“Author’s Reply: Critique of Mexico’s New Social Security Act”, Octavio Maupomé-Carvantes,July, 1999

Abstract

This paper considers the pension plan as part of the capital structure of the sponsoring employer. This enables lessons from financial theory concerning capital structure to be used to answer the question, “What assets should a pension fund hold?” The standard Modigliani-Miller framework is expanded on to consider the implications of corporate tax. This leads to the conclusion that bond investment for pension plans has tangible advantages over holding risky assets (e.g., equities). The paper considers a case study of the pension plan of the Boots Company, a U.K. pharmacy retailer with a pension fund of around £2.3 billion ($3.5 billion), where these ideas were put into practice. Finally, the paper discusses the value released to shareholders and the extra security members of the pension fund have derived from putting theory into practice.     

Public capital, public pension, and growth

This paper constructs an endogenous growth model with overlapping generations, whose engine of economic growth is productive public capital. We investigate a public policy under which the government allocates tax revenue between investment in public capital accumulation and public pension provision. We show that increasing the share of spending on public pensions always reduces economic growth. However, we show numerically that public pension provision improves social welfare and there exists an optimal share of spending on public pension provision unless the value of the time discount factor of the government is sufficiently high. Moreover, we show that in an economy facing an aging population, an increase in social security provision for the old rather than an increase in public investment can be preferable from the viewpoint of social welfare.     

Shareholder governance, bondholder governance, and managerial risk-taking

We examine the relation between the overall corporate governance structure and managerial risk-taking behavior. We find that the overall governance structure has a significant impact on how managers make decisions on investment policy: strong bondholder governance motivates more low-risk investments such as capital expenditure and lower high-risk investments such as R&D expenditures, whereas weak shareholder governance (entrenched managers) leads to more R&D expenditures. Moreover, we find that the effects of governance on investment policy differ significantly between speculative and investment-grade firms. For speculative firms, strong bondholder or shareholder governance leads to more capital expenditures and low R&D investments. For investment-grade firms, strong bondholder or shareholder governance leads to low capital expenditures and an insignificant impact on R&D investments. Furthermore, financing and investment covenants exhibit strong binding power to deter risky investments. Finally, a more dependent (or a less independent) board is associated with low capital expenditures and high R&D investments.     

Risk Management, Capital Budgeting, and Capital Structure Policy for Insurers and Reinsurers

This article builds on Froot and Stein in developing a framework for analyzing the risk allocation, capital budgeting, and capital structure decisions facing insurers and reinsurers. The model incorporates three key features: (i) value‐maximizing insurers and reinsurers face product‐market as well as capital‐market imperfections that give rise to well‐founded concerns with risk management and capital allocation; (ii) some, but not all, of the risks they face can be frictionlessly hedged in the capital market; and (iii) the distribution of their cash flows may be asymmetric, which alters the demand for underwriting and hedging. We show these features result in a three‐factor model that determines the optimal pricing and allocation of risk and capital structure of the firm. This approach allows us to integrate these features into: (i) the pricing of risky investment, underwriting, reinsurance, and hedging; and (ii) the allocation of risk across all of these opportunities, and the optimal amount of surplus capital held by the firm.     

上山下乡经历与家庭风险金融资产投资——基于断点回归的证据

本文使用中国家庭追踪调查(CFPS)2010年家庭和个人层面数据,考察了户主的上山下乡经历对于家庭风险金融资产投资决策的影响。结果表明,上山下乡经历显著提高了家庭对于股票及广义风险金融资产的投资概率和投资规模。机制分析表明,此经历主要通过提升家庭投资的风险偏好和投资能力来影响家庭的风险金融资产投资。分样本讨论结果表明,上山下乡经历对家庭风险金融投资产生的正向影响在高人力资本、高收入和高社会资本群体中更为显著。     

Excess Asset Reversions and Shareholder Wealth

The ownership of pension assets in a defined benefit pension plan is an unresolved issue in corporate finance. The issue is important because it defines the appropriate investment policy for a pension fund. In this paper, we summarize the ownership debate in the form of two mutually exclusive theories. We then focus on a recently popular event in pension finance, excess asset reversions. Our paper demonstrates the valuation effects associated with this event in a stochastic dominance framework. Under certain conditions, a reversion constitutes an expropriation of wealth from the participants and beneficiaries of the plan to the firm. Using data provided by the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation and the Center for Research in Security Prices tape, we examine the returns to the shareholders of 58 companies which conducted excess asset reversions between 1980 and 1984. Our results show that large abnormal returns accrued to these shareholders around the time of the reversion. These findings have implications both for the appropriate investment policy of pension funds and for public policy with respect to plan terminations.     

