昆明市工程招投标监管的探索与发展研究

针对工程招标投标领域存在的突出问题,昆明市近几年在工程招标投标监管方面进行了许多新的探索.从昆明市招标投标监管机构设置、标前监管、标中监管、标后监管4个角度对昆明市工程招标投标监管现状进行分析,并对工程招标投标监管领域的一些新趋势进行探讨,提出强化招标投标监管的建议.新技术为招标投标监管提供了新工具,需要进一步探索新技术在招标投标监管领域的应用.     

基于人工神经网络的地铁施工招标综合评估模型

广州地铁工程是国内数个重要的大型城市基础建设项目之一。目前对于这种复杂的大型工程项目,迫切需要一个成熟可靠的公开招标评估系统。根据广州地铁工程的实际招标评标数据,提出应用人工神经网络(ANN)建立地铁施工招标综合评估模型。BP神经网络具有很强的自学习和自适应能力,可以精确地迫近复杂的非线性动态函数。经过训练网络,基于BP网络的模型成功量化了主观和定性的技术评估指数,得出较满意的评估结果。该模型可以通过增加样本提高精度,从而应用在地铁和其他类似建设项目招标中。     

工程量清单招标方法的探讨

工程量清单招标是国际上普遍使用的通行做法。它适应市场并合理配置资源,有利于施工企业合理报价,实现优胜劣汰,有利于标底的管理和控制,合理分散风险等,是我国工程造价体制改革的必然走向。     

建筑工程项目无标底招标行为的经济博弈分析

运用博弈方法对建筑工程项目无标底招标行为展开模型化研究,剖析各投标人的出价策略以及招标人的期望收益,演绎其博弈特性和博弈均衡.在实证中提出建筑工程项目无标底招标行为博弈所需满足的条件,设计可操作的建筑工程项目无标底招标博弈机制,规范建筑行业经营及行政管理部门提供决策支持.     

建筑工程无标底招标理论与实践

随着中国建筑业管理体制改革的不断深化，招投标制度在中国得以推广应用，但在招投标机制方面还存在不足，有待完善。文章通过无标底招投标的博弈论基础，分析了无标底招标的意义和作用，同时对无标底招标的实施提出了一些相应的措施和建议，最后指出，随着中国加入WTO，与国际接轨，推广无标底招投标方法是我国建筑业招投标制度改革的当务之急。     

目标公司股权结构对敌意收购的影响——中信证券收购广发证券的案例研究

兼并、收购、接管(敌意收购)和买断,是公司控制权市场常见的几种表现形式。本文通过中信证券收购广发证券的案例研究,从敌意收购的过程、动因、反收购措施及市场反应的角度对其进行了分析,并指出目标公司的股权集中度、交叉持股、非上市公司特征等股权结构方面对敌意收购的影响。     

清单计价背景下投标报价策略研究

在建筑市场推行无底招标和清单计价规范的背景下，探讨由业主给定工程量，投标单位填报单价，最后经过验方计价，以单价结算的合同下，投标单位如何根据业主给定工程量可能的变动趋势，基于运筹学的线性规划理论，进行不平衡报价，最大化其收益。     

Rent Seeking with Efforts and Bids

We introduce bids in a rent-seeking contest. Players compete for a prize. Apart from exerting lobbying efforts, they also submit a bid which is payable only if they win the prize. We show that our model has a unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies, in which each active player submits the same bid, while the sum of all efforts equals that bid. In equilibrium there is underdissipation of rent.     

Competition and Regulation in Franchise Bidding

In this work we show that the separation property identified in the franchise bidding literature depends strictly on the hypothesis of coincidence of the regulator's beliefs with those of the competing firms. Nevertheless, in many contexts it is more truthful to hypothesize that the regulator's information is vaguer than that of the producers, so we introduce the possibility that the regulator is dealing with a double informational asymmetry as compared to the firms. In this case, the separation property is no longer valid, and the optimal tariff becomes a decreasing function of the degree of competition exercised during the auction.     

Researching Preferences,Valuation and Hypothetical Bias

A number of recent papers in environmental economics have focused on the process of researching preferences – agents are uncertain about preferences but with effort may narrow their uncertainty. This issue has arisen in formulating bids in contingent valuation (CV) as well as the debate over the divergence between WTP and WTA. In the context of CV, it has been suggested that the hypothetical nature of the preference elicitation process biases responses. This paper provides both a theoretical model and experimental evidence to contribute to this debate. The model is a model of competitive bidding for a private good with two components that are particularly relevant to the debate. The first component is that bidders are unsure of their own value for the private good but may purchase information about their own value (researching preferences). The second component is that there is a probability that the auction is hypothetical – that the winning bidder will not get the private good and will not pay the winning bid. The experiment tests this theoretical model of bidding equilibrium and analyzes the effects of variations in the parameters (hypotheticalness, information costs and number of agents) on the endogenous variables (such as the proportion of bidders who become informed and the winning bid). Experimental results suggest that an increase in the hypotheticalness of an auction tends to decrease the likelihood that bidders pay for information on their valuation with an ambiguous effect on the winning bid.