媒体新闻报道的声誉溢出效应

本文聚焦于公司违规曝光这一特定事件,使用三重差分的计量分析方法,探讨了媒体的事前新闻报道是否会影响其在投资者群体中的声誉,即是否存在声誉溢出效应。结果表明媒体对违规公司的事前新闻报道越正面(负面),其日后针对非涉案公司发布的新闻报道的市场反应就越弱(强),即存在双向声誉溢出效应。然而该效应存在不对称性,表现为负面报道带来的正向溢出效应明显强于正面报道带来的负向溢出效应。进一步研究发现,声誉溢出效应取决于投资者对于媒体声誉的主观感知以及对于违规事件的信息解读能力。当媒体的既有声誉水平较低、违规案件较为严重,或非违规公司机构投资者比例较高时,媒体的声誉溢出效应更加明显。本文论证了媒体客观公正性对于声誉积累的重要性,为媒体是否应当以及如何维护在投资者群体中的声誉形象提供了经验证据。本文对投资者如何判断和使用媒体发布的信息,进而做出正确投资决策也具有重要意义。     

审计师个人经验与审计质量

本文研究了审计师个人经验与审计质量的关系,以及投资者对审计师个人经验的反应。研究结果表明:在控制事务所和公司特征的情况下,审计师个人经验与操控性应计之间存在显著的负相关关系,并且这种负相关关系主要存在于调高盈余的公司组。这一结果说明审计师经验越丰富,越能抑制管理层的机会主义行为。在投资者反应方面,审计师经验越丰富的公司盈余反应系数越大,说明投资者认为审计师经验越丰富,其审计的财务报告可信度越高。进一步检验的结果表明,审计师个人经验对审计质量的提升作用在重要性高的客户和国有企业中更为明显。采用持续经营审计意见衡量审计质量并未改变本文的结论。     

审计师规模与审计质量:声誉视角

本文基于2010年至2013年的四个公司舞弊事件,考察了声誉受损后的审计师变更情况,发现:市场并没有用"及时离开"来惩罚声誉受损的审计师,使其失去准租,审计师的执业资格直接决定了其能否继续获取准租。我们的讨论,是对De Angelo(1981b)审计师规模与审计质量的补充与修正,将有助于更好地理解审计师规模与审计质量之间的传导机制,丰富规模与质量的理论体系。     

客户声誉与审计收费北大核心

本文运用企业集团内有成员公司违规而造成客户声誉受损的外在冲击,研究了客户声誉对审计收费的影响。研究发现,客户声誉受损后审计收费上升。进一步研究表明,“十大”会计师事务所、负面传闻以及客户处于高社会信任水平的地区均提高了客户声誉受损的审计收费上升效应,而国有股权、分析师跟踪以及机构投资者持股等,都能够抑制客户声誉受损的审计收费上升效应。同时,我们并没有发现客户声誉受损对审计投入、审计质量和关键审计事项具有显著影响的证据,也没有发现声誉受损公司的基本面与财务报告质量发生明显变化的证据。     

企业风险与审计师选择

信号传递理论认为,IPO市场中审计师选择可以作为信号机制,降低发行企业和投资者之间的信息不对称程度.本文以股权分置改革后我国证券发行制度向市场化过渡为背景,考察我国审计师声誉和IPO企业特征之间的关系.研究结果表明,在公司规模、资产负债率、资产净利率、投资银行声誉、公司成立时间这五个反映公司风险的变量中,公司规模、投资银行声誉、公司成立时间与是否选择大事务所进行审计有显著正相关关系,且大规模事务所审计的IPO企业的首日回报显著要低,这意味着大规模事务所的高声誉得到了市场的认可,审计师的信号传递功能在我国初步有效.     

审计师聘约权安排重要吗?——审计师声誉角度的检验

通过考察中国证监会1993-2004年度间所有涉及到审计师和事务所的处罚公告发布后,是否出现资本市场股票价格下降和事务所客户流失等经济后果。数据分析表明,当审计师受到处罚的事件公布后,市场存在一定程度的负反应;但是,只要这种处罚没有触及到审计师的执业资格,审计师的市场份额就没有下降。借助一个理论分析的框架,我们推测认为,当聘约权主要由公司管理层和/或控股股东掌控且他们的财富与审计师声誉没有直接关联度的情况下,审计师声誉下降并不必然具有经济后果。这一研究为更好地理解审计师声誉的形成机制以及审计师声誉与审计质量之间的关系,提供了新的证据。     

审计师声誉研究:述评与展望

审计师声誉是审计师保持独立性的动机,对审计师声誉的研究在2001年安然事件后逐渐增多并引发了广泛关注。现有文献主要从审计师声誉的形成、作用、毁损与修复机制等方面展开。具体而言,监管、行业专门化、审计质量、媒体及法律等是审计师声誉形成的重要影响因素,审计师声誉的建立有助于审计师保持独立、提高审计质量和收费等,而审计师声誉的毁损将会导致市场反应和溢出效应,同时也催生了相应的声誉修复问题。本文的综述有助于全面了解审计师声誉的现状并可能对其未来发展方向提供建议。     

