Business groups in China

We investigate whether business groups in China act as internal capital markets, in an environment that is characterized by a high level of government intervention, a weak legal system, and an underdeveloped financial market. We study how institutional factors, such as the ultimate owner and level of market development, shape the role of these business groups. We find that business groups help member firms overcome constraints in raising external capital, and that the internal capital market within a business group is more likely to be an alternative financing channel among state-owned firms than among private firms. We also find that the internal capital market is more likely to help those affiliated firms which are private, local government owned relative to those owned by central government, or located in regions with a well-developed institutional environment. We present evidence of the role of business groups in risk sharing among affiliated firms, but find that business group affiliation has no impact on firm accounting performance. This study sheds new light on the theory of the firm and its boundaries, and provides a better understanding of China's rapidly growing economy.     

Product market competition and cost stickiness

Extant literature on cost stickiness has focused on how firm-specific characteristics affect the asymmetric cost behavior. In this paper, we explore how a firm’s operating environment affects the firm’s cost stickiness. Specifically, we examine the effect of product market competition on cost stickiness since a firm’s investment and cost retention decisions partly depend on how the firm interacts with its rival firms in the product markets. Using two firm-level text-based product market competition measures extracted from management disclosures in firms’ 10-K filings (Li et al. in J Account Res 51(2):399–436, 2013; Hoberg and Phillips in Rev Financ Stud 23(10):3773–3811, 2010; J Polit Econ, 2015), we find strong evidence consistent with cost asymmetry increasing in competition after controlling for known economic determinants of cost stickiness. In additional analyses, we also find that the effect of product market competition on the degree of cost stickiness increases in firms’ financial strength, likely because management in financially stronger firms has more resources for investment expenditures in spite of a sales fall. We also find that cost stickiness is increasing in competition if management is optimistic about future demand, whereas competition is not associated with cost asymmetry if management is pessimistic about future demand. Finally, we find that the relationship between competition and cost stickiness, although statistically insignificant at conventional levels, is more pronounced for single-segment firms relative to multi-segment firms.     

Cost Stickiness in Australia: Characteristics and Determinants

This study presents empirical evidence on cost stickiness using a large sample of Australian listed firms from 1990–2010. We find cost behaviour in Australian firms is sticky on average, with a lower degree of stickiness than in United States firms. Costs increase by 0.885% with a 1% increase in sales revenues, but decrease by only 0.797% for a 1% decrease in sales. The degree of cost stickiness demonstrates a ‘U’ shape over the period and increases after the adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards. Sticky cost behaviour, however, is not evidenced in the resources, construction and retail industries. We document evidence consistent with the argument of adjustment costs of employed resources, managerial incentives and agency costs. The degree of cost stickiness in Australia increases with a firm's asset and employee intensity, and when managers have strong incentives to avoid decreases in earnings or losses, but is less pronounced when revenues decline in the preceding period and in firms with strong governance mechanisms. Our results provide important implications for external stakeholders’ understanding of firm performance.     

成本粘性研究:来自中国上市公司的经验证据

成本粘性是指当成本随着业务量的变动而变动时,其业务量增加时的成本增加量大于业务量等额减少时的成本减少量,这与大多数管理会计教材中传统的成本性态模型认为成本的变动率和业务量变动的对称性是矛盾的。本文通过对我国927家A股上市公司的2001—2005年的数据测试发现:(1)我国上市公司存在着成本粘性;(2)时间范围越长,成本粘性水平越小;(3)成本粘性与业务量的变化幅度有关,随着收入的大幅下降,成本粘性变小;(4)各个行业和公司属性也影响成本粘性水平,资本密集型和劳动密集型公司成本粘性水平较高。     

Are Selling,General, and Administrative Costs “Sticky”?

