On the power of indicators: how the choice of fuel poverty indicator affects the identification of the target population

In light of the creation of the EU Energy Poverty Observatory (EPOV) in January 2018 and the increase in debates on how fuel poverty is measured, we propose a critical analysis of fuel poverty indicators and demonstrate that choosing a given indicator is central to the identification of the fuel-poorpopulation.

First, we conducted an inter-indicator analysis to show how profiles of fuel-poor households vary depending on the indicator selected. We designed a multidimensional approach based on a multiple correspondence analysis and a hierarchical and partitioning clustering analysis to study characteristics of fuel-poor households. We highlight the difficulty of identifying a fuel-poor ‘typical profile’ and show that the composition of the population depends on the choice of the indicator.

Second, we applied an intra-indicator analysis using two objective expenditure-based indicators with thresholds. In particular, we conducted a sensitivity analysis based on a logit model including variables describing household and dwelling characteristics. We show that the profiles of fuel-poor households as well as the drivers of fuel poverty vary considerably with the chosen threshold level.Given these findings, we stress the need to review how we currently rely on conventional fuel poverty indicators to identify target groups and give some recommendations.     

Firm listing status and the investment home bias

Are public firm investment rates more sensitive than private firm rates to new investment opportunities? We offer a new explanation for differences in public and private firm investment sensitivities: investment sensitivities differ because the type of investments favored by firms varies with their listing status. Specifically, we consider the geography of investment opportunities and find that private firms have a much stronger investment home-bias than similar public firms which makes their investment decisions more sensitive to local investment opportunities than public firms. Controlling for local investment opportunities explains four-fifths of the differential sensitivity between public and private firms not explained by more traditional measures of investment opportunities.     

The impact of investor structure on stock price crash sensitivity: Evidence from China's stock market

Stock price crash sensitivity refers to the conditional probability of a stock crash when the market collapses. It focuses on individual stocks' sensitivity to the market crash and can affect stock pricing significantly. Although the crash sensitivity of China's stock market is very high as a whole (Weigert, 2016), different individual stocks show varying degrees of crash sensitivity. This paper, adopting the perspective of institutional investors, explores the reasons for the difference in crash sensitivity in China's stock market, and finds that: First, institutional investors' shareholdings is positively related to firms' stock price crash sensitivity. However, after dividing institutional investors into professional (represented by financial institutions) and non-professional institutional investors (represented by general legal persons), we find that only professional institutional investors' shareholdings is negatively related to firms' stock price crash sensitivity. Second, the impact of professional institutional investors on the crash sensitivity is influenced by stock liquidity and media sentiment: when the stock liquidity of listed companies is good or the media sentiment is strong, the negative impact of professional institutional investors on the crash sensitivity is accordingly high. This paper, by highlighting the investor structure, attempts a pioneering exploration of the influencing factors of the difference in stock price crash sensitivity in China. Our empirical results enrich research on stock price crash sensitivity and the heterogeneity of institutional investors. They can also serve to guide regulatory authorities' development of institutional investors and efforts to maintain market stability.     

Managerial Overconfidence,Self-Attribution Bias,and Downwardly Sticky Investment: Evidence from Korea

The extant literature on behavioral corporate finance has explored the effects of overconfidence on investment–cash flow sensitivity (ICS) to explain overinvestment, yet it has overlooked the asymmetric behavior of investments in relation to changes in cash flow levels. This study examines whether investments behave asymmetrically responding to changes in cash flows and, if so, how managerial overconfidence affects asymmetric ICS. Using a sample of KOSPI and KOSDAQ firms in Korea, we find the incidence of downwardly sticky ICS in unconstrained firms. We then find that overconfident managers encourage ICS to be stickier than their rational peers do in unconstrained firms. Finally, we find that managerial overconfidence intensified by self-attribution bias induces ICS to get even stickier, suggesting more explicit evidence of corporate investment distortions. The results of alternative tests using the asymmetric models of Homburg and Nasev (2008) are qualitatively consistent with prior results. Overall, our findings imply a higher incidence of excessive investment commitments driven by overconfident managers.     

Testing loss aversion and diminishing sensitivity in review sentiment

This article analyzes the relationship between ratings and review sentiment by introducing, for the first time, the tenets of prospect theory. Specifically, we test loss aversion and diminishing sensitivity on a sample of 132,486 reviews and find that: first, negative deviations in ratings (receiving a service with worse performance than expected) bring about a higher impact on review sentiment than positive deviations of equal magnitude (receiving a service with better performance than expected), thus, confirming loss aversion; and second, regardless of whether the service received is better or worse than expected, variations in ratings closer to the reference point result in higher marginal impacts on sentiment than equivalent variations further away from the reference point, thus, proving diminishing sensitivity. These results have relevant theoretical implications related to the use of relative vs absolute measures and the cognitive bias involved, and managerial implications linked to meeting expectations and service recovery.     