审计师变更的经济后果研究——来自中国证券市场的经验证据

本文运用2002—2008年我国上市公司数据研究了审计师变更的经济后果。以公司市场价值与其财务盈利的相关系数(简称为盈利可信度)作为审计师变更的经济后果的替代变量,通过研究我们发现:审计师变更总体上降低了上市公司的盈利可信度;变更前一年度财务报告被出具非标准审计意见或者处于财务困境的公司,发生审计师变更使其盈利可信度下降的程度更大;出于对审计服务级差需求的审计师变更,无论是升级变更还是降级变更公司的盈利可信度均显著高于同级变更的公司,而升级变更为声誉较好的国际四大会计师事务所带来的盈利可信度的提高程度最大;审计委员会的设立与否以及上市公司的盈余管理程度对于审计师变更的经济后果没有显著影响,这可能是由于我国上市公司审计委员会的独立性不强以及投资者对上市公司的盈余管理行为识别不足造成的。研究结论同时还说明审计意见分歧、上市公司财务困境以及对审计服务的级差需求是我国上市公司变更审计师的主要原因。本文的研究发现有助于包括上市公司、会计师事务所、投资者以及证券市场监管部门在内的信息使用者更好地理解和评价我国证券市场中的审计师变更现象,并为相关领域的研究提供了新的经验证据。     

机构持股、审计师选择与审计意见

本文运用中国A股上市公司的数据,研究了机构投资者持股对上市公司的审计师选择及审计意见的影响。研究结果发现,机构投资者持股比例越高,公司越可能聘请大型会计师事务所进行审计,也更容易获得清洁的审计意见。机构投资者对审计师选择、审计意见的上述影响在法律保护较差的环境中更加明显。在控制了自选择问题后,上述结论仍然成立。本文的研究结论表明,我国的机构投资者能够改善独立审计的治理环境,进而提升公司的治理水平,它是法制等外部治理环境的重要替代性治理机制。     

风险投资声誉和股价“传染”效应——来自中国上市公司立案公告的证据

本文以我国2007-2015年证监会立案调查事件为样本,研究当风险投资支持的上市公司涉嫌违规,同一风险投资所支持的其他上市公司(即关联公司)的股价是否会被“传染”。实证结果表明,有风投背景的上市公司在立案公告日有显著的负面市场反应(约-8%),并且这种负面反应会通过共同的风险投资链条“传染”给关联公司(约-1.2%)。我们还发现,风险投资机构的声誉越高,风险投资对涉嫌违规企业参与度越高,则立案调查事件对风险投资的声誉损害越严重,市场对关联上市公司的惩罚也越严重。     

Stock market reactions to audit failure in Japan: The case of Kanebo and ChuoAoyama

This paper investigates the impact of accounting fraud by Kanebo and the resulting penalties on Kanebo and its auditor, ChuoAoyama, on the stock prices of clients of ChuoAoyama and the other Big 4 auditors in Japan. Studying such a case in a low-litigation country provides an opportunity to test whether loss of an auditors' reputation matters without an insurance rationale. We find that the announcements of poor audit quality has significantly decreased the stock prices of clients of ChuoAoyama and, to a lesser extent, stock prices of the clients of the other Big 4 auditors. This industry-wide spillover has not been previously studied.     

Auditor Reputation Building

This paper reports the results of an experimental economics study designed to examine reputation building by information verifiers (auditors). The results identify boundary conditions to reputation formation and supply insight into auditors' incentives to form reputations. Reputations form in all sessions of treatments that supply nearly immediate rewards to participants who adopt reputation equilibrium strategies. In contrast, reputations form in less than half of the sessions of a treatment where participants have to maintain reputation equilibrium strategies for number of periods before the market rewards their effort. The results suggest the immediacy of rewards for adopting reputation strategies is a critical determinant of reputation formation.     

Why Press Coverage of a Client Influences the Audit Opinion

In this study I use an experiment to examine why auditors are more likely to issue going–concern opinions when the client has been the subject of negative press coverage prior to the date of the audit opinion. I find no evidence that negative press coverage increases auditors' perceptions of legal liability, as was suggested in the prior literature. I do find, however, that negative press coverage increases auditors' perception of a client's bankruptcy probability and this, in turn, leads auditors to modify the audit opinion. Because the press coverage presented in this study provides no new information, the results suggest that auditors react too strongly to redundant information. This over–reaction can result in inefficient allocation of audit resources and can have deleterious affects on clients. Accordingly, policy makers, auditors and their clients might be interested in how auditors' reliance on redundant information can be reduced.     

