Dealer attention,the speed of quote adjustment to information,and net dealer revenue

Using trade and quote data from the NYSE, we examine the relation between dealer attention, dealer revenue, and the probability of informed trade. We find that dealer revenue net of losses to better-informed traders in NYSE stocks is positively related to the speed at which quotes adjust to full information levels. The speed of quote adjustment is faster for stocks with greater dealer attention, as measured by a stock’s relative prominence at its post and panel location on the NYSE floor. The level of dealer attention in turn is positively related to a stock’s probability of information-based trading. The results are consistent with a theoretical model we derive in which dealers trade multiple securities and must optimally allocate their limited attention to monitoring order flow to minimize losses to better-informed traders.     

Belief-free price formation

We analyze security price formation in a dynamic setting in which long-lived dealers repeatedly compete for the opportunity to trade with short-lived retail traders. We characterize equilibria in which dealers’ pricing strategies are optimal irrespective of the private information that each dealer may possess. Thus, our model’s predictions are robust to different specifications of the dealers’ information structure. These equilibria reconcile, in a unified and parsimonious framework, price dynamics that are reminiscent of well-known stylized facts: excess price volatility, price to trading flow correlation, stochastic volatility and inventory-related trading.     

Crossing Networks and Dealer Markets: Competition and Performance

This paper studies the interaction between dealer markets and a relatively new form of exchange, passive crossing networks, where buyers and sellers trade directly with one another. We find that the crossing network is characterized by both positive ('liquidity') and negative ('crowding') externalities, and we analyze the effects of its introduction on the dealer market. Traders who use the dealer market as a 'market of last resort' can induce dealers to widen their spread and can lead to more efficient subsequent prices, but traders who only use the crossing network can provide a counterbalancing effect by reducing adverse selection and inventory holding costs.     

The Making of a Dealer Market: From Entry to Equilibrium in the Trading of Nasdaq Stocks

This paper provides an analysis of the nature and evolution of a dealer market for Nasdaq stocks. Despite size differences in sample stocks, there is a surprising consistency to their trading. One dealer tends to dominate trading in a stock. Markets are concentrated and spreads are increasing in the volume and market share of the dominant dealer. Entry and exit are ubiquitous. Exiting dealers are those with very low profits and trading volume. Entering market makers fail to capture a meaningful share of trading or profits. Thus, free entry does little to improve the competitive nature of the market as entering dealers have little impact. We find, however, that for small stocks, the Nasdaq dealer market is being more competitive than the specialist market.     

Entry, exit and trading profits: A look at the trading strategies of a proprietary trading team

We examine the behavior of a 15 strong proprietary stock trading team and show how consistent intraday trading profits were generated. The team, who worked for a large US direct access trading firm, executed over 96 thousand trades in 3 months in 2000. Profitable intraday trading occurred in an anonymous dealer capacity, on both long and short positions, especially when volume and price volatility were higher. The traders rapidly entered long (short) positions when the number of dealers and size become greater on the bid (offer) side of the spread. Profits were taken early against the trend.     

Intermediaries and product quality in used car markets

We present empirical evidence supporting that used cars sold by dealers have higher quality: (i) dealer transaction prices are higher than unmediated market prices, and this dealer premium increases in the age of the car as a ratio and is hump-shaped in dollar value, and (ii) used cars purchased from dealers are less likely to be resold. In a model, we show that these empirical facts can be rationalized either when dealers alleviate information asymmetry, or when dealers facilitate assortative matching. The model predictions allow us to distinguish these two theories in the data, and we find evidence for both.     

An empirical investigation of large trader market manipulation in derivatives markets

Using account-level transaction data in options and futures markets, we investigate the existence of market manipulation, which is the ability of large traders to trade strategically, impacting prices and making abnormal profits. First, large trader’s option positions have a quantity impact on the underlying asset’s price. Second, large traders generate significantly positive alphas from trading options and futures. Among the different investor types, proprietary dealers generate the largest positive alphas. Third, these abnormal returns are consistent with strategic trading and cross-market manipulation. The evidence supports market manipulation across the options and futures markets, but not within the futures market itself.     