Adam Smith on lotteries: an interpretation and formal restatement

The paper concerns a neglected aspect of the Wealth of Nations (with the notable exception of D. Levy 1999 Levy, D. M. 1999. “Adam Smith’s Katallactic Model of Gambling: Approbation from the Spectator.” Journal of the History of Economic Thought 21 (1): 81–91. doi:10.1017/S1053837200002868.[Crossref] , [Google Scholar]), dealing directly with decision under risk. In a few pages from book I, chapter 10, Adam Smith explicitly named “lotteries” various objects of choice (possible occupations, or investment opportunities, for instance) and provided an analysis which standard expected utility glasses would hardly fit. Taking this into account allows a better understanding of the part played by typical characters like the “projector” or the “sober man”, in such matters as Smith’s conception of entrepreneurship or of the credit market. The use of some modern concepts in decision analysis (inverse stochastic dominance, rank dependent utility, prudence toward risk), is a means to show the existence, in Smith’s work, of an original theory from decision under risk, where his analysis of lotteries in the Wealth of Nations is consistent with statements from his moral philosophy on asymmetric sensitivity to gains and losses and to the regulating part played by the impartial spectator.     

异质机构投资者对高管薪酬的影响研究——来自A股上市公司的经验数据

以2012—2016年沪深A股上市公司为样本，从静态和动态两个角度实证研究异质机构投资者对上市公司高管薪酬的影响，结果表明：在高管薪酬方面，压力抵抗型投资者持股对薪酬总额的影响并不显著，而压力敏感型机构投资者则能显著提高薪酬总额；在高管薪酬变动速度方面，压力抵抗型机构投资者能够显著提升上市公司的业绩—薪酬敏感性，压力敏感型机构投资者的这一提升效果不显著；在高管薪酬变动幅度方面，A股上市公司高管薪酬普遍存在向下的粘性，相较于压力敏感型机构投资者，压力抵抗型机构投资者能够显著抑制高管薪酬粘性。     

Performance sensitivity of non-executive compensation in China: The role of economic policy uncertainty

This paper examines the impact of economic policy uncertainty on non-executive employees from the perspective of pay-performance sensitivity (PPS). Economy-wide uncertainty can trigger adverse impacts for businesses, and in response enterprises may adjust employee pay to maintain their level of activity. Using firm-level data on A-share companies listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges during 2003–2016, this paper finds that better-performing firms pay higher wages on average, which they adjust only during uncertain times. We also show that the impact of economic policy uncertainty on PPS is more pronounced in the context of labor-intensive, highly competitive industries and state-owned enterprises, because they tend to respond to uncertainty via wage adjustment. The evidence demonstrates that the pay-performance link is much weaker during uncertain times, when different subgroups react differently. However, our finding of a robust pay-performance relation holds, even with a range of firm-level controls and accounting for different levels of firm heterogeneity.     

中国菊花主题花展及其对行业发展的作用

以解决岩石园“如何设计”“为何设计”的问题入 手，通过分析国内外知名岩石园，从而得到当前岩石园规划设计 依据的类型，确定以高山生境特征作为设计依据。但高山生境在 城市中无法完全复制，因此仅以模仿其景观风貌特点作为设计依 据。以中国高山生境为例，通过对生长的高山植被景观风貌进行 提炼，得到高山植被外观风貌构建模式图；结合外观风貌特点， 提取高山植被景观元素特点和设计要点，通过植物种类替换，构 建出岩石园基于高山生境特征的植物造景设计模式     

Institutional quality,investment efficiency,and the choice of public–private partnerships

We examine a sample of 625 public–private partnership (PPP) firms from 1980 to 2015 that straddle nine countries with varying degrees of economic development and PPP markets. We find that the motivations of the firms that undertake PPP investments vary. While private sector firms in economies with low institutional quality choose to engage in PPPs to alleviate capital constraints attributed to underinvestment, those in economies with high institutional quality participate in PPPs to solve the problem of overinvestment due to an abundant cash flow. In the long run, the benefits of lower capital constraints through PPP investments are more pronounced in economies with high institutional quality.