A fundamental assumption in cost accounting is that the relation between costs and volume is symmetric for volume increases and decreases. In this study, we investigate whether costs are "sticky"—that is, whether costs increase more when activity rises than they decrease when activity falls by an equivalent amount. We find, for 7,629 firms over 20 years, that selling, general, and administrative (SG&A) costs increase on average 0.55% per 1% increase in sales but decrease only 0.35% per 1% decrease in sales. Our analysis compares the traditional model of cost behavior in which costs move proportionately with changes in activity with an alternative model in which sticky costs occur because managers deliberately adjust the resources committed to activities. We test hypotheses about the properties of sticky costs and how the degree of stickiness of SG&A costs varies with firm circumstances.     

Do political connection disruptions increase labor costs in a government-dominated market? Evidence from publicly listed companies in China

This paper investigates whether the disruption of political connections increases labor costs among Chinese listed firms. Using the Communist Party of China's Rule No. 18 as an exogenous shock that forces firms to lose their politically connected independent directors, we find that the disruption of political connections is associated with an increase in labor costs (both in terms of aggregate labor costs per firm and average labor costs per employee) and an increase in employee turnover. Such increases do not lead to labor productivity improvements, and cannot be attributed to changes in corporate policies or the composition of labor forces after Rule No. 18. We also find that firms with higher unemployment risk and skilled labor risk increase their labor costs to a larger extent. Our results are robust to alternative labor cost measures, controlling for potential confounding events, and alternative political connection channels. Our study shows an unintended labor market consequence—increases in labor costs—of political connection disruptions for firms that are adversely affected by such disruptions.     

失业保险与公司财务杠杆

我国劳动力市场化程度日益加深导致劳动者职业转换愈加频繁,失业保险的作用日益突出。本文探究了失业保险金水平对企业财务杠杆的影响。运用2009—2019年上市公司数据进行实证分析,结果发现失业保险金上升会导致公司财务杠杆下降。渠道检验显示,提高失业保险金可以降低员工失业风险溢酬,公司劳动力成本下降,公司有更多自由现金流和盈利进行内源融资和偿还债务,公司财务杠杆下降。进一步分析发现,失业保险金的作用在失业率高的地区更加显著。主要结果在分别运用《社会保险法》和《关于调整失业保险金标准的指导意见》构造双重差分模型和工具变量解决内生性问题、更改模型设置、排除投资水平影响、删除特殊省份、更换样本期间后,依然成立。本文结果说明加大失业保险保障力度有助于降低企业财务风险。     

CEO-director ties and labor investment efficiency

We examine the impact of CEO-director ties on labor investment efficiency. Using an aggregate measure of CEO-director ties we find that CEOs who have strong ties with independent board members are associated with inefficient labor investment. The effect is stronger in firms that rely more on skilled labor and those that are financially constrained, and that inefficient labor investment exacerbates labor cost stickiness. Our results are robust to selection bias, endogeneity concerns, and alternative explanations. Overall, the results are consistent with the view that stronger CEO ties to independent board members makes monitoring ineffective, which, in turn, aggravates the inefficient labor investment problem. Thus, we identify a potential channel through which CEO-director ties can be detrimental to shareholder value.     

Corporate governance in South Korea: the chaebol experience

Utilizing a large sample of South Korean firms, this paper explores the impact of corporate governance in an emerging market country dominated by a few large business groups. Firms affiliated with the top five groups (chaebol) exhibit significantly lower performance and significantly higher sales growth relative to other firms. Furthermore, top executive turnover is unrelated to performance for top chaebol firms, indicating a breakdown of internal corporate governance for the largest business groups. Internal corporate governance appears much more effective for firms unrelated to the top chaebol as managers at poorly performing firms are significantly more likely to lose their job. These results imply that the lack of properly functioning internal corporate governance among the top chaebol, which dominate the Korean economy, may have increased the severity of the recent financial crisis.     

