产品市场竞争与上市公司过度投资

对于企业过度投资问题的研究,目前国内文献一般集中于代理问题展开的。本文认为,产品市场竞争也会对公司的过度投资行为产生影响。通过2001～2004年中国制造业上市公司数据,本文实证研究发现,产品市场竞争对公司的过度投资行为有显著影响,市场竞争能够约束公司过度投资水平。当公司代理问题严重时,产品市场竞争状况与公司的过度投资水平高度相关,公司经理会利用现金流进行过度投资。另外,处于行业内主要厂商地位的公司的过度投资问题也比其它公司严重。     

内部控制质量、自由现金流量与非效率投资

目前我国上市公司普遍存在因委托代理冲突和信息不对称产生的非效率投资问题,从而出现资源配置效率低下、资源浪费和投资机会丧失的情况.本文以2011—2016年沪市交通运输业上市公司为研究对象,分析了内部控制质量对非效率投资的影响、自由现金流量与非效率投资之间的关系以及高质量的内部控制对自由现金流量引起的非效率投资是否具有抑制作用.研究发现:内部控制质量与非效率投资之间负相关,内部控制质量越高,公司非效率投资行为越少;自由现金流量短缺的公司倾向于发生投资不足行为;高质量的内部控制能够抑制自由现金流量对投资不足的影响.     

微观企业的投资行为特征和减税的宏观经济效应：动态一般均衡分析

“微观企业投资的非平滑性特征能否对财税货币政策的宏观经济效应产生重要影响”是宏观经济学研究中的一个重要前沿问题。以中国减税政策实践为研究对象,本文构建了嵌入有效税率差异和非凸性投资成本函数的异质性企业随机动态一般均衡模型。该模型不但能够准确地刻画非平滑性特征,更能够拟合出与代表性微观实证文献相一致的投资价格弹性。研究发现,非平滑性能够显著影响减税的宏观经济效应,相比于不考虑非平滑性特征的代表性企业模型,基准模型中的宏观经济效应显著增强。机制分析发现大小规模企业群体间的有效税率差异是投资价格弹性的一个重要影响因素,其通过抑制投资价格弹性强化了非平滑性的影响。政策分析表明,降低消费型增值税税率和企业所得税税率的产出乘数均显著大于1,提高企业投资的可逆性程度能够有效地增强减税的刺激效率。     

论财务报告质量与公司投资效率

本文以我国A股上市公司为样本,采用非线性操控应计额估计模型计量财务报告质量,以Richardson模型计量投资效率研究财务报告质量对投资效率的影响,进而检验会计信息是否具有定价和治理功能.研究结果表明,在不考虑融资约束和现金过剩因素,财务报告能缓解投资不足和过度投资;当公司面临的融资约束程度越严重,财务报告未能缓解公司投资不足;当公司面临的现金过剩程度越严重,财务报告有效地抑制了公司过度投资.总体而言,我国上市公司提供的会计信息具有治理功能但尚未发挥定价功能.     

高管投行背景、政策机会与公司金融投资偏好

本文以我国非金融上市公司为样本,考察高管投行背景对公司投资行为的影响,研究发现:拥有投行背景的高管更偏好金融投资;高管具有投行背景的公司的金融投资收益率相对更高,表明投行背景具有价值优势;政策投资机会会抑制金融投资偏好,当公司所在行业受惠于产业政策支持时,上述正相关关系显著减弱。本文的研究结论从高管专业背景的角度拓展了公司金融化的解释,丰富了相关文献,也从微观层面提供了产业政策影响公司行为的证据,对认识公司金融化现象提供了一定的参考价值。     

财务困境、政府干预与管理者自利

文章运用处理效应(treatment effect)模型,从财务困境视角研究了政府干预对管理者自利行为的影响。研究发现,当政府干预程度较低时,相对于未发生财务困境的公司,困境公司管理者的自利行为会有所减弱;但当政府干预程度增强时,困境公司管理者自利行为减弱的程度将趋缓。对于政府控制的公司,当金融机构信贷决策受到政府干预的影响较弱时,财务困境期间管理者自利行为会有所减弱;随着政府对金融机构信贷决策干预程度的加强,困境公司管理者自利行为趋于严重。对于非政府控制的公司,困境期间管理者自利行为对金融机构信贷决策的自主性并不敏感。     

风险投资对上市公司投融资行为影响的实证研究

本文研究风险投资机构对上市公司投融资行为的影响机制和作用效果,结果发现:风险投资的加入不仅可以抑制公司对自由现金流的过度投资,而且可以增加公司的短期有息债务融资和外部权益融资,并在一定程度上缓解因现金流短缺所导致的投资不足问题。进一步研究还发现不同特征的风险投资机构均可起到抑制自由现金流过度投资的作用,但只有高持股比例、高声誉、联合投资或非国有背景的风险投资机构才能够显著地改善外部融资环境,缓解现金短缺公司的投资不足问题。综合本文研究结果,作者认为企业上市后仍然可以利用风险投资机构的监督职能、声誉资源和融资关系网络来解决代理问题和信息不对称问题,进而促进企业投融资行为的规范化和理性化。     

