股权集中度、董事会治理特征与银行综合绩效——基于我国上市银行的实证研究

文章以2007-2010年我国上市满一年的14家银行为样本,实证分析了股权集中度和董事会治理特征对银行综合绩效的影响。研究结果表明：就股权集中度而言,第一大股东持股比例与综合绩效负相关,而前五大股东及前十大股东持股比例与综合绩效显著正相关;就董事会治理而言,董事会规模与综合绩效之间存在非线性的倒U型关系,董事会会议次数和董事薪酬与综合绩效显著正相关,但独立董事比例对综合绩效的影响不显著。     

我国上市银行公司治理与内部控制关系的实证研究

商业银行良好的公司治理对于我国金融系统的稳定具有十分重大的作用。本文选取2010-2012年我国16家上市银行的数据对银行公司治理机制与内部控制的关系进行了实证研究。结果发现,内部控制绩效与独立董事比例、董事会专门委员会数量和第二到第五大股东的持股比例之间呈负相关,并且都是显著的。而董事会规模、监事会规模、外部监事比例和第一大股东的持股比例并没有对银行内部控制产生显著影响。此外,大股东的国有性质有利于银行的风险控制。     

上市证券公司内部治理与公司经营绩效的实证分析

本文以18家已上市证券公司为样本,对其内部治理与公司经营绩效之间的关系进行了实证分析。结果表明:中国上市证券公司股权集中度与公司经营绩效呈负相关关系;股权制衡度对公司经营绩效的影响不显著;国有控股性质有助于提高公司经营绩效;董事会规模对公司经营绩效呈正相关关系,但影响不显著;独立董事比例与公司经营绩效呈显著正相关关系;董事长与总经理的职位分离有利于提高公司经营绩效,但在统计上不显著;监事会规模与公司经营绩效呈显著负相关关系;管理层报酬与公司经营绩效呈显著正相关关系,管理层规模与公司经营绩效呈正相关关系,但影响不显著。     

我国上市公司董事会效率与公司绩效的实证研究

该文以2008年在深圳交易所上市的公司为样本,采用定性定量结合的方法,将董事会效率特征量化为5个指标,提出合理假设,建立多元线性回归模型,对董事会效率与公司经营绩效的关系进行了实证分析.实证检验结果发现董事会规模与公司经营绩效存在显著的负相关关系;外部董事比例与公司经营绩效存在显著的正相关关系;董事会领导结构、董事会会议次数和董事会持股比例与公司经营绩效不相关.     

商业银行公司治理与信用风险:基于上市银行的实证研究

本文基于中国16家上市银行2008～2011年的数据,从股权集中度、董事会规模、董事独立性和监事会规模等方面反映银行的公司治理状况,并运用面板数据模型,实证分析商业银行公司治理与信用风险之间的关系。研究结果表明:商业银行股权集中度、商业银行董事会规模与信用风险显著正相关;商业银行董事独立性、商业银行监事会规模与信用风险显著负相关。     

我国民营上市公司董事会特征与现金持有水平关系的实证研究

董事会作为公司治理的核心,是影响企业现金持有水平的重要因素之一。文章以2008-2011年间民营上市公司为研究对象,对董事会特征与现金持有水平之间的关系进行了实证研究。结果发现:董事会规模、独立董事比例与现金持有水平存在不显著显著的负相关关系;董事会会议频次与现金持有水平存在显著负相关关系;两职合一、董事长持股比例、董事薪酬与现金持有水平存在不显著正相关关系。     

我国上市商业银行治理绩效的实证研究——来自沪深两市的经验证据

本文使用我国沪深两市14家上市商业银行作为研究样本,使用其2007年度财务报告数据,运用最小二乘估计（OLS）方法,从股东、董事会和高级管理层这三个维度出发,对公司治理与经营绩效（ROA、NPL）之间的关系进行了实证分析。结果表明,国家控股、股权集中度和战略投资者对银行公司治理绩效不存在显著影响;内部执行董事比例、高管薪酬与其经营绩效负相关;而高管持股和经营绩效则存在正相关关系。     

