基于产品差异化和规制条件下的斯坦克尔伯格模型研究

本文研究了产品差异化和规制条件下的斯坦克尔伯格模型,认为跟随企业的定价受主导企业定价的影响,但其定价受主导企业定价的影响的敏感程度随行业内跟随企业数量增加而下降.此外,本文还研究了在完全信息和不对称信息条件下政府对主导企业进行不对称规制时,为实现社会福利最大化对其征税的最优税率的确定.     

基于信息不对称视角的小微企业融资难博弈分析

小微企业在创造就业机会、维护社会稳定以及活跃市场经济等方面发挥着巨大的作用.但是,由于小微企业经营规模小、自有资产少、抗风险能力差等原因,其很难通过银行等金融机构获得有效贷款.从信息不对称视角分析小微企业的逆向选择和道德风险对银行放贷的影响,结果表明：为解决小微企业融资困境,应加强诚信教育,传播信用知识;搭建信息平台,互通信用信息;提升评级质量,公布评级结果;促进银企沟通,建立服务平台.     

学习能力影响下供应链企业间知识交易的最优合约配置!

在知识买方——供应链中的供应商的学习能力为其私人信息的情况下,知识卖方——制造商通过设计将知识交易量与原材料产品折扣价格相结合的合约菜单来甄别供应商的学习能力类型。在此基础上,建立信息不对称情形下的知识交易模型,通过模型求解得出最优的合约配置,并结合信息对称情形下的基准情形对合约菜单的相关性质进行了分析。最后利用数值算例对上述相关性质进行了说明。     

Oil price shocks on Indian economy: evidence from Toda Yamamoto and Markov regime-switching VAR

The study investigates the dynamic impact of linear and non-linear specifications of oil price shocks on macroeconomic fundamentals for an oil-importing emerging economy – India – during the period March 1991 to January 2009. The paper deploys extended vector autoregressive (VAR) model of possibly integrated processes proposed by Toda and Yamamoto, which has its advantage of application irrespective of the variables being stationary or cointegrated. The study further estimates two-state Markov regime-switch VAR model to examine regime shift behaviour of the underlying variables and its relationship. The study finds that inflation and foreign exchange reserve are greatly impacted by oil price shocks. The study also confirms that the movement in oil price is exogenous with respect to the movement of India’s macroeconomic variables and the impact of oil price shocks are asymmetric in nature with negative price shocks having more pronounced effect than positive shocks.     

基于供应商入侵的两级供应链批量博弈及决策

考虑由一个供应商和一个零售商组成的两级供应链,构建了三阶段博弈模型,研究在不对称信息下供应商入侵对零售商订单量及供应商库存量决策的影响。通过设计市场规模阈值及调查市场规模,进而得出每一阶段下供应商和零售商的利润。对3个阶段供应商和零售商利润先后进行比较分析,发现当后一阶段利润大于前一阶段时,供应链成员才会对订单量及库存量进行调整,从而得出在每阶段零售商订单数量及供应商库存数量范围。结果表明,供应商入侵在一定的零售商订单量及供应商库存量范围内可以提高供应链利润。     

Ex ante contracting with endogenously determined communication plans

Summary. In this paper we introduce a new model of ex ante contracting for economies with asymmetric information to examine endogenously determined communication plans for information sharing in the interim stage. In contrast to the models used in previous research, in the present model agents negotiate not only on a contract of state contingent allocations but also on a communication plan, a set of rules describing how agents will reveal part of their private information at the interim stage to execute the trade contracts. We prove a result about the nested structure of the set of allocations implementable by various communication plans and establish the existence of core strategies for this cooperative game under various regularity conditions. Received: 4 March 1998; revised version: 17 September 1999     

Adverse selection and bilateral asymmetric information

A simple principal-agent model with bilateral asymmetric information and common values is developed. The agent(s) has private information about his characteristics but does not knowhow these affect outcomes. The principal knows how the characteristics translate into outcomes, but does not observe the characteristics. It is shown that equilibrium contracts aresimple in being designednot to reveal the agent's characteristics. When the agent knows howsome of his characteristics affect the outcome, contracts will be differentiated with respect to precisely those characteristics. An application to the use of genetic information is considered.     

Green Business and Blue Angels

This paper presents a model of a monopolist'svoluntary overcompliance with legal environmentalstandards under asymmetric information about thefirm's environmental impacts. The key assumptions are:the existence of quality premia for environmentalsoundness, a positive but imperfect degree ofmonitoring, and adaptive consumer expectations.Conditions necessary for overcompliance to arise in aprofit-maximizing equilibrium are derived. The effectsof a third-party eco-labeling system are analyzed. Itis shown that the existence of an independent labelingauthority increases the likelihood of overcomplianceto be profit-maximizing. Moreover, firms might have anincentive to lobby for the introduction of such asystem. The effect of consumers' risk preferences andan instrument for preventing ``Greenwash' (companieslying about their environmental performance) is alsodiscussed.     

不对称信息下餐饮企业绿色供应链管理实践多案例研究

本文通过多案例研究方法研究了餐饮企业在不对称信息下实施绿色供应链管理的实践以及信任关系协调,即企业如何在供应链中有效地传递环境绩效信息,协调机会主义行为与信任合作之间的关系。研究表明：企业通过第三方独立认证,可以构建绿色品牌声誉,从而向利益相关者传递环境绩效信息;通过契约合同及纵向一体化可以实现绿色采购;不对称信息下,企业面临平衡信任合作与机会主义行为之间的矛盾问题,需要通过提高信任程度来实现绿色供应链管理的持续改进。     

Replacing the Stability and Growth Pact?

The euro-zone division between a single, federal monetary system and separate national fiscal systems is troublesome. The attempt to deal with it via the Stability and Growth Pact has not succeeded. Any hopes that the function of stabilizing asymmetric shocks might be shifted to the federal centre have been dashed by the referendums. I argue that the main concern over the event of a failure of a nation state in the euro-area to meet its debts is the contagious effect that that would currently have on its domestic financial intermediaries. So the proper response would be to enforce significant incremental capital requirements on financial institutions' holdings of such debt.Financial Market Group London School of Economics—United Kingdom. Presidential Address at the Sixty-First International Atlantic Economic Conference, March 15–19, 2006 Berlin, Germany. Presidential Address at the Sixty-First International Atlantic Economic Conference, March 15–19, 2006 Berlin, Germany. My thanks are due to Peter Kenen, Jacques Melitz, Warren Mosler, Waltraud Schelke and Randy Wray and to the editors of this journal fortheir most helpful suggestions, corrections, and advice. All remaining errors are my own.