Fuel hedging,operational hedging and risk exposure — Evidence from the global airline industry

The aviation industry is characterized by low profit margins and a constant struggle with skyrocketing fuel costs. Financial and operational hedging strategies serve aviation managers as a tool to counteract high and volatile fuel prices. While most research on fuel hedging has concentrated on the U.S. airline market, this paper is the first study to include airlines from Asia and Europe. We analyze 64 airlines over 11 years and find that Asian carriers are more negatively exposed than European airlines but less exposed than North American airlines. In contrast to Treanor, Simkins, Rogers and Carter (2012), this study finds less significant negative exposure coefficients among U.S. carriers. Using a fixed effects model we reject the hypothesis that financial hedging decreases risk exposure. One possibility is that the decreased volatility in jet fuel prices over the past few years has perhaps made airlines less exposed to fuel prices and hence, financial hedging is less effective. Operational hedging, defined by two proxies for fleet diversity, does not reduce exposure significantly, either. In contrast, a one percentage point increase in fleet diversity, calculated with a dispersion index using different aircraft types, increases the risk exposure coefficient by 1.83%. On the other hand, fleet diversity, calculated with different aircraft families, increases exposure by only 0.63%. These results are supported by the global trend of airline managers to reduce fleet diversity. Airlines have reduced their fleet diversity by 7.70% or 10.77% (depending on the proxy) between 2002 and 2012. The greatest reduction can be found among European airlines with 23.12% (28.04%).     

The influence of aviation disasters on engine manufacturers: An analysis of financial and reputational contagion risks

One of the key sub-sectors in the aviation industry includes that of engine manufacturers, who have long led technological advancement and the battle to reduce airline carbon emissions. However, these same companies have been susceptible to a number of issues that have been central to international airlines due to higher costs and competition pressures. When an aviation disaster occurs, there is widespread allocation of blame and responsibility, which has left engine manufacturers exposed until the true cause is identified. This can generate many issues with regards to reputational damage and ability to generate finance. We set out to analyse such interactions over time and region. Our results indicate that engine manufacturers have had to contend with substantial income and financial leverage issues in the aftermath of a major aviation disaster, irrespective of whether they have been identified as a causation factor in the incident itself. Further, we clearly identify that there exists an average one day loss of 1.64% in the immediate aftermath of aviation incidents. Substantial corporate instability is found to persist without the company being in any way responsible for the incident. Shortly thereafter, contagion effects increase as speculation diminishes and more factual evidence arrives. The role of social media is examined as a potential contributory factor.     

COVID-19 social distancing and the US service sector: What do we learn?

This study investigates the impact of COVID-19 social distancing on the US service sector. Results from four industry indexes (hotels, entertainment, restaurants and airlines) indicate that conditional correlations among index pairs exhibited substantial increases. Iterated Cumulative Sums of Squares (ICSS) tests in dynamic conditional correlations show that while the relationship between airlines and entertainment venues is unstable, restaurants and hotels demonstrate stable co-movement. Markov regime-switching regression analysis suggests the pandemic is affecting mainly the entertainment and airline industries, with gradual deterioration in the hotel industry, led by small-market-cap companies. However, we see no evidence of a negative impact on the restaurant industry from the pandemic in our analysis period. This may be related to Maslow's hierarchy of needs. Based on our results, we recommend employment of effective working capital and supply chain management methods in the service sector to streamline the operations of affected companies. In addition, all other sectors should utilize appropriate methods of risk measurement and should take 'Black Swans' into account to incorporate a more accurate probability of unexpected events.     

The financial market effects of international aviation disasters

The spread of misinformation with regards to aviation disasters continues to be a point of concern for aviation companies. Much of this information usually surrounds speculation based on the cause and responsibility attributed to the incident, implicitly possessing the potential to generate significant financial market price volatility. In this paper, we investigate a number of stylised facts relating to the effects of airline disasters on aviation stocks, while considering contagion effects, information flows and the sources of price discovery within the broad sector. Results indicate a substantially elevated levels of share price volatility in the aftermath of aviation disasters, while cumulative abnormal returns present sharp under-performance of the analysed companies relative to international exchanges. When considering an EGARCH analysis, we observe that share price volatility appears to be significantly influenced by the scale of the disaster in terms of the fatalities generated. Significant contagion effects upon the broad aviation index along with substantial changes in traditional price discovery channels are also identified. The role that the spread of information on social media, whether it be correct or of malicious origins, cannot be eliminated as an explanatory factor of these changing dynamics over time and region.     

