Self-Selection and Optimal Nonlinear Effluent Charges

This paper proposes an optimal nonlinear effluent-charge system forenvironmental pollution control. This system achieves the first-bestoptimum through a self-selecting mechanism under asymmetric information.The proposed system can also control the level of revenues so as to reducethe excess burden of environmental taxation, and discriminate among thepolluters. The paper also compares this system with the conventional lineareffluent-charge system and discusses some economic implications ofimplementing the system.     

Open-Market Stock Repurchase and Stock Price Behavior When Management Values Real Investment

This paper provides a simple explanation of open‐market stock repurchases and the stock price behavior surrounding them. There is ex ante asymmetry of information with regard to the private benefits that corporate managers can attain from real investments. In our model, open‐market repurchase announcements reveal information about the managers' private benefits when real investment opportunities are unprofitable in terms of firm values. This study differs from previous studies in that we show that announcements of open‐market repurchase programs can be believable without the restriction that the announcements are commitments. Empirically, the model simultaneously predicts that a stock price will drop prior to an open‐market repurchase announcement and will rise in response to the announcement. These predictions are consistent with stylized facts.     

过度投资影响因素的研究综述

过度投资是导致公司投资效率低下的一个重要因素。近年来，关于公司过度投资行为的研究成为公司治理研究领域的一个热点问题．文章主要对近年来国内外关于公司过度投资产生原因的研究文献进行了综述。     

发展森林保险的政策研究

林业是国民经济的重要基础产业,也是为社会提供生态产品的重要公益事业,但是林业生产面临巨大的自然灾害风险。森林保险是重要的林业风险保障机制,但由于其准公共产品的性质和信息不对称等原因,森林保险在我国的发展历经曲折,严重滞后于林业发展对风险保障的巨大需求。通过对森林保险的经济学分析和对国外森林保险制度的研究和借鉴,本文认为建立政策性森林保险机制对于我国森林保险事业的发展具有重要的意义,并提出了相应的政策建议。     

信息不对称下的几个经济学实验

实验方法受到经济学界的重视,不对称信息条件下的实验方法研究具有重要现实意义。笔者探讨了若干在不对称信息条件下的经济学实验,包括名誉的作用、信号传递等重要实验,认为不对称信息下的实验的方法及其研究思路值得我国经济学者借鉴和深入研究。     

非对称信息条件下代建制的研究

由于代建项目一般工程量大、建设周期长、涉及的关系复杂、隐蔽性较强，很多质量问题在使用过程中逐渐暴露出来，而且在施工过程中项目代建单位比政府投资主管部门对工作及其环境更为了解，因此，政府投资主管部门和项目代建单位在信息占有方面不对称。在这种情况下，有些项目代建单位可能会利用自己的信息优势，通过损害政府投资主管部门的利益来最大化地提高自己的利益，如偷工减料、以次充好、无理索赔等等。在此，文章针对在这种非对称信息条件下如何完善代建制提出一些建议。     

Research on principal-agency of stockholders and managers under asymmetric information condition

In modem enterprises, a separation of the right of ownership and management results in asymmetric information problems between stockholders and managers. In conditions of principal-agency relationship, the game behaviors between principle and agency within enterprises are impacted by asymmetric information. This study discusses the game behaviors between stockholders and managers by using information economic theories from the perspective of asymmetric information. Based on the model of the principal-agency relationship between stockholders and managers, our research uses quantitative analysis to reveal how to achieve maximum profit expected of stockholders through an incomplete contract, under asymmetric information condition.     

信息不对称对绿色产品市场的影响——基于制造商和消费者关系的研究

运用数学模型从内部性和逆向选择两个方面分析了信息不对称对绿色产品市场的影响,指出了绿色产品市场的运行规律,并提出了解决该问题的对策建议。     

Welfare Effects of Foreign Direct Investment: Cost Saving vs. Signaling

We compare the effects of two types of foreign direct investment (FDI) (viz., FDI for trade cost saving and FDI for signaling foreign cost of production) on consumer surplus, profit of the host-country firm and host-country welfare. We show that the effects are dramatically different. If the reason for FDI is to save trade cost, FDI (compared to export) always makes the consumers better off and the host-country producer worse off, while the effect on host-country welfare is ambiguous. However, if the FDI is to signal the foreign cost of production, FDI (compared to export) always makes the host-country producer better off and increases host-country welfare, while it makes the consumers almost always worse off.