声誉激励、社会监督与质量规制——城市垃圾处理行业中的博弈分析

我国实施市政公用事业市场化改革以来,民营企业通过竞标等方式从政府手中获取特许经营权,凭借其垄断地位和信息优势降低服务标准,导致垃圾处理行业陷入质量规制的困境。本文针对城市垃圾处理行业的问题,先是构建以规制机构与垃圾处理特许经营企业为参与者的博弈模型,分析了声誉激励和社会监督对博弈参与双方损益及其策略的影响;然后构建纳入举报机制的由社会民众、规制机构和特许经营企业三方参与的序列博弈模型。研究得出四点结论：（1）减少规制成本,增加对违规垃圾处理企业的惩罚力度,可减少企业违规概率;（2）声誉激励和社会监督均可减少垃圾处理特许经营企业违规概率;（3）社会监督有助于节约规制成本,减弱规制机构与企业间信息不对称程度,提高规制效率;（4）规制机构的检查行为与公众举报行为之间存在明显的互补性。最后针对性地提出了提高城市垃圾处理行业质量规制效果的政策建议。     

Socialism,Spillovers and Markets in Cuba

This article undertakes an empirical evaluation of Cuba's new development strategy placing tourism at the heart of the process of incorporating markets into a socialist system. The principal research question is whether the introduction of markets related to the Cuban tourism complex has been as successful in establishing viable backward linkages to industry as claimed. Drawing on a multitude of quantitative and qualitative sources, the article demonstrates that backward linkage building has been quite successful and even made possible a transformation of Cuba's formerly so dependent trade structures. However, there are signs that backward linkages are not as viable as could be desired. Other complementary reforms beside the introduction of markets are necessary, such as fighting soft budget constraints in user and producer firms. The article concludes that it will be difficult to fight the roots of the inherited incentive problem without initiating fundamental labour market reforms.     

SHOULD A MANDATORY SUBORDINATED DEBT POLICY BE INTRODUCED IN THE UNITED KINGDOM? EVIDENCE FROM THE ISSUANCE ACTIVITY OF BANKS AND BUILDING SOCIETIES

Current research is beginning to question the role and effectiveness of traditional rules‐based bank regulatory oversight in favor of incentive‐compatible regulatory design and market discipline and, in particular, mandatory subordinated debt market discipline. However, research on the suitability of a mandatory subordinated debt policy (MSNDP) has focused primarily on the United States. The primary aims of this article, therefore, are to examine the market for subordinated debt (SND) issued by UK credit institutions and to assess the suitability of introducing an MSNDP into UK banking regulation. A further contribution of this article is that it explores SND issuance and its characteristics at a bank level and, uniquely, considers them in relation to regulatory, structural, and economic events that either are specific to the UK or otherwise affect international banks. The article compares the UK findings with research on SND markets in the United States and Europe and, in so doing, raises concerns over whether an MSNDP for the largest global credit institutions would be feasible. Although the focus of this study is the UK banking industry, the country‐focused bank‐level approach provides conclusions that might be relevant to other countries considering the implementation of an MSNDP.(JEL G18, G28)     

我国电网激励性价格监管政策研究

本文主要研究电网的价格监管政策框架。通过监管方法配合的视角，以监管内容与监管时间为标准，将世界主要国家的电网监管制度总结为四大模式，并详细对比分析了英美两国的电网监管实践。以理论与国际实践为参照，本文指出我国实行的以回报率监管为基准的模式是适合当前发展阶段的，后续需要针对回报率监管的弱激励以及事前定价的特点，引入强激励机制和不确定调整机制。特别是制定强激励方案，本文提出了两条可选择路径。     

The future of financial markets: financial crisis avoidance

This article considers the lessons from the global financial crisis for redesigning the financial system and its regulation to make the chance of future such crises lower. It focuses on three areas: improvements to the regulation of individual financial firms; macroprudential analysis and improving the structure of crisis resolution and management. It argues that if the authorities implement a credible crisis management regime where no firm is too big to be resolved, a smarter and more incentive based approach to the regulation of individual financial firms and extensive macroprudential analysis that both makes the structure of financial markets less risky and identifies risks, the risk of future crises will be reduced. But no framework can eliminate the risk altogether.     

