雄才大略 着手成春——长城证券电子元器件行业分析师岳雄伟

上榜理由 通过今日投资＂分析师实时排名＂系统对业内1800名分析师的追溯跟踪,长城证券电子元器件行业分析师岳雄伟在＂最牛分析师＂排行榜中近一年名列第一,获得我们评选的第八十四期＂每周一星＂称号。     

证券分析师可信度与胜任能力:一个文献述评

本文以"公众投资者"为全新研究视角,构建证券分析师可信度指标评价体系,通过问卷调查对证券分析师可信度进行综合评价。利用平均赋权、专家赋权以及因子分析三种方法,计算出证券分析师可信度分别为2.82、2.87及2.9,语义都为"部分可信"。该研究结果说明:公众投资者认为证券分析师的投资建议只有40%～59%的可信水平。由于证券分析师的工作性质使他们常常陷入各种"利益漩涡"当中,他们所预测的股票并非都是"信得过产品",这些都影响了他们的"客观性"、"独立性"以及"准确性",使他们在公众投资者心中的可信度"大打折扣"。     

证券分析师：角色、责任及独立性

2001年，伴随着美国股市牛市的终结，以及大部分证券分析师对行情和股票的错误判断，上至美国证监会，下到媒体和投资者，出现了对华尔街证券分析师信用的争论。争论的核心是：投资者能否相信华尔街证券分析师的证券研究?证券分析师能否……     

证券分析师的信息解读能力调查

本文是对我国证券分析师1994-2003年1156份“年报分析”的调查。我们发现,总体上看,证券分析师对年报信息的使用能力在提高,对管理信息和会计信息的使用频率都有所上升,且会计信息的使用比例远高于管理信息。但是,在会计信息中,对盈利能力特别关注。此外,证券分析师使用的财务分析工具和方法一般还只停留在常用比率分析上。在这类分析报告中,很少有预测分析。可以说,预测分析是我国证券分析中最为薄弱的地方之一,也很少有分析师根据分析结果给出具体的买卖建议。     

证券市场效率实现机制的一种解释

证券市场效率的两个主要决定因素是证券价格准确性和证券流动性。可以由监管部门选择来完成实现市场效率任务的市场参与者群体有内幕人士、证券分析师、流动性交易者、噪音交易者。这四个群体中,证券分析师最适合承担实现市场效率的任务。监管部门通过禁止内幕交易、强制披露义务、禁止欺诈与操纵,帮助形成了一个竞争性的证券分析师市场。这一竞争性证券分析师市场有效地促进了证券的准确定价,提高了市场流动性,从而达到了实现市场效率的目的。同时这一竞争性分析师市场还在信息市场和整个投资银行产业产生了正外部性。     

我们还需要证券分析师吗?

证券分析师竟然有了“黑嘴”之称,既然这样,就产生一个问题,我们还需要证券分析师吗     

证券分析师VS统计模型:证券分析师盈余预测的相对准确性及其决定因素

本文使用2005年35家券商对我国上市公司做出的每股盈余预测数据,考察了证券分析师盈余预测相对于统计模型的相对准确性及其决定因素。我们发现,我国证券分析师做出的盈余预测,同以年度历史数据为基础的统计模型得出的盈余预测相比,预测误差较小,证券分析师盈余预测具有一定的优势;但同某些以季度历史数据为基础的统计模型得出的盈余预测相比,预测误差较大,证券分析师盈余预测不具有优势。我们同时考察了决定证券分析师盈余预测相对准确性的决定因素。我们发现,公司每股盈余的波动性越大,公司上市越晚,跟踪公司的分析师越多,证券分析师的优势就越大。我们的研究对证券分析师以及投资者都有一定的启示作用。     

私募股权投资与证券分析师新股关注

本文采用2009年至2011年新上市的281家创业板公司为研究样本,考察私募股权投资如何影响证券分析师对被投资企业上市的关注程度。结果发现私募股权投资支持的企业能够吸引到更多的证券分析师关注,并且证券分析师的预测也更加准确,这与私募股权投资的认证假说和市场能力假说相符。此外,相比非外资背景的私募股权投资,外资背景的私募股权投资支持的企业在上市时受到更多的证券分析师关注,并且分析师预测准度也更高。进一步研究发现,参与上市公司的私募股权投资机构越多,对该上市公司关注的证券分析师越多,但并未发现对分析师预测准度的显著影响。本文的研究不仅丰富了PE与证券分析师的文献,也为我国如何加强建设内资PE团队提供了重要的参考价值。     

