How does the Funding Status of Defined Benefit Pension Plans Affect Investment Decisions of Firms in the United States?

We investigate whether the flexibility in making contributions towards defined benefit pension plans sponsored by firms in the United States allows managers to save cash and increase investments. Firms invest more at higher levels of pension deficit, defined as pension benefit obligations less pension assets, and scaled by total assets. At the median level (90^th percentile) of pension deficit, investments increase by 6.7 cents (9.4 cents) for every dollar increase in cash. As the pension deficit increases, firms deviate more from the predicted level of investment. These findings suggest that the incremental investments are more likely to represent overinvestment by managers. Our results are robust to alternative model specifications and endogeneity concerns that may arise if investments are jointly determined with the funding policy of pension plans and the firm's target cash level. We repeat our main analysis for the United Kingdom and also find for that country that, at a fixed cash level, total investment increases as pension deficit increases.     

An analysis of risk-taking behavior for public defined benefit pension plans

This paper presents the first comprehensive study on the determinants of public pension fund investment risk and reports several new important findings. Unlike private pension plans, public funds undertake more risk if they are underfunded and have lower investment returns in the previous years, consistent with the risk transfer hypothesis. Furthermore, pension funds in states facing fiscal constraints allocate more assets to equity and have higher betas. There also appears to be a herding effect in that CalPERS equity allocation or beta is mimicked by other pension funds. Finally, our results suggest that government accounting standards strongly affect pension fund risk, as higher return assumptions (used to discount pension liabilities) are associated with higher equity allocation and portfolio beta.     

Do Managers of U.S. Defined Benefit Pension Plan Sponsors Use Regulatory Freedom Strategically?

We use historical particularities of pension funding law to investigate whether managers of U.S. corporate defined benefit pension plan sponsors strategically use regulatory freedom to lower the reported value of pension liabilities, and hence required cash contributions. For some years, pension plans were required to estimate two liabilities—one with mandated discount rates and mortality assumptions, and another where these could be chosen freely. Using a sample of 11,963 plans, we find that the regulated liability exceeds the unregulated measure by 10% and the difference further increases for underfunded pension plans. Underfunded plans tend to assume substantially higher discount rates and lower life expectancy. The effect persists both in the cross‐section of plans and over time and it serves to reduce cash contributions. We further show that plan sponsor managers use the freed‐up cash for corporate investment and that credit risk is unlikely to explain the finding.     

An Examination of ERR and Asset Allocation in Public Pension Plans

In this paper, we examine the usefulness of expected rates of return (ERR) for public pension plans. Specifically, we test the correlation between the expected rate of return on plan assets and asset allocation. We also examine the predictive power of ERR on the actual returns of the pension assets. We find that the correlation between expected return and the percentage of assets that are equity securities is relatively weak. Further, we find that the percentage of assets that are equity securities is a much better predictor of actual returns than the disclosed expected return in public pension plans. These results provide evidence to support SFAS No. 87 , which requires the disclosure of plan assets and against recently promulgated SFAS No. 132 , which eliminates this disclosure requirement. The evidence also supports GASB 25'sStatement of Net Plan Assets .     

“De‐risking” Corporate Pension Plans: Options for CFOs

Until the stock market bubble burst in 2000–2002, most CFOs viewed their defined benefit pension plans as profit centers and relatively risk‐free sources of income. Since neither pension assets nor liabilities were reported on corporate balance sheets, and expected returns on pension stocks could be substituted for actual returns when reporting net income, the risks associated with DB plans were masked by GAAP accounting and thus assumed to have no bearing on corporate capital structure. But when stock prices and corporate profits fell together, the risks associated with conventional stock‐heavy pension plans showed up first in reduced pension surpluses (or, in many cases, deficits) and then later in higher required cash contributions and lower reported earnings. As a consequence, today's investors (and rating agencies) are viewing pension and other legacy liabilities as corporate debt, and demands for transparency and increased funding have triggered accounting changes and proposed legislative reforms that will further unmask the economics. This article aims to provide both private‐sector and public‐sector CFOs with suggestions for reducing and controlling the cost of providing for the retirement of their employees. Profitable, tax‐paying companies with DB plans should consider (1) funding any unfunded liabilities (if necessary, by issuing debt) and (2) reducing pension equity and interest rate exposures by shifting some (if not all) pension assets into bonds and defeasing the pension liability (achieving a tax arbitrage in the process). And in cases where the expected costs of maintaining DB plans outweigh the benefits, companies should consider freezing or terminating their plans and switching to a defined contribution (DC) or some form of hybrid plan. The authors also propose similar changes for public pension plans, where underfunding and mismatch problems are greater, less transparent, and in some ways less tractable than those of corporate DB plans.     

