民营企业引入职业经理过程中的逆向选择问题

现有文献还没有对我国民营企业的家族化运作给出令人满意的经济学解释。本文应用逆向选择和动态匹配模型对民营企业引入职业经理的过程进行分析，尝试从经济学角度给出一个对家族制度的解释。分析表明，家族化是有关职业经理能力和忠诚度信息不对称的一个均衡，该均衡导致企业管理退化到“封闭”的家族模式。而雇主与经理人之间的互动信息揭露有助于改善这一均衡，一定程度上实现双方的“双赢”匹配。本文据此提出了一些对策建议。     

SNMP和CMIP网络管理结构的比较及其综合统一方案

本文阐述了基于ＳＮＭＰ和ＣＭＩＰ的网络管理结构，从信息结构、管理功能、基本通信三方面扼要地比较了两者之间的差异，最后讨论了采用共存和互通方式的综合统一方案。     

惯性投资策略对股票收益惯性影响的实证研究——基于证券投资基金经理投资行为

选取沪深两市2003年6月至2007年6月共55只封闭式基金与18只开放式基金及其重仓持有的126支股票为研究对象,通过构建MT指标考察中国证券投资基金经理惯性投资策略对股价惯性的影响.研究表明,中国开放式基金经理大多倾向于采取追涨杀跌的惯性投资策略,并且惯性收益随MT值的上升而上升,说明证券投资基金经理的惯性投资策略影响了重仓股股票的惯性收益.     

Corporate governance and pay for performance: evidence from Germany

This paper investigates how two distinctive features of the German corporate governance system—concentrated ownership structure and representation of employees on firm supervisory boards—influence the sensitivity of managerial pay to firm profitability. There is a positive, though very small, link between pay and profitability for widely held firms. The presence of a largest owner seems hardly to affect this link in any economically significant way. However, the link between pay and profitability is smaller and indeed not significantly different from zero in firms whose largest owner is a German financial institution. This suggests that large owners tend to act as a substitute for rather than a complement to performance related pay in Germany. We thank Dennis Leech for allowing us to use his algorithms for computing voting power indices, and Brian Cheffins, Tim Guinnane, Andrew Harvey, Dennis Leech, Hamish Low, Sheilagh Ogilvie, Melvyn Weeks and two anonymous referees for helpful comments. The research reported in this paper was started during a joint visit to CES, University of Munich, and completed during visits of Edwards and Weichenrieder to the University of Konstanz and the ifo Institute for Economic Research in Munich. We thank the three institutions for their hospitality, especially Bernd Genser and Hans-Werner Sinn. A previous version of this paper was circulated under the title “The Measurement of Firm Ownership and its Effect on Managerial Pay”.     

并购经营者与并购促成者关系下的主并方合作联盟关系契约研究

主并方为多方的合作并购是一种新的企业并购形式,当外部潜在收益作用于合作并购联盟时,主并方的合作并购联盟稳定性会受到威胁。从不完全信息角度分析了合作并购中关系契约作为正式合作契约补充的必要性,进而系统地分析了关系契约中并购促成者和并购经营者的最优努力与最优转移支付的选择问题,并给出了并购经营者与并购促成者关系契约的达成条件及相关贴现值的选择准则。研究结论表明,关系契约中,并购经营者努力程度受到并购经营者转移支付的正向影响,而最优转移支付又取决于并购成功概率下的级差收益。     

公允价值计量对我国企业管理人员薪酬的影响分析

现行公司治理普遍采用公司业绩作为管理层努力的代理变量,而会计盈余又往往成为衡量公司业绩的主要指标。这为管理人员作为会计政策选择的主体利用政策选择操控利润来提高自身报酬提供了机会。公司管理层选择会计政策的动机和管理层如何对新发布的会计准则做出反应向来备受关注,2006年的企业会计准则改革扩大了公允价值的运用,为以薪酬操纵为目的会计政策选择提供了更广阔的空间。在此背景下,考察公允价值在管理层薪酬契约中的作用显然具有重要的理论意义和现实意义。     

The economic effects of expanded compensation disclosures

This paper analyzes the effects of expanded compensation disclosures on manager pay. For identification, I use the introduction of the Compensation Discussion and Analysis (CD&A) in the 2007 proxy season, a significant expansion in required compensation disclosures, to compare manager pay at firms with and without the disclosure in a difference-in-differences analysis. These disclosures are associated with increasing pay, contrary to the conventional wisdom that pay disclosures reduce pay levels via better shareholder monitoring. I hypothesize that enhanced ex ante disclosures of incentive plans reduce boards’ flexibility to make ex post adjustments or to use subjectivity and pressure boards toward more formulaic plans. Both effects impose higher payout risk on managers, leading to increased pay levels. Consistent with this hypothesis, the CD&A introduction is associated with lower likelihood to earn variable cash pay, greater use of formula-based pay, and higher pay at firms with more volatile measures of performance.     

Managerial risk appetite and asymmetry cost behavior: evidence from China

Managerial risk preferences have considerable impacts on a firm’s cost management through committed resource adjustment decisions. We investigate whether a firm’s cost behaviour is influenced by managers’ risk appetite and find that cost stickiness increases with managers’ risk-seeking. The positive relationship between risk-seeking and cost stickiness is weaker for firms with higher levels of manager capacity. We further find that the moderating effect of managerial capacity is more pronounced in non-state-owned enterprises, in less competitive industries, and in areas with lower degrees of marketisation. These results suggest that managers’ personal characteristics are key factors that affect sticky cost behaviour.     

商业银行个人客户经理制考核体系的构建探析

商业银行个人客户经理制起源于20世纪80年代的美国,通过专业人员对客户的专门服务,取得客户的信任、支持和协作,以达到企业价值的最大化。当前,各家商业银行倡导以＂市场为导向、以客户为中心＂的经营理念,也纷纷组建了自己专职的个人客户经理队伍,向有价值的客户提供差别化服务。本文重点介绍了个人客户经理制的核心内容,分析了当前各家商业银行在实施个人客户经理中普遍存在的问题,提出了要通过个人客户经理平衡积分卡来解决个人客户经理的考核,并就考核中应当关注的问题做了简要阐述。     

项目经理在工程项目管理中需要注意的几个问题

工程项目管理工作是一项很艰巨的任务，同时也是一个很严肃的工作，关系到国计民生。文章主要探讨了如何在工程项目管理中发挥好项目经理的职能。