资产价格扭曲是否形成了企业投资约束--基于托宾Q值的理论与实证分析

通过构建含有企业在不同资本市场上市比例作为利率权重的托宾Q模型,解释说明同时在多地资本市场上市的企业因股票价格具有差异而产生的价格扭曲使托宾Q值的有效性降低。企业整体估值受到多个资本市场的影响,当企业股价产生较大程度的价格扭曲时,管理层会重新审视托宾Q值的可信性,从而对投资产生约束。实证中以中国境内A股市场和中国香港H股市场同时上市企业的年度数据为例,检验理论模型的相关推论,结果发现:价格扭曲现象削弱了企业价值的真实性,使投资—Q敏感度降低,形成企业投资约束;股权上市比例较高的资本市场利率对企业投资影响较大,且股权上市比例越高的市场估值对投资—Q敏感度影响越大;基于不同方法计算的托宾Q值对企业投资的影响具有差异。最后,从促进企业价值回归、提升企业投资效率的角度提出相关建议。     

全流通市场下的估值中枢为何呈现下移趋势

本文根据托宾Q比率理论,从投资收益的角度分析了尚未完全流通情况下托宾Q比率对投资的引导作用,分析了在托宾Q比率指导下的投资策略以及这些策略对资本市场估值中枢的理论影响。文章还通过对所有A股公司的托宾Q值进行测算,分别检验了托宾Q值对"大小非"减持和实物资产投资的引导关系,并通过Granger因果检验证明了"大小非"减持数量对市场的估值中枢产生了影响的结论,认为由于托宾Q值的仍旧较高而导致股票市场估值中枢可能会较之历史高水平呈现下移趋势。     

全流通市场下的估值中枢为何呈现下移趋势

本文根据托宾Q比率理论,从投资收益的角度分析了尚未完全流通情况下托宾Q比率对投资的引导作用,分析了在托宾Q比率指导下的投资策略以及这些策略对资本市场估值中枢的理论影响.文章还通过对所有A股公司的托宾Q值刲行测算,分别检验了托宾Q值对"大小非"减持和实物资产投资的引导关系,并通过Granger因果检验证明了"大小非"减持数量对市场的估值中枢产生了影响的结论,认为由于托宾Q值的仍旧较高而导致股票市场估值中枢可能会较之历史高水平现下移趋势.     

托宾Q值对企业价值的影响

本文从詹姆斯．托宾的Q理论出发．比较了中美资本市场的托宾Q值，分析了我们资本市场存在的问题．并对我国资本市场提出一些建议和展望.     

上市公司投资决策行为的实证分析

研究公司投资的融资约束问题是西方最近20年来的热门话题之一。由于新古典投资理论和托宾Q理论在测定相对持续的投资需求模型中，忽略了融资因素产生的影响，其对现实问题的解释力受到了怀疑。在宏观和微观两个需求层次的推动下，一些经济学家指出，由于不完全资本市场的存在，公司投资面临的融资约束问题会引起和放大经济波动。     

托宾Q值对企业价值的影响

本文从詹姆斯·托宾的Q理论出发,比较了中美资本市场的托宾Q值,分析了我们资本市场存在的问题.并时我国资本市场提出一些建议和展望.     

我国资本市场的货币政策传导机制研究

资本市场的货币政策传导机制 一、q效应 托宾的q理论提供了一种有关股票价格与投资支出相互关联的理论,q值定义为企业市场价值与资产重置成本之比.     