Social responsibility and corporate reputation: The case of the Arthur Andersen Enron audit failure

We examine the influence of social responsibility ratings on market returns to Arthur Andersen (AA) clients following the Enron audit failure. Chaney and Philipich (2002) found that AA’s loss of reputation resulted in negative market returns to AA clients following the Enron audit failure. Proponents of social responsibility argue that social responsibility can improve the reputation of the firm, while detractors argue that social responsibility expenditures are a poor use of shareholder money. If social responsibility sends a signal to investors regarding the reputation/ethics of management, social responsibility could mitigate the negative returns to AA clients following the Enron audit failure. Using a matched sample of AA and non-AA firms, we do not find evidence that social responsibility mitigated the negative returns to AA clients following the Enron audit failure. Our results are inconsistent with claims that social responsibility can burnish a firm’s reputation in a time of crisis and with prior research indicating a positive relationship between social responsibility and market value.     

Information uncertainty and auditor reputation

This paper explores the relationship between information uncertainty and auditor reputation revealed by the failure of Arthur Andersen (AA). AA’s reputation deteriorated considerably when it announced on January 10, 2002, that it had shredded documents related to its audit of Enron. AA’s demise was sealed on March 14, 2002, with its indictment for obstruction of justice. We find that on these dates the clients of AA and other Big Five auditors that are characterized by higher information uncertainty experience relatively larger share price declines compared to clients with lower information uncertainty. The findings suggest that the market relies more heavily on auditor reputation for higher information uncertainty firms, which implies that the value of an audit is greater when a firm is harder to value. Our results highlight the importance of information uncertainty in financial markets: where there is a shock to auditor reputation, firms with greater information uncertainty suffer the largest losses.     

Market competitiveness and Big 5 pricing: Evidence from China's binary market

Big 5 auditors enjoy a worldwide audit fee premium that is believed to be attributable primarily to their reputation for providing high-quality services to clients. This study finds that the fee premium is also attributable to a lack of competition in the market. Taking advantage of the binary structure of the audit market in China, we compare the pricing practices of the Big 5 in the competitive statutory market and the less competitive supplementary market. Although the Big 5 have a reputation for high-quality audits in both markets, the degree of competition in the two markets is very different. Using audit fee data from the period 2000 to 2003, we find that the Big 5 earn a significant fee premium in the less competitive supplementary market, but not in the competitive statutory market. Although our results do not completely rule out reputation as an explanation, they are consistent with the notion that the audit fee premium that is earned by the Big 5 is more likely to be attributable to their dominant market position than to their reputation in the emerging Chinese markets, in which the usual audit-quality benefits for investors and managers are either absent or minimal.     

Taxing audit markets and reputation: An examination of the U.S. tax shelter controversy

From 2002 to 2007, the nation's largest CPA firms faced allegations of illegal activity related to the sale of tax shelters: EY, KPMG and PwC paid fines; KPMG was investigated by a federal grand jury; and EY faced a criminal inquiry. These shelter events occurred shortly after the 2002 collapse of Arthur Andersen, when policy makers were concerned about audit market concentration. This is the first paper to provide a chronological summary of how the tax shelter controversy started and ended. We investigate the stock market reaction to tax shelter news developments between 2003 and 2005 to make inferences about the market's view of audit competition and CPA firm reputation. Our results are consistent with market concern over large audit firm concentration, evidenced by large negative returns for clients of all audit providers upon the KPMG grand jury investigation announcement. We also find that tax shelter activities impact both the reputation of the accounting profession and the individual CPA firms marketing tax shelter products.     

Does Auditor Reputation Matter? The Case of KPMG Germany and ComROAD AG

We study the stock and audit market effects associated with a widely publicized accounting scandal involving a public company (ComROAD AG) and a large, reputable audit firm (KPMG) in a country (Germany) that has long provided auditors with substantial protection from shareholder legal liability. We use this event to study whether an auditor's reputation helps to ensure audit quality, a rationale for which recent literature and events provide scant support. Given the absence of a strong insurance rationale for audit quality, Germany permits a relatively clean test of whether auditor reputation matters. We find that KPMG's clients sustain negative abnormal returns of 3% at events pertaining to ComROAD, and that these returns are more negative for companies that are likely to have higher demands for audit quality. We also find an increase in the number of clients that drop KPMG in the year of the ComROAD scandal (mostly smaller, recently public companies that are similar to ComROAD). Overall, our results provide support for the reputation rationale for audit quality.     

Shredded Reputation: The Cost of Audit Failure

In this article we investigate the impact of the Enron audit failure on auditor reputation. Specifically, we examine Arthur Andersen's clients' stock market impact surrounding various dates on which Andersen's audit procedures and independence were under severe scrutiny. On the three days following Andersen's admission that a significant number of documents had been shredded, we find that Andersen's other clients experienced a statistically negative market reaction, suggesting that investors downgraded the quality of the audits performed by Andersen. We also find that audits performed by Andersen's Houston office suffered a more severe decline in abnormal returns on this date. We are not able to show that Andersen's independence was questioned by the amount of non–audit fees charged to its clients.