海南省被征地农民基本养老保险项目投资收益需求测算

目前,为保障被征地农民的利益,相关省市已陆续出台了被征地农民养老保险的相关政策。为了满足养老金的支付需求,必须对资金的投资收益需求进行测算。依据海南省颁布的《海南省被征地农民基本养老保险暂行办法》(下称《暂行办法》)的相关规定,本文对海南省被征地农民养老保险资金的投资收益率需求做了测算,并对性别比例、平均年龄、消费价格指数等因素进行了敏感性分析。     

资产负债指数：资产负债匹配管理框架下的保险固定收益投资绩效评价

保险机构必须在同时考虑资产和负债的基础上进行投资决策,提供足够回报支持未来预期的承诺支出。因此,保险绩效考核具备一定的特殊性和复杂性,使用一般的市场指数无法激励投资人活动与公司的价值取向形成一致。本文分析了保险投资的绩效评价要点,尝试在资产负债匹配管理的框架下,构建符合保险公司固定收益资产投资要求的定制化基准——资产负...     

Corporate pension funding policy

What policy should a corporation adopt concerning the funding of a defined-benefit pension plan and the investment of the assets held in trust for the plan? Until recently, pension plans did not have to be insured, and some risk could be borne by intended beneficiaries. Federal legislation has now mandated such coverage. This paper analyzes corporate policy under three conditions which correspond, roughly, to the earlier situation (‘uninsure’ loans), the current situation (‘partially insured’ loans), and the situation required by law to be implemented in the future (‘completely insured’ plans). We show that if insurance premiums are set correctly, corporate policy in this area may not matter; otherwise the optimal policy may simply be that which maximizes the difference between the value of the insurance and its cost.     

国资划转对企业职工基本养老保险降费空间影响的研究

基于企业职工基本养老保险基金收支精算平衡原理,本文建立企业职工基本养老保险缴费率模型,探讨国资划转对企业职工基本养老保险降费空间的影响。研究发现,国资划转能为养老保险提供降费空间;但当前国资划转比例为养老保险提供的降费空间十分有限;若加大国资划转比例,养老保险降费空间可以提升。进一步研究改变缴费基数对国资划转为养老保险贡献的缴费空间的影响,发现缴费基数增加后,企业平衡缴费率降低,国资划转为养老保险降费率提供的空间减小。本文建议通过提高国有资产划转充实养老保险基金的比例、进行养老保险征管体制改革以做实缴费基数,从而改革和完善企业职工基本养老保险制度。     

Performance evaluation of balanced pension plans

This paper examines the ability of balanced pension plan managers to successfully time the equity and bond market and select the appropriate assets within these markets. In order to evaluate both market timing abilities in these balanced pension plans, we extend the traditional equity market timing models to also account for bond market timing. As far as we know, we are among the first to apply this multifactor timing model to investigate equity and bond market timing simultaneously. This performance evaluation has been conducted on two samples of Spanish balanced pension plans, one with Euro Zone and one with World investment focus. This allows us to decompose managers’ skills into three components: selectivity, equity market timing, and bond market timing. Our findings suggest that the average stock-picking ability of pension plans is positive. World schemes tend to have positive bond timing skills, while Euro Zone pension plans are on average not able to time equity or bond markets.     

