Niche firms,mass markets,and income across countries: Accounting for the impact of entry costs

I develop a model of monopolistic competition in which I distinguish between niche markets and mass markets, in the spirit of Holmes and Stevens, 2014. Firms choose between entering a small niche market with high markups or a large mass market with low markups. Entry costs and other distortions have a much greater impact on output in the niche market as the gains to specialization are high, relative to the mass market where varieties are highly substitutable. Calibrated to match data from U.S. manufacturing, the model generates an elasticity of total factor productivity with respect to entry costs almost twice that in a model that abstracts from heterogeneous markets. I use data on entry costs across countries to show entry costs alone can account for 23 percent of the cross-country variation in income per worker.     

The shadow costs of repos and bank liability structure

Making use of a structural model that allows for optimal liquidity management, we study the role that repos play in a bank׳s financing structure. In our model the bank׳s assets consist of illiquid loans and liquid reserves and are financed by a combination of repos, long-term debt, deposits and equity. Repos are a cheap source of funding, but they are subject to an exogenous rollover risk. We show that the use of repos inflicts two types of indirect (“shadow”) costs on the bank׳s shareholders: first, it induces the bank to maintain higher liquid reserves in order to alleviate the additional default risk; second, it adds to the cost of long-term debt financing. These shadow costs limit the bank׳s appetite for cheap but unstable repo funding. This effect is, however, weakened under poor returns on risky assets, access to deposit funding and the depositor preference rule. We also analyze the impact of a liquidity coverage ratio, payout restrictions and a leverage ratio on the bank׳s financing choices and show that all these tools are able to curb the bank׳s reliance on repos.     

The paradoxes of risk management in the banking sector

This paper uses empirical evidence to examine the operational dynamics and paradoxical nature of risk management systems in the banking sector. It demonstrates how a core paradox of market versus regulatory demands and an accompanying variety of performance, learning and belonging paradoxes underlie evident tensions in the interaction between front and back office staff in banks. Organisational responses to such paradoxes are found to range from passive to proactive, reflecting differing organisational, departmental and individual risk culture(s), and performance management systems. Nonetheless, a common feature of regulatory initiatives designed to secure a more structurally independent risk management function is that they have failed to rectify a critical imbalance of power - with the back office control functions continuing to be dominated by front office trading and investment functions. Ultimately, viewing the 'core' of risk management systems as a series of connected paradoxes rather than a set of assured, robust practices, requires a fundamental switch in emphasis away from a normative, standards-based approach to risk management to one which gives greater recognition to its behavioural dimensions.     

Regulation and taxation: A complementarity

I show how quantity regulation can lower elasticities and thereby increase optimal tax rates. Such regulation imposes regulatory incentives for particular choice quantities. Their strength varies between zero (laissez faire) and infinite (command economy). In the latter case, regulation effectively eliminates any intensive behavioral responses to taxes; a previously distortionary tax becomes a lump sum. For intermediate regulation (where some deviation is feasible), intensive behavioral responses are still weaker than under zero regulation, and so quantity regulation reduces elasticities, thereby facilitating subsequent taxation. I apply this mechanism to labor supply and present correlational evidence for this complementarity: hours worked in high-regulation countries are compressed, and these countries tax labor at higher rates.     

房地产市场调控，要坚持更要完善——“十年调控”问卷调查的启示和思考

通过对196份问卷的总结分析，得到对于未来房地产调控的许多启示：十年房地产调控是必要的；总体评价消极的依据是供求依然失衡，房价越来越高。调控成效不彰的原因有：对住房供求政策、调控配套政策评价消极，还认为财政税收压力是地方政府不积极的首要原因。大多数问卷建议：推动供求和房价基本稳定还是调控首要目的确立；房价合理上升的几个界限；房地产调节机制应该以市场调节为主、政府调节为辅；明确住房需求政策、住房供给政策、住房土地政策、经济手段、行政手段和税收手段改进的方向。     