Is corporate social responsibility engagement influenced by nearby firms? Evidence from China

This paper explores whether the CSR engagement of a focal firm is influenced by the CSR density formed by nearby firms. Using a sample of listed firms from 2010 to 2019 in China, we find a positive relationship between the local CSR density and the CSR engagement of a focal firm. Based on the heterogeneous analysis, we find that the impact of local CSR density is more pronounced for firms with worse financial conditions (i.e., lower profits, cash to debt, sales to inventory, and higher leverage), less corporate investment (i.e., lower capital expenditure growth, organization capital investment, employee growth) and fewer market shares. The primary findings are robust after addressing potential concerns. Overall, our findings provide evidence of the effect of firms' locations in the context of CSR engagement and have insightful implications for managers and governments seeking CSR improvement in emerging markets.     

The influence of group affiliation and the underwriting process on emerging market IPOs: The case of the Philippines

In this paper we document underpricing and aftermarket returns of Philippine IPOs, discuss specific features of the Philippine IPO market, and investigate whether differential underpricing occurs due to certification considerations or potential conflicts of interest. We find that IPO underpricing is greater in cases where the offering firm is affiliated to a family business group, specifically when these affiliated firms use a foreign lead underwriter. Our results lead us to conclude that conflict of interest problems are recognized by market participants and that these conflicts of interest lead to differential underpricing.     

Do banks appraise internal capital markets during credit shocks? Evidence from the Greek crisis

Using data of bank loans to Greek firms during the Greek crisis we provide evidence that affiliated firms, having access to the internal capital markets of their associated group, are less likely to default on their loans. Furthermore, banks require lower loan collateral coverage from affiliated firms and are less likely to downgrade the affiliates’ credit profile. Finally, banks are more likely to show forbearance to affiliated firms with non-performing loans. The results are consistent with the view that banks manage their relationships with firms in a business group jointly, as opposed to viewing each firm as an independent entity. Our findings also suggest that the value of risk sharing through internal capital markets increases when external financing is scarce.     

Asymmetric Cost Behavior and Dividend Policy

Costs are sticky on average, that is, they fall less for sales decreases than they rise for equivalent sales increases. We examine the effect of this asymmetric cost behavior on a firm's dividend policy. Given investors’ aversion to dividend cuts, we predict that firms with higher resource adjustment costs and stickier costs pay lower dividends than their peers because they are less able to sustain any higher level of dividend payouts in the future. We find evidence consistent with this prediction. Further, using a regression discontinuity design that exploits variation in labor adjustment costs generated by close-call union elections, we provide evidence suggesting that the negative relation between cost stickiness and dividend payouts is driven by resource adjustment costs. Our paper sheds new light on the determinants of dividend policy and demonstrates the role of cost behavior in corporate decisions.     

The effects of accounting restatements on firm growth

Do restatements result in lower firm growth? One argument in support of this contention is that accounting restatements hurt contracting relations between the firm and outside parties such as a firm’s customers and suppliers, negatively impacting firm cash flows. The negative impact on cash flow reduces the level of internal cash holdings available for investment. Another argument is that restatements dampen firm growth by increasing the firm’s cost of external financing. We empirically evaluate these arguments by using the standard sales growth based financial planning model. In carrying out our analysis, we distinguish the effects of restatement on overall firm growth as well as its components of internally and externally financed growth. Our findings suggest that overall firm growth rates decline following a restatement. Furthermore, we find that accounting restatements have a greater adverse impact on externally financed growth rates. We also find that not all restatements yield identical effects: the impact of restatements is more pronounced for the subsample of firms identified to have undertaken the more egregious fraudulent reporting than the subsample of firms that reported restatements to correct previous accounting errors. We also find that firms with severe restatements, measured based on announcement period market reactions, have lower externally financed growth. Overall, our evidence highlights the adverse impact of restatement on firm growth, particularly through external financing.     