Why should the portfolios of mandatory,private pension funds be captive? (The foreign investment question)

A model of portfolio optimization, which takes account of the difference between the private and social cost of foreign investment, is used to analyze the relationship between capital shortages and the international diversification of mandatory, private pension funds in developing and transition countries. The socially optimal rate of foreign portfolio investment may be positive, even when access to international capital markets is limited. I propose replacing investment limits with a tax on foreign investments, equal to the difference between their social and private cost. The use of international pension swap is seen to be formally equivalent to the imposition of such a tax.     

国外养老基金投资规则与绩效的比较

由于政治和人口老龄化对传统的现收现付体制带来的财政压力，养老基金制度改革已经成为一个全球性课题。在一些国家，由于对部分或全部基金型养老基金投资限制的改革，不仅使养老基金行业受益，而且对资本市场发展也产生了积极的影响。本文通过对不同投资监管制度下养老基金投资绩效差异和对资本市场不同影响的分析，探讨中国养老基金投资监管制度的改革方向和政策选择。     

Pension Funds’ Asset Allocation and Participant Age: A Test of the Life‐Cycle Model

This article examines the impact of participants’ age distribution on the asset allocation of Dutch pension funds, using a unique data set of pension fund investment plans for 2007. Theory predicts a negative effect of age on (strategic) equity exposures. We observe that a 1‐year higher average age in active participants leads to a significant and robust reduction of the strategic equity exposure by around 0.5 percentage point. Larger pension funds show a stronger age‐equity exposure effect. The average age of active participants influences investment behavior more strongly than the average age of all participants, which is plausible as retirees no longer possess any human capital.     

划转国有资本充实社保基金的实务问题与优化路径

为应对日益扩大的养老基金缺口,实现代际公平,在2018年中央和部分省份试点划转的基础上,国家全面推开划转部分国有资本充实社保基金工作.划转部分国有资本充实社保基金为基金养老保障制度的可持续发展提供了坚实物质保障,使人民能够共享国有企业改革发展成果,实现老有所养.本文介绍了国有资本充实社保基金的政策沿革,对比了历次政策的优缺点.结合笔者在试点划转和全面划转中的实际工作经历,发现划转国有资本充实社保基金政策在实务操作中存在的划转范围和比例"一刀切",权益资本与现金流不匹配,承接主体股权管理程度有限,现金收益投资渠道过窄等问题,并针对以上问题,提出了相应的优化路径,以供读者研究及参考.     

Quantifying the Costs of Investment Limits for Chilean Pension Funds*

Since the creation of the Chilean pension fund industry in 1981, pension fund administrators have not been free to choose their investment portfolios because of stringent regulation of investment limits. The diagnosis implicit with the imposition of limits was that the Chilean capital market was not deep, that there was an important demand for funds to finance the expansion of the productive sector and that, due to principal‐agent problems, protection for uninformed account holders was needed. As this regulation entails an inefficient combination of risk and return, this paper quantifies its costs.     

HOW SHOULD PENSION FUNDS MANAGE RISK?

Despite recent advances in risk management techniques, pension funds are still struggling with the concept of risk and with the practical challenges of managing and measuring it in useful ways. This article addresses this problem by showing that pension fund managers must manage two types of risk that affect a pension fund balance sheet's funded ratio. The most important of the two is asset policy risk, which arises from the choice of an asset mix policy that does not match the accrued pension liabilities. The other risk results from the decision to implement the chosen asset mix using active rather than passive management strategies.
This article shows how both types of risk can be measured and managed through an adapted value at risk (VAR) metric: the funded ratio VAR. A study of the performance of 98 pension funds during the period 1992–1995 shows that the funds were adequately compensated, on average, for taking on the policy risk, but not for implementation risk.     

Were internal capital markets affected by the ‘perfect’ pension storm?

We examine capital expenditures in multi-segment firms before and after the “perfect storm” that affected pension plans between 2000 and 2002, when bond yields and stock prices both fell precipitously. Our sample of firms went from having overfunded to underfunded pension plans as a result of the storm. We examine the segment-level relation between investment, Tobin's q, and cash flow both before and after the event. We find mixed evidence on the change in the relation between investment and q, which may be a result of measurement error in q. We find stronger evidence for the conclusion that after the pension storm, firms with underfunded pension plans directed more investment towards segments that produce higher cash flow.     

