Reining in auditors: On the dynamics of power surrounding an “innovation” in the regulatory space

In the aftermath of Enron and the collapse of Arthur Andersen, new “independent” institutions were created to oversee financial auditing. Based on a modified version of Lukes’ multidimensional model of power, we first investigate how the creation of the Canadian Public Accountability Board (CPAB) has affected the dynamics of power among the main players enlisted in Canada’s regulation of public accounting. Our findings strengthen the view that a “form of allegiance” was, at the time of data collection, developing between CPAB and the largest Canadian accounting firms. Through a second analytical movement, we extend the boundaries of our argument, showing that patterns of resistance against the logic of arm’s length regulation operate in a variety of audit regulatory sites. Our conclusion points, in particular, to the spatial gap - and incidentally the limitations - of any attempt to control and supervise a globalized industry from a national or regional perspective.     

首席财务官与首席执行官薪酬的相关性研究——基于沪深两市946家上市公司的数据

在现代公司治理结构中,首席财务官（CFO）发挥着愈来愈重要的职能和作用,在一些方面具有与首席执行官（CEO）同等重要的法律地位。制定合理的CFO薪酬政策,对于协调CFO与CEO在公司治理中的关系,促使CFO积极履行在公司战略决策方面的重要职责具有重要意义。文章以我国946家上市公司为研究样本,全面地对CFO与CEO薪酬的差异及其相关性进行了研究.     

Can Management Turnover Restore the Financial Statement Credibility of Restating Firms? Further Evidence

This paper investigates the association between management turnover following financial restatements and the probability of subsequent restatements. We find that restating firms that replace management (CEO and/or CFO) are more likely to restate their financial statements again. We also find that subsequent restatements are mainly attributable to the new management. Overall, our results suggest that management turnover following restatements may not be an effective mechanism to remediate financial restatements, but the change to a new management results in a greater possibility of lower earnings quality (i.e., higher probability of subsequent financial restatements and accruals‐based earnings management). Our study supports prior literature's findings that the change in the top management leads to organizational instability and higher accounting information risk. Our findings have implications for internal decisionmaking with regard to top executive replacement.     

The wolves of Wall Street? Managerial attributes and bank risk

We find that chief executive officers and chief financial officers exert significant individual effects on bank risk. Manager transitions, including transitions generated by plausibly exogenous manager departures, lead to abnormally large changes in bank risk. We demonstrate that the effects of managers on bank risk are sizable and manager-specific. The effects are also partly anticipated by the board because they are reflected in managers’ pay. However, wide-ranging personal attributes, including biographical, experience, and compensation data, only explain a small share of managers’ impact on bank risk. This implies that attempts to rein in bank risk-taking by targeting manager characteristics will be challenging for investors and regulators.     

Upper‐echelon executive human capital and compensation: Generalist vs specialist skills

This study extends current knowledge of upper echelon executive compensation beyond the CEO, specifically CFO compensation, based on whether they possess generalist or specialist skills. We find that “strategic” CFOs with an elite MBA (generalist) consistently command a compensation premium, while “accounting” CFOs (specialist) and CFOs with a non‐MBA master's degree, even from an elite institution, do not. Further, scarce “strategic” CFOs are awarded both higher salaries and higher equity‐based compensation. Our findings support the view that unique complementarities between scarce CFOs and firms increase these executives' bargaining power leading to pay premium. Our results are robust to post‐hiring years, firm sizes, board characteristics, and CFO's insider/outsider status. We contribute at the confluence of upper‐echelon compensation, executive human capital, resource‐based view, and assortative matching literatures. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

制度理论与高阶理论整合视角下创业制度环境如何影响企业创新绩效

转型经济下企业创新绩效差异不仅来源于创业制度环境,而且受到高层管理者心智模式的影响。为探讨创业制度环境对企业创新绩效的作用机制,对制度理论和高阶理论进行整合,引入创业导向作为中介变量,CEO自恋作为调节变量。运用问卷调查法对北京、吉林、甘肃、重庆、山西和福建等地385家高新技术企业进行实证分析,结果表明：在创业制度环境对企业创新绩效的影响过程中,创业导向起显著中介作用;CEO自恋在创业制度环境与创业导向之间发挥正向调节作用,并正向调节创业导向在创业制度环境与创新绩效之间的中介作用。相关结论丰富了制度理论和高阶理论研究成果,可为企业提升创新绩效提供借鉴。     

季度现金流量的信息含量研究

本文选择沪深两市共85家在2004年4月28日公布季度报表的A股上市公司为样本,采用事件法检验累计报酬率与非预期现金流量的关系。结果发现,我国的证券市场对于季度现金流量信息反应较弱,投资者基本上不关注季度现金流量信息。根据未预期盈余对样本进行分组,重新检验了市场对于不同盈余公司的现金流信息的市场反应,发现市场对于好消息公司的现金流信息的反应比坏消息公司更为敏感。     

关于ERP电子沙盘实训考核标准的探讨

ERP电子沙盘实训是目前经济管理专业采用的仿真性实训系统,文章通过分析ERP电子沙盘中各种角色的特征以及对企业发展的影响意义,制定出一个综合考虑企业表现以及课堂表现的考核评价体系,并通过实践分析具有激励学生学习积极性的作用。     

CEO与CFO股权激励的治理效应之比较:基于盈余管理的实证研究

在西方发达国家,CFO与CEO拥有相同的法律地位,负有监督CEO的责任,在公司治理结构中拥有重要的地位。本文从盈余管理角度研究我国CFO股权激励的公司治理效应,并比较CFO与CEO股权激励的公司治理效应,发现:尚未实施股权激励计划的公司,其CFO股权和期权占总薪酬比率与盈余管理呈负相关关系,而实施股权激励计划的公司,其CFO股权和期权占总薪酬比率与盈余管理的负相关关系显著变弱;尚未实施股权激励计划的公司,其CFO股权和期权占总薪酬比率对盈余管理抑制的程度显著小于CEO。这表明,正式实施股权激励会诱发盈余管理行为,其它类型的CFO持股则会抑制盈余管理行为,并且CFO股权激励的积极治理效应显著小于CEO。     

Narcissistic rhetoric and crowdfunding performance: A social role theory perspective

Drawing from clinical and organizational narcissism research, we develop a novel measure of narcissistic rhetoric, investigating its prevalence in a sample of 1863 crowdfunding campaigns. An experiment using 1800 observations further validates our measure and confirms our hypothesized inverted-U relationship between narcissistic rhetoric and crowdfunding performance. Leveraging social role theory, we explore sex, sexual orientation, and race as potential moderators of this relationship. Moderation tests reveal LGBTQ entrepreneurs generally yield greater performance when using narcissistic rhetoric than heterosexuals while racial minorities underperform Caucasians using narcissistic rhetoric. Our findings suggest successful crowdfunding campaigns must balance narcissistic rhetoric with entrepreneurs' perceived social roles.