Irreversible investment,ambiguity and equity default swaps

We study the impact of ambiguity on the pricing and timing of the option to invest. There is a funding gap to undertake the investment, which is covered by entering into an equity-for-guarantee swap. Our model predicts that the more ambiguity-averse the agents, the less the option value, the later the investment and the higher the guarantee cost and the leverage. If the entrepreneur is more ambiguity-averse than the insurer, the investment threshold slightly rises as the perceived ambiguity increases, and on the contrary, if the entrepreneur is less ambiguity-averse than the insurer, the investment threshold increases sharply as the perceived ambiguity rises.     

The effects of credit default swaps on corporate investment

ABSTRACT

This paper examines how credit default swaps (CDS) affect the corporate investment of the referenced entities. We document a significant reduction in corporate investment after CDS trading, a result that is robust to alternative model specifications and a set of endogeneity tests. Our findings of the increased firm risk and cost of capital support the costly external capital channel. The cross-sectional variations in CDS effects demonstrate that both reduced monitoring and the empty creditor problem might be the underlying forces driving the costly external capital channel. Our additional analysis implies that CDS trading is associated with an enhancement in investment efficiency for firms that are prone to overinvestment.     

Failure to learn from failure: The 2008 mortgage crisis as a déjà vu of the mortgage meltdown of 1994

This article traces the developments in the market for residential mortgage-backed securities (MBS) during the period 1970–2008. Drawing on an analysis of trade publications, business press, and interviews with practitioners, it shows that an MBS market meltdown in 1994 provided clear signals of problems with MBS. The market participants did not re-evaluate their use of risk management tools or adjust security design in response to the 1994 crisis, suggesting a lack of understanding of the implications of the crisis. The 1994 meltdown showed that MBS were vulnerable to systematic risks and that these risks could precipitate an MBS market crash. Furthermore, the 1994 meltdown demonstrated that large-scale investment in MBS could affect the primary mortgage market, thereby rendering the MBS risks unpredictable. After 1994, MBS investment shifted to MBS backed by mortgages with default risk – a development that led to the crash of 2008. By drawing parallels between the 1994 and 2008 crises, this article shows how the MBS market failed to self-correct. The results suggest that financial market participants do not always incorporate relevant information in their decision-making and that market participants have difficulties in both foreseeing the effect of financial innovations on markets and interpreting these effects.     

A Multicriteria Approach for Modeling Small Enterprise Credit Rating: Evidence from China

ABSTRACT

As the engine of China’s economy, small enterprises have been the central to the country’s economic development. However, given the characteristics of the small enterprises loan (i.e., short borrowing period, large volume, small amount and incomplete information), it is extremely challenging for financial institutions to assess their creditworthiness. Thus, it seriously delays and restricts the financing access for small enterprises. In an attempt to relieve the financing difficulty of small enterprises, this article makes use of 687 small wholesale and retail enterprises in a regional commercial bank in China, to establish a credit rating indicator system composed of 17 indicators by using both partial correlation analysis and probit regression. It then utilizes TOPSIS together with fuzzy C-means to score the credit ratings of our sample of small enterprises. With the dual test of default discrimination and ROC curve, the prediction accuracy of the established indicator system has reached 80.10% and 0.917, respectively, indicating the robustness and validity of our credit rating system.     

Consequences of Debt Forgiveness: Strategic Default Contagion and Lender Learning

I use a unique data set of loans to small business owners to examine whether lenders face adverse consequences when they grant debt forgiveness to borrowers. I provide evidence consistent with borrowers communicating their debt forgiveness to other borrowers, who then more frequently strategically default on their own obligations. This strategic default contagion is economically large. When the lender doubles debt forgiveness, the default rate increases by 10.9% on average. Using an exogenous shock to the lender's forgiveness policy, my findings suggest that as the lender learns about the extent of borrower communication the lender tightens its debt forgiveness policy to mitigate default contagion.     

Does default point vary with firm size?

This article aims to improve the predictive ability of KMV model by distinguishing firm size. The evidence suggests that default point would vary with firm size. Using the method of particle swarm optimization, we obtain the optimal default point separately for large firms and small firms. Several statistical tests such as the model confidence set methodology show that our relatively tractable model is more likely to have the strongest predictive ability.     

Lack of successors,firm default,and the performance of small businesses

We investigate the effects of the lack of successors on small businesses with an elderly manager. Using firm-level data from Japan, a country with an aging population, we find the following results. First, smaller, younger, highly leveraged, and nongrowing firms are likely to have no successor. Second, firms with an elderly manager are more likely to exit and default if they have no successors, and this is particularly the case during the global financial crisis around 2009. This result suggests that these firms have less incentive to repay debts because they are not going concerns. As a result of the high probability of default, the annual change in bank borrowing is low if firms with an elderly manager have no successor. Third, the annual change of bank borrowing is lower for firms with no successor during the crisis and post-crisis periods, implying that banks reduce lending to these firms because of their high risk.     

How do “gatekeepers” affect credit risk?

This study investigates the relationship between auditor tenure and credit default swap (CDS) spreads of U.S. firms based on quantile regression. After allowing for common determinants of CDS spreads, auditor tenure exerts both statistically and economically significant additional impacts on the CDS market. Furthermore, there are differential effects of common CDS spread determinants and auditor tenure. While common determinants of CDS spreads (e.g., leverage, volatility, risk free rate, credit ratings, and earnings) have monotonically increasing impacts when CDS spreads (and their changes) are increasingly higher, auditor tenure primarily has the impact when CDS spreads are of low or median levels for less risky firms.     

Moving markets? Government bond investors and microeconomic policy changes

Do sovereign bond markets react systematically to microeconomic policy reforms? Some observers suggest that investors are very attentive to supply‐side policies such as those related to labor markets, corporate taxation, and product standards. They argue that, along with macroeconomic outcomes and broad financial market conditions, such reforms affect sovereign bond premiums, for developed as well as emerging economies. In contrast, we predict few systematic effects of supply‐side policy reforms on sovereign bond market outcomes. Our theory draws on a standard three‐equation model of the economy, widely accepted among economic and finance professionals. That model makes few clear predictions regarding the anticipated effects of microeconomic policy changes; as a result, we expect that such reforms will not generate systematic market reactions. Our analyses, based on daily data from 37 countries from 2004 to 2012, indeed reveal little evidence of a systematic bond market reaction to the 47 most significant reforms to corporate taxation and labor market regulation. These results call into question the notion that “bond market vigilantes” play a central role in compelling governments to enact specific microeconomic policy changes.