后金融危机时代金融消费者保护的若干问题——以美国2010年的新法案为视角

本文以2010年7月美国《多德—弗兰克华尔街改革与消费者保护法》为探索视角,简要回顾了美国金融消费者保护的历史和教训,指出消费者保护的思想不仅应该明确体现在金融监管目标中,还需设置达至目标的适当监管机构,同时提出金融消费者保护的立法力度与金融创新速度相匹配的问题。就中国学界对新法案高涨的借鉴热情,文章认为:国外先进立法经验的本土植入需考量现实条件,我国目前亟须完成的工作是提升金融消费者概念的认同程度并设置适宜的金融消费者保护性机构。     

再融资监管促进企业理性投资了吗？——来自中国上市公司的证据

本文以2007-2016年的A股上市公司为样本,实证检验中国再融资监管制度是否促进了企业的理性投资行为。研究发现:上市企业投资决策符合资本成本约束的理性准则,表明中国权益市场中存在普遍的市场约束力量;但企业再融资后投资理性程度明显降低;对监管失效的原因分析表明,企业投资理性程度下降受到事前融资动机和事后募资投向变更的影响:监管规则对事前再融资动机缺乏有效把控,导致再融资资格出现错配;而对事后募资用途的监管不严,则导致部分企业对募集资金的用途进行随意变更,使得企业投资理性程度降低。研究结论为完善企业投资决策自治机制、优化权益再融资监管、促进资本市场改革提供了实证依据和一定的现实启示。     

我国金融市场基础设施管理:现状、难点和立法路径

随着我国金融市场的纵深化发展,金融市场基础设施因其基础服务、系统性风险管理、辅助监管以及助力金融市场开放和营商环境完善等作用而日益受到重视,并成为现代金融治理和推动金融现代化的重要内容。但我国金融市场基础设施在运行和管理过程中却存在监管分散、制度空白、支持宏观审慎监管不力等情况,各方在相关概念和标准、统筹监管、恢复与处置安排等方面难以形成法律共识。为更好发挥金融市场基础设施作用,完善制度环境,我国应从金融市场基础设施的相关概念入手,明确其稳健运行所需的保障手段,完善统筹监管框架,有效衔接其他相关法律,并通过分步走的方式填补制度空白,提高立法层级。     

网络嵌入、绿色动态能力与企业绿色创新——环境规制和管理者环境注意力的调节作用

基于动态能力理论、社会网络理论和制度理论等,探讨网络嵌入对企业绿色创新的影响,并进一步考察绿色动态能力在其中的中介作用以及环境规制、管理者环境注意力的调节作用。运用多元回归和Bootstrap方法进行实证检验,结果显示：结构嵌入和关系嵌入对企业绿色创新均具有显著影响;绿色动态能力在结构嵌入、关系嵌入与绿色创新之间起中介作用;环境规制、管理者环境注意力均正向调节绿色动态能力与绿色创新间关系。     

生态资源环境公共产权的经济学分析

在产权制度的界定和规范引导下,生态资源经济才能实现环境友好型、可持续为主题的科学发展。历史上“公有地的悲剧”的启示不单是对产权问题的反思,而是通过设立一套巧妙的制度,以达到“量体裁衣”之功效。生态资源环境公共产权的产生是源于其稀缺性及非排他性的特质。但随着计量这种产权成本与收益的难度不断加深,环境资源体系的经济价值就越来越大。必须考虑在有效利用的前提下,重新界定产权来保证市场与主体效率目标的实现。作为现代产权制度体系的最重要的组成部分——资源类产权,它有别于企业产权制度,且它涉及利益主体的范围之广。涵盖的意义也极其深远。本文对生态资源环境这一较为特殊公共物品的产权问题用产权经济学的思维框架进行研究,从政府、企业、市场、制度四个层级,相应提出构建此类公共产权的四层规制模式,以求破解在生态环境规制过程中出现的产权失灵现象及界定不清的困局。