Loan pricing under Basel II in an imperfectly competitive banking market

The new Basel II Accord (2006), established new and revised capital requirements for banks. In this paper we analyze and estimate the possible effects of the new rules on the pricing of bank loans. We relate to the two approaches for capital requirements (internal and standardized) and distinguish between retail and corporate customers. Our loan-equation is based on a model of a banking firm facing uncertainty operating in an imperfectly competitive loan market. We use Israeli economic data and data of a leading Israeli bank. The main results indicate that high quality corporate and retail customers will enjoy a reduction in loan interest rates in (big) banks which, most probably, will adopt the IRB approach. On the other hand high risk customers will benefit by shifting to (small) banks that adopt the standardized approach.     

年报风险信息披露与银行贷款利率

既有文献较少从银行视角关注年报风险信息披露的经济后果。银行更有能力解读年度风险信息,银行利益也更直接受到年报风险信息的影响,银行贷款利率更能体现年报风险信息披露的经济后果。本文基于2008-2017年单笔银行贷款利率数据的研究发现:总体上我国年报风险信息披露降低了银行贷款利率,说明我国年报风险信息披露更符合趋同观假说。中介效应检验发现:我国年报风险信息披露通过提高信息透明度,降低银行风险感知水平进而降低了银行贷款利率,即信息质量和风险是我国年报风险信息披露影响银行贷款利率的不完全中介。进一步分析发现:我国年报风险信息披露与银行贷款利率的负相关关系主要体现在货币政策紧缩组、非国有企业组以及公司治理水平较高组。本文首次研究银行贷款利率与年报风险信息披露的关系,有助于丰富风险信息披露文献和银行贷款文献。     

The Basel Committee proposals for a new capital accord: implications for Italian banks

Following a few general considerations on the recently proposed revision of the Basel Agreement on capital adequacy, this paper focuses on the first pillar of the Basel Committee proposals, the handling of capital requirements for credit risk in the banking book. The Basel Committee envisages an approach alternatively based on external ratings or on internal rating systems for the determination of the minimum capital requirement related to bank loan portfolios. This approach supports a system of capital requirements that is more sensitive to credit risk. On the basis of specific assumptions, these requirements provide a measure of the value at risk (VaR) produced by models used by major international banks. We first address the impact of the standardised and (internal ratings-based) IRB foundation approach using general data on Italian banks loans' portfolios default rates. We then simulate the impact of the proposed new rules on the corporate loan portfolios of Italian banks, using the unique data set of mortality rates recently published by the Bank of Italy. Three main conclusions emerge from the analysis: (i) the standardised approach implicitly penalizes Italian banks in their interbank funding as their rating is generally below AA/Aa, (ii) the average default rate experienced by Italian banks is higher than the one implied in the benchmark risk weight (BRW) proposed by the Basel Committee for the IRB foundation approach, thereby potentially leading to an increase in the regulatory risk weights, and (iii) the risk-weight is based on an average asset correlation that is significantly higher than the one historically recorded within the Italian banks' corporate borrowers. These findings support the need for a significant revision of the basic inputs and assumptions of the Basel proposals. Finally, in relation to the conditions that allow the capital market to effectively discipline banks, we comment on the proposals advanced in relation to the third pillar of the new capital adequacy scheme.     

资本计量方法改革、商业银行风险偏好与信贷配置

为提高银行业风险管理水平与信贷配置效率,监管部门于2014年开展了资本管理高级方法的试点工作。本文基于上市银行2010至2016年的微观数据,与银监会公布的行业信贷风险进行匹配,采用双重差分和三重差分法,实证分析前述改革如何影响试点银行的风险偏好和信贷调配。研究发现,在资本管理高级方法实施后:(1)试点银行显著降低了风险加权资产的规模;(2)试点银行风险偏好的变化存在非线性的特征,在调减高风险行业贷款的同时,并未显著增加最安全行业的贷款,而是增加了风险略高行业的贷款,体现出试点银行对风险与收益的权衡;(3)进一步将行业划分为“虚”与“实”,研究发现试点银行减少了房地产业(“虚”)、制造业(“实”)和建筑业(“实”)贷款,显著增加了金融业(“虚”)贷款。本文研究不仅丰富了资本监管方面的文献,也对金融支持供给侧结构性改革具有启示意义。     

Capital shocks, bank asset allocation, and the revised Basel Accord

In contrast to the 1988 Basel Accord (Basel I), the revised risk-based capital standards (Basel II) propose regulatory capital requirements based on credit ratings. This paper develops a theoretical model to analyze how banks will adjust their low and high credit risk commercial loans under the proposed newer standard. Capital-constrained banks respond to an adverse capital shock by reducing high credit risk loans, while under certain circumstances, low credit risk loans may actually increase. When compared to Basel I, it is shown that high-risk loans are reduced more under Basel II, but whether a bank reduces total lending more under Basel I or under the revised standards depends on a complex interaction of factors.     

Why is credit-to-GDP a good measure for setting countercyclical capital buffers?