Does Hedging Affect Firm Value? Evidence from the US Airline Industry

Does hedging add value to the firm, and if so, is the source of the added value consistent with hedging theory? We investigate jet fuel hedging behavior of firms in the US airline industry during 1992–2003 to examine whether such hedging is a source of value for these companies. We illustrate that the investment and financing climate in the airline industry conforms well to the theoretical framework of Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993). In general, airline industry investment opportunities correlate positively with jet fuel costs, while higher fuel costs are consistent with lower cash flow. Given that jet fuel costs are hedgeable, airlines with a desire for expansion may find value in hedging future purchases of jet fuel. Our results show that jet fuel hedging is positively related to airline firm value. The coefficients on the hedging variables in our regression analysis suggest that the “hedging premium” is greater than the 5% documented in Allayannis and Weston (2001), and might be as large as 10%. We find that the positive relation between hedging and value increases in capital investment, and that most of the hedging premium is attributable to the interaction of hedging with investment. This result is consistent with the assertion that the principal benefit of jet fuel hedging by airlines comes from reduction of underinvestment costs.     

Depreciation in the Canadian Airline Industry

This case is designed to help students enhance their analytical skills and link accounting policy choices with corporate strategy. Written initially for MBA students and senior analysts attending executive education sessions, it provides participants with 1) industry background for the Canadian airline sector, and 2) historical and selected financial and non‐financial information from the annual reports and initial public offering documents of three players in this industry. Participants are invited to reflect on the theoretical and practical reasons underlying the choice of a depreciation method by airline companies, to find ways to quantitatively compare companies that use different depreciation methods, and to link these policy choices to possible strategic considerations. This case is based on a unique situation prevailing in 2009 where financial information was available for all three airlines which were using different approaches for aircraft depreciation.     

Exposure,hedging, and value: New evidence from the U.S. airline industry

For a variety of reasons, the U.S. airline industry is a natural sample to analyze the relation between corporate risk exposure, hedging policy, and firm value. First, we find that airline exposures to fuel prices are higher when fuel prices are high or when they are rising. Second, we analyze the relation between exposure coefficients and the percentage of next year's fuel requirement hedged by airlines. In response to higher fuel price levels, rising fuel prices, and higher levels of exposure to fuel prices, airlines tend to increase their hedging activity. Finally, we explore the previously documented jet fuel hedging premium illustrated in Carter, Rogers, and Simkins (2006). We find a positive hedging premium in our analysis; however, the interaction of hedging and exposure does not affect firm value. We conclude that airlines increasing hedging activity because of higher fuel price exposure are not valued higher compared to those airlines employing more stable hedging policies.     

Threat of entry and debt maturity: Evidence from airlines

I explore the effect of the threat posed by low-cost competitors on debt structure in the airline industry. I use the route network expansion of low-cost airlines to identify routes where the probability of future entry increases dramatically. I find that when a large portion of their market is threatened, incumbents significantly increase debt maturity before entry occurs. Overall, the main findings suggest that airlines respond to entry threats trading off the benefits of short-term financing for lower rollover risk. The results are consistent with models in which firms set their optimal debt structure in the presence of costly rollover failure.     