The Relationship Among Market-Making Revenue, Payment for Order Flow, and Trading Costs for Market Orders

We study the division of market-making revenue among dealer, broker, and trader. When Knight Securities, a major Nasdaq dealer, interacts with market orders in actively traded stocks during the fourth quarter of 1996, we estimate that its revenue is $0.057 per share. Knight pays brokers at least $0.025 per share (44% of revenue) for orders. To examine whether brokers appear to share these payments with traders, we compare net trading costs (trade price net of commissions) for traders using brokers routing Knight orders with estimated net trading costs for traders using the only discount broker we can determine did not directly receive market-making revenue. We find that the net trading cost of the broker refusing order-flow payments does not dominate the net trading cost of all brokers selling order flow to Knight. This finding suggests that order-flow payments do not unambiguously harm traders and challenges the conclusions of extant studies using only trade prices to assess market quality.     

Relationship Trading in Over-the-Counter Markets

We examine the network of trading relationships between insurers and dealers in the over-the-counter (OTC) corporate bond market. Regulatory data show that one-third of insurers use a single dealer, whereas other insurers have large dealer networks. Execution prices are nonmonotone in network size, initially declining with more dealers but increasing once networks exceed 20 dealers. A model of decentralized trade in which insurers trade off the benefits of repeat business and faster execution quantitatively fits the distribution of insurers' network size and explains the price–network size relationship. Counterfactual analysis shows that regulations to unbundle trade and nontrade services can decrease welfare.     

Capital Commitment and Illiquidity in Corporate Bonds

We study trading costs and dealer behavior in U.S. corporate bond markets from 2006 to 2016. Despite a temporary spike during the financial crisis, average trade execution costs have not increased notably over time. However, dealer capital commitment, turnover, block trade frequency, and average trade size decreased during the financial crisis and thereafter. These declines are attributable to bank‐affiliated dealers, as nonbank dealers have increased their market commitment. Our evidence indicates that liquidity provision in the corporate bond markets is evolving away from the commitment of bank‐affiliated dealer capital to absorb customer imbalances, and that postcrisis banking regulations likely contribute.     

Market Orders and Market Efficiency

This work compares a dealer market and a limit-order book. Dealers commonly observe order flow and collect information from multiple market orders. They may be better informed than other traders, although they do not earn rents from this information. Dealers earn rents as suppliers of liquidity, and their decisions to enter or exit the market are independent of the degree of adverse selection. Introduction of a limit-order book lowers the execution-price risk faced by speculators and leads them to trade more aggressively on their information. Introduction of the book also lowers dealer profits, but increases the informational efficiency of prices.     

DO DEALERS INFER INFORMATION FROM ORDER FLOW?

I examine strategic behavior among dealers in the NASDAQ market and document that there is a lead quote‐setting dealer in each security and that the quotes posted by this leader are informative. Other dealers free‐ride this information by following the lead quote‐setting dealer. The lead dealer can be identified by two information signals: (1) percentage of time spent on the inside market (i.e., posting inside quotes), and (2) trade volume transacted. Dealers that free‐ride the leader's quotes quickly update their posted quotes in the same direction as the leader's quote change. My findings suggest that directing trade to the lead dealer may be more advantageous than randomly routing trade.     

PRICE AND QUANTITY QUOTES ON NASDAQ: A STUDY OF DEALER QUOTATION BEHAVIOR

We show that the majority of quotes posted by NASDAQ dealers are noncompetitive and only 19.5% (18.4%) of bid (ask) quotes are at the inside. The percentage of dealer quotes that are at the inside is higher for stocks with wider spreads, fewer market makers, and more frequent trading, and lower for stocks with larger trade sizes and higher return volatility. These results support our conjecture that dealers have greater incentives to be at the inside for stocks with larger market‐making revenues and smaller costs. Dealers post large depths when their quotes are at the inside and frequently quote the minimum required depth when they are not at the inside. The latter quotation behavior leads to the negative intertemporal correlation between dealer spread and depth.     