我国民营企业集团内部资本市场配置效率的实证研究

本文以2003-2006为数据窗口,选取我国资本市场上20个民营系属上市公司为研究样本,利用EWIEWS软件对企业系中ICM的配置效率进行了实证研究。研究结果表明:①我国民营系内存在着活跃的资本市场,民营对比公司的投资支出对现金流的敏感性要明显高于民营系属公司,说明企业系中的ICM发挥了重新配置资本的功能。②由于系属上市公司对托宾Q不敏感(系数为负),故系属上市公司中的资本并没有高效率地配置给市场前景较好的投资项目。     

我国民营企业集团内部资本市场配置效率的实证研究

本文以2003-2006为数据窗口,选取我国资本市场上20个民营系属上市公司为研究样本,利用EWIEWS软件对企业系中ICM的配置效率进行了实证研究。研究结果表明:①我国民营系内存在着活跃的资本市场,民营对比公司的投资支出对现金流的敏感性要明显高于民营系属公司,说明企业系中的ICM发挥了重新配置资本的功能。②由于系属上市公司对托宾Q不敏感(系数为负),故系属上市公司中的资本并没有高效率地配置给市场前景较好的投资项目。     

我国民营企业集团内部资本市场配置效率的实证研究

本文以2003～2006为数据窗口,选取我国资本市场上20个民营系属上市公司为研究样本,利用EWIEWS软件对企业系中ICM的配置效率进行了实证研究.研究结果表明:①我国民营系内存在着活跃的资本市场,民营对比公司的投资支出对现金流的敏感性要明显高于民营系属公司,说明企业系中的ICM发挥了重新配置资本的功能.②由于系属上市公司对托宾Q不敏感(系数为负),故系属上市公司中的资本并没有高效率地配置给市场前景较好的投资项目.     

Learning about Internal Capital Markets from Corporate Spin-offs

We examine the investment behavior of firms before and after being spun off from their parent companies. Their investment after the spin-off is significantly more sensitive to measures of investment opportunities (e.g., industry Tobin's Q or industry investment) than it is before the spin-off. Spin-offs tend to cut investment in low Q industries and increase investment in high Q industries. These changes are observed primarily in spin-offs of firms in industries unrelated to the parents' industries and in spin-offs where the stock market reacts favorably to the spin-off announcement. Our findings suggest that spin-offs may improve the allocation of capital.     

Do stock price bubbles influence corporate investment?

Dispersion in investor beliefs and short-selling constraints can lead to stock market bubbles. This paper argues that firms, unlike investors, can exploit such bubbles by issuing new shares at inflated prices. This lowers the cost of capital and increases real investment. Perhaps surprisingly, large bubbles are not eliminated in equilibrium nor do large bubbles necessarily imply large distortions. Using the variance of analysts’ earnings forecasts to proxy for the dispersion of investor beliefs, we find that increases in dispersion cause increases in new equity issuance, Tobin's Q, and real investment, as predicted by the model.     

The Relation Between Patent Citations and Tobin's Q in the Semiconductor Industry

The market value of a firm is largely determined by the expected returns to the firm's tangible and intangible assets. However, accounting data generally excludes intangible assets. Financial variables which are constructed in part from accounting data, such as Tobin's Q, are thus biased. If measures of intangible capital are successful in explaining variation in Q, then a case can be made for incorporating such measures into future research. In high technology industries, such as the semiconductor industry, valuing a firm's intangible assets requires the valuation of its technological capital. Past studies have relied heavily on simple patent counts and research and development expenditures to quantify the technological component of a firm's intangible assets. This paper examines the ability of measures of intangible capital to explain variation in Q and considers an additional data source, patent citations. We find that stock variables created from citation data contain relevant information about the market's valuation of intangible assets.     

中国上市银行特许权价值的自律效应

银行特许权价值是银行风险自我约束的重要机制。本文使用托宾Q值衡量了中国14家上市银行的特许权价值,借助面板数据回归分析对银行特许权价值的自律效应进行了实证检验。结果表明:上市银行特许权价值对反映外部评价的市场风险确实存在着自律效应,但还未对表现为内部风险控制的资本充足率产生显著作用。因国家对银行业提供了全面担保,银行所有制性质对银行风险无显著影响。随着银行业竞争日趋激烈,通过引导商业银行提升特许权价值来激励银行审慎经营并加强内部风险控制,对后金融危机时期中国银行业的健康稳定发展具有积极意义。     

董事会人力资本、外部社会资本对企业创新投入的影响

基于资源依赖理论与高层梯队理论,依据2011-2016年深沪两市A股上市公司数据,考量董事会人力资本、外部社会资本对企业创新投入的影响。结果表明：董事会人力资本与企业创新投入呈正向关系,董事会外部资本对企业创新投入有一定促进作用,但董事会外部资本对董事会人力资本与企业创新投入关系的调节效应并不显著。鉴此,应优化董事会人力资本,拓展董事会外部社会资本,注重人力资本与外部社会资本的良性互动。     

The Impact of Capital Requirements and Managerial Compensation on Bank Charter Value

This paper examines the joint impact of capital requirements and managerial incentive compensation on bank charter value and bank risk. Most of the previous literature in the area of banking and agency theory has focused on asymmetric information between either banks and regulators, (and therefore on the role of bank capital), or between bank shareholders and bank managers, (and therefore on the role of managerial ownership). In this paper we unify these issues and present empirical results from the regression of capital requirements jointly with measures of incentive compensation on Tobin's Q, our proxy for bank charter value, and on the standard deviation of total return, our proxy for bank risk. In a sample of 102 bank holding companies we find that capital levels are consistently a significant positive factor in determining bank charter value and a significant negative factor in determining risk. On the other hand, we find our six measures of incentive compensation to be generally insignificant relative to charter value but do provide some evidence consistent with a theory relating types of incentive compensation with risk.     

产融结合资本配置效应的理论分析

本研究以内部资本市场理论为基础,对产融结合的资本配置效应进行了分析,得出结论:产融结合能为企业构造包含金融机构的内部资本市场,一方面可以缓解企业的融资约束,但另一方面也会使企业的组织结构复杂化,公司治理难度加大,进而对资本的配置产生负面影响。     

基于知识的企业性质与收益分配模式

本文从知识视角重新审视了新经济下的企业性质及由此决定的收益分配模式.分析认为,新经济下企业是财务资本所有者与人力资本所有者订立的特别契约,企业拥有或控制的财务资本和技术性、管理性等知识以及聚合财务资本与各种知识的能力决定着企业的效率边界;股票期权制不仅仅是一种激励制度,而是企业所有权范式基于知识的转换,进而导致收益分配制度变迁的必然结果.文章最后对以净利润为基础的收益分配模式进行了澄清,提出新经济下的企业收益分配应以EVA为基础,以真正体现人力资本价值的大小及其创值能力的高低.     

Value of Multinationality: Internalization, Managerial Self-interest, and Managerial Compensation

In this paper, we examine the impact of managerial self-interest on the value of multinationality. Since agency theory also suggests that a divergence between the interests of managers and shareholders can be aligned by effective managerial incentive, we also examine the effect of managerial compensation on the value of multinationality. Our results show that for high- Q (Tobin's Q > 1 ) firms, investors do not associate the spending of free cash flow on multinationality with the problem of overinvestments. For high- Q firms, it is also found that the value of multinationality can be enhanced by effective managerial incentives. For low- Q firms (Tobin's Q < 1 ), it is found that the concern of managerial self-interest overwhelms the benefits of internalization, making multinationality a value-decreasing event. For low- Q firms, managerial compensation is also ineffective in promoting value-enhancing foreign direct investments.     

Is It Inefficient Investment that Causes the Diversification Discount?

Diversified conglomerates are valued less than matched portfolios of pure-play firms. Recent studies find that this diversification discount results from conglomerates' inefficient allocation of capital expenditures across divisions. Much of this work uses Tobin's q as a proxy for investment opportunities, therefore hypothesizing that q is a good proxy. This paper treats measurement error in q . Using a measurement-error consistent estimator on the sorts regressions in the literature, I find no evidence of inefficient allocation of investment. The results in the literature appear to be artifacts of measurement error and of the correlation between investment opportunities and liquidity.