The Forgotten Risk: Financial Incentives

Summary  The number of risks that are taken into account by risk managers has grown over the years, but they still have a blind spot for the danger that remuneration schemes and financial incentives can lead to more risk taking. Such an effect constitutes a regime change, making standard statistical analyses of previous data obsolete. Common remuneration contracts for hedge fund managers and bank traders provoke risk taking and lead to volatile results. The incentive structure of rating agencies sheds doubts on the quality of their judgment. Risk managers should address the behavioral effects of incentive schemes, both inside and outside their firm. Incentive schemes should be corrected in such a way that only long-term results pay off. CEO, ABN-AMRO Bank and former Minister of Finance. These comments were prepared for the occasion of the Jelle Zijlstra Lecture by Martin Hellwig at the VU University, Amsterdam, May 27, 2008, when Gerrit Zalm was CFO of DSB Bank.     

An assessment of market-based approaches to providing ecosystem services on agricultural lands

Market-based approaches are increasingly being advocated as tools for achieving the conservation of ecosystem services. We examine the reasons why markets so far appear to have failed to provide an efficient allocation of many ecosystem services, and identify the conditions under which markets deliver efficient resource allocation. We discuss different forms of market-based approaches to ecosystem services and identify the characteristics of services that make them better suited to one or another of these approaches. We find that lack of low-cost measurability and valuation currently precludes efficient allocation of many ecosystem services through market-based approaches. Still, some forms of market-based approaches hold promise for cost-effectively managing some ecosystem services provided by and to agricultural lands. In many cases some form of well-designed government involvement will be required to seek outcomes that protect the public interest.     

Financing entrepreneurship: Bank finance versus venture capital

This paper examines the entrepreneur's choice between bank finance and venture capital. With bank finance, the entrepreneur keeps full control of the firm and has efficient incentives to exert effort. With venture capital finance, there is a two-sided moral hazard problem as both the entrepreneur and venture capitalist (VC) provide unverifiable effort. The entrepreneur benefits from the VC's managerial input but must surrender partial ownership of the venture, thus diluting the entrepreneur's incentive to provide effort. Venture capital tends to be preferred to bank finance when VC productivity is high and entrepreneurial productivity is low.     

Can Consumers Buy Responsibly? Analysis and Solutions for Market Failures

This paper analyses one of the business case arguments for social responsibility: that corporate social responsibility plans are rewarded by consumers. This paper explores the ability of consumers to buy responsibly, identifies the main obstacles for responsible consumption, and suggests conditions for it to work. The review of previous studies leads us to conclude that consuming responsibly is seen as a time consuming activity, economically disadvantageous, and stressful. The main thesis of this paper is that unless market failures are corrected, consumers will not be able to buy responsibly, and therefore, market incentives for CSR are seriously threatened.

在整合渠道视角下分销渠道激励模式的构建

分销渠道激励对于促进渠道成员高效率合作有重要的作用。在阐述分销渠道激励概念的基础上,分析了对分销渠道成员激励的原因;明确了分销渠道激励的基础,阐释了整合渠道系统的构建;最后提出了整合渠道视角下的三种分销渠道激励模式:短期激励模式、长期激励模式和分销规划激励模式。     

Dynamics of judicial service supply chains

Behavioral issues, coupled with temporary capacity imbalances, dictate the characteristics that a service supply chain assumes in the long run. The paper looks at a service chain in which two factors, backlogs and incentives, influence human agent processing times and, hence, service supply chain capacity. The paper finds that servers within the supply chain change their processing speeds in order to maintain a backlog of cases that is acceptable and credible. The backlog must not be too small, so as to avoid the impression that work is scant and there is idleness; but it must not be too large, so as to avoid the impression of laziness. Simultaneously, the paper finds that there are implicit incentives in the formal hierarchy that impinge upon throughput rates at certain stages of the supply chain: agents upstream try not to overwhelm their bosses' stations downstream with excess work. Hence, this paper looks at the effects of perceived backlogs within service supply chains and also at capacity unbalances that stem from such incentives. The study explores these issues in the context of a managerial intervention in a judicial service supply chain. The study identifies the structure of a seemingly unstructured decision execution that leads to the observed outcomes. The research results in a preliminary system dynamics model that suggests several operational steps to overcome bottlenecks and incompetency.     

高投资、宏观成本与经济增长的持续性

过去20多年,中国高投资—高增长的发展模式以宏观成本积累为代价。增长是中国今后相当长时期的主题,但是以高成本为代价的高投资—高增长发展模式的持续性如何?本文从理论上说明了中国高投资的政府激励机制及宏观成本边界和高成本增长的临界点;进而指出,在开放经济中,资本流动、外部需求和供给冲击构成高成本投资模式的现实约束,政府必须权衡粗放式高增长的宏观收益和成本,制定相应的政策来约束低效率的投资行为,实现全社会的福利优化。     

Is participation in agri-environmental programs affected by liquidity and solvency?

Financial constraints, both in the short and long run, have an impact on economic well-being of farm families. Additionally, financial constraints have an impact on production efficiency and technology adoption. This study investigates factors affecting farmers’ participation in the agri-environmental programs like Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) and the Environmental Quality Incentives Programs (EQIPs) in the U.S. particular attention is given to the roles of liquidity and solvency on participation in CRP and EQIP. Results show that both liquidity and solvency have a negative impact on participation in such programs. Additionally, we found that access to the Internet plays an important role in the farmer's decision to participate in CRP and EQIP. Our results also suggested that beginning farmers are more likely to participate in EQIP program.     

Career concerns incentives: An experimental test

Holmström’s [Holmström, B., 1982/1999. Managerial incentive problems: a dynamic perspective. Review of Economic Studies 66, 169–182. Originally published in: Essays in Economics and Management in Honour of Lars Wahlbeck, Helsinki] career concerns model has become a workhorse for analyzing agency issues in many fields. The underlying signal jamming argument requires players to use information in a Bayesian way, which is difficult to directly test with field data: typically little is known about the information that individuals base their decisions on. Our laboratory experiment provides prima facie evidence: (i) the signal jamming mechanism successfully creates incentives on the labor supply side; (ii) decision errors take time to decrease; (iii) while subjects’ average beliefs are remarkably consistent with play, a mild winner’s curse arises on the labor demand side.     

When punishment fails: Research on sanctions, intentions and non-cooperation

People can become less cooperative when threatened with sanctions, and previous research suggests both “intentions” and incentives underlie this effect. We report data from an experiment aimed at determining the relative importance of intentions and incentives in producing non-cooperative behavior. Participants play a one-shot investment experiment in pairs. Investors send an amount to trustees, request a return on this investment and, in some treatments, can threaten sanctions to enforce their requests. Decisions by trustees facing threats imposed (or not) by investors are compared to decisions by trustees facing threats imposed (or not) by nature. When not threatened, trustees typically decide to return a positive amount less than the investor requested. When threatened this decision becomes least common. If the request is large relative to the sanction then most trustees return nothing. If the request is small, trustees typically return the requested amount. These results do not vary with investors' intentions.