我国证券分析师独立性问题探析

本文主要对我国证券分析师的独立性问题进行简要的分析与研究,通过对样本选择与变量的描述,以及利用多元回归模型进行分析,深入探究证券分析师面临的各种利益关系对其发布的研究报告所造成的影响。本文首先简要概述了当前我国证券分析师的重要性地位,之后又探究了影响分析师独立性的相关因素,最后对全本进行了总结与概括。     

证券分析师与有效资本市场

有效资本市场需要证券分析师，因为证券分析师可以提高资本市场效率，有利于证券价格更快向价值回归，证券分析师对成熟的资本市场起着极为重要的作用。随着我国资本市场的发展及证券价值投资理念的确立，证券分析师必将在我国资本市场日益发挥重大作用。但是，证券分析师作用良好发挥的前提是对证券分析师的有效监管。我们应在充分认识我国目前证券分析师行业存在的问题的基础上制定科学合理的监管措施，以促进证券分析师行业的良性发展，从而更好地促进我国资本市场的发展。     

上市公司信息环境和分析师的盈利预测——来自中国上市公司的经验证据

分析师在证券市场中扮演着重要角色,而上市公司信息环境则直接将影响分析师作用的发挥。本文研究了我国上市公司信息环境对分析师预测行为的影响。实证研究表明：公司信息环境越差,证券分析师将越少使用历史会计信息,分析师向证券市场传递的增量信息就越多,相对历史会计信息而言,分析师预测信息的竞争力就越高。由于国内研究上市公司信息环境的文章相对较少,所以本文为国内分析师的盈利预测及相关研究提供了一个新视角。     

The effect of non-recurring items on analysts’ earnings forecasts

This article discusses the effects of non-recurring profits and losses on statement users’ decision-making processes from the perspective of securities analysts. We examine the relationship between analysts’ forecast revisions and firms’ non-recurring earnings. We find that 1) non-recurring gains and losses can influence analysts’ earnings forecast revision; 2) compared with non-recurring items resulting from policy changes, analysts are more concerned about those attributed to changes in business scope; 3) if listed companies use non-recurring items to turn losses into gains during earnings management, it will weaken the effects of non-recurring items on analysts’ earnings forecast revision. The results suggest that non-recurring items that result from changes in business scope incorporate information that users need for the future operation of the business. This article verifies the information relevance of non-recurring items and provides evidence for the necessity of non-recurring item disclosure.     

承销业务利益对证券分析师盈利预测准确性影响研究

证券分析师作为证券市场信息的挖掘者和传播者,在证券市场上扮演着双重角色。由于受到所属证券公司的承销业务利益的影响,承销商分析师可能会因为缺乏独立性而使盈利预测产生偏差。按分析师所属的券商是否是预测对象的承销商而把分析师分为两组,对比研究其盈利预测的准确性,结果发现承销商分析师的盈利预测比非承销商分析师更偏向乐观,且预测误差更大。说明承销商分析师在面临承销业务所导致的利益冲突时,并不能保持独立性。     

监督抑或跟随：机构投资者治理角色研究——来自舞弊公司机构持股行为的经验证据

文章利用被中国证券监管部门处罚的舞弊公司及未舞弊公司为对象,考察机构投资者在公司治理中是扮演监督者还是跟随者角色。研究发现,从公司舞弊前一季度到后一季度机构投资者并未减持舞弊公司股份,不具备舞弊预测与识别能力;机构投资者倾向于利用分析师评级结果进行投资决策;机构投资者容易被舞弊公司误导,而分析师评级则有助于减轻机构投资者被误导程度。结果表明,目前机构投资者更多扮演着跟随分析师的消极角色而非有效监督者的积极角色,分析师评级具有一定的决策有用性。     

Corporate culture and analyst catering

This study examines the relation between financial institutions’ corporate culture and the quality of analysts’ research services. Using data collected from the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, I measure the weakness of financial institutions’ corporate culture based on violations observed in securities activities unrelated to equity research. I find evidence demonstrating an association between weak corporate culture and analysts’ providing research products catered to institutional clients at the expense of individual investors. Specifically, FINRA violations are associated with both (i) less accurate forecasts and less informative reports, and (ii) higher institutional commission revenues and more broker-hosted conferences for select institutional clients.     