Technical efficiency,allocative efficiency,and the impact of incentive regulation in telecommunications in the United States

Incentive regulation is now an important regulatory tool in the telecommunications industry in the United States. The objective of incentive regulation is to improve productive efficiency, enhance service quality and consumer welfare, and reduce the costs of regulation. The issue that is considered here is whether incentive regulation in the form of a price cap applicable to interstate access service to local loops has resulted in an increase in the technical efficiency and allocative efficiency of local exchange carriers (LECs). After discussing the reasons for adopting incentive regulation, the nature of price caps is explored followed by an overview of the methodology for measuring the effects of incentive regulation on productive efficiency. The results indicate that for changes in technical efficiency, there is a definite randomness between 1985 and 1993 with technical efficiency increasing in some years and decreasing in others. Subsequent to 1993, however, there is a consistent improvement in technical efficiency. Given that incentive regulation in the forin of price caps was implemented for LECs in 1991, it is likely that some portion of the improvement in technical efficiency subsequent to 1993 is attributable to incentive regulation. A pronounced upward trend in allocative efficiency is observed beginning in 1985. It is problematic, however, to attribute the improvement in allocative efficiency to the adoption of incentive regulation. It is more likely an artifact of the divestiture of AT&T although some indeterminant portion is probably associated with the implementation of price caps.JEL classification: L51, L96     

Globalisation and the Institutional Re-embedding of Markets: The Political Economy of Price Formation in the Bordeaux En Primeur Market

Contemporary analyses commonly attribute the global credit crisis to faulty regulation. What have been the roots of these deficient rules, particularly in Europe, where rapid spill-over from US markets took policy makers and observers by surprise? This article focuses on regulatory liberalism as the paradigm guiding European Union (EU) regulation. It has dominated regulatory thinking for decades, but it has been implemented throughout Europe only since the mid-1990s. This shift can be traced to political institutions that have filtered policy ideas. EU financial reforms have pushed policy from pragmatism, under which it was adapted to political contingencies, to dogmatism, which adapts it to the intellectual exigencies of rigid policy paradigms. Inadvertently, reforms had created an epistemic community in which ‘professional’ rule setters systematically ignored external criticisms. The institutionalised ambition to craft ‘intellectually sound’ policy–rather than policy that simply ‘works’ –generated rules that persistently ignored the financial markets' self-reflexivity and thereby aggravated the crisis.     

Price Discrimination, Regulation and Entry in the UK Residential Electricity Market

The residential electricity market in Great Britain has recently been opened to competition and is served by 14 regional incumbents, and up to 15 entrants in each area. This study finds that the incumbents' regulated prices are discriminatory between consumers using different payment methods, and that firms are practising third‐degree price discrimination between areas. The authors discuss the implications for regulatory policy both in the UK and in other countries where electricity markets are being deregulated.     

The Change in Productive Efficiency in Telecommunications in the United States

The question addressed here is whether the adoption of incentive regulation, which has become an important regulatory tool in the telecommunications industry in the USA, has resulted in a change in the technical efficiency of local exchange carriers in the USA. After providing an overview of the nature of incentive regulation, a methodology for measuring technical efficiency and its change is introduced. This is a multiple-output/multiple-input distance function approach to measuring technical efficiency. The results of implementing this approach for 19 local exchange carriers for the 1988–2001 period indicate that in the production of local service, intrastate toll/access service, and interstate access to local loops, there was no change in technical efficiency between the 1988–1990 period and the 1991–2001 period, something that incentive regulation was specifically designed to promote.     