货币政策、企业家信心与上市公司投资效率*

企业、企业家等微观主体对货币政策的反应，在较大程度上影响货币政策的效果。货币政策可通过对企业家信心的影响，进而对公司投资效率产生作用。基于中国2007—2016年40个季度A股上市公司样本的实证研究表明：企业家信心在货币政策传导过程中有不可忽视的作用。企业家信心增强或者货币政策宽松时会加剧过度投资，减轻投资不足；企业家信心减弱或者货币政策紧缩时可以有效抑制过度投资，但会加剧投资不足。其中，国有企业对企业家信心和货币政策松紧的敏感性更强。进一步，货币政策对企业投资效率的影响，也会通过货币政策和企业家信心的交互作用而发挥作用。这种作用在国有企业和非国有企业之间无显著差异。     

会计稳健性与企业投资效率——来自中国A股上市公司的经验证据

文章选取我国A股上市公司为研究样本,实证检验我国特殊制度背景下会计稳健性对企业投资效率的影响。研究结果表明:会计稳健性对企业投资效率的影响具有双面性,一方面能够抑制企业的过度投资行为,改善投资效率,另一方面加剧企业投资不足行为,恶化投资效率。     

政府干预、政治联系与企业过度投资效应

本文以民营上市公司为研究样本,从民营企业和政府两个角度考察了政治联系与企业过度投资的双向影响关系。实证结果显示:政府干预企业决策行为能够导致企业产生过度投资行为;建立政治联系的民营企业为了满足政治上的投资需求往往会产生过度投资行为,政治联系强度越大其过度投资越严重,政治联系层级越高其过度投资也越严重;政治联系导致企业产生过度投资之后,过度投资会巩固和提升企业政治联系的强度和层级。本文研究结论不但深化和丰富了政治联系与企业过度投资的理论研究,而且对中国当前的产能过剩治理问题提供了理论借鉴。     

Informational externalities,strategic delay,and optimal investment subsidies

Abstract This paper examines optimal government policy when private investment generates information, but investors cannot internalize the informational value their actions have to others. Equilibrium exhibits inefficient delay, as investors adopt a wait‐and‐see approach. The government can alter incentives via an investment subsidy, but complications arise, since future subsidies may induce investors to disregard current policy initiatives. The paper shows that the government achieves its desired outcome only when the the investment subsidy is financed by a non‐distortionary, lump‐sum tax. When taxation is distortionary, the government faces a time inconsistency problem that may prevent effective policy.     

Capital income taxation in a growing world economy

This paper deals with dynamic adjustment in large economies to changes in the rate of capital income taxation or in the rate of investment tax credit in one country. The framework applied in the paper is a continuous-time, overlapping generations model with two countries. It features population growth and debt non-neutrality. We address impact and steady state effects of capital income tax and investment subsidy changes in the home country on consumption per capita, the capital intensity, and the per capita net foreign asset position in both countries. We also briefly consider individual welfare consequences of these policies.     

Regional debt in monetary unions: Is it inflationary?

This paper studies the inflationary implications of interest bearing regional debt in a monetary union. Is this debt simply backed by future taxation with no inflationary consequences? Or will the circulation of region debt induce monetization by a central bank?We argue here that both outcomes can arise in equilibrium. In the model economy, there are multiple equilibria which reflect the perceptions of agents regarding the manner in which the debt obligations will be met. In one equilibrium, termed Ricardian, the future obligations are met with taxation by a regional government while in the other, termed Monetization, the central bank is induced to print money to finance the region's obligations. The multiplicity of equilibria reflects a commitment problem of the central bank. A key indicator of the selected equilibrium is the distribution of regional debt holdings. We show that regional governments, anticipating central bank financing of their debt obligations, have an incentive to create excessively large deficits. We use the model to assess the impact of some policy measures within a monetary union as well as dollarization.     

企业社会责任、现金股利与投资效率

本文选择我国2008-2016年沪深两市的A股上市公司作为研究样本,首先实证检验了企业承担社会责任对企业现金股利分配的影响。研究结果表明,社会责任表现越好的企业其更倾向于派发或连续派发现金股利,并且现金股利支付率越高。接下来本文对企业发放现金股利与投资效率的关系进行了研究。研究表明,企业发放现金股利通过减少企业的自由现金流抑制代理问题,缓解了自由现金流富余的企业的过度投资,连续派现向市场传递出的积极信号为企业带来新的融资,缓解了自由现金流紧缺的企业的投资不足。最后,本文进一步研究了企业社会责任在现金股利与投资效率的相关关系中发挥了何种调节作用,研究结果显示企业通过履行社会责任增加现金股利的发放,进而可以显著提高现金股利对过度投资的抑制作用。履行社会责任的企业更倾向于连续派现,从而提高了现金股利对投资不足的缓解程度。     

