住房按揭还款新模型研究

住房按揭还款主要采用等额还款和等本还款两种方式,这主要适用于前后收入较均衡的居民,但对前后期收入差异大的居民可能出现贷款风险。本文以按揭等额还款的现金流分析为切入点,在假定所选各还款区间的月数相等且能整除贷款期限总月数的基础上,建立区间递增(递减)还款的数学模型,并依此模型设计了简便实用的还款因子表,为住房按揭提供两组新模型、四种还款方式,使区间递增(递减)还款在理论上科学化,在实际操作中可用、简便易行。     

Why are social network transactions important? Evidence based on the concentration of key suppliers and customers in China

Based on a new institutional economy framework, this study examines the formation and economic consequences of social networks (guanxi) from the perspective of key suppliers and customers in China. Results show that commercial activities which depend on networks are determined by the institutional environment. For example, companies that have lower accumulated social capital (less trust among people) and are subject to more government invention depend more on social network transactions than on the market. In addition, this study shows that network transactions can provide benefits to firms, especially in weak institutional environments. Networks can reduce transaction costs by reducing information asymmetry, i.e., increased network dependence is associated with lower credit costs and lower advertising and sales costs. Networks can also reduce the effect of industry shocks, especially negative shocks, by creating a bonding mechanism. This study contributes to our understanding of social networks in emerging markets by providing evidence on network transactions with key suppliers and customers and their influence on firms’ accounting behavior.     

Credit Reporting, Relationship Banking, and Loan Repayment

How does information sharing between lenders affect borrowers repayment behavior? We show—in a laboratory credit market—that information sharing increases repayment rates, as borrowers anticipate that a good credit record improves their access to credit. This incentive effect of information sharing is substantial when repayment is not third‐party enforceable and lending is dominated by one‐shot transactions. If, however, repeat interaction between borrowers and lenders is feasible, the incentive effect of credit reporting is negligible, as bilateral banking relationships discipline borrowers. Information sharing nevertheless affects market outcome by weakening lenders' ability to extract rents from relationships.     

失信风险传染会影响债券定价吗？——基于担保网络大数据的实证研究

在债券定价研究中不仅应该考虑企业自身的信用风险,还应该考虑相关网络组织的传染风险。本文基于43万笔非金融企业间的担保数据,构建了企业信用担保网络,发现失信风险作为一种广义的信用风险,在担保网络中具有传染效应,该传染效应能够影响债券的信用利差。企业的失信行为产生了三类传染效应,一是直接传染效应,无论是发债主体的担保人出现失信行为,还是被担保人出现失信行为,都会引起发债主体的信用利差上升;二是局部感染效应,如果局部担保网络中失信主体的占比提升,可能引起投资者对发债主体的“团体处罚”,导致信用利差上升;三是全局扩散效应,失信信息沿担保网络向整个市场扩散,导致债券信用利差上升。从企业所有制来看,民营企业主要受微观的直接传染效应和中观的局部感染效应影响;而国有企业主要受全局扩散效应影响;被担保人的失信风险对两类企业都有显著影响。失信风险传染效应会降低企业的再融资能力,其中局部感染效应导致企业次年的借款融资额下降,全局扩散效应导致企业次年的债券融资额下降。     

Social capital and management control systems: A study of a non-government organization

In this paper we use the concept of social capital to outline a distinctive approach to understanding the interplay between management control systems and the development of social connections in and between organisations. Social capital provides a comprehensive framework for examining the nature of social connections through its focus on both structural networks (bridging) and interpersonal relationships that predispose individuals towards mutually beneficial collective action (bonding). In doing so, social capital provides a means of considering how individuals react to management control systems in terms of the social ties that exist both within the organization and external to the organization. Using a case study of a non-government organization, we show how social capital is implicated in efforts to attract economic capital and cultural capital. We demonstrate how elements of a management control system can either enhance or inhibit the bonding and bridging dimensions of social capital with potential consequences on both economic and cultural capital. We highlight the mixed and sometimes contradictory effects of management control systems on social capital, and provide a powerful illustration of the role of management control systems in brokering alliances and bridging structural holes.     

绿色信贷发展对商业银行财务绩效影响的实证研究

基于2007—2020年商业银行财务数据,构建多期DID模型,从规模效应、风险结构效应、成本收入效应分析绿色信贷对商业银行财务绩效的影响路径,并检验绿色信贷对银行财务绩效的异质性影响。实证结果表明：绿色信贷对商业银行财务绩效存在直接负向影响与间接正向影响,且综合影响具有异质性,对国有银行以及城市商业银行具有负的政策效应,对股份制商业银行不具备显著的政策效应;绿色信贷业务对银行企业价值的影响机制中规模效应、成本收入效应为主要影响路径。     

How does mandatory CSR reporting affect supply chain? A new perspective from suppliers