Hedging and Value in the U.S. Airline Industry

This article discusses the findings and practical import of the authors' study of the fuel hedging activity of 28 U.S. airlines during the period 1992‐2003. The aim of the study was to answer the following question: Does fuel hedging add value to the airlines and, if so, how? The airline industry provides a natural experiment for investigating the relation between hedging and value for a number of reasons: (1) the industry is by and large competitive and remarkably homogeneous; (2) airlines are exposed to a single, volatile input commodity—jet fuel—that represents a major economic expense for all competitors; and (3) fuel price increases cannot be easily passed through to customers because of competitive pressures in the industry. The results of the study show that jet fuel hedging is positively related to airline firm value. Those airlines that hedged their fuel costs had Tobin's Q ratios that were 5‐10% higher, on average, than those of airlines that did not hedge. What's more, the higher the proportion of future fuel requirements hedged, the larger the valuation premium. The authors' results also suggest that the main source of value added by hedging in the airline industry is its role in preserving the firm's ability to take advantage of investment opportunities that arise when fuel prices are high and airline operating cash fl ows and values are down. Consistent with this argument, the study finds that the value premium associated with hedging increases with the level of the firm's capital spending. The authors also report that the most active hedgers of fuel costs among the airlines are the larger firms with the least debt and highest credit ratings. This result is somewhat surprising, at least to the extent that smaller airlines are expected to have larger financial distress costs (as a percentage of firm value) and hence greater motive to hedge. One explanation is that the smaller airlines have lacked either sufficient resources or the strategic foresight to acquire a derivatives hedging capability. A second possibility—one that is consistent with the study's main findings—is that the largest airlines also have the highest costs of financial distress (even as a percentage of firm value) in the form of larger growth opportunities that could be lost as a result of high leverage and financial risk. In other words, only the largest airlines are typically able to buy distressed assets during periods of industry weakness; to the extent this is so, such firms may also have the most to gain from hedging.     

Does Operational and Financial Hedging Reduce Exposure? Evidence from the U.S. Airline Industry

We examine the effects of both financial and operational hedging on jet fuel exposure in the U.S. airline industry. Specifically, we investigate two operational hedging strategies: the extent to which airlines operate different aircraft types and the degree to which airlines operate fuel‐efficient fleets. We find that both financial and operational hedging are important tools in reducing airline exposure to jet fuel price risk. However, operational hedging strategies appear to be more economically important, which suggests that hedging with derivatives is more likely to be used to “fine‐tune” risk exposure, whereas operational choices have a higher order effect on risk exposure.     

Empires of the sky: determinants of global airlines' accounting-policy choices

This study quantifies the current level of diversity observed in airline accounting and examines possible determinants that explain accounting-policy choices by the global airline industry. Airlines' accounting-measurement policy for unrealized foreign-exchange differences and their disclosure of frequent-flyer information remains diverse. Inferential statistics shows that larger airlines tend to take unrealized foreign-exchange differences directly to equity and tend to disclose frequent-flyer accounting policy, while airlines with lower leverage tend to disclose frequent-flyer accounting.     

Using “Statement of Intermediate Balances” As Tool for International Financial Statement Analysis in Airline Industry

Since September 11, 2001 and during the ensuing economic slowdown, a number of airline companies have experienced significant financial difficulties, including bankruptcies and near bankruptcies. In an economic setting where many airlines are struggling to achieve or maintain profitability, it is important for accountants, auditors, and financial analysts to be able to analyze the relative performance of such companies. In this industry, income statements are normally prepared “by nature” rather than “by function.” This differs from the usual presentation found in the income statements of many companies around the world, in particular most American companies. This paper demonstrates how to perform a comparative financial statement analysis when an income statement is prepared “by nature,” through application of a tool called the “Statement of Intermediate Balances.” This tool is illustrated using three companies chosen from different continents: Southwest Airlines, a low cost U.S. air carrier, Air France, the leader in Europe, and China Eastern Airlines, one of the biggest Chinese air carriers.     