Are All Security Analysts Equal?

We examine the extent to which security analysts are homogeneous in their effect on firm valuation as measured by Tobin's Q. Earlier research documents a significant and positive relation between analyst coverage and firm valuation. We identify three classes of equity analysts and examine their differential effect on firm valuation associated with their coverage and their information production. We find that equity analysts are not homogeneous in their effect on firm valuation. The presence of analysts at national securities firms have the strongest effect on firm valuation followed by analysts at regional securities firms and finally analysts at nonbrokerage, or research, firms. We attribute this result to the differential monitoring and information dissemination function rendered by the analysts. Information produced by analysts, however, does not share the same credibility. Specifically, we find brokerage firms' buy recommendations are discounted by the market and have a weak effect on firm valuation. The results can be supported by arguments that brokerage firm analysts' recommendations are contaminated by their firms' investment banking relations with corporations.     

Which types of analyst firms are more optimistic?

Research optimism among securities analysts has been attributed to incentives provided by underwriting activities. We examine how analysts’ forecast and recommendation optimism varies with the business activities used to fund research. We find that analysts at firms that funded research through underwriting and trading activities actually made less optimistic forecasts and recommendations than those at brokerage houses, who performed no underwriting. Optimism was particularly low for bulge underwriter firm analysts, implying that firm reputation reduces research optimism. There is also evidence that analysts at retail brokerage firms are more optimistic than those serving only institutional investors. We conclude that analyst optimism is at least partially driven by trading incentives.     

Ratings Changes,Ratings Levels,and the Predictive Value of Analysts’ Recommendations

We show that abnormal returns to analysts’ recommendations stem from both the ratings levels assigned and the changes in those ratings. Conditional on the ratings change, buy and strong buy recommendations have greater returns than do holds, sells, and strong sells. Conditional on the ratings level, upgrades earn the highest returns and downgrades the lowest. We also find that both ratings levels and changes predict future unexpected earnings and the associated market reaction. Our results imply that 1) investment returns may be enhanced by conditioning on both recommendation levels and changes; 2) the predictive power of analysts’ recommendations reflects, at least partially, analysts’ ability to generate valuable private information; and 3) some inconsistency exists between analysts’ ratings and the formal ratings definitions issued by securities firms.     

Equity home bias and corporate disclosure

I show that more comprehensive corporate disclosure reduces investors’ uncertainty about domestic companies’ payoffs at no cost, thereby decreasing investors’ equity home bias toward a country. Since investors should base their investment decisions on valid and easily interpretable company information only, more comprehensive disclosure will reduce the home bias only if domestic securities law is sufficiently stratified and domestic companies use international accounting standards. Using panel data for 38 countries from 2003 to 2008 I find that more comprehensive disclosure reduces investors’ home bias, though significantly only for countries that sufficiently enforce their securities law and implement international accounting standards.     

Why Do Analysts use a Zero Forecast for Other Comprehensive Income?

Accounting theory and accounting researchers stress the importance of clean surplus accounting and comprehensive income to corporate valuation. However, casual observation suggests that sell-side equity analysts routinely ignore other comprehensive income (OCI) in their forecasts and instead focus on forecasting earnings (before OCI). Using a sample of analyst reports, I first confirm that analysts normally omit forecasts of OCI or comprehensive income from their reports, consistent with analysts forecasting OCI as zero. I then predict and find that a zero forecast for OCI generally produces lower forecasting errors than alternative time-series models, such as a random walk or AR(1) model, suggesting a rational reason why analysts take this approach. Finally, I predict and find that although analysts’ point forecasts of future OCI are usually zero, their implied cost of equity estimates are consistent with analysts forecasting a positive variance for OCI.