基于岗位胜任力的某通信服务分公司的中干培训体系构建

为适应公司数字化转型,某通信服务分公司在2019年调整了中干组织结构。调整1年后,高层发现很多中干急缺管理、专业知识等相关知识和技能,这就需要公司构建培训体系来提高中干的整体能力和素质来适应快速的转型。论文通过问卷调研、统计分析、专家咨询法等方法构建了适应通信服务公司转型的中干培训体系,试图为构建完整的通信服务公司中层管理者胜任能力模型评价体系奠定基础。     

均衡性原则之“权重公式”的反思与重构——一个法经济学的分析视角

为避免均衡性原则适用的模糊抽象,具体化成为学界共识,量化方法颇受关注。阿列克西设计的“权重公式Wij”的影响力较大,发挥着定序量化分析的功能,但公式的适用范围受限及构成要素的赋值不当,降低了其应用价值。解决问题的关键在于重构“权重公式”的适用框架,法经济学的分析方法能强化公式的适用能力,使量化过程更具客观性。在以利益为核心的成本收益分析框架下,“权利”作为公式的适用对象,经必要变量的逻辑改进,“权利”的保护强度作为公式的构成要素;经济学上的价值及“权利”的损害导向确立公式的量化基础,继而“权利”能实现货币等价或价值评估。尤其基于经济学的替代理论,“权利”之间构成了新的权衡模型：“权衡公式Bij。”在“权衡公式”的结果判定上,Bij≥1,手段不符合均衡性,不应改变“初始状态”下“权利”的比例关系;Bij＜1,手段符合均衡性,且尽力选择使Bij值更小之手段。“权衡公式”兼具体系化与精细化分析能力,保持了严密结构和强操作性,为更普遍的实践应用提供新思路。在“权衡公式”与成本收益分析的关系上,它是一种融合成本收益分析的均衡性判断。     

中国民营企业劳资关系问题探析

改革开放以来,我国民营企业发展迅速,但在发展过程中也存在许多问题.本文针对我国民营企业劳资关系的现状,深入研究了民营企业劳资矛盾的理论根源,进而从中得到启示:提高政府的执政能力.     

Post OPA-90 Vessel Oil Transfer Spill Prevention: The Effectiveness of Coast Guard Enforcement

Although oil spills from tanker accidents receive the most publicity, most vessel spills are not the result of accidents but of oil transfer activities. We investigate determinants of the size of vessel oil transfer spills as well as the effectiveness of Coast Guard enforcement activities in reducing their size. Vessel out-of-water and in-water oil transfer spillage functions are estimated utilizing tobit regression and detailed data on individual vessel oil transfer spills as well as Coast Guard safety/environmental enforcement activity data for the 1991–1995 period. Our estimation results suggest that Coast Guard hull but not machinery inspections are effective in reducing both out-of-water and in-water spills; patrols by air, but not by boat, are effective in reducing out-of-water spills; but neither is effective in reducing in-water spills. The results also show that the type of vessel (oil- and non-oil-cargo), vessel characteristics, vessel operations, weather/visibility conditions, and waterway type are determinants of post OPA-90 vessel oil transfer spills.     

高效的营销系统模型在竞争市场环境中的理论应用

目前绝大多数营销活动的预测都只能定性的做一些粗略的估计，还不能做到定量分析与管理，这给正确的销售规划带来了困难。本文根据市场运行的规律分析一个销售方和竞争对手的销量函数关系，指出影响销量的因素分为三类：市场因素、本方因素、对手因素，对连续型的数量关系用解微分方程组的方法推导出结论．对离散型数据关系也类推出数学表达式。给出了来源于实际的两个例子。该数学模型的特点是构造市场运动的结构关系，不需要大量的统计数据，简洁实用，可操作性强，准确性高，适应性强。从而为理论界以及销售管理者实施管理提供了一个定量、合理、高效的管理工具。     

A duration analysis of privatization in the telecom sector

The paper attempts to identify the telecom-sector performance indicators, relevant economic variables, and institutional characteristics of a country that effect the process of privatization of state-owned telecom enterprises. Using standard duration analysis of a panel data, we demonstrate that the privatization incentives are not only shaped by the mobility of financial capital in a country but are also influenced by the degree of competitiveness of private sector participation in policy-making process. The empirical results also reveal the significant impact of productive efficiency in telecom service provision on its course to privatization. We thank an anonymous referee for helpful comments and suggestions. We are solely responsible for all mistakes.     

努力培育WTO环境下苏南乡镇企业的竞争机制

２００１年１２月１１日，中国正式成为了WTO的一员。这标志着中国经济将融入世界经济主流，全面参与国际经济合作与竞争，必将给中国经济带来广泛而深远的影响。面对这种深刻变化，作为苏南经济半壁江山的苏南乡镇企业该如何积极面对呢？我们认为，适应WTO的要求，积极培育苏     

我国能源消费存在的主要问题及对策分析

本文分析了我国能源消费具有消费结构以煤炭为主、能源价格改革滞后和能源金融市场发展不足的特点，能源消费存在对环境污染严重、能源利用效率较低和能源技术创新不足的问题。文章最后提出了提高能源使用效率、鼓励能源技术创新的途径和对策。     

Partial International Coordination in the Great Fish War

This study extends the great fish war model of Levhari and Mirman [Levhari, D. and Mirman, L. (1980) Bell Journal of Economics 11: 322–344] by incorporating a multiple country context into the model and investigates the existence of a partial coordination Nash equilibrium. First, findings of this paper suggest that a partial coordination scheme is sustainable only in limited cases. Any coalition that has more than two member countries cannot be sustained. Second, the existence and the number of coordinating countries depend critically on the magnitude of the biological and preference parameters. Finally, if the coalition is assumed to be a dominant player, there always exist one or two welfare-improving sustainable coalitions and the size of the sustainable coalitions depends on the parameters of the problem.