The Change in Productive Efficiency in Telecommunications in the United States

The question addressed here is whether the adoption of incentive regulation, which has become an important regulatory tool in the telecommunications industry in the USA, has resulted in a change in the technical efficiency of local exchange carriers in the USA. After providing an overview of the nature of incentive regulation, a methodology for measuring technical efficiency and its change is introduced. This is a multiple-output/multiple-input distance function approach to measuring technical efficiency. The results of implementing this approach for 19 local exchange carriers for the 1988-2001 period indicate that in the production of local service, intrastate toll/access service, and interstate access to local loops, there was no change in technical efficiency between the 1988-1990 period and the 1991- 2001 period, something that incentive regulation was specifically designed to promote.     

Consumer‐benefiting exclusive territories

Abstract.  I investigate the effect of exclusive territories, which are typical vertical controls imposed by upstream firms. Using shipping spatial models, I consider an industry that consists of many independent local markets. An upstream monopolist restricts competition between downstream firms using exclusive territories. I find that exclusive territories reduce the prices of final products in all local markets in quantity‐setting competition. In price‐setting competition, they raise prices in half the local markets, reduce them in other markets, and also reduce the total consumer surplus. JEL classification: L42, R32     

Market access in regulated and unregulated markets: The continuing cost of interstate motor carrier regulation

This study examines the effect of regulatory reform in the interstate trucking industry. In our model, carriers travel in round trips and choose to serve different markets corresponding to each leg of the trip. Some carriers have authority to haul freight subject to regulation while other carriers do not. Unlike previous studies, our model applies to decisions acrossmultiple legs. Using a bivariate probit, we find differences in the determinants of accessacross markets. Entry regulation has a significant influence only in markets dominated by regulated traffic, whereas location has a significant influence only in markets dominated by unregulated traffic.Name order was determined by a coin toss. Kenneth Boyer, Victoria Dailey, Gregory Duncan, Jo Anna Gray, Shane Greenstein, Edward H. Rastatter, and Joe A. Stone made a number of useful comments that improved the paper, and Marylynne Diggs made a number of editorial comments.     

Market Power and Emissions Trading: Theory and Laboratory Results

Policymakers are concerned with market power being exploited by dominant firms in emission permit markets. Two types of market power may emerge: simple and exclusionary manipulation. Simple manipulation should result in reduced pollution‐control cost relative to command‐and‐control regulation. Exclusionary manipulation may result in increased cost. The paper reports results of an economic experiment to determine whether (i) such opportunities are successfully exploited when a dominant firm has the opportunity to do so, and (ii) the resulting outcomes are serious enough to merit consideration by regulators. Market power outcomes emerge and market efficiency is far below predicted levels.     

La réglementation et l'organisation du transport de personnes par chemins de fer dans l'Union européenne:

This article proposes an analysis of recent developments of the railway sector‐mainly passenger transport—in the European Union. It first provides a critical synthesis of the foundations and practical intervention modes of the European legislators.
A typology of the organizational structures applied in various Member States shows the diversity of the reforms undertaken in Europe, among others under the impulse of the common European transport policy.
Finally the authors analyse advantages and disadvantages of recent regulatory reforms aimed at introducing in the railway sector a separation between infrastructure and operation of transport services in order to increase competition in transport supply.     

The economics of deregulation of local exchange telecommunications

This paper has two objectives. The first is to reappraise the potential competitiveness of local exchange telecommunications markets, in light of recent arguments in favor of deregulation. The second objective is to discuss regulatory reform strategies. We conclude that local telecommunications markets retain the essential characteristics of a natural monopoly, but that many of the regulatory reforms are nevertheless desirable.     

Interest Rate Defenses of Currency Pegs

ABSTRACT

Reducing rigidity in labor markets is key to lowering unemployment. Theoretical models suggest that the impact of such reforms depends on the country-specific regulatory framework. We test this hypothesis by estimating