This dissertation aims at elucidating the history of Vernon Smith’s experimental economics by focusing its attention upon the three themes of rationality, minds and machines that assumed significance at different (albeit overlapping) stages of the development of Smith’s experimental economics with the help of his published and unpublished papers.Chapter 1 is devoted to the scrutiny of the form of rationality incorporated into the portions of Smith’s laboratory experiments whose results have usually been taken as corroborations of his “Hayek Hypothesis.” By bringing into the foreground Smith’s definite position on demand theory and its concrete instantiations on many different occasions, we make the case that Smith has consistently imposed by means of the induced value theory certain narrowly defined preference structures that have definite implications for the form of rationality instantiated in the laboratory.The main narrative in Chapter 2 concerns Smith’s intellectual interchanges with behavioral scientists in the early 1960s, more specifically, his reactions to behavioral scientists’ attempts at cognitive modeling. We present several reasons for interpreting Smith’s initiation of the attempt at the maximization-based induced value theory as an endeavor to discipline subjects’ minds. We also provide in Chapter 2 a portrayal of Smith’s missed opportunities to get involved in the large-scale laboratory experimentation projects pursued in the 1950s in close connection with several branches of psychology.Chapter 3 consists of two parts. In Part 1, we describe the origin of mechanism design economics, and offer a detailed explanation of the analytical kinship between Smith’s “microeconomic system theory” and the standard conceptual framework utilized in mechanism design economics. Part 2 is devoted to describing the roles played by the computer in both Smith’s empirical research agenda and the theoretical, mechanism design research pursued by Stanley Reiter (one of Smith’s intellectual companions since the 1950s). Our historical narrative in Chapter 3 is intended to clarify that computer experience and computational theory drove the development of Reiter’ version of mechanism design economics, and that they also (partially) shaped some crucial events in the history of Smith’s version of experimental economics.JEL Classification: B21, B31, C90, C92, D02Prof. Philip E. Mirowski: Advisor 相似文献
This paper reports an experiment designed to assess the effects of a rotation in the marginal cost curve on convergence in a repeated Cournot triopoly. Increasing the cost curve's slope both reduces the serially-undominated set to the Nash prediction, and increases the peakedness of earnings. We observe higher rates of Nash equilibrium play in the design with the steeper marginal cost schedule, but only when participants are also rematched after each decision. Examination of response patterns suggests that the treatment with a steeper marginal cost curve and with a re-matching of participants across periods induces the selection of Nash Consistent responses. 相似文献
We present a brief overview of recent developments in discounted repeated games with (imperfect) private monitoring. The literature explores the possibility of cooperation in a long-term relationship, where each agent receives imperfect private information about the opponents' actions. Although this class of games admits a wide range of applications such as collusion under secret price-cutting, exchange of goods with uncertain quality, and observation errors, it has fairly complex mathematical structure due to the lack of common information shared by players. This is in sharp contrast to the well-explored case of repeated games under public information (with the celebrated Folk Theorems), and until recently little had been known about the private monitoring case. However, rapid developments in the past few years have revealed the possibility of cooperation under private monitoring for some class of games. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C73, D43, D82, L13, L41. 相似文献
Past field validity tests of contingent valuation have relied on voluntary contribution mechanisms to elicit actual willingness to pay, and may overestimate hypothetical bias because of free riding in the actual contributions. This paper argues that provision point mechanisms are a preferred alternative for field validity tests of contingent valuation because they increase the proportion of demand revealed in cases in which public goods can be provided in a step function. The results of a contingent valuation validity study of participation in a green electricity pricing program that uses a provision point mechanism are reported, and hypothetical open-ended and dichotomous choice responses are compared to actual participation. Calibration of hypothetical responses is also explored. 相似文献
Objective: To investigate preferences for fertility treatment from the Australian general population with the aims of calculating the willingness to pay in tax contribution for attributes (characteristics) that make up treatment and for an “ideal” fertility treatment program. We also assessed whether willingness-to-pay varies by the relationship status or sexual orientation of the patient.
Methods: A stated preference discrete choice experiment was administered to a panel of 801 individuals representative of the Australian general population. Seven attributes of fertility treatment under three broad categories were included: outcome, process, and cost. Attributes were identified through published literature, focus group discussions, expert knowledge, and a pilot study. A Bayesian fractional experimental design was used, and data analysis was performed using a generalized multinomial logit model. Further analyses included interaction terms and latent class modeling.
Results: Six of the seven attributes influenced the choice of a treatment program. Under process attributes, individuals preferred: continuity of care of clinic staff, where patients are seen by the same doctor but different nurses at each visit; “alternative” treatments being offered to all patients; and onsite clinic counseling and peer-support groups. Personalization and tailoring of the treatment journey were not important. Among outcome attributes, the improved success rate of having a baby per cycle and significant side-effects were considered important. Cost of treatment also influenced the choice of treatment program. Individual preferences for fertility treatment were not associated with patients’ relationship status or sexual orientation. Latent class modeling revealed sub-groups with distinct fertility treatment preferences.
Conclusion: This study provides important insights into the attributes that influence the preferences of fertility treatment in Australia. It also estimates socially-inclusive willingness-to-pay values in tax contributions for an “ideal” package of treatment. The results can inform economic evaluations of fertility treatment programs. 相似文献