Exploiting a quasi-natural experiment which mandates a subset of Chinese listed firms to report corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities, this paper examines how mandatory CSR disclosure affects suppliers' willingness to extend trade credit. We document that mandatory CSR disclosure firms suffer a significant shrinking in the volume of trade credit, which is driven by the supply side instead of the demand side. Further mechanism analyses reveal that both financial condition deterioration and interest conflicts contribute to adverse policy effects. These two factors negatively impact the credit quality of mandatory firms and then weaken credit quality after the mandate subsequently undermines suppliers' willingness to lend. Additionally, the negative association between mandatory CSR disclosure and trade credit is mainly concentrated on highly policy-exposed corporates, that is, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and high-polluting firms. Our work innovatively evaluates CSR effects from the perspective of suppliers, which provides a new insight into CSR management along the supply chain for academics and practitioners.     

服务能力、信贷环境与银行效率

新兴金融、互联网金融发展不断倒逼着银行业必须提高效率,而服务能力、信贷环境是银行效率提升的关键因素。本文运用数据包络分析方法和广义相加模型,对特定信贷环境中银行效率与服务能力的关系假设进行检验。实证结果表明,银行的信贷供给和服务配送能力对银行效率的提升具有正面影响,但信贷供给能力对银行效率的提升作用存在上限边界约束,而服务配送能力对银行效率的提升作用则受到下限边界约束;银行效率对信贷环境变化的动态响应呈“S”型变动特征。     

绿色信贷政策得不偿失还是得偿所愿？——基于资源配置视角的PSM-DID成本效率分析

党的十九大报告聚焦生态文明体制改革,明确提出了发展绿色金融的战略要求。商业银行作为实施绿色信贷政策的主体,更加关注因此而产生的成本效率问题,即考量银行自身是得不偿失抑或得偿所愿？本文基于2005—2017年间73家中国商业银行的数据,首先,运用SFA模型测算商业银行的成本效率;其次,运用倾向得分匹配—双重差分法(PSM-DID)实证分析绿色信贷政策对银行成本效率影响的净效应;最后,采用边际动态检验方法考察绿色信贷政策净效应的影响趋势。文章发现绿色信贷政策的实施会通过成本效应机制降低银行成本效率,但同时因其改善了银行的信贷风险管理、提升了银行的声誉,从而对银行成本效率施加正向影响。此外,文章还发现绿色信贷政策的净效应呈现U型趋势,表现为2007—2013年绿色信贷政策净效应负向影响加深,2014年后出现转好信号,现已越过U型谷底。因此,从长期看,绿色信贷政策将有利于银行成本效率提升。     

Determinants of Mortgage Default and Consumer Credit Use: The Effects of Foreclosure Laws and Foreclosure Delays

The mortgage default decision is part of a complex household credit management problem. We examine how factors affecting mortgage default spill over to other credit markets. As home equity turns negative, homeowners default on mortgages and home equity lines of credit at higher rates, whereas they prioritize repaying credit cards and auto loans. Larger unused credit card limits intensify the preservation of credit cards over housing debt. Although mortgage nonrecourse statutes increase default on all types of housing debt, they reduce credit card defaults. Foreclosure delays increase default rates for housing and nonhousing debts. Our analysis highlights the interconnectedness of debt repayment decisions.     

Valuation of the Firm's Liabilities When Equity Holders Are Also Creditors

Abstract:  This paper presents a tractable structural model whereby controlling equity holders are also among the creditors of the firm. As the firm approaches distress, equity holders can drain the assets of the firm and expropriate other creditors by repaying their credit before bankruptcy. The right of the bankruptcy court to revoke such repayment protects arm's length creditors, reduces the cost of borrowing and induces equity holders to anticipate repayment of their credit. Equity holders decide repayment neither too early nor too late, so as to reduce the risk of repayment revocation by the bankruptcy court. Similar conclusions apply to the preferential repayment of bank loans personally guaranteed by equity holders. The analysis also suggests that callable bearer bonds may be more valuable to equity holders than to other creditors.     

国家助学贷款还贷问题与对策分析

国家助学贷款是贫困大学生顺利完成学业的主要支持渠道,然而由于贷款还贷约束机制不完善、贷款人还贷能力低下和诚信意识淡薄等多方面原因,高违约率已经成为助学贷款健康持续开展的一大瓶颈.从结合我国大学生的收入与消费实际设计合理还贷期限与方案、完善征信系统、建立规范的助学贷款违约惩罚机制,以及加强诚信宣传教育等多方面着手,是解决问题的根本对策.     

Funding Liquidity without Banks: Evidence from a Shock to the Cost of Very Short‐Term Debt

In 2011, Colombia instituted a tax on repayment of bank loans, which increased the cost of short‐term bank credit more than long‐term credit. Firms responded by cutting short‐term loans for liquidity management purposes and increasing the use of cash and trade credit. In industries in which trade credit is more accessible (based on U.S. Compustat firms), we find substitution into accounts payable and little effect on cash and investment. Where trade credit is less available, firms increase cash and cut investment. Thus, trade credit provides an alternative source of liquidity that can insulate some firms from bank liquidity shocks.     

