成本粘性的实证研究:来自制造业下子行业的经验数据

成本粘性是指成本随业务量的变化而变化时,其边际变化率在业务量不同变化方向上表现的不对称性,这与传统成本性态理论相矛盾。本文通过对1486家制造业上市公司的财务数据进行实证研究后发现:我国制造业各个子行业上市公司都存在成本粘性,而且大部分子行业上市公司的成本粘性随着时期的延长而减弱。     

上市公司费用粘性的成因及控制对策

成本粘性是指当成本随着业务量的变动而变动时,其业务量增加时的成本增加量大于业务量等额减少时的成本减少量,这与大多数管理会计教材中传统的成本性态模型认为成本的变动率和业务量变动的对称性是矛盾的.本文以成本性态分析的理论和国内外学者实证研究的结论为基础.来分析企业成本粘性产生的原因,并且针对这些原因给出相应的降低成本粘性的对策.     

上市公司费用粘性的成因及控制对策

成本粘性是指当成本随着业务量的变动而变动时，其业务量增加时的成本增加量大于业务量等额减少时的成本减少量，这与大多数管理会计教材中传统的成本性态模型认为成本的变动率和业务量变动的对称性是矛盾的。本文以成本性态分析的理论和国内外学者实证研究的结论为基础，来分析企业成本粘性产生的原因，并且针对这些原因给出相应的降低成本粘性的对策。     

我国制造业上市公司成本粘性研究

本文基于契约理论、交易成本理论和委托代理理论分别从调整成本、管理者预期、代理问题分析了成本随业务量变动的边际变动幅度存在不一致的原因,即成本粘性产生的动因。并选取2012-2016年沪、深两市A股制造业上市公司作为研究样本,从销售管理费用、营业成本、营业总成本三个维度出发,验证我国制造业上市公司是否存在成本粘性或反粘性,实证结果显示,我国制造业上市公司销售管理费用和营业总成本存在成本粘性,营业成本存在反粘性。对成本粘性的研究在准确地把握成本习性及其变动规律,促进管理者有效地进行成本管理、预算和决策,提升企业竞争力等方面具有积极的意义。     

成本粘性问题探讨

<正>一、成本性态假设:传统观点与现代研究(一)成本性态的传统假设成本性态是指成本与业务量之间的关系。传统观点假设成本与业务量存在线性关系,并根据成本变动与业务量水平的关系,将成本分为固定成本、     

我国钢铁行业成本粘性的实证研究

近些年,学者研究发现业务量的等额增减所引起的成本变化并不对称,业务量上升时成本的增加量大于业务量下降相等幅度时成本的减少量,即成本粘性.适逢钢铁行业面临着去产能的严峻局势,本文将对我国钢铁行业成本粘性进行研究并提出相应建议.     

年报风险披露与权益资本成本

本文从权益资本成本视角探究了中国上市公司年报风险披露的价值相关性及信息性质。基于2007-2014年A股上市公司的研究发现:(1)年报风险披露长度及其变化值越大,公司权益资本成本及其变化值越小,说明披露的风险越多,市场给予的信任越多,因而要求的风险溢价越小,从而支持了风险披露的同质观;(2)风险披露与权益资本成本的负相关关系主要体现在信息环境差、显性风险较小的公司;(3)投资者对增加披露风险信息具有正向市场反应,且投资者异质信念降低,表明风险信息异质性较弱,而信息不对称是风险披露影响权益资本成本的不完全中介;(4)风险披露变化值越大,公司股权再融资的可能性越大、折价率越低,债券利差越小。本文首次检验了我国年报风险披露对权益资本成本的影响,得到与国外文献不一致的结论,丰富了信息披露与资本成本关系相关的文献。     

地区要素市场发育、国有控股与成本和费用粘性

本文研究了地区要素市场发育对中国上市公司成本和费用粘性的影响及其在不同产权性质公司之间的差异。结果发现,公司所在地要素市场发育水平越高,国有控股公司和非国有控股公司的成本粘性都会越小,但对国有控股公司的影响更大;国有控股公司费用粘性越小,非国有控股公司费用粘性则不显著。结果表明,相对于非国有控股公司而言,由于受政府干预和地区市场分割的限制较多,国有控股公司的要素配置和调整更大程度上受制于当地要素市场发育,因而使得公司所在地要素市场化程度对其成本和费用粘性具有显著影响。本文的研究结论对深化企业成本和费用粘性的形成机制、特点以及中国市场化进程和产权改革的经济后果方面的认识,具有重要的理论价值。     

