新股短期价格表现研究评述

新股抑价是证券发行市场普遍存在的一个谜题,许多学者提出各种理论进行解释。本文从信息不对称、信息完全和市场无效率三方面对这些理论进行梳理,借此对研究我国股票市场异常行为提供一些思考。     

Optimum Currency Areas Under Inflation Targeting

Several countries face the choice between targeting inflation independently and entering a monetary union that targets inflation. The present paper extends the theory of optimum currency areas to deal with this choice. In contrast to the conventional theory, countries might form more of an optimum currency area the more asymmetric supply shocks are.     

Interbank market frictions, international banks and growth

In developing countries and countries in transition, a lack of finance is regarded as a major reason for the underperformance of the SME sector. The financial sector does not channel funds efficiently from savers to the most efficient investment. In a general equilibrium endogenous growth model, we explain the underperformance of the SME sector by interbank market frictions. High information costs in the interbank market lead to a high loan/deposit spread and hence to a low growth equilibrium. The solution to this problem is twofold. First, central bank policy could reduce interbank information problems by providing effective bank supervision. Second, if the central bank is expected not to have sufficient monitoring capabilities, reputation and reserves, opening up the interbank market to international banks can substitute for insufficient central bank activities.The sources of this advantage in efficiency are stronger incentives for workers and managers (direct connection between effort and return), easier monitoring and greater flexibility (McIntyre 2001).     

论税收征收管理技术创新

在税收征收管理过程中,征税方和纳税方的信息不对称给税收征收管理带来一定负面影响。在减少信息不对称、实现税收优化目标的过程中,税收征收管理技术创新是重要手段之一,具有自身的特点和作用。为了进一步提高税收征收管理的水平,技术创新要着眼于税收征收成本和遵从成本的均衡、技术创新与传统人工的结合、政策主导和市场机制的协调等策略原则,采取必要的措施,提高税收征收管理的质量。     

证券监管者声誉和承销商声誉的关联性研究

作者通过构建不对称信息结构下的两阶段博弈模型,应用Bayes法则对证券监管者声誉和承销商声誉的动态化以及二者声誉变动的关联性进行了研究。模型结论显示,监管者对承销商的违规或错误评估行为的“宽容”以及任何“下不为例”的监管思维不仅会加剧自身声誉的下降,而且会导致承销商评估失误概率的上升和承销商声誉的下降,表明监管者声誉和承销商声誉具有一损俱损的关联性。     

Asymmetric rivalry between strategic groups: response,speed of response and ex ante vs. ex post competitive interaction in the spanish bank deposit market

The objective of this study is to examine asymmetric rivalry between strategic groups in a given industry. Two research hypotheses argue for the existence of asymmetric rivalry in the sense that strategic groups of small companies have a greater degree of response but a slower speed of response to the actions of strategic groups of large companies, than vice versa. To test this, we use an ex post approach that examines the news releases published on the strategic actions and reactions of firms. A third hypothesis compares ex ante competitive expectations with ex post asymmetric rivalry between strategic groups. To test this, we compare ex post news on actions/reactions with an ex ante approach that estimates conjectural variations. The empirical application carried out on bank deposits in the Spanish market defines strategic groups in terms of size due to the historical and institutional conditions of the industry (deregulatory change). The results obtained show that rivalry patterns between strategic groups in terms of company size can be predicted as asymmetric in the sense that smaller bank strategic groups have a greater degree of response (Stackelberg ‘leader–follower’ competitive interaction), and a slower speed of response to the actions of larger bank strategic groups than is found the other way around. Moreover, ex ante expectations of aggressiveness on the part of larger strategic groups characterize greater ex post reactions from the smaller‐size strategic groups. Therefore, the size distribution of strategic groups is valuable to research on complex industries with deregulation changes. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

日本金融业不良债权产生的根源及政策措施

20世纪90年代初泡沫经济崩溃以来,日本银行业的不良债权一直大量存在,阻碍了日本经济的自律恢复。本文对日本银行业不良债权产生的经济背景、金融体制和经济结构原因以及市场经济条件下不良债权产生的一般原因进行了剖析,并对日本政府采取的政策措施及新进展进行了分析,在此基础上探讨了防范和化解不良债权的有效途径。     

Optimal Area-Yield Crop Insurance Reconsidered

The implementability of area-yield insurance contracts in the presence of symmetric and asymmetric information about the farmer's "beta" linking his yield to the risk-pool's yield is examined. In the presence of fixed costs and symmetric information Mahul's result that optimality requires setting the slope of the indemnity schedule equal to each farmer's beta is confirmed. When there is asymmetric information between the insurer and the farmer, however, this full-insurance contract is vulnerable to adverse selection, and therefore may not be implementable for general cost structures. The optimal area-yield insurance contract under asymmetric information is characterized.     

Stop and Go Agricultural Policies with a Land Market

This article studies the design of farm policy in the presence of asymmetric information about farmers' productivity, a government objective to insure farmers a minimum "parity" income, an endogenous land rent, and diminishing returns on alternative (nonprogram crop) land uses. In this setting, acreage set asides are never part of an optimal farm policy, although compensated acreage limits are. When there are new farmer entrants who cannot be excluded from farm programs, optimal policy takes the form of a pure voluntary acreage limitation—or "buyout"—program in which high-cost producers participate and low-cost producers do not.     

大户与散户在证券市场的博弈

通过对Laffon的模型进行了改进，将散户的效用函数改成了常系数绝对风险厌恶的负指数形式。Laffon的结论为：当θ1,θ2相距不远时，大户与散户都偏好混同均衡。而改进后的模型却找到了θ1,θ2的距离在一个具体的范围内，大户与散户才都偏好混同均衡。