We examine banks’ loan losses in Europe in 1982–2012 using a nonlinear three-factor model that takes into account output growth, real interest rate, and the ratio of private credit to GDP relative to its trend (i.e., “excessive indebtedness”). We find that a drop in output has an intensified impact on loan losses if the private sector is excessively indebted. Because increased bank credit risk should be matched with higher bank capital, the result motivates the Basel III's countercyclical capital buffers as a function of private indebtedness relative to its trend. The result also helps to explain differences in the amount of loan losses in different recessions across time and across countries. The model also indicates that low interest rates during the recent recession have clearly mitigated loan losses.     

BANKING RELATIONSHIPS AND THE EFFECT OF MONITORING ON LOAN PRICING

In a sample of bank loans to small firms we find a positive relation between the bank's monitoring effort and the loan's interest rate. We also observe an inverse relation between the closeness of banking relationships and interest rates. Further, we see that banks less frequently monitor firms with whom they have closer relationships. We conclude that banking relationships are valuable because firms can significantly reduce their costs of capital by establishing and maintaining close ties to a particular bank. As firms successfully complete loan transactions with banks, banks monitor them less frequently and, ultimately, charge them lower interest rates.     

Are all types of real transaction management equal in the eyes of bank lenders?

This study examines whether bank lenders react differently to various types of real transaction management (RTM) by borrowing firms. Drawing upon the differential cash and cash flow effects of alternative forms of RTM, we predict and find that banks provide more favorable loan terms, that is, lower interest spread and reduced likelihood of required collateral, for firms reporting more discretionary reductions in research and development (R&D) expenditures. In contrast, lending banks respond unfavorably to borrowers’ engagement in RTM through aggressive sales discounts and overproduction of inventories. Additional analysis reveals that the favorable effect of discretionary R&D reductions on loan pricing is greater (smaller) for borrowing firms with a prior relationship with the bank or with a lower level of cash holdings (loans with longer maturity). Overall, our findings suggest that banks, with their unique payoff functions and monitoring incentives, do not view all forms of RTM negatively.     

Rules versus discretion in loan rate setting

Loan rates for seemingly identical borrowers often exhibit substantial dispersion. This paper investigates the determinants of the dispersion in interest rates on loans granted by banks to small and medium sized enterprises. We associate this dispersion with the loan officers’ use of “discretion” in the loan rate setting process. We find that “discretion” is most important if: (i) loans are small and unsecured; (ii) firms are small and opaque; (iii) the firm operates in a large and highly concentrated banking market; and (iv) the firm is distantly located from the lender. Consistent with the proliferation of information-technologies in the banking industry, we find a decreasing role for “discretion” over time in the provision of small credits to opaque firms. While widely used in the pricing of loans, “discretion” plays only a minor role in the decisions to grant loans.     

Bank Mergers,REIT Loan Pricing and Takeover Likelihood

The impact of bank mergers on Real Estate Investment Trust (REIT) loan pricing and takeover likelihood is assessed. REITs that lose their primary banking relationship due to bank mergers pay higher interest rates on future borrowings. Bank consolidation reduces bank competition for REIT loans which affects loan pricing. Moreover, based on randomly matched samples of REITs, the results imply that firms losing their agent banks due to bank mergers and those with limited access to bank debt are more likely to be acquired while REITs associated with acquiring banks are more likely to acquire other firms. Additional analysis of the 92 merged REITs reveals that 33% of the target REITs’ banks are merged with their REIT acquirers’ banks prior to the REIT mergers while 67% of the target REITs share at least one major bank with their acquirer.     

《新资本协议》对商业银行信贷运行的影响——兼论其宏观经济效应

《新资本协议》的出台和实施是银行监管历史上一个具有里程碑意义的事件。本文认为,《新资本协议》特别是内部评级法极大地提高了资本监管的风险敏感度,将对商业银行的信贷增长方式、信贷结构调整和贷款损失准备计提、以及宏观经济运行产生一定的影响。按照目前我国商业银行资本充足水平和资产质量,无论是实施标准法还是内部评级法都将强化信贷扩张的资本约束效应。我国应慎重选择《新资本协议》的实施时机,避免由此对信贷供给和宏观经济运行造成的负面冲击。     

Bank stability and the price of loan commitments

Firms insure themselves from liquidity shocks by contracting on credit lines from banks. I document novel empirical evidence on how the risk of contract nonperformance by banks is priced. Firms pay a higher price for loan commitments from safer banks. A one standard deviation increase in the cross-sectional mean of bank capital increases the commitment fees by 5%. To investigate a potential causal effect of lender stability on commitment fees, I exploit exogenous variation in the market value of banks’ assets from natural disasters. The sensitivity of the fees is higher for firms with higher short-term liabilities and higher income uncertainty.     

The expansion of services in European banking: Implications for loan pricing and interest margins

Our study of 602 European banks over 1996–2002 investigates how the banks’ expansion into fee-based services has affected their interest margins and loan pricing. We find that higher income share from commissions and fees is associated with lower margins and loan spreads. The higher the commission and fee income share, moreover, the weaker the link between bank loan spreads and loan risk. The latter result is consistent with the conjecture that banks price (or misprice) loans to increase sales of other services. That loss leader (or cross selling) hypothesis has implications for bank regulation and competition with (non-bank) lenders.     