破解民航飞行员流动迷局

民航飞行员短缺现象越来越突出的同时,国内航空公司和飞行员之间因待遇、跳槽而引发的纠纷也越来越多。     

Timing of Sale,Pricing, and Cost Information: Evidence from the Airline Industry*

This study examines the association between when an airline sells its passenger seats and the pricing method (marginal cost or full cost) it employs. Prior literature suggests that when firms are able to change prices during the selling period, the optimality of full cost pricing or marginal cost pricing depends on when demand information is revealed during the period between capacity commitment decisions and time of sale. Full cost‐based pricing is appropriate in determining capacity commitment and prices simultaneously, while marginal cost provides more relevant information for pricing when capacity has been committed. Using the price and cost data from a sample of four U.S. domestic airlines, we find that full cost explains price variations of first‐day sales robustly. The adjusted R² of the marginal cost pricing model is larger in the sample of sales two days prior to departure than in the sample of first‐day sales. In the analysis of the sample of sales two days prior to departure, we find that, based on the adjusted R² of the full cost pricing and marginal cost pricing models, the explanatory power of marginal cost pricing is relatively weaker than full cost pricing. Our results document the use of different cost information along the dynamic change of price and provide implications in understanding the role of cost information in setting prices.     

U.S. Airways merger: A strategic variance analysis of changes in post-merger performance

This case provides students the opportunity to apply strategic variance analysis (SVA) methodology in analyzing the performance changes realized in an airline merger. The U.S. Airways–America West merger provides an example of a complex, strategic action that simultaneously impacts firm size, unit pricing and costs, efficiency, and capacity for the combining airlines. This merger provides a rich example for the analysis since it combines U.S. Airways, a higher cost network airline that is geographically focused on the Eastern U.S., with America West, a low cost airline operating primarily along the Western U.S. The case includes merger and acquisition (M&A) theory discussing market power vs. efficiency motives for mergers and discusses the role of the U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission in evaluating M&As and their impact on markets. The case asks students to serve as consultants applying the SVA methodology to the past U.S. Airways–America West merger and provide conclusions.     

Recent Developments in the Aviation Insurance Industry

The aviation industry has been hard hit in recent years. While there are numerous factors that have contributed to the industry's dilemma, rising and volatile insurance premiums—particularly after the events of 9/11—have posed a particular problem for many airline managers. Despite a general trend for accident rates involving commercial passenger airplanes to decrease as aviation technology has advanced over the years and airplanes have become safer, the aviation insurance market has been far from stable. This article provides an overview of how the aviation insurance industry works and how it has changed in recent years. We take a look at how the risk is spread between insurers, how insurers treat deliberate acts of violence, and lastly, how insurers price the risk. Our article shows that the aviation insurance market has undergone considerable changes in recent years and that it has adjusted to the post-9/11 aviation insurance realities being reasonably ready to handle events of an even more catastrophic magnitude.     

The Impact of Venture Capital Monitoring

We show that venture capitalists' (VCs) on‐site involvement with their portfolio companies leads to an increase in both innovation and the likelihood of a successful exit. We rule out selection effects by exploiting an exogenous source of variation in VC involvement: the introduction of new airline routes that reduce VCs' travel times to their existing portfolio companies. We confirm the importance of this channel by conducting a large‐scale survey of VCs, of whom almost 90% indicate that direct flights increase their interaction with their portfolio companies and management, and help them better understand companies' activities.     

AIRLINE DEREGULATION AND THE PROBABILITY OF AIR CARRIER INSOLVENCY

This study investigates the effects of deregulation from the perspective of airline lenders. Airline-specific, pre- and post-deregulation insolvency probabilities are used to assess the effects on creditors. The results suggest that the financial condition of several airlines has significantly deteriorated as a by-product of deregulation, although most have been unaffected.     

航空公司利用上海燃料油期货套期保值交易的战略研究——基于ECM-GARCH模型的实证分析

十二五规划中我国将航空业纳入了重点新兴产业,但是,近几年来航油价格剧烈波动给航空业及其相关产业发展带来较大风险。本文研究了航空公司利用上海燃料油期货交易对航空煤油进行套期保值的策略,基于2004—2012年现货和期货价格的日数据,采用ECM—GARCH模型测算出最优的套期保值比率为39．72％,能够帮助航空公司规避约15％的航油价格波动风险。本文认为,该策略在一定程度上能稳定企业收益,但绩效值略微偏低,这主要是由于危机时期,套期保值的绩效不仅与套保比率相关,还较大程度地受到汇率波动和宏观经济形势的影响。基于此,本文提出了新时期国有和民营航空公司进行套保交易的战略建议。