我国商业银行内部法人治理与银行绩效的实证分析

改善商业银行内部法人治理已成为我国银行改革与发展的根本出发点之一,对这一问题的研究具有重要的现实意义。关于商业银行内部法人治理对银行绩效的影响,国外学者做了大量的实证研究,但在国内由于银行信息不透明和由此导致的相关研究数据的难以获得,使得对商业银行内部法人治理绩效的实证研究非常匮乏。本文采用银行年报的数据,对我国商业银行内部法人治理绩效进行了实证分析,结果发现:银行第一大股东和前五大股东的持股比例与银行绩效呈比较明显的负相关,第一大股东控股能力与商业银行绩效没有显著相关性;独立董事比例和每年的董事会会议次数与商业银行绩效呈显著的负相关;高管人员的薪酬激励与商业银行绩效正相关。     

我国董事会结构及其治理绩效的实证研究——基于公司规模的对比

本文选取A股沪深主板的400家上市公司作为研究样本,以净资产回报率作为公司经营绩效的衡量指标,使用多元回归分析方法对董事会结构与公司经营绩效之间的关系进行实证研究,结果表明:规模小的公司董事会规模与公司经营绩效正相关,规模大的公司董事会规模与公司经营绩效负相关;规模小的公司独立董事占比与公司经营绩效正相关,规模大的公司独立董事占比与公司经营绩效负相关;两职分离有利于规模小的公司经营绩效的提升,两职分离对规模大的公司经营绩效存在负面影响;董事会持股对规模小的公司经营绩效有着较为显著的正面影响,对于规模大的公司而言董事会持股与公司经营绩效之间不存在显著的相关性。     

战略投资者、公司治理与银行绩效——对中国城市商业银行的实证研究

基于中国8家城市商业银行的数据,采用截面数据和序列数据相结合的方法,对战略投资者参与中国城市商业银行治理的理论机理及其影响城市商业银行绩效的途径进行的分析表明:境外战略投资者可以促进城市商业银行改善公司治理,从而提升中国城市商业银行的绩效;国有股权比例与银行盈利性、第一大股东持股比例与银行资本充足率、董事会规模与银行盈利性均成负相关关系;股权集中度对银行盈利性和安全性均成正相关关系;管理层介入董事会比例对银行的盈利性和安全性的影响都不显著;独立董事比例对银行的盈利性有很强的正面影响。     

商业银行运营效率与董事会治理

本文在对中国16家上市商业银行绩效进行前沿效率分析的基础上,建立以董事会规模、外部董事监事占比、CEO薪酬和管理层人均薪酬为基础的二元选择模型,对中国商业银行运营效率同董事会治理的关系进行了实证研究。结果表明,独立董事在商业银行公司治理中的作用并不明显,CEO薪酬和董事会规模对商业银行业绩并无显著影响,董事会规模过大无...     

Board Size,Independence and Performance: An Analysis of Thai Banks

This study examines the impact of board size and independent directors on the performance of local commercial banks in Thailand. A panel fixed-effect in the individual regression model is used to examine this relationship over 1999–2003. The results showed a statistically significant negative relation between Thai banks’ board size and their performances. In addition, a statistically significant positive relationship was found between the proportion of independent directors on the bank board and performance.     

Board characteristics and Chinese bank performance

Using a sample of 50 largest Chinese banks during the period of 2003–2010, we explore a comprehensive set of board characteristics (size, composition and functioning of the board) and analyze their impacts on bank performance and bank asset quality in China. We find that the number of board meetings and the proportion of independent directors have significantly positive impacts on both bank performance and asset quality while board size has a significantly negative impact on bank performance. We find new evidence that the degree of bank boards’ political connection is negatively correlated with bank performance and asset quality. The findings suggest that the board of directors plays a significant role in bank governance in China.     

Ownership, Governance, and Bank Performance: Korean Experience

The paper examines the effect of ownership and governance on firm performance. Tracing the post financial crisis experience, 1998–2002, of the Korean commercial bank industry, the paper investigates whether the involvement of foreign investors in the ownership structure had any significant effect on the banks' performance i.e., return and risk measures. Further, it examines the effects of the presence of outside directors, especially directors from foreign countries, in the corporate board structure impacts banks performance. Evidence indicates that the extent of the foreign ownership level, not the mere existence of foreign ownership, has a significant positive association with the bank return and a significant negative association with the bank risk. The number of outside board of directors does not have any significant affect on performance however the presence of a foreign director on that board is significantly associated with bank return and risk. These findings are relatively robust under the different specifications of performance measures.     