Reputation and interdealer trading: a microstructure analysis of the Treasury Bond market

Trading generates not only information about the payoff of the assets traded, but also information about the traders themselves. Over time this information creates reputation. By using a unique dataset on the Treasury bond market, we derive a measure of reputation. This is then used to group dealers on the basis of their reputation and to analyze how they react to the reputation of other dealers. We show that the same type of trade, on the same asset, in the same market can generate different volume and volatility patterns depending on the type of dealers originating it. We also identify the “salient traders”. These traders, even if they do not originate the biggest volume of trade, have the highest impact on the market. These results have strong implications in terms of forecastability of future returns, volatility and overall trading volume because they show that most of the explanatory power of trades is due to salient traders.     

Identifying informed traders in futures markets

We use daily positions of futures market participants to identify informed traders. These data contain 8,921 unique traders. We identify between 94 and 230 traders as overnight informed and 91 as intraday informed with little overlap. Floor brokers/traders are over-represented in the overnight informed group. The intraday informed group is dominated by managed money traders/hedge funds and swap dealers, with commercial hedgers under-represented. We find that characteristics such as experience, position size, trading activity, and type of positions held offer significant predictive power for who is informed. An analysis of daily trader profits confirms that we select highly profitable traders.     

Dealer behavior and trading systems in foreign exchange markets

We study dealer behavior in the foreign exchange spot market using detailed observations on all the transactions of four interbank dealers. There is strong support for an information effect in incoming trades. The direction of trade is most important, but we also find that the information effect increases with trade size in direct bilateral trades. All four dealers control their inventory intensively. Inventory control is not, however, manifested through a dealer's own prices in contrast to findings by Lyons (J. Financial Econ. 39(1995) 321). Furthermore, we document differences in trading styles, especially how they actually control their inventories.     

The Dynamics of Dealer Markets Under Competition

The behavior of competing dealers in securities markets is analyzed. Securities are characterized by stochastic returns and stochastic transactions. Reservation bid and ask prices of dealers are derived under alternative assumptions about the degree to which transactions are correlated across stocks at a given time and over time in a given stock. The conditions for interdealer trading are specified, and the equilibrium distribution of dealer inventories and the equilibrium market spread are derived. Implications for the structure of securities markets are examined.     

THE DEALERS' PRICE/SIZE QUOTE AND MARKET LIQUIDITY

We model trading in a competitive securities market where informed traders and liquidity traders transact with dealers. The dealers' entire published quote is modeled: bid-ask prices and the number of shares the dealer is willing to buy/sell at these prices (i.e., size quotes). We argue that size quotes are a more informative indicator of market liquidity than the bid-ask spread's adverse-selection component. Moreover, the size quotes reveal several market characteristics that cannot be inferred from the bid-ask spread's adverse-selection component alone. The model generates a number of empirically testable predictions that clarify certain key elements of market liquidity.     

Microstructure with multiple assets: an experimental investigation into direct and indirect dealer competition

This paper uses the economic laboratory to isolate the effects of direct and indirect competition on dealer profitability. We compare these two settings: (1) three competing dealers in a single asset (direct competition) with (2) three assets with a monopoly dealer in each (indirect competition). We find that: bid–ask spreads are wider, prices are less responsive to order flow (so there is less price discovery), and per-trade dealer profits are larger in the single-asset setting. Important economic differences between these two settings include a heightened adverse selection problem in the three-asset setting and a public good nature of price discovery in the one-asset setting.     

Anonymity, Adverse Selection, and the Sorting of Interdealer Trades

This article uses unique data from the London Stock Exchangeto examine how trader anonymity and market liquidity affectdealers' decisions about where to place interdealer trades.During our sample period, dealers could trade with each otherin the direct, nonanonymous public market or use one of fouranonymous brokered trading systems. Surprisingly, we find thatadverse selection is less prevalent in the anonymous brokeredmarkets. We show that this pattern can be explained by the waydealers "price" the adverse selection risk inherent in tradingwith other dealers. We also relate our findings to recent changesin dealer markets.