基于未确知测度理论的多科性医院医疗大数据治理能力成熟度评价

为实现对多科性医院大数据治理水平的分析和评估,在数据管理成熟度模型和能力成熟度模型基础上,构建多科性医院大数据治理能力成熟度评价模型。将医院大数据治理能力成熟度分为初始级、程序级、规范级、管理级和优化级五个等级,基于医院内部大数据治理特征,建立包括三级指标的成熟度评价指标体系。然后,分别用客观赋权法及组合赋权法确定各指标权重,并结合未确知测度理论和评价方法,量化评估两个三甲多科性医院大数据治理能力的成熟度。结果表明,两种赋权方法下两家医院的大数据治理能力水平均处于规范级,与两家医院大数据治理的实际情况相吻合。未确知测度理论与信息熵权相结合,可以平衡指标测量主观性和评价结果稳定性,建立的模型能为多科性医院大数据治理提供具有参考价值的决策信息。     

不确定性情况下的居民资产组合行为与中国金融结构变迁

转轨经济的一个显著特点是各项制度不断变化,制度变迁带来的不确定性对居民资产选择行为产生重要影响,进而影响和决定了金融结构的形成与变迁.     

组织激励资源运用的效率分析

本文从企业组织整体目标利益角度出发，将组织激励资源作为稀缺性资源，探讨了组织内部员工的激励问题，同时借助经济学关于资源有效配置的理论，以及组织行为学中的公平激励理论，对组织激励经济资源运用的有效性，以及相关的影响因素进行了探讨，并在此基础上提出了组织一定经济激励资源量获得最大组织激励动力的条件，以及组织获得最大经济激励资源运用绩效效率水平的条件或原则。     

Recovering Hicksian Consumer Surplus within a Collective Model: Hausman's Method for the Household

The purpose of this paper is to describe the implications of the collective model of household behavior for the methods used to estimate the economic value of non-marketed environmental resources. After demonstrating how the separability restrictions inherent in the collective model allow individual preference and household income allocation choices to be distinguished, the paper demonstrates how the framework can be used to recover Hicksian consumer surplus. An algebraic example is used to illustrate how the framework can be used in valuing environmental resources.     

Dissertation abstract: “Essays in applied economics on the intervention of a third player in agency relationships”

Agency theory has established that appropriate incentives can reconcile the diverging interests of the principal and the agent. Focusing on three applications, this dissertation evaluates the empirical relevance of these results when a third party interacts with the primary contract. The analyses provided rely on either laboratory or natural experiments. First, corruption is analyzed as a two-contract situation: a delegation contract between a Principal and an Agent and a corruption pact concluded between this Agent and a third player, called Briber. A survey of the recent microeconomic literature on corruption first highlights how corruption behavior results from the properties of those two agreements. We thereafter show that the Agent faces a conflict in reciprocities due to those two conflicting agreements. The resulting delegation effect, supported by observed behavior in our three-player experimental game, could account for the deterrence effect of wages on corruption. Second, health care is governed by contradictory objectives: patients are mainly concerned with the health provided, whereas containing health care costs is the primary goal of health care administrators. We provide further insights into the ability of incentives to balance these two competing objectives. In this matter, our theoretical and econometric analysis evaluates how a new mixed compensation scheme, introduced in Quebec in 1999 as an alternative to fee-for-services, has affected physicians’ practice patterns. Free switching is shown to be an essential feature of the reform, since it implements screening between physicians. Finally, the demand for underground work departs from the traditional Beckerian approach to illegal behavior, due to the dependence of benefits from illegality on competitors’ behavior. We set up a theoretical model in which the demand for underground work from all producers competing on the same output market is analyzed simultaneously. We first show that competition drastically undermines the individual benefits of tax evasion. At equilibrium, each firm nonetheless chooses evasion with a positive probability, strictly lower than one. This Bertrand curse could then account for the “tax evasion puzzle” i.e. the overprediction of evasion in models that ignore market interactions. We thereafter show that allowing firms to denounce competitors’ evasion is not likely to solve this curse—by providing a credible threat against price cuts, it fosters illegal work. Empirical evidence from a laboratory experiment confirms these predictions. Without denunciation, experimental firms often choose evasion whereas evasion benefits are canceled out by competition. When introduced, denunciation is rarely used by firms, but the threat makes evasion profitable. JEL Classification K42, I18, D21, C25, C91     

深圳市市政公园游客行为调查与分析

深圳市市政公园免费对外开放,其优美的环境和完善的设施已成为市民和外来务工人员休闲娱乐的好去处。文章对市政公园游客的结构、游园目的、交通方式、逗留时间、游园频率、消费情况及游客对公园清洁生产活动进行了具体调查和分析,得出了游客游园的基本资料及游客对深圳市政公园管理的认可程度,并在此基础上提出了深圳市市政公园建设与管理的几点建议。     

Strategic Firm Behavior Under Average-Revenue-Lagged Regulation

Price caps have been shown to have incentive properties superior to traditional rate of return regulation. Average-revenue-lagged regulation (ARL) is attractive in that steady-state prices are known to be efficient. We show that the ARL scheme can be manipulated by the firm so as to yield the unregulated global profit maximum. While tests exist that can provide the regulator with evidence of this strategic behavior, we also demonstrate that the unregulated global profit maximum will not be attainable if Laspeyres (L) regulation is employed.Jel classification: L43, L51I would like to thank Michael Crew and an anonymous referee for their extremely helpful suggestions.     

中国船舶制造业:SCP范式分析

以产业组织理论中哈佛学派的SCP范式为基本分析框架,考察我国的船舶制造业的产业组织状况后发现,中国船舶制造业市场结构是寡占型结构,垄断程度比较高,市场行为表现为更多的政府推动下的兼并与重组行为,而市场绩效相对效率低,技术进步和产品创新乏力.降低行业进入壁垒,鼓励民间资本进入造船业,推进产业规模经营是中国船舶制造业发展的必然选择.     

植入"公平博弈"的委托-代理模型——来自行为经济学的一个贡献

本文通过将Rabin(1993)提出的"公平博弈"概念植入现有委托一代理模型,获得一个考虑了代理人表现出"互惠性"非理性行为的新委托一代理模型.由该模型给出来的最优委托一代理合约可以给委托人带来比现有委托一代理最优合约更高的利润水平.研究发现,现有的Holmstrom-Milgrom模型中的最优合约不是帕累托最优的.新模型可以解释企业人性化管理和许多有特色的人性化企业文化的形成.本文是行为经济学与现有激励理论相结合研究的一种初步尝试,是运用行为经济学原理重建信息经济学基本框架的原创性工作.     

模仿行为经济学分析——对经济波动的一种新解释

当前 ,世界经济面临衰退的威胁 ,科学解释经济波动具有重大的理论意义和现实意义。RBC理论或方法是当代西方经济学界解释经济波动最具前沿的一种理论或方法 ,也是宏观经济分析的方向。但存在明显缺陷。本文在修正RBC模型的基础上 ,首次建立模仿行为理论模型重新解释经济波动 ,并就中国政府在防止和治理经济波动的作用进行了独特的解释 ,认为政府所起的作用是示范人作用。