Board governance and bank performance: A meta- analysis

Using a database of 56 studies on corporate governance in the banking industry that were published between 2007 and 2019, this study performs a meta-analytic review to examine the impact of board governance on bank performance. We investigate how board size, CEO duality, outside directors, and female directors on board play a role in determining bank performance. Variations in the relationship between board governance and bank performance that attribute to moderating effects of potential moderators, including the system of corporate governance, bank performance measures, the definitions of governance variables, publication quality, and endogeneity concerns, are also encapsulated. Our study shows that bank performance is positively associated with larger boards and a high proportion of outside and female directors, supporting the resource dependence theory. We find that the moderating variables considerably alter the link between board governance and bank performance. The study offers ways to enhance board effectiveness by enforcing governance practices in the banking systems based on each countries’ legal and institutional framework and suggests reconsidering mandates for smaller boards and duality on boards of banking firms.     

Corporate governance in banking: The role of the board of directors

We use a sample of large international commercial banks to test hypotheses on the dual role of boards of directors. We use a suitable econometric model (two step system estimator) to solve the well-known endogeneity problem in corporate governance literature, and demonstrate the empirical and theoretical superiority of system estimator over OLS and within estimators. We find an inverted U-shaped relation between bank performance and board size, and between the proportion of non-executive directors and performance. Our results show that bank board composition and size are related to directors’ ability to monitor and advise management, and that larger and not excessively independent boards might prove more efficient in monitoring and advising functions, and create more value. All of these relations hold after we control for the measure of performance, the weight of the banking industry in each country, bank ownership, and regulatory and institutional differences.     

Bankers in the Boardroom and Firm Performance in China

We use a dataset comprising the appointments of commercial bankers as board of directors at Chinese listed firms and find that financially distressed firms are more likely to recruit a commercial banker as a director of the board. The presence of a banker on the board increases access to bank loans, yet many investors react negatively to announcements of such appointments. We also find that such appointments are typically followed by a drop in the appointing firm’s operating performance, and an increase in rent-seeking activities. This suggests that bank directors cannot strengthen corporate governance. Most financial resources are expropriated by corporate insiders.     

Does board structure in banks really affect their performance?

We study whether board structure (board size, independence and gender diversity) in banks relates to performance. Using a broad panel of large US bank holding companies over the period 1997–2011, we find that both board size and independent directors decrease bank performance. Although gender diversity improves bank performance in the pre-Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) period (1997–2002), the positive effect of gender diminishes in both the post-SOX (2003–2006) and the crisis periods (2007–2011). Finally, we show that board structure is particularly relevant for banks with low market power, if they are immune to the threat of external takeover and/or they are small. Our two-step system generalised method of moments estimation accounts for endogeneity concerns (simultaneity, reverse causality and unobserved heterogeneity). The findings are robust to a wide range of other sensitivity checks including alternative proxies for bank performance.     

Bank board structure and performance: Evidence for large bank holding companies

The subprime crisis highlights how little we know about bank governance. This paper addresses a long-standing gap in the literature by analyzing the relationship between board governance and performance using a sample of banking firm data that spans 34 years. We find that board independence is not related to performance, as measured by a proxy for Tobin’s Q. However, board size is positively related to performance. Our results are not driven by M&A activity. But, we provide new evidence that increases in board size due to additions of directors with subsidiary directorships may add value as BHC complexity increases. We conclude that governance regulation should take unique features of bank governance into account.     

CORPORATE CONTROL IN COMMERCIAL BANKS

Unique factors in commercial banks' legal and regulatory environment may influence their mechanisms of corporate control. I investigate this issue in a sample of U.S. bank holding companies (BHCs) by analyzing how many underwent a change in corporate control by hostile takeover, friendly merger, management turnover by the board, or intervention by regulators. I compare the relative importance of these methods with those in nonfinancial firms. 1 relate the use of these methods to BHC board and ownership structure and performance. I find that the most important corporate control mechanism in banks is regulatory intervention, and that the primary market-based corporate control mechanism is action by the board of directors. Overall, however, BHC boards are much less assertive than their counterparts at nonfinancial firms. I examine reasons for this.