Fiscal strategies,foreign indebtedness,and overlapping generations

Conclusions This paper offers a unifying dynamic system approach to real government debt and real capital formation in a world economy. The sustainability of permanently maintained primary fiscal deficits is investigated in an open economy. In particular if national governments compete in the issuance of debt at an international capital market sustainable debt profiles appear only as a theoretical (i. e., not empirically valid) curiosity. Within the more realistic regime of an undercapitalized world economy a nation can only run a permanently maintained primary surplus. Starting from a PMP surplus the paper also demonstrates the viability of temporary deficits implying an increase in taxation later to stabilize the fiscal debt. By reversing the argument this shows, the right way to reduce government debt in a non-traumatic manner is to run a higher temporary surplus via higher taxation. Using this extrasurplus to buy back fiscal debt the economy may reduce taxation later while enjoying vigorous capital accumulation towards a higher capital-labour ratio. Furthermore, the paper shows that ceteris paribus a relatively high social security load and a relatively high size of a balanced budget causes external indebtedness via consumption oriented current account deficits. It is left for further research to see what happens if government borrows for public investment instead of public consumption.My research was supported by Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft. While preparing the paper 1 had access to unpublished work by M. Carlberg and T. Ihori. Discussions with M. Carlberg, H. Großmann, J. Michaelis, and H. Schmid are gratefully acknowledged. The diagrams were mastered by C. Schwarz.     

Investment Cycles and Sovereign Debt Overhang

We characterize optimal taxation of foreign capital and optimal sovereign debt policy in a small open economy where the government cannot commit to policy, seeks to insure a risk-averse domestic constituency, and is more impatient than the market. Optimal policy generates long-run cycles in both sovereign debt and foreign direct investment in an environment in which the first best capital stock is a constant. The expected tax on capital endogenously varies with the state of the economy, and investment is distorted by more in recessions than in booms, amplifying the effect of shocks. The government's lack of commitment induces a negative correlation between investment and the stock of government debt, a "debt overhang" effect. Debt relief is never Pareto improving and cannot affect the long-run level of investment. Furthermore, restricting the government to a balanced budget can eliminate the cyclical distortion of investment.     

Are Higher Education Subsidies Second Best?

An optimal taxation framework is considered in which part of the population can take advantage of investment in higher education. It is shown that social welfare can sometimes be increased by supplementing linear income taxes with a subsidy to material investment in higher education, but that social welfare can never be increased by supplementing a non‐linear income tax with such a subsidy.     

Financial crises,debt overhang,and firm growth in transition economies

ABSTRACT

We examine the effects of the global financial crisis of 2008 and the European debt crisis of 2011 on the relationship between capital structure, investments, and performance for Eastern European companies. While the existing literature documents how firms’ investments are sensitive to the availability of internal funds and to debt holdings, we further investigate whether this investment sensitivity also translates in different levels of performance, and document that capital structure indeed has both a direct and an indirect effect, mediated by the capital expenditure channel. We show that firms with higher financial flexibility experience higher investments and returns on capital. Over-levered firms instead suffer from a debt overhang condition, forcing them to curb investments, and consequently experiencing lower performance. Overall, we provide evidence on the importance of capital structure and financial flexibility on investments and performance, showing the real consequences of the debt overhang condition on firm value creation. Firms should therefore aim at maintaining adequate financial flexibility in order to be able to pursue future profitable investment opportunities, and avoid the under-investment problem arising from a debt overhang situation.     

The effects of company taxation in EU accession countries on German FDI1

This article investigates how company taxation affects German foreign direct investment (FDI) in European Union (EU) accession countries. In 2004 and 2007, 10 former socialist eastern European countries joined the EU. Although the EU integration is associated with increasingly favourable investment conditions, accession countries also pursue active strategies to attract foreign firms. In particular, taxes on corporate income have been significantly reduced during the last decade. We analyse whether corporate tax policies of eastern European countries affect three aspects of multinational activity: the location decision, the investment decision and the capital structure choice. The results suggest that local taxes are negatively related to both location and investment decisions. The analysis of the capital structure confirms that higher local taxes imply higher debt‐to‐capital ratios.     

Human capital investment and debt constraints

When young individuals face binding debt constraints, their human capital investments will be insufficiently financed by private creditors. If generations overlap, then a well-designed fiscal policy may be able to improve human capital investments by replacing missing capital markets with an intergenerational transfer scheme. The optimal (balanced budget) fiscal policy in this context entails the joint provision of an education subsidy for the young and a pension program for the old, financed with a tax on those in their peak earning years. We demonstrate, however, that the desirability of such a cradle-to-grave policy depends crucially on the assumption of an exogenous debt constraint. If debt constraints arise endogenously for reasons of limited commitment, then the optimal (balanced budget) fiscal policy looks radically different. Furthermore, we find that cradle-to-grave type policy interventions may actually lead to lower levels of human capital investment as altered default incentives induce private creditors to contract the supply of student loans by an amount greater than the subsidy. In some cases, the constrained-optimal policy entails zero intervention. These results highlight the importance of taking seriously the reasons for why debt constraints exist.