The strategic use of corporate cash holdings in collective bargaining with labor unions

We provide evidence that firms in more unionized industries strategically hold less cash to gain bargaining advantages over labor unions and shelter corporate income from their demands. Specifically, we show that corporate cash holdings are negatively related with unionization. We also find that this relation is stronger for firms that are likely to place a higher value on gaining a bargaining advantage over unions and weaker for those firms in which lower cash holdings provide less credible evidence that a firm is unable to concede to union demands. Additionally, we show that for unionized firms increases in cash holdings raise the probability of a strike. Finally, we show that unionization decreases the market value of a dollar of cash holdings. Overall, our findings indicate that firms trade-off the benefits of corporate cash holdings with the costs resulting from a weaker bargaining position with labor.     

Product market effects of IFRS adoption

Prior literature finds that International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) adopters enjoy lower financing costs subsequent to IFRS adoption. We predict and find that mandatory IFRS adopters exploit lower financing costs to increase market share vis-à-vis non-adopters. This effect is robust across several different model specifications in a sample capturing the universe of public and private firms in the EU, in a matched sample of public and private firms, and in a public firm sample comparing mandatory and voluntary IFRS adopters. We further find that IFRS is associated with an increase (decrease) in industry sales concentration (competition), consistent with large public firms increasing market share. In supplemental analyses, we find that mandatory adopters issue more equity and debt after IFRS adoption and that larger market share gains accrue to those mandatory IFRS adopters that issue more equity and debt after IFRS adoption. Overall, we provide evidence of unintended product market consequences of IFRS adoption.     

Organizational complexity and CEO labor markets: Evidence from diversified firms

We examine whether CEO turnover and succession patterns vary with firm complexity. Specifically, we compare CEO turnover in diversified versus focused firms. We find that CEO turnover in diversified firms is completely insensitive to both accounting and stock-price performance, but CEO turnover in focused firms is sensitive to firm performance. Diversified firms also experience less forced turnover than focused firms. Following turnover, replacement CEOs in diversified firms are older, more educated, and are paid more when hired. Collectively, our results indicate that the labor market for CEOs is different across diversified and focused firms and that firm complexity and scope affect CEO succession.     

Managerial risk appetite and asymmetry cost behavior: evidence from China

Managerial risk preferences have considerable impacts on a firm’s cost management through committed resource adjustment decisions. We investigate whether a firm’s cost behaviour is influenced by managers’ risk appetite and find that cost stickiness increases with managers’ risk-seeking. The positive relationship between risk-seeking and cost stickiness is weaker for firms with higher levels of manager capacity. We further find that the moderating effect of managerial capacity is more pronounced in non-state-owned enterprises, in less competitive industries, and in areas with lower degrees of marketisation. These results suggest that managers’ personal characteristics are key factors that affect sticky cost behaviour.     

ISO certification,financial constraints,and firm performance in Latin American and Caribbean countries

We employ World Bank Enterprise Survey data collected in 2006–2010 for 21,852 firms from 31 Latin American and Caribbean countries to investigate determinants of the adoption of International Organization for Standardization (ISO) certification, the relation between ISO certification and firm financial constraints, and the effect of ISO certification on firm performance. We find that ISO accreditation is positively related to firm size and firm age. Exporters and foreign firms are more likely to adopt ISO certification. We document that ISO-certified firms exhibit significantly lower level of financial constraints and higher labor productivity and lower cost of sales than non-certified firms.     

Firm Characteristics and Stock Price

This study examines the stock price reaction to the internal control reporting required under Section 404 of the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act of 2002 for three distinct groups of firms. After controlling for general stock price movements, we find that stock returns are most negative for firms that delay filing of their internal control reports, continue to be negative for firms with ineffective internal controls, and are positive for firms with effective internal controls. The decrease in stock prices of the first two groups is more pronounced for those with a lower return on assets, higher growth rate in sales, and no prior disclosure of their internal controls weaknesses. Our results indicate that market participants value the reliability of financial information ensuing from Section 404 compliance, irrespective of firm size and debt proportion. Thus, regulators and policymakers worldwide should consider mandating comparable SOX 404 compliance for all publicly held companies to improve the accuracy and reliability of financial reports.