财务报告舞弊行政处罚与可感知审计质量

以2001年至2008年间非金融类、非外资类正常交易A股公司为研究样本,考察财务报告舞弊行政处罚是否传递了可感知审计质量信息,实证研究结果表明:投资者总体上并不认可财务报告舞弊行政处罚传递了可感知审计质量信息,仅当投资者观察到反映坏消息的审计意见(如审计师出具非标审计意见、审计意见未改善等)和反映审计师声誉信息(如审计师受到行政处罚)的情况下,投资者才认为财务报告舞弊行政处罚传递了可感知审计质量信息。     

基于博弈视角的银企信贷关系分析

银行和企业之间的信贷关系是影响我国经济增长的重要因素。由于信息不对称,银企信贷关系存在着很大的不确定性。本文通过对银企信贷行为的博弈分析,找出信贷风险的存在原因。通过增大企业贷款前的伪装成本,减少企业的逆向选择行为;增大企业贷款后的惩罚成本,减少企业的道德风险行为,从根本上改变银企之间的信息不对称状况,有利于银企关系的良好发展。     

JIT供应链的惩罚机制研究

运用数学方法,导出JIT供应链上惩罚因子与库存的关系.惩罚因子的设定反映了供应链上厂商的关系,并得出结论:当对上游厂商的惩罚因子等于市场对供应链的惩罚因子时,供应链才是JIT方式.     

Granger causality detection in high-dimensional systems using feedforward neural networks

This paper proposes a novel methodology to detect Granger causality on average in vector autoregressive settings using feedforward neural networks. The approach accommodates unknown dependence structures between elements of high-dimensional multivariate time series with weak and strong persistence. To do this, we propose a two-stage procedure: first, we maximize the transfer of information between input and output variables in the network in order to obtain an optimal number of nodes in the intermediate hidden layers. Second, we apply a novel sparse double group lasso penalty function in order to identify the variables that have the predictive ability and, hence, indicate that Granger causality is present in the others. The penalty function inducing sparsity is applied to the weights that characterize the nodes of the neural network. We show the correct identification of these weights so as to increase sample sizes. We apply this method to the recently created Tobalaba network of renewable energy companies and show the increase in connectivity between companies after the creation of the network using Granger causality measures to map the connections.     

地区环境治理动机、政治关联与企业环境违规处罚 ——来自环保督政制度的新证据

基于新《环保法》的准自然实验,运用双重差分法和倾向得分匹配法,考量新法实施前后地方环境治理动机变化对企业环境违规处罚力度的影响。结果显示,新法实施前,政治关联对企业环境违规处罚力度具有“庇护”效应;新法实施后,“庇护”效应被削弱。其中,官员型政治关联和市场化水平较低地区的“庇护”效应削弱程度更大。结果表明,治理动机不足是以往环境治理失灵的重要成因。应着力完善正负激励互补的激励结构,强化地方政府环境治理动机。     

The suspension of borrowing: an implicit penalty for loan default under imperfect information

A credit seeker may be suspended from borrowing for a period of time due to a previous default. Such suspension is widely used in bank lending through credit check. Our work analyses the effects of suspension on the investment choice of borrowers under uncertainty and on the lending policy of banks facing asymmetric information. We show that suspension should be tightened at low loan rates, but loosened otherwise, to improve the repayment performance of borrowers. We also show that although credit rationing may not be completely removed due to imperfect information, the excess demand for credit or transitive waiting in the market can actually be attenuated by such efficient use of suspension. Our theoretical predictions are consistent with observed cyclical patterns of changes in lendingrates and suspension severity.     

基于Logistic回归惩罚函数的企业财务危机预警

随着大数据时代的到来，企业的财务数据越来越复杂，在高维的财务数据中选出重要的影响因素，可以帮助企业人员对企业发生财务危机的可能性进行分析预测，降低企业的风险。研究企业财务危机的传统方法大多数是基于低维数据，而目前的财务数据变量众多。惩罚函数（penalty function）不仅能在高维数据的情况下进行稳定的变量选择，还能进行参数估计。采用基于Logistic回归惩罚函数模型研究企业财务危机预警问题，通过选取48个财务指标来进行建模和分析，找出影响企业财务危机的主要因素，并从预测精度、风险区分能力、变量选择这3个方面与传统方法进行对比，最终得到基于Logistic回归的惩罚函数方法更具有优越性。这对企业进行财务危机分析具有预警作用。     

MINIMUM GUARANTEED PAYMENTS AND COSTLY CANCELLATION RIGHTS: A STOPPING GAME PERSPECTIVE

We consider the valuation and optimal exercise policy of a δ‐penalty minimum guaranteed payment option in the case where the value of the underlying dividend‐paying asset follows a linear diffusion. We characterize both the value and optimal exercise policy of the considered game option explicitly and demonstrate that increased volatility increases the value of the option and postpones exercise by expanding the continuation region where exercising is suboptimal. An interesting and natural implication of this finding is that the value of the embedded cancellation rights of the issuer increase as volatility increases.     

投入50亿元以奖代罚治理六省市大气污染的绩效探讨

在大气污染治理中,经济利益与环保压力、防治与排污之间的博弈,影响着大气污染治理的绩效.过去的环保政策和治理行为表明：逐利博弈下,环保治理“罚”得很困窘,防治污染的效果不大.只有设计出多重激励下的“奖”励政策,才会产生很好的大气污染治理绩效.     

基于监督与惩罚的食品供应链突发事件治理研究

构建以食品供应链内核心企业为主导、其他成员企业为从属关系的监管博弈模型,分析核心企业所实施的惩罚力度和发现概率两种监管手段对防范供应链成员非诚信行为的作用,并对两种监管手段的效果进行比较分析。