银行对企业经营的监督效应研究——基于控股股东掏空行为的视角

从控股股东掏空行为的视角,采用中国上市公司的贷款数据分析中国的商业银行对企业的监督作用。研究发现,银行对控股股东的掏空行为具有一定的监督作用,在银行贷款数量多、贷款期限长的公司中,控股股东的掏空行为明显减少。对不同所有制的企业,银行的监督作用存在异质性。目前,银行的监督作用主要体现在国有银行中,而国有银行能有效监督的对象仅限于地方政府和私人控制的企业,国有银行对中央企业的监督能力较弱。从事后监督来看,银行会对控股股东的掏空行为做出贷款政策的调整,对于控股股东掏空严重的企业,续新贷款的银行数量、续新贷款比例显著下降,而且贷款利率显著提高。     

The transformation of banking: Tying loan interest rates to borrowers' CDS spreads

We investigate how the introduction of market-based pricing, the practice of tying loan interest rates to credit default swaps, has affected bank financing. We find that market-based pricing is associated with lower interest rates, both at origination and during the life of the loan. Our results also indicate that banks simplify the covenant structure of market-based pricing loans, suggesting that the decline in the cost of bank debt is explained, at least in part, by a reduction in monitoring costs. Market-based pricing, therefore, besides reducing the cost of bank debt, may also have adverse consequences resulting from the decline in bank monitoring.     

借贷便利创新工具有效影响了商业银行贷款利率吗？

本文基于手工收集的2009—2017年中国银行业数据,利用我国借贷便利工具创新这一准自然实验,以借贷便利工具的运用需要商业银行提供合格担保品这一要求为切入点,考察了借贷便利工具对商业银行贷款利率的影响。研究发现,借贷便利工具创设后,商业银行持有的合格担保品规模越大,其贷款利率越低,且这一效应随着时间推移逐渐增强。进一步的作用机制检验发现,央行的借贷便利操作扩大了商业银行向中央银行借款规模和贷款投放规模,从而有效降低了商业银行贷款利率,也表明借贷便利工具可通过商业银行合格担保品渠道发挥作用。因此,可以通过调整借贷便利操作规模、操作利率以及合格担保品范围的方式有效影响商业银行贷款利率进而发挥对社会融资成本的调控作用。     

The role of culture in firm-bank matching

We assemble a unique dataset containing population-level information on loan applications in a region hosting two cultural groups to study the role of culture in firm borrowing decisions. We find that firms are more likely to apply for loans from culturally close banks. This effect is stronger for opaque firms, but not for less performing firms, indicating that firms do not expect preferential treatment from same-culture banks. Loan applications to culturally distant banks increase sharply with firms’ size and age, suggesting a role of information asymmetry in firm-bank matching. In contrast, we find no effect of cultural proximity on loan supply. Overall, our results show that demand-side factors play a key role in the formation of same-culture lending relationships.     

When bank loans are bad news: Evidence from market reactions to loan announcements under the risk of expropriation

In this paper we investigate whether inefficient bank loans can reduce the value of borrowing firms when expropriation of the stock of minority shareholders by controlling shareholders is a major concern. Using data from Chinese banks, we find that bank loan announcements generate significantly negative abnormal returns for the borrowing firms. In line with this expropriation view, negative stock price reactions following bank loan announcements are concentrated in firms that are perceived to be more vulnerable to expropriation by controlling shareholders. Finally, we find evidence that a negative relationship between market reactions and firm vulnerability to expropriation exists only when firms borrow from the least efficient banks.     

Credit derivatives and loan pricing

This paper examines the relation between the new markets for credit default swaps (CDS) and banks’ pricing of syndicated loans to US corporates. We find that changes in CDS spreads have a significantly positive coefficient and explain about 25% of subsequent monthly changes in aggregate loan spreads during 2000–2005. Moreover, when compared to traditional explanatory factors, they turn out to be the dominant determinant of loan spreads. In particular, they explain loan rates much better than same rated bonds. This suggests that CDS prices contain, beyond general credit risk, to a substantial extent information relevant for bank lending. We also find that, over time, new information from CDS markets is faster incorporated into loans, but information from other markets is not. Overall, our results indicate that the markets for CDS have gained an important role for banks.     

非标意见与债务融资——基于银行借款和债务期限结构的经验证据

理论上,年报被出具非标意见会降低企业的债务融资能力。但本文发现非标意见对企业新增银行借款和债务期限结构没有显著负面影响,不支持理论预期。我们认为,在中国,银行是一个并非完全以利润最大化为目标的独立市场主体,他们会为了地方社会稳定和经济发展向企业提供贷款;另外,企业有政府的隐性支持,银行不需要太关注企业的偿债风险。因此,虽然非标意见传递出会计信息质量低或未来经营风险高等问题,但它对银行借款的影响相当有限。本文的研究有助于我们理解中国上市公司会计造假盛行、非标意见比例过高的现象。