消费信贷与家庭人力资本投资

已有丰富的文献考察了消费信贷对家庭消费和投资行为的影响，但少有研究关注其对家庭人力资本投资的影响。家庭人力资本投资对于人力资本积累、经济高质量发展至关重要。基于此，本文考察了信用卡使用对家庭人力资本投资的影响及其影响机制，主要发现如下：信用卡使用显著增加了家庭人力资本投资，且这一效应具有长期动态影响并对城市、高收入、高教育程度家庭影响更为显著，这意味着信用卡消费信贷可能会增加人力资本不平等。进一步研究发现，家庭会增加劳动力供给来应对人力资本支出的增加。机制分析表明，信用卡使用主要通过增加家庭消费投资、促进消费升级、缓解家庭预算约束三种途径促进家庭人力资本投资。在风险可控的前提下，引导消费信贷流向有利于实体经济发展的领域，可助力于消费升级与人力资本积累，从而为经济发展提供新动能。     

Why Inside Money Matters

This note observes that in a simple infinite horizon economy with heterogeneous endowments and a cash-in-advance constraint fiat money can be used to implement a Pareto optimum only with type-specific taxation. By contrast, if credit contracts are enforceable, the same allocation can be reached in equilibrium without type specific policy. We argue that the advantages of inside money and the fact that they depend on the capacity of the economy to enforce the repayment of debt direct us toward the study of the institutional infrastructure underlying self-enforcing inside money equilibria.     

Credit Relationships: Evidence from Experiments with Real Bankers

We experimentally examine to what extent long‐term “lender–borrower” relationships mitigate moral hazard. The originality of our research lies in recruiting not only students but also commercial and social bankers. The opportunity to engage in bilateral long‐term relationships mitigates the repayment problem. Lenders take advantage of their long‐term situation by increasing their rates. Consequently, borrowers are incited to take more risk. Improving information disclosure ameliorates the repayment but does not incite lenders to offer more credits. Social bankers exhibit a higher probability of granting a loan and make fairer credit offers to borrowers than the other subject pools do.     

社会信用、刚兑信仰与地方政府隐性债务

防范化解地方政府隐性债务风险是当前我国亟待解决的重要问题。本文基于2007年至2019年293个地级市面板数据,研究社会信用对地方政府隐性债务的影响。我们发现:(1)社会信用下滑会导致地方政府隐性债务规模提高和融资成本上升。(2)社会信用通过影响市场金融资源供给和政府债务需求进而影响隐性债务规模与融资成本,但上述机制在有无“刚兑信仰”情境下存在差异。(3)对比新《预算法》和“43号文”出台前后社会信用对隐性债务影响的异质性发现,债务管制显著提高了融资平台的市场化程度。虽然政策前期金融市场更多呈现出一种观望态度,但违约事件打破了金融市场对地方政府隐性债务的“刚兑信仰”,隐性债务发行受到的市场约束力度显著增强。本文对更好地认识地方政府隐性债务风险、理解当前债务治理措施的有效性以及未来如何通过完善社会信用体系建设化解地方政府隐性债务风险具有启示意义。     

修正的房价收入比:衡量我国城市房价泡沫水平的更优指标

改革开放以来,我国城镇居民可支配收入连续多年高速增长,本文通过构建一个包含收入增长的模型,估算城镇居民可承受的按揭还款房价收入比极值。在此基础上,考虑到实际购房分为首付和按揭还款两部分,提出了修正的房价收入比这一新指标,用于衡量首付部分或按揭还款部分是否存在泡沫。通过实证检验,发现我国房地产市场的泡沫主要集中在首付部分,且当首付比例超过20%以后,所考察的13个重点城市的房价都存在严重的泡沫。     

Director Networks and Credit Ratings

We explore the effect of director social capital, directors with large and influential networks, on credit ratings. Using a sample of 11,172 firm‐year observations from 1999 to 2011, we find that larger board networks are associated with higher credit ratings than both firm financial data and probabilities of default predict. Near‐investment grade firms improve their forward‐looking ratings when their board is more connected. Last, we find that larger director networks are more beneficial during recessions, and times of increased financial uncertainty. Our results are robust to controls for endogeneity. Tests confirm that causality runs from connected boards to credit ratings.     

Information Transfer Effects of Bond Rating Downgrades

This paper investigates information transfer effects of bond rating downgrades measured by equity abnormal returns for industry portfolios. Industry rivals can be subject to two opposing effects, the contagion effect and the competition effect. We find that the net effect is strongly dependent on the original bond rating of the downgraded firm. For investment‐grade (speculative‐grade) firms, industry abnormal equity returns are negative (positive), which implies a predominant contagion (competition) effect. The analysis reveals a rich pattern of positive and negative correlations across negative credit events, which can be used to improve our understanding of portfolio credit risk models.