Managerial risk taking incentives and corporate pension policy

We examine whether the compensation incentives of top management affect the extent of risk shifting versus risk management behavior in pension plans. We find that risk shifting through pension underfunding (and, to a lesser extent, through pension asset allocation to risky securities) is stronger with compensation structures that create high wealth-risk sensitivity (vega) and weaker with high wealth-price sensitivity (delta). These findings are stronger for chief financial officers (CFOs) than for chief executive officers (CEOs), suggesting that pension policy falls within the CFO’s domain. Risk shifting through pension underfunding is also lower when the CFO’s personal stake in the pension plan is larger. Overall, these findings show that top managers’ compensation structure is an important driver of corporate pension policy. They also highlight firms within which the moral hazard concerns fueled by Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation insurance are most relevant.     

Risk Allocation in Retirement Plans: A Better Solution

The corporate world is reconsidering the cost‐effectiveness of defined benefit pension plans while contemplating a change to defined contribution plans. This article begins by examining the three primary risks faced by sponsors of most DB pension plans—investment risk, interest rate risk, and longevity risk—and shows how shifting these risks to employees through a DC plan would affect both the corporation and the individual. Although DC plans clearly help companies manage risks, they provide at best an incomplete solution for individual participants. This article describes an innovation in pension design—the Retirement Shares Plan (RSP)—that combines many of the best features of DB and DC plans. An RSP provides:

• ? predictable and stable cost to the plan sponsor, with little chance of unfunded liabilities;
• ? lifetime income, guaranteeing that retirees will never outlive their benefits;
• ? a benefit accrual pattern comparable to that of traditional pension plans that preserves value for older, long‐service employees; and
• ? potential inflation protection for retirees.

The RSP accomplishes this by allocating risk to sponsors and individuals differently than either a traditional DB plan or a DC plan. Unlike most DB plans, the RSP shifts investment and interest rate risks from plan sponsors to participants. Unlike DC plans, the RSP keeps longevity risk with the sponsor.     

德国新型个人储蓄性养老保险计划述评

德国新型个人储蓄性养老保险计划(里斯特养老金和吕库普养老金)通过税收优惠和直接补贴的方式极大地激发了个人购买储蓄性养老保险计划的热情,多角度分析上述两种养老金计划,总结其成功经验,对我国促进个人储蓄性养老保险计划的发展有一定的启示。     

Determinants of Real Estate Asset Allocations in Private and Public Pension Plans

Numerous studies have examined the factors associated with allocation of corporate and government pension-plan assets. Yet to date there has been no attempt to identify the sponsor-related conditions that affect the percentage of U.S. private and public pension-fund assets invested in real estate. The purpose of this article is to examine various asset-and liability-matching hypotheses regarding pension-plan asset allocations. Models are specified for both corporate and government defined-benefit plans that relate the characteristics of each plan to the percentage allocated to real estate investments. Our results confirm the existence of a significant size effect for both corporate and government pension plans, although we find mean levels of real estate allocation to be much lower than those suggested in previous real estate allocation studies. The article, however, contains some anomalous findings. In particular, our findings suggest that pension-plan sponsors do not hedge their real estate risk. We also find that pension-plan sponsors do not invest in real estate, as theory might suggest, to minimize the noise level in their pension liabilities.     

The Value and Risk of Defined Contribution Pension Schemes: International Evidence

We use historical data on investment returns and labor income from 16 countries to quantify the value and risk of defined contribution pension plans, building frequency distributions of pension fund and pension replacement ratios for each country. We show that pension risk is substantial and find that pension fund ratios are lower and less variable than when the correlation between wage growth and investment returns is ignored, typically halving the median pension fund ratio. We also show that an all‐equity fund is the dominant investment strategy across all countries, although sometimes a life‐cycle strategy insures against downside risk.     