金字塔集团不同层级公司成本粘性差异及其成因的实证分析

本文以2003-2014年中国A股上市公司年度数据为样本,研究了金字塔集团不同层级公司成本粘性差异及其成因。结果发现:公司距离最终控制人的层级数(下文简称金字塔层级)越多,成本粘性程度越高,此关系在公司融资约束程度较低、管理层不持有公司股份、股权集中度较低时更加明显,此关系在公司收入持续下降时无显著变化;中介机制分析表明,金字塔层级增加会通过增加管理费用率、过度投资而提高成本粘性。这些结果说明,金字塔层级增加是通过恶化管理层代理问题而提高了成本粘性,没有证据表明金字塔层级通过影响资源调整成本和管理层乐观主义而提高了成本粘性。本文既丰富了成本粘性影响因素方面的研究,也丰富了金字塔集团经济后果方面的研究。     

资本结构、管理层防御与上市公司高管薪酬水平

将人力资本破产成本引入研究框架是高管薪酬理论研究的新突破.其他条件相同时,公司的资产负债率越高,破产可能性就越大,高层管理者因而要求更高的薪酬水平以补偿所需承担的更高的人力资本破产成本.可见,公司资本结构因暗涵了人力资本破产成本,可作为衡量高管薪酬是否合理的依据.本文以2004-2007年上市公司为样本,从资本结构的视角来审视上市公司的高管薪酬,并探究公司管理层防御现象.研究发现:(1)我国上市公司普遍存在管理层防御现象;(2)平均而言,国有企业高管薪酬水平高于民营企业,但资本结构相近,因此,相比于其所承担的人力资本破产成本,国有企业高管的薪酬水平太高了;(3)与民营企业相比,国有企业存在着更为严重的管理层防御问题.     

Are Selling,General, and Administrative Costs “Sticky”?

A fundamental assumption in cost accounting is that the relation between costs and volume is symmetric for volume increases and decreases. In this study, we investigate whether costs are "sticky"—that is, whether costs increase more when activity rises than they decrease when activity falls by an equivalent amount. We find, for 7,629 firms over 20 years, that selling, general, and administrative (SG&A) costs increase on average 0.55% per 1% increase in sales but decrease only 0.35% per 1% decrease in sales. Our analysis compares the traditional model of cost behavior in which costs move proportionately with changes in activity with an alternative model in which sticky costs occur because managers deliberately adjust the resources committed to activities. We test hypotheses about the properties of sticky costs and how the degree of stickiness of SG&A costs varies with firm circumstances.     

Cost Stickiness in Australia: Characteristics and Determinants

This study presents empirical evidence on cost stickiness using a large sample of Australian listed firms from 1990–2010. We find cost behaviour in Australian firms is sticky on average, with a lower degree of stickiness than in United States firms. Costs increase by 0.885% with a 1% increase in sales revenues, but decrease by only 0.797% for a 1% decrease in sales. The degree of cost stickiness demonstrates a ‘U’ shape over the period and increases after the adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards. Sticky cost behaviour, however, is not evidenced in the resources, construction and retail industries. We document evidence consistent with the argument of adjustment costs of employed resources, managerial incentives and agency costs. The degree of cost stickiness in Australia increases with a firm's asset and employee intensity, and when managers have strong incentives to avoid decreases in earnings or losses, but is less pronounced when revenues decline in the preceding period and in firms with strong governance mechanisms. Our results provide important implications for external stakeholders’ understanding of firm performance.     

Sticky cost behaviour: evidence from small and medium sized companies

This paper investigates whether cost stickiness occurs in small and medium sized companies using a sample of Italian nonlisted and listed firms during the period 1999–2008. Our findings show that cost stickiness emerges only for the total cost of labour and not for selling, general and administrative (SG&A) costs, cost of goods sold and operating costs. Stickiness of operating costs is only detected in a sample of listed companies. We further contribute to the literature on sticky cost behaviour by discussing critical issues associated with the extant approach of empirical analysis and interpretation of sticky cost behaviour.     

The unintended consequence of collateral-based financing: Evidence from corporate cost behavior

This paper examines how real estate appreciation correspondingly changes collateral value, which affects debt structure choices and consequent operating decisions. Specifically, we explore whether collateral-based financing provides a link between real estate values and corporate cost behavior. Our baseline results show that an appreciation of a firm’s real estate assets alleviates its cost stickiness. A further analysis shows that this influence is stronger for firms with less prior bank debt, less dependence on external financing, and a lower leverage ratio. We also observe that the impact of collateral shocks on cost stickiness is more pronounced when selling, general and administrative (SG&A) costs create less future value for mature firms and for firms with weaker external governance. Collectively, our results support the argument that an increase in bank debt arising from collateral value appreciation mitigates agency problems and thus lessens cost stickiness.     