养老金改革考验我们经济学的功底和智慧北大核心

本文从四个方面思考中国养老金改革问题。一是指出养老金改革是一个多维复杂的系统。宏观角度涉及养老金缺口问题和资本市场健康发展,微观角度与生产率密切相关。从国际比较来看,中国的老龄化程度比全球平均水平更严重,但养老金储备属于全球较低水平。从增强养老保障可持续性看,可能有延长退休年龄、增加储蓄、减少替代率、增加预筹资金并确保资金保值增值等四种办法。二是提出中国养老金改革的总体框架。本文建议建立一个较为综合的衡量目标,比如G30采用的"终身财务安全度量(Lifetime Financial Security,简称LFS)"的方法,跨部门比较政策效果,讨论维持在同一框架内,避免各说各话。本文还提出,中国养老金制度从DB型转向DC型,可以采取历史还原法和名义账户的办法,解决养老金改革转轨中的代际公平问题,以及城乡差别、所有制差别问题。三是提出"N对1"养老金发放模式与30余个养老金管理机构数量等养老金经营管理设想,并指出养老金投资回报与风险偏好须匹配,结合我国资本项目开放进程考虑养老金全球化投资。四是从住房、民粹主义等非金融领域,延伸思考养老金改革的复杂性。最后,本文总结指出,中国养老金改革是一项考验经济学功底和智慧的重大课题,应从多个维度全面分析、讨论、测算、论证,高度重视养老金改革对相关各方的激励作用,做出大胆有效的改革。     

Accounting for banks,capital regulation and risk-taking

This paper examines risk-taking incentives in banks under different accounting regimes in presence of capital regulation. In the model the bank jointly determines the capital issuance and investment policy. Given an exogenous minimum capital requirement, lower-of-cost-or-market accounting is the most effective regime that induces the bank to issue more excess equity capital above the minimum required level and implement less risky investment policy. However, the disciplining role of lower-of-cost-or-market accounting may discourage the bank from exerting project discovery effort ex-ante. From the regulator’s perspective, the accounting regime that maximizes the social welfare is determined by a tradeoff between the social cost of capital regulation and the efficiency of the bank’s project discovery efforts. When the former effect dominates, the regulator prefers lower-of-cost-or-market accounting; when the latter effect dominates, the regulator may prefer other regimes.     

Institutional Traders' Behavior in an Emerging Stock Market: Empirical Evidence on Polish Pension Fund Investors

Abstract:   In this paper, we contribute to the literature on institutional herding and feedback trading by analysing the investment behavior of pension funds on the Polish stock market. Pension funds entered into the stock market due to the national pension system reform in 1999, providing a unique opportunity to receive deeper insight into the behavior of institutional investors in an emerging capital market. Our results show that Polish pension fund investors are to a greater extent involved in herd‐like behavior and pursue feedback trading strategies more often than their counterparts in mature markets. This finding is primarily attributed to a stringent investment regulation and high market concentration. We do not detect, however, that trading by the pension funds exerts significant influence on the future stock prices.     

Innovation,endogenous overinvestment,and incentive pay

We analyze how two key managerial tasks interact: that of growing the business through creating new investment opportunities and that of providing accurate information about these opportunities in the corporate budgeting process. We show how this interaction endogenously biases managers toward overinvesting in their own projects. This bias is exacerbated if managers compete for limited resources in an internal capital market, which provides us with a novel theory of the boundaries of the firm. Finally, managers of more risky and less profitable divisions should obtain steeper incentives to facilitate efficient investment decisions.     

Bank Insolvency, Deposit Insurance, and Capital Adequacy

This paper extends the Dowd (2000) model by introducing a risky investment technology. This assumption allows to introduce the possibility of an insolvency crisis. A banker may earn a positive expected profit by insuring depositors against the technological risk. If the bank has adequate capital, the insurance is credible and an insolvency crisis cannot occur. A public safety net may be unnecessary to prevent insolvency crises.     

Government pension policy and the cost of labor and capital

This article examines how the pension insurance provided by the PBGC and the tax treatment of pension plans affect the cost of labor and capital. Two important aspects of the insurance program are (1) the premium schedule and (2) an employer's liability for unfunded pension benefits (the deductible). These two aspects interact to increase the cost of capital relative to labor, especially for firms with underfunded plans.     

论基本养老保险基金投资国债的流程重塑

本文分析了当前基本养老保险基金投资国债面临的问题。本文认为,根据我国国债市场现状和我国基本养老基金的运行特点,应取消地方社保部门的养老基金管理权,归并养老基金投资账户,由中央政府养老基金管理机构统一招标确定基金托管银行和投资机构,地方社保部门再根据资金需求申购或赎回养老基金。