风险分散与中国混合型基本养老保险制度改革研究

本文从参保人养老投资风险分散角度研究混合型基本养老保险制度设计。通过构建一个两期消费模型,综合考虑参保人所面临的人口结构、工资增长率、养老基金投资等风险因素,本文研究了混合型基本养老保险制度中现收现付制与基金积累制的最优比例,并利用中国数据进行了测算与敏感性分析。研究发现:引入小规模个人账户基金积累制可以分散人口老龄化给现收现付制所带来的风险,中国实行混合型基本养老保险制度有其合理性;但如果要维持40%～45%的养老金替代率水平,中国基本养老保险制度的财务可持续性会面临较大挑战。     

Do a firm's equity returns reflect the risk of its pension plan?

This paper examines the empirical question of whether systematic equity risk of US firms as measured by beta from the capital asset pricing model reflects the risk of their pension plans. There are a number of reasons to suspect that it might not. Chief among them is the opaque set of accounting rules used to report pension assets, liabilities, and expenses. Pension plan assets and liabilities are off-balance sheet and are often viewed as segregated from the rest of the firm, with its own trustees. Pension accounting rules are complicated. Furthermore, the role of the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation clouds the real relation between pension plan risk and firm equity risk. The empirical findings in this paper are consistent with the hypothesis that equity risk does reflect the risk of the firm's pension plan despite arcane accounting rules for pensions. This finding is consistent with informational efficiency of the capital markets. It also has implications for corporate finance practice in the determination of the cost of capital for capital budgeting. Standard procedure uses de-leveraged equity return betas to infer the cost of capital for operating assets. But the de-leveraged betas are not adjusted for the risk of the pension assets and liabilities. Failure to make this adjustment typically biases upward estimates of the discount rate for capital budgeting. The magnitude of the bias is shown here to be large for a number of well-known US companies. This bias can result in positive net present value projects being rejected.     

英国养老金金融化改革的经验和启示

文章梳理了英国养老金制度改革历程,归纳了三个支柱改革的金融化导向及表现,分析了金融化改革对第二、三支柱养老金覆盖率、缴费率、投资收益和基金积累的影响,以及生命周期化投资、养老金债券等金融创新在应对低利率风险、金融危机冲击风险中的作用.基于英国养老金金融化改革经验,结合我国企业年金和个人养老金发展的实际,总结了引入"自动加入"制度、发展集合年金计划、完善税收优惠、推行审慎监管、鼓励养老金生命周期投资创新以及改革基础养老金制度为职业年金和个人养老金金融化改革创造条件等结论和启示.     

延迟退休对城镇职工养老保险收支影响的净效应估计——基于2025年起渐进式延迟退休年龄的假设

鉴于延迟退休对养老金收支有多重影响,本文假定2025年起以"每4年延迟1年"节奏,逐步将男(女)养老金正常领取年龄(NRA)从60(55)岁提高至2049年的65(60)岁,利用中国未来分年龄人口数的完整估计数据,估算了延迟退休对城镇职工基本养老保险收支影响的净效应。估算结果显示,延迟退休为2050年争取到了近25%的制度赡养比下降空间,养老压力高峰期大大推迟。无论延迟与否,未来养老金收支缺口规模都很大,但延迟退休对抑制缺口扩大仍有显著效果,特别是在短中期,每年的收支缺口会因此减少40%~70%,但2050年后的远期效果明显减弱。建议尽早实施渐次延迟退休,减少工作退休的强制性,尊重国情允许男女差龄退休;加强养老金财政补贴长期规划,减轻远期财政兜底压力;加强养老金缴费与受益的精算联系,大力提高基金投资效率等。     

公务员养老金制度并轨改革的设计思路与精算评估

我国公务员与企业职工的退休待遇存在巨大差距,养老保险制度的公平性备受质疑,由制度差异带来的阻碍人才流动等弊端日益凸显,已成为近年来社会关注的焦点问题,本文在分析公务员的职业特点及其养老保障特殊性的基础上,借鉴国际经验,并基于融入全国统一的养老金体系和保护公务员既得权益的考虑,给出了公务员养老金改革应采取“基本养老金＋职业年金”的设计思路和具体方案,测算分析了改革方案对个人和财政支出的影响以及在实施上的可行性。