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This study extends the leisure constraint-effects-mitigation model to the perceived behavioural control (PBC)- constraint-negotiation model by adding PBC. Three competing models were tested to determine which model best fits the data. Results suggested that PBC mediates the relationship between motivation and negotiation, and there is a direct path from motivation to participation. Findings contribute to deepening and broadening the theory of leisure constraint negotiation because the new variable was successfully added to the original model and the model was extended to new settings (i.e. solo travel and non-Western). 相似文献
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Youjin Baik Hyojin Kim Young‐Ryeol Park 《Canadian Journal of Administrative Sciences / Revue Canadienne des Sciences de l\u0027Administration》2021,38(1):68-79
The person–environment fit theory posits that the term “environment” can be defined at different levels. This study delineates two environmental dimensions (strategic and organizational) and empirically examines the potential moderating effects of two strategic factors (intra‐ and inter‐regional diversification) on the relationship between two organizational factors (subsidiary ownership and host‐country experience) and MNE subsidiary staffing composition. The results indicate that strategic and organizational dimensions have impacts on subsidiary staffing composition. This study also finds that the interaction effects between strategic and organizational factors are significant only when there is congruence between demands from different environmental dimensions. 相似文献
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Baik Bok Kim Jin-Mo Kim Kyonghee Patro Sukesh 《Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting》2020,54(3):877-910
Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting - Using 13F filings from 1996 to 2011, we document that hedge fund holdings are negatively associated with the subsequent frequency of portfolio... 相似文献
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Kyung Hwan Baik 《Southern economic journal》2007,73(4):986-1002
We consider two-player contests in which each player hires a delegate who expends his effort to win a prize on the player's behalf. Endogenizing delegation contracts, we focus on the equilibrium contracts between the players and their delegates. We first show that each player's equilibrium contract is a no-win-no-pay contract. Then, we examine the delegates' equilibrium compensation spreads, effort levels, probabilities of winning, expected payoffs, and the players' equilibrium expected payoffs. We show that economic rents for the delegates may exist. 相似文献
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Kyung Hwan Baik 《European Journal of Political Economy》1998,14(4):685-701
We examine players' equilibrium effort levels in a contest with difference-form contest success functions in which two players compete with each other to win a prize. We show the following. At the pure-strategy Nash equilibrium of a simultaneous-move game, and in the subgame-perfect equilibrium of a sequential-move game, only one of the players expends effort or neither player expends effort. If one player's composite strength is far greater than the other player's, only the player with greater composite strength expends effort whether they move simultaneously or sequentially. If the players' valuations for the prize and their marginal probabilities of winning at (0, 0) are sufficiently small, neither player expends effort whether they move simultaneously or sequentially. 相似文献
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Kyung Hwan Baik 《Economics & Politics》1994,6(2):147-162
We define a winner-help-loser group in a rent-seeking contest as follows: (a) the member players compete noncooperatively to win the rent, and (b) if a member player wins the rent, he helps the losing member players according to the previously written agreement. We demonstrate that one and only one winner-help-loser group is formed voluntarily. One important consequence of such group formation is that rent dissipation is small relative to individual rent seeking. Therefore, such group formation decreases the social cost associated with rent seeking and thus decreases the economic inefficiency of rent seeking. 相似文献
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We consider a strategic situation in which a firm may conceal the illegal activity of violating environmental regulations and a regulator seeks to verify the illegality to punish the firm. We study two main factors, fines and social monitoring, that influence the firm’s decision in that situation. First, we find all the possible equilibria of our model and examine conditions of those two factors that lead to each equilibrium. Using the equilibrium conditions, we then study the optimal enforcement policies that induce the most socially desirable equilibrium and improve social welfare within each equilibrium. Our main findings are as follows. First, the two factors have a complementary relationship in getting the most desirable equilibrium: Certain high levels of fines and social monitoring are both needed. Second, if making the social monitoring above the certain critical level is impossible, setting the level of the fines as high as possible may be the optimal enforcement policy. Finally, if setting the fines above the certain critical level is not available, either, setting the level of the fines as low as possible might be optimal, and the higher level of the social monitoring does not necessarily bring higher social welfare. 相似文献
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One of the fundamental problems in strategic management is to map a heterogeneous set of firms in an industry into subsets of firms within which firms are homogeneous in their conduct and performance. The strategic group concept provides an answer to this intriguing question. Researchers in strategic group theory argue that firms within the same strategic group are behaviorally similar and thus tend to compete more fiercely within the group than across groups. In this paper, we focus on the question whether firms within the same group show similar decision‐making characteristics. Strategic‐choice theorists argue that top management teams in firms have substantial discretion in determining the future strategic contour of firms. Upper‐echelon theorists also argue that top managers are the strategists who set the direction of firms and the pace of competition in the industry. Further, they argue that top management team characteristics are an important element that determines the market niche in which a firm competes and the strategic direction a firm follows. Based on these arguments, we expect that there will be a significant link between grouping of firms by the patterns of competitive interactions and grouping of firms by top management team heterogeneity. Moreover, we argue that the closer the TMT heterogeneity of a firm is to the dominant heterogeneity in the competitive interaction group, the better it performs. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献