Signing auditors' cultural background and debt financing costs

This study explores the effect of signing auditors' cultural background on debt financing costs. Using a sample of Chinese listed firms from 2007 to 2019, we find a negative association between signing auditors of Confucian origin and the cost of debt, indicating that signing auditors who grow up in strong Confucian atmospheres increase perceptions of audit quality. Furthermore, empirical results show that signing auditors of Confucian origin enhance accounting information quality. Meanwhile, these signing auditors can obtain high audit fees, attract more clients, and are more likely to be selected by client firms when changing auditors. Additional tests document that signing auditors' gender, education level, and working experience attenuate the negative relationships between signing auditors' Confucian background and debt financing costs. The negative effect of signing auditors' cultural background on debt financing costs is more pronounced in non-state-owned firms and firms with less analyst coverage. This paper extends the literature about the influencing factors of financing costs and provides insights into the economic consequence of culture.     

Cost stickiness and bank loan contracting

This study examines whether and, if so, how borrowers' asymmetric cost behavior (i.e., cost stickiness) is factored into the price and non-price terms of bank loan contracts. We provide strong and reliable evidence that ex-ante, the loan spread increases with cost stickiness after controlling for other known determinants of loan contract terms. Moreover, we find that the effect is more pronounced for borrowers with higher default risk and higher information risk. This is consistent with borrowers' asymmetric cost behavior increasing lenders' uncertainty about the liquidation value of assets, and hence, lenders need to be compensated ex-ante. Additionally, we conjecture that higher cost stickiness may increase the need for ex-post monitoring. Consistent with this conjecture, we find some evidence that lenders impose tighter non-price terms on firms with stickier costs. This study integrates cost stickiness research with the banking literature by showing that banks incorporate borrowers' asymmetric cost behavior into loan contracting terms.     

Political Incentives to Suppress Negative Information: Evidence from Chinese Listed Firms

This paper tests the proposition that politicians and their affiliated firms (i.e., firms operating in their province) temporarily suppress negative information in response to political incentives. We examine the stock price behavior of Chinese listed firms around two visible political events—meetings of the National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party and promotions of high‐level provincial politicians—that are expected to asymmetrically increase the costs of releasing bad news. The costs create an incentive for local politicians and their affiliated firms to temporarily restrict the flow of negative information about the companies. The result will be fewer stock price crashes for the affiliated firms during these event windows, followed by an increase in crashes after the event. Consistent with these predictions, we find that the affiliated firms experience a reduction (an increase) in negative stock return skewness before (after) the event. These effects are strongest in the three‐month period directly preceding the event, among firms that are more politically connected, and when the province is dominated by faction politics and cronyism. Additional tests document a significant reduction in published newspaper articles about affected firms in advance of these political events, suggestive of a link between our observed stock price behavior and temporary shifts in the listed firms’ information environment.     

融资融券能抑制企业费用粘性吗——基于中国上市公司的经验证据

以2010—2015年我国沪深两市A股上市公司为研究样本,实证检验融资融券对企业费用粘性的影响。研究发现：融资融券对上市公司费用粘性具有显著的抑制作用,且分样本组回归结果表明,在所在地区投资者保护环境较差的企业、代理问题更为严重的国有企业及外部审计质量较低的企业中上述抑制效果更为明显。进一步分析发现:融资融券抑制费用粘性的效用主要出现在不包含企业研发支出的费用中。     

The rise of robots and the fall of cost stickiness: Evidence from Chinese manufacturers

Industrial robots are increasingly used to perform tasks traditionally assigned to humans. Using a sample of Chinese manufacturers, we examine the impact of robot adoption on firm cost stickiness. We find that robot adoption is associated with less sticky costs. The negative impact of robot adoption on cost stickiness is particularly meaningful for state-owned enterprises and firms with higher labour costs, and becomes significantly stronger after the enactment of China's Labour Contract Law, which significantly increases labour adjustment costs. These findings are consistent with the conjecture that the adoption of robots allows firms to reduce their overall labour adjustment costs.     

Can material asset reorganizations affect acquirers’’ debt financing costs?——Evidence from the Chinese Merger and Acquisition Market

In this paper, we investigate whether material asset reorganizations (MARs), a special form of merger and acquisition (M&A) transactions, can affect the acquirers’ cost of debt financing. Further, we examine the effect of acquiring firms’ accounting information quality on the cost of debt and on the association between MARs and debt costs. We predict that compared to conventional M&As, large-scale acquisitions through MARs can generate a much greater influx of assets from target firms. This raises the acquirers’ asset collateral and thus reduces the cost of debt. Because the quality of accounting information is a key factor affecting the cost of debt, we suggest that it has a spillover effect on the debt-cost effect of MARs. Using M&A transactions by listed companies in the Chinese A-share market from 2008 to 2014 as our sample, we find that MARs are associated with a higher asset collateral and lower ex post cost of debt than conventional M&As. Furthermore, we show that the acquiring firms’ accounting information quality has a significant negative effect on debt costs, and the negative association between MARs and the cost of debt is more pronounced when accounting information quality is higher.