约?依据De Franco,Kothari和Verdi(2011)的可比性度量方法,本文对上述问题做了实证检验。研究结果发现,较高的会计信息可比性增加了融资规模,降低了融资成本,债务融资合约可修正性影响上述关系的显著性,银行借款的显著性弱于债券融资。本文是对会计信息质量与债务合同关系研究的拓展,也为上市公司外部融资时财务报表可比性的经济后果提供了证据和启示。     

企业债务融资成本和会计信息质量管理讨论

在利率市场化改革的逐步推动下,不同企业的债务融资成本必然会显现出差异性。影响企业债务融资成本的因素主要包括企业规模、企业所属行业、企业资产结构与负债率、企业法人治理等企业经营信息。会计信息质量通过企业会计信息的可靠性、及时性、可比性、透明度等相关标准判断会计信息是否能够有效反映企业经营信息。通过有效的会计信息质量要求,可以降低企业偿债风险及企业经营者和贷款人之间的信息不对称,影响企业的债务融资成本。     

环境信息披露视阈下的企业融资约束:基于现金—现金流敏感性模型

本文探究了企业环境信息披露程度对公司融资约束的影响。研究发现,我国上市公司普遍存在融资约束问题,而企业披露环境信息可以降低企业的融资约束,且企业环境信息披露质量越高,对于企业融资约束的缓解作用越明显。因此,存在融资约束的企业应通过充分披露企业的相关信息,降低与市场的信息不对称程度,缓解自身的融资约束问题。     

环境信息披露视阈下的企业融资约束:基于现金—现金流敏感性模型北大核心

本文探究了企业环境信息披露程度对公司融资约束的影响。研究发现,我国上市公司普遍存在融资约束问题,而企业披露环境信息可以降低企业的融资约束,且企业环境信息披露质量越高,对于企业融资约束的缓解作用越明显。因此,存在融资约束的企业应通过充分披露企业的相关信息,降低与市场的信息不对称程度,缓解自身的融资约束问题。     

Green credit policy and corporate access to bank loans in China: The role of environmental disclosure and green innovation

This research assesses the effectiveness of China's green credit policy. We explore whether firms with better external environmental disclosure and internal green innovation receive more bank loans because of green credit, and utilize a panel of 1086 listed Chinese manufacturing enterprises from 2012 to 2017 to test our hypotheses. The results suggest that firms with higher environmental disclosure quality do not obtain more loans, and only green innovation promotes access to corporate loans. We show that the underlying cause of this phenomenon is corporate green-washing, which is prevalent in soft environmental disclosure and hinders enterprises from obtaining more loans. Our findings contribute to the literature on green credit policy, corporate green innovation, environmental disclosure, and green-washing, and provide a reference for companies, banks, and governments to make decisions.     

内部控制质量、信用模式与企业价值——基于深市A股上市公司的实证分析

内部控制和企业价值之间存在着密切的联系,内部控制是否有效及效率高低影响着企业的价值。内部控制质量高的企业有动机通过自愿性信息披露向市场传递企业价值较高的信号,由于信号传递作用,企业更容易获得较低成本的商业信用和银行信用借款,提升了企业价值,而内部控制质量低的企业没有动机进行内部控制信息披露,从而不得不付出较高的债务融资成本,降低了企业价值。     

年报风险信息披露与银行贷款利率

既有文献较少从银行视角关注年报风险信息披露的经济后果。银行更有能力解读年度风险信息,银行利益也更直接受到年报风险信息的影响,银行贷款利率更能体现年报风险信息披露的经济后果。本文基于2008-2017年单笔银行贷款利率数据的研究发现:总体上我国年报风险信息披露降低了银行贷款利率,说明我国年报风险信息披露更符合趋同观假说。中介效应检验发现:我国年报风险信息披露通过提高信息透明度,降低银行风险感知水平进而降低了银行贷款利率,即信息质量和风险是我国年报风险信息披露影响银行贷款利率的不完全中介。进一步分析发现:我国年报风险信息披露与银行贷款利率的负相关关系主要体现在货币政策紧缩组、非国有企业组以及公司治理水平较高组。本文首次研究银行贷款利率与年报风险信息披露的关系,有助于丰富风险信息披露文献和银行贷款文献。     

Quality of information disclosure,property rights,and bank loans: A bank heterogeneity perspective

Using the context of the financial reform and the development of the non-state sector in China in the past decade, we examine the roles that the quality of information disclosure and property rights play in the allocation of different types of bank credit. We find that foreign banks and policy banks exercise “financial discrimination,” and that local commercial banks, large state-owned commercial banks, national joint-stock banks, local city commercial banks, and rural commercial banks not only exercise financial discrimination but also provide significant “financial support” to non-state-owned enterprises by providing more lending opportunities and larger loans. However, when enterprises commit information disclosure violations, the local commercial banks, national joint-stock banks, local city commercial banks, and rural commercial banks reverse their credit decisions and begin to exercise financial discrimination against non-state-owned enterprises. At the same time, large state-owned commercial banks continue to provide financial support to non-state-owned enterprises. We also find that the quality of the information disclosed by enterprises has a moderating effect rather than an intermediary effect on the relationship between property rights and bank loans. Overall, the results of this paper shine new light on the market-oriented reform of the banking industry, and provide new empirical evidence for the presence of financial discrimination in the supply of bank credit. Our findings also have practical implications for solving the financing difficulties of non-state-owned enterprises.     

