Descending price multi-item auctions

We propose a simultaneous descending price auction mechanism to sell multiple heterogeneous items, each owned by a distinct seller, to a number of buyers. Each buyer has known private valuations on items, and wants at most one item. We show that if the sellers follow a descending price offer procedure and the buyers follow a greedy strategy for accepting the offers, the auction results in a nearly efficient allocation, and terminates close to a competitive equilibrium price vector. The descending price offer strategy of the sellers is close to a Nash equilibrium. However, we show that the buyers are better off waiting in our auction. There is a maximum limit (corresponding to the minimum competitive equilibrium price vector) till which they can wait without running into the risk of not winning any item. If the buyers wait within this limit, the prices can be brought arbitrarily close to a uniquely defined competitive equilibrium price vector.     

Political foundations of the resource curse

In this paper we argue that the political incentives that resource endowments generate are the key to understanding whether or not they are a curse. We show: (1) politicians tend to over-extract natural resources relative to the efficient extraction path because they discount the future too much, and (2) resource booms improve the efficiency of the extraction path. However, (3) resource booms, by raising the value of being in power and by providing politicians with more resources which they can use to influence the outcome of elections, increase resource misallocation in the rest of the economy. (4) The overall impact of resource booms on the economy depends critically on institutions since these determine the extent to which political incentives map into policy outcomes. Countries with institutions that promote accountability and state competence will tend to benefit from resource booms since these institutions ameliorate the perverse political incentives that such booms create. Countries without such institutions however may suffer from a resource curse.     

The set of equilibria of first-price auctions

I specify the class of functions that are equilibria of symmetric first-price auctions. A formula to recover the distribution of valuations for any equilibrium bidding strategy is given.     

Guard labor

We explore the economic importance of the private and public exercise of power in the execution of contracts and defense of property rights. We define power and represent it in a model of growth in a modern capitalist economy, borrowing themes from the classical economists (unproductive labor, profit-driven investment), Marx (the labor disciplining effect of unemployment), and the contemporary theory of incomplete contracts (the role of monitoring and enforcement rents). We use this model to identify the resources devoted to the exercise of power, which we term guard labor as we measure these in labor units. Data from the United States indicate a significant increase in its extent in the U.S. over the period 1890 to the present. Cross-national comparisons show a significant statistical association between income inequality and the fraction of the labor force that is constituted by guard labor, as well as with measures of political legitimacy (inversely) and political conflict. Some observations on the welfare implications of guard labor conclude the paper.     

The strategy of professional forecasting

We develop and compare two theories of professional forecasters’ strategic behavior. The first theory, reputational cheap talk, posits that forecasters endeavor to convince the market that they are well informed. The market evaluates their forecasting talent on the basis of the forecasts and the realized state. If the market expects forecasters to report their posterior expectations honestly, then forecasts are shaded toward the prior mean. With correct market expectations, equilibrium forecasts are imprecise but not shaded. The second theory posits that forecasters compete in a forecasting contest with pre-specified rules. In a winner-take-all contest, equilibrium forecasts are excessively differentiated.     

Retail profit margins in Japan and Germany

Retail Profit Margins in Japan and Germany. — This study compares the determinants of retail profit margins in Japan and Germany. Although several studies consider the peculiarities of the Japanese society and its economic structure, the comparison in this study is the first systematic, empirical analysis of the consequences of these characteristics for Japanese retail profit margins. For this purpose, two extensive data sets are used and a mark-up relationship is tailored to examine differences in Japanese and German retail profit margins. The empirical outcomes indicate that small firms can survive more easily in Japan than in Germany. This explains the abundance of small stores in Japan.     

Future of Economic Growth for South Korea*

More than 80 percent of US growth between 1950 and 1993 can be attributed to transition dynamics (increases in R&D intensity and educational attainment), with less than 20 percent of growth deriving from population growth. Similarly, growth accounting shows that 80 percent of economic growth in Korea can be attributed to transition dynamics. However, the specific factors that have moved Korea far from its steady state are significantly different from the factors that have done so for the USA. In addition to the growth rates of the two countries, we also analyzed the (steady‐state) level of output per worker to determine where the Korean economy is headed relative to the USA. In 1960, Korea was characterized as poor (0.111) relative to its own steady state (0.765), and incomes were at 11.1 percent of those in the USA. Since then, however, Korea has been growing more rapidly than the USA. In our analysis, we also consider the extreme case where total factor productivity levels converge completely. Interestingly, in this case, the USA and Korea exhibit unconditional convergence similar to what is generally observed in the OECD. As the economy approaches the steady‐state income level, however, the growth rate of output per capita will decline.     

The Relation Among Targets' R&D Activities, Acquirers' Returns, and In-Process R&D in the US

Abstract:  Using a sample of 129 mergers and acquisitions (M&As) in the US between publicly traded acquirers and targets in research and development (R&D) intensive industries over the period of 1994-2004 and a size- and industry-matched sample, we examine the relation among targets' R&D activities, the probability of acquirers' writing-off in-process R&D (IPRD), and acquirers' returns around the time of M&A announcements. We find that firms acquiring targets with higher R&D investments tend to write off some of the acquired R&D assets upon the completion of the M&As. We also find that the median cumulative abnormal return during the three days around M&A announcements for acquirers with subsequent IPRD write-offs is −2.73% while the return for acquirers without IPRD write-offs is −0.60%. This suggests that acquirers' stock returns around M&A announcements are much lower when investors expect acquirers to expense IPRD. The results are consistent with our conjecture that acquirers tend to write-off IPRD when they acquire overvalued targets. We also find that IPRD write-offs do not increase earnings or stock returns of acquirers after M&As, which is inconsistent with an earnings management hypothesis.     

Emergence of Captive Finance Companies and Risk Segmentation in Loan Markets: Theory and Evidence

A seller with some degree of market power in its product market can earn rents. In this context, there is a gain to granting credit to purchase of the product and thus to the establishment of a captive finance company. This paper examines the optimal behavior of such a durable good seller and its captive finance company. The model predicts a critical difference between the captive finance company's credit standard and that of independent lenders ("banks"), namely, that the captive finance company will adopt a more lenient credit standard. Thus, we should expect the likelihood of repayment of a captive loan to be lower than that of a bank loan, other things equal. This prediction is tested using a unique data set drawn from a major credit bureau in the United States, and the evidence supports the theoretical prediction.