External regulation,independent director attendance,and governance effects

In this study we examine how the regulation of director attendance disciplines directors’ behavior, and consider the governance effect of such regulations. This examination exploits the differences between the requirements for director attendance at board meetings enacted by the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE) and by the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE). Using a difference-in-differences model with a sample of A-share listed firms from 2006 to 2017, we document that the rate of meeting attendance by independent directors who serve with firms listed on the SHSE (SHIDs) has increased significantly since the exchange’s enforcement of the regulation on attendance. This positive effect has been more pronounced for independent directors with legal backgrounds. Further investigations find that the regulation of attendance plays a corporate governance role through the mechanism of enhanced monitoring. The attendance regulation increases the SHIDs likelihood of casting dissenting votes, and it leads to both better accounting performance and higher firm value. In addition, SHIDs are more likely to depart from firms listed on the SHSE, and to transfer their directorships to firms listed on the SZSE, which has a less constraining attendance requirement. Our findings provide evidence of how external regulation shapes director attendance and voting behavior in emerging markets.     

Firms’ performance following the initial resignation of independent directors: evidence from Taiwan

This study investigates the operating performance of firms listed on the Taiwan stock exchange following the initial resignation of independent directors. The results show that the firms’ operating performance following the resignation of these directors has not only deteriorated, but is also significantly below the industry average. In addition, firms with a relatively severe agency problem, including firms that have lower insider or institutional shareholdings, receive audit opinions other than unqualified opinions or change their auditors prior to the resignation of the independent directors, tend to perform more poorly following the resignation.     

Gender equality's impact on female directors’ efficacy: A multi-country study

This paper studies the role of gender equality in female directors’ efficacy and its subsequent effects on firms. Female directors in more gender equal societies should possess greater skills and exert more influence due to better access to educational/professional opportunities and more amicable boardroom dynamics. Therefore, we hypothesize that gender equality serves as an important moderator in the relation between female board representation and firm outcomes. Using a multi-national panel comprising 1986 public firms from 24 countries or areas spanning from 2007 to 2016, we obtain results that firms with higher female board representation exhibit higher overall performance, less earnings management, and less excessive risk taking, in which all three relations are stronger in countries with greater gender equality. Taken together, our paper implies that the impact of female directors on firm outcomes depends on a country's overall level of gender equality.     

The value of ongoing venture capital investment to newly listed firms

We examine whether the market values continuing venture capital (VC) investor involvement in firms post-IPO. Compared to the US, Australian VC investors exit their investments post-IPO by on-market sales rather than distribution of holdings to their investors. Lockup periods tend to be longer and ownership thresholds for reporting trades lower. We find that the market responds positively to buy transactions, negatively to sell transactions of VC investors and negatively to the resignation of VC directors. These results are consistent with VC investors in the firm having a positive influence and creating value from which the VCs and other shareholders benefit.     

Independent director compensation,corruption, and monitoring

We find that independent directors in more corrupt countries receive greater pay. This relation could reflect outside directors in corrupt countries expropriating firm value, or it could reflect higher compensation for the additional effort required to lessen the negative effects of corruption. Acquirer acquisition announcement returns are lower in more corrupt countries, and this relation is mitigated by higher director pay. Higher director pay is also associated with greater sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm performance and moderates the negative effects of country‐level corruption on firm value. This evidence is consistent with higher director pay in corrupt countries incentivizing effort.     

钻孔咬合桩在复合地层中的应用研究 ——以杭州地铁3号线工业大学站为例

钻孔咬合桩多用于软土地层,采用全套管钻机软切割法施工,但在上软下硬的复合地层中,全套管法成孔困难,无法保证桩体的垂直度,以致于咬合效果达不到设计要求。为了解决此类工程问题,依托杭州地铁3号线一期工程工业大学站基坑工程,研究了钻孔咬合桩在上软下硬复合地层中的适应性及应用情况,并与其他围护方式在可实施性、安全性、经济性、施工效率等方面进行了综合比较。研究结果表明,在复合地层中采用旋挖钻机硬切割法施工咬合桩,成孔效率高,桩体垂直度高,止水效果好,能产生更好的工期效益、社会效益和经济效益。并且钻孔咬合桩能够很好地适应复合地层,经济性好,施工效率高,解决了复合地层中钻孔咬合桩的施工工艺和设备选型问题。研究过程及结果可为复合地层中的基坑工程施工提供借鉴与参考。     

公司治理、董事会独立性与公司绩效

通过利用215家上市公司2001-2003年的数据,对董事会的独立性与公司业绩的关系进行实证分析发现:我国上市公司董事会的独立性较差,独立董事对公司业绩的影响很小,独立董事在很大程度上只起到“装饰”性的作用。因此,不断完善我国的独立董事制度,努力提高董事会的独立性,建立董事会的约束机制,对改善上市公司治理绩效有重要意义。     

基金会制度与独立董事制度的完善

呼吁引进一个新的制度,即基金会制度,并且从我国实际出发,研究分析了基金会制度在解决独立董事制度中的难题作用。从基金会制度在独立董事的选任和激励约束制度中的作用来看,基金会应是一个独立的非营利性法人机构,将其融入独立董事制度中,能使许多问题迎刃而解。     

中国证券市场风险若干问题探析

中国证券市场历经 1 0余年的发展 ,在对企业进行股份制改造、活跃投融资渠道等方面发挥了积极的作用。但在其自身运行过程中 ,不论在微观层面———上市公司 ,还是在宏观层面———市场建设和临管方面 ,都暴露了自身的缺陷与不足。因此 ,研究我国证券市场的风险机制 ,对预防证券市场风险 ,维护证券市场稳定 ,保障投资者利益等方面都具有不可估量的意义。     

公司治理机制下独立董事功能分析

独立董事具有监督公司管理层,评价董事会,树立公司形象等功能,但其自身存在信息不灵、缺乏动力及不能真正独立等缺欠。应从对其功能合理定位,完善选拔机制与选聘程序、完善激励与约束机制,建立健全相关法律法规体系等方面施以对策,以更好地发挥独立董事的功能及作用。