审计师声誉与银行信贷资源配置——基于银行信用借款决策的经验证据

本文以2001至2006年沪深A股上市公司为样本,从银行信用借款决策的视角,研究了审计师声誉对银行信贷资源配置的影响。研究发现,聘请高声誉审计师的上市公司更可能获得银行信用借款(即存在门槛效应)且信用借款的比例更高(即存在约束效应);在区分产权性质后发现,国有控股公司中审计师声誉机制主要体现为约束效应,其原因在于政治关系是一种更可靠的替代机制;非国有控股公司中仅存在审计师声誉机制的门槛效应,主要归因于我国司法体系不健全,银行将寻求其他更可靠的替代机制。研究结果表明审计师声誉是一种有效的资源配置机制,但其有效性受制度环境的制约。     

Does carbon emission of firms matter for Bank loans decision? Evidence from China

In the context of global climate governance, greater carbon emissions of enterprises often result in a higher potential risk of environmental violations. Taking the non-financial companies listed in China from 2008 to 2018 as research samples, this paper empirically examined the impact of firm carbon emission on their acquisition of new bank loans and its mechanism of action. This paper empirically finds that if the carbon emission of an enterprise is higher, it will be granted with less new bank loans. The results remain robust after pairing analysis and instrumental variable analysis. The mechanism analysis shows that corporate credit rating plays a significant moderating role in the relationship between corporate carbon emission and new bank loans. Carbon emission leads to the improvement of earnings management of enterprises and the significant decline in the conservatism and comparability of accounting information, which is likely to be an important channel for the reduction of corporate bank loans. Upon further analysis, we find that the carbon emission of enterprises will not significantly affect the cost of acquiring bank loans, but it will significantly reduce the loan term structure. The cross-sectional analysis shows that the effect of carbon emission on new bank loans is more obvious in state-owned listed enterprises, enterprises with high internal control quality and enterprises with strong environmental law enforcement. The research results of this paper enrich the research on the economic consequences of carbon emission, reveal the implementation effect of green credit policies, provide empirical evidence for bank credit to play a role in green governance, and promote enterprises to actively reduce carbon emission.     

Moral hazard and adverse selection in the originate-to-distribute model of bank credit

Bank credit has evolved from the traditional relationship banking model to an originate-to-distribute model. We show that the borrowers whose loans are sold in the secondary market underperform their peers by about 9% per year (risk-adjusted) over the three-year period following the initial sale of their loans. Therefore, either banks are originating and selling loans of lower quality borrowers based on unobservable private information (adverse selection), and/or loan sales lead to diminished bank monitoring that affects borrowers negatively (moral hazard). We propose regulatory restrictions on loan sales, increased disclosure, and a loan trading exchange/clearinghouse as mechanisms to alleviate these problems.     

Agency problems,accounting slack,and banks’ response to proposed reporting of loan fair values

We investigate the determinants of bank representatives’ responses to the United States Financial Accounting Standard Board’s 2010 Exposure Draft that proposes fair value measurement for most financial instruments. Over 85% of the 2971 comment letters were received from bank representatives, with most bank-affiliated letters addressing—and opposing—one issue: fair value measurement of loans. The Exposure Draft proposes that companies report both fair value and amortized cost measures for loans; thus, the proposal should result in increased levels of loan-related information and improved financial reporting transparency. We investigate three reasons for bank representatives’ resistance. First, fair value measurement should result in less accounting slack than the current incurred-loss model for loan impairments; therefore, we propose that representatives from banks that historically utilized that slack will resist fair value measurement for loans. Second, we propose that agency problems are an important motivating factor because bank representatives reaping more private benefits from their franchises have less incentive to support increases in financial reporting transparency. Third, we test whether the most common reasons for opposition included in the comment letters are associated with negative letter writing. Our analyses support the first two determinants of bank representatives’ resistance to the Exposure Draft. Specifically, accounting slack and lower demand for accounting transparency are strongly associated with resistance to the standard. However, we find that stated reasons for resistance are not associated with letter writing. Specifically, representatives at firms with difficult to value loans and firms that mostly hold loans to maturity are no more likely to resist the standard than others. The narrow scope of bank representatives’ comments and our empirical findings suggest that bankers’ responses to the Exposure Draft may be more driven by concerns over reduced availability of accounting slack and accompanying de facto regulatory forbearance than by the conceptual arguments they offer. Our results have implications for standard setters, who must navigate special interests as they attempt to promulgate high quality accounting standards, and for users of financial statements who must consider how political forces shape generally accepted accounting principles.     

公司治理与银行借款融资

本文以中国深沪两市A股上市公司为样本,检验了公司治理在银行信贷决策中的作用。通过检验公司治理水平对企业银行借款融资能力和融资成本的影响,我们发现,企业银行借款融资能力方面,无论长期借款还是短期借款,公司治理因素对企业银行借款融资能力均没有影响,银行更看重企业的经营状况。企业银行借款融资成本方面,我们发现公司治理机制中只有监事会特征和股权集中度对企业银行借款融资成本有显著影响。具体地,监事会规模越大,融资成本越低;股权集中度越高,融资成本越高。本文结果说明公司治理因素在我国银行放贷决策中的作用有限。     

两权分离度、信息不对称与债务融资选择 — 基于中国民营上市公司的样本分析

本文主要探讨了我国民营上市公司终极控制人的两权分离程度与银行借款和公开 发债选择之间的关系,以2011-2015年我国民营上市公司的面板数据为样本,利用多元回归分 析方法进行研究。结果表明两权分离程度越大,公司进行债务融资时越倾向于银行借款;当信 息不对称程度越低、信息透明程度越高时,公司倾向于选择公开发债,两权分离程度较大导致 的代理问题也会得到弱化。结论符合有效市场理论。