Understanding Communication Research Findings

A central aspect of communication research is widely misunderstood, ignored, or not known by researchers in other fields and by the public. The problems this creates are discussed; the correct understanding is identified, and an appeal is made for attention to the issue by researchers.     

Using Market Expectations to Test for Speculative Bubbles in the Crude Oil Market

The wide fluctuations of oil prices from 2003 to 2008 have attracted the interest of academics and policymakers. A popular view is that these fluctuations were caused by speculative bubbles due to the increased financialization of oil futures markets. This hypothesis, however, is difficult to examine since the fundamental price of oil is unobservable and, therefore, econometric evidence in favor of bubbles may actually be due to misspecified market fundamentals. In this paper, we extend two recently proposed methodologies for bubble detection that alleviate this problem by using market expectations of future prices. Both methodologies provide no evidence of speculative bubbles.     

PERCEPTIONS AND MISPERCEPTIONS IN CONSUMER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

The extent to which respondents are able to correctly perceive and subjectively report their relative level of household food consumption is examined. The role of perception and misperception is examined in the context of a family economics-resource management framework and a causal path model. Findings suggest that the perceptual error is remarkably modest. The characteristics of households systematically associated with positive and negative perceptual error are identified.     

Taxes and the Theory of Trade Debt

In this paper, we show that taxes motivate the flow of trade credit without involving the assumption of credit market imperfections. The direction of trade credit flow depends on the distribution of marginal tax rates among buyers and sellers. In equilibrium, the trade credit decision follows a tax-induced clientele on both the supply and demand side.     

CEO Horizon,Optimal Pay Duration,and the Escalation of Short‐Termism

This paper studies optimal contracts when managers manipulate their performance measure at the expense of firm value. Optimal contracts defer compensation. The manager's incentives vest over time at an increasing rate, and compensation becomes very sensitive to short‐term performance. This generates an endogenous horizon problem whereby managers intensify performance manipulation in their final years in office. Contracts are designed to encourage effort while minimizing the adverse effects of manipulation. We characterize the optimal mix of short‐ and long‐term compensation along the manager's tenure, the optimal vesting period of incentive pay, and the dynamics of short‐termism over the CEO's tenure.     

Information search in the mutual fund market in the U.S. A.

Sequential decision-making principles are introduced which can be applied to mutual fund investing. Specific attention is given to the nature of the mutual fund market and the expected pay-off from a low-cost information search. Empirical results are based on historical returns and information that is readily available in popular press sources. Substantial variation in historical performance was found and the pay-off from a market search was positive and substantial in many cases.     

HOUSEHOLD PRODUCTION AND MARKET EMPLOYMENT: DUAL AVENUES OF CONSUMER BEHAVIOUR

A theoretical model of the economics of production and consumption within the household is developed into an empirical path model. With data from a representative Iowa sample the impact of household production on expenditure patterns is examined with estimates of the implied income equivalence or marginal value of nonmarket production.