An Examination of the Naïve‐Investor Hypothesis in Accruals Mispricing in Tunisian Firms

This study extends previous studies on accrual anomaly to investigate the emerging market's mispricing of accruals. Using Mishkin (1983) test, hedge portfolio test and Fama and MacBeth (1973) regression, we test whether the Tunisian Stock Exchange price rationally reflects the 1‐year ahead earnings implications of its earnings components. We find that earnings and their cash flow and accrual components are not rationally priced by the market. Additionally, this paper examines the role of sophistication investors in the pricing of earnings and their components. Our results show that accruals for firms with higher level of institutional ownership are not mispriced, while accruals for firms with lower institutional ownership are overpriced significantly by the market.     

Alleviating rural poverty in sub-Saharan Africa

This analysis of rural poverty and hunger in Africa discusses the intertemporal and cross-sectional dimensions of poverty as an aid to policies and programs to alleviate hunger. Since nutritional adequacy of diets varies according to season, seasonality is an important cause of poverty especially in countries with 1 major harvest. In agricultural communities the wet season brings on food shortages and high prices, requiring assistance programs to concentrate on alleviating hunger at this time of year. Drought places a similar demand on resources. People may be poorer in 1 section of a country than another if they have no access to the existing power system, depriving them of services and assistance. There are forgotten regions of Africa where people are poor due to physical isolation, increasing the risk of drought and impeding emergency relief. Production in these areas may be low because there are no consumer goods to buy with surplus. It is important to identify target groups for financial assistance which will change with time and environmental conditions.     

Cash holdings of politically connected firms

Politically connected firms benefit from soft-budget constraints and are unlikely to suffer from liquidity constraints. This argument suggests that politically connected firms should hold less cash than non-connected peers. Another view posits that these firms exhibit acute corporate governance problems. In this setting, politically connected firms are more likely to hold more cash than non-connected firms. Using a sample of 50,119 firm-year observations from 31 countries, we find that politically connected firms hold more cash than their non-connected peers. We put forth two explanations for this result. Firstly, politicians use politically connected firms as “cash cows” to advance their political agendas. Secondly, political connections are conducive to agency problems. In additional analyses, we find that the positive relationship between political connections and cash holdings is stronger when corporate governance is weak.     

Foreign direct investment in the privatisation of the Polish economy

In the 1990s a major change took place in the ownership structure in the Polish economy, with a dramatic shift towards the private sector. The following article examines the different ways in which privatisation has taken place, the penetration of foreign capital into the Polish economy and the role which foreign direct investment has played in the transformation process. The author is an expert of the Goansk Institute for Market Economics; she would like to thank Catherine Lockhead-Strzępka, Institute of Economics at the University of Information Technology in Rzeszów, for corrections to the English translation.     

Strategic Interaction between Governments and Investors under Privatization Programs

This article analyses the strategic moves of governments and investors under privatization programs in a game‐theoretic context. In sequential‐move games of both perfect information and incomplete information, the best response of the strategic investors to observing a slow pace of privatization is to have a low participation in economic activity because of concerns over public policy credibility. This is true even if the government chooses to randomize its action to send mixed signals to the investors while adopting a slow pace of privatization for budgetary reasons. However, the outcome is Pareto inferior to a situation of phased but fast implementation of privatization programs and high private‐sector participation under plausible assumptions. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Team Production with Punishment Option: Insights from a Real‐Effort Experiment

This paper analyzes the consequences of allowing for punishment in a real‐effort pair production experiment. The behavior of the best performer in the team differs on whether he or she can impose a sanction on the less performing partner. When sanctions are not allowed, good performers reduce their effort in response to the advantageous difference in scores; when they can impose sanctions, their change in effort is no longer related to the difference in scores. To some extent, a sanction mechanism allows good performers to focus on their own performance. In the case of costless sanctions, not sanctioning a partner who under‐performs, what we refer to as forgiveness, prompts the latter to improve his or her performance, but applying the sanction has a stronger push effect. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Use of Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) in Tourist Information and Promotion of the Polish Carpathians in Foreign Tourism Markets

The recent years have been a time of rapid development of information and communication technologies (ICTs) in tourism. The objective of this article is to analyse and assess the use of ICTs in tourist information and promotion of selected municipalities in the Polish Carpathians, the largest region of mountain tourism in Poland. Particular attention was paid to the activities taken by DMOs, local entrepreneurs and cultural institutions. The use of ICTs in the Polish Carpathians is at a relatively advanced level, but still not sufficient enough to make these solutions a fully effective tool in building a strong regional brand in the international tourism markets.     

THE COST OF THE U.S. SUGAR PROGRAM REVISITED

The article analyzes the welfare cost of the U.S. sugar program using a multimarket model of U.S. sweetener markets. The latter includes raw crops, sugar extraction and refining, and sweetener users (food-processing industries and final consumers). The authors address the industrial organization of food industries using sweeteners and treat the United States as a large importer. With the removal of the program, this article estimates (all figures in 1999 dollars) that in 1998 cane growers, sugar beet growers, and processors would have lost $307, $650, and $89 million, respectively; sweetener users would have gained $1.9 billion. World prices would have increased by 13.2%. The deadweight loss of the program is estimated at $532 million.