Promotion and Prevention Contracts in Industry Level Firm to Firm Dyad

ABSTRACT

Purpose

This article aims to introduce and distinguish two features of contract design – prevention and promotion contracts – and compares their effects on opportunism within the distributor–supplier relationship. It also examines the moderating role of ex post contract enforcement strategies.     

高管机会主义品行与公司信息披露决策

文章构建相应策略识别了高管机会主义品行，并探究其对公司信息披露决策的影响。研究结果表明，高管的机会主义品行会显著增加公司信息披露违规、真实盈余管理行为；提升公司选择非国际“四大”会计师事务所的概率，并支付更高的审计费用。随着高管机会主义水平上升，公司更有可能作出上述决策。进一步地，国有产权能在一定程度上抑制高管机会主义品行对信息披露质量的负面影响，却显著增加了公司应计盈余管理；当高管机会主义水平较高时，国有产权也无法发挥有效治理作用。从经济后果看，高管的机会主义品行能被资本市场识别，并显著减损公司未来价值。     

How to inhibit a partner's strong and weak forms of opportunism: Impacts of network embeddedness and bilateral TSIs

This study investigates the moderating effects of a firm's network embeddedness and a partner's transactional specific investments (TSIs) on relationships between the firm's TSIs and its partner's strong- and weak-form opportunism, and compares the efficiency among these moderator variables. The regression results suggest that (1) a firm's TSIs are positively related to partner's opportunism when network embeddedness and the partner's TSIs are relatively low; but (2) a firm's TSIs are negatively related to partner's opportunism when network embeddedness and the partner's TSIs are relatively high. Furthermore (3) network embeddedness is more effective in inhibiting partner's weak-form opportunism than in inhibiting strong-form opportunism resulting from the firm's TSIs. Finally (4) with regard to the relationship between TSIs and weak-form opportunism, the negative moderating effect of network embeddedness is greater than the negative moderating effect of partner's TSIs. This study explains reasons why conflicting views exist about the relationship between TSIs and partner's opportunism, reveals the differences in the moderating effects of network embeddedness and partner's TSIs, and makes new contributions to both transaction cost theory and embeddedness literature. It also provides, for firms involved in TSIs in a buyer–supplier relationship, insightful managerial suggestions about ways to reduce their partner's varying forms of opportunism.     

Relationship Commitment and Ethical Consumer Behavior in a Retail Setting: The Case of Receiving Too Much Change at the Checkout

In this study, we conducted two experiments to examine the effect of relationship commitment on the reaction of shoppers to receiving too much change, controlling for the amount of excess change. Hypotheses based on equity theory, opportunism and guilt were set up and tested. The first study showed that, when the less committed consumer is confronted with a large excess of change, he/she is less likely to report this mistake, compared with a small excess. Conversely, consumers with a high commitment towards the retailer are more likely to tell when they receive too much change, especially when the amount is large. The second experiment provided an explanation for these findings: the less committed consumer is driven by opportunism, whereas guilt-related feelings play an important role in a high commitment relationship. These results have several implications for both retail management and future research.     

Bilateral Opportunism in Buyer–supplier Partnerships

ABSTRACT

Purpose

Literature analyzes interorganizational relationships mostly from a relational perspective by emphasizing partnerships’ positive aspects. Yet business reality is often less romantic and more opportunistic. Especially within the automotive industry opportunistic behaviors often cause extreme reactions in both partners, resulting in poisoned relationships. This study examines the effects of bilateral opportunism between buyers and suppliers on both partners’ relationship induced financial performance, using an automotive industrial setting of new product development (NPD) partnerships. Furthermore, we evaluate the “opportunistic fit” between both partners to assess whether partnerships are characterized by opportunistic parity or unilateral domination.     

机会主义还是稳健主义?——来自中国上市公司解聘审计师的经验证据

上市公司解聘审计师问题是学术界和监管部门关注的热点,本文选取2002至2004会计年度解聘审计师的公司为研究样本,考察了上市公司解聘审计师的动机及其经济后果。结果表明,公司解聘审计师并非由于前任审计师过于稳健,当公司具有避免亏损、ST、退市以及摘除ST的动机时,则更有可能解聘审计师,而且这些公司通过解聘审计师成功实现了审计意见的购买。     

公司治理与管理层机会主义会计选择——基于新会计准则的实证分析

2007年1月1日开始实施的新会计准则为上市公司提供了更多的会计选择空间,诱发了管理层的机会主义动机。本文以新会计准则下金融资产分类为例,结合2007～2008年中国A股上市公司数据,实证检验了公司治理安排对管理层机会主义会计选择的影响。研究发现,国家控股和两职合一的公司更倾向于机会主义会计选择,独立董事比例和管理层持股比例与机会主义会计选择显著负相关。并且,独立董事和股权激励制度对管理层机会主义会计行为的约束作用在国有企业中更加显著。本研究丰富了会计选择的研究文献,有助于监管部门了解新会计准则的实施效果及影响机制。     

股权激励下经理人机会主义行为的经济学分析

从理论上探讨股权激励下经理人机会主义的动机与实现途径。在薪酬委员会不独立时,具有信息优势地位的经理人可以通过在实施激励前尽可能地将股权激励授予时的获取成本压低以及实施激励后通过盈余管理的行为将公司的股价抬高等机会主义行为实现其股权基础薪酬最大化。为了保证股权激励的有效性,应从委员构成以及议事程序等方面进一步提高薪酬委员会的独立性。     

从国际金融危机看新加坡的国家治理

新加坡作为亚洲四小龙之一,以国家资本主义模式特立于世,是高度出口依赖、本地资源匮乏的国家,出口贸易和国际金融中心运营是主要经济支柱,国际人才战略是新加坡立于不败的根本。在国际金融危机来临时,新加坡应对措施及时、适当,加之国企公司治理制度的良好基础,使得它在2009年迅速恢复元气。新加坡成功的国家治理经验值得中国借鉴。     

人大预算决策、机会主义行为与宪法性约束

与行政部门一样,立法机构在预算决策过程中同样存在着机会主义行为.本文从抑制公共支出总量膨胀与防止公共支出结构异化这两个角度,就如何施加宪法性约束以限制人大在预算决策过程中的机会主义行为做出了理论的探讨.问题的研究对于目前正在进行的<预算法>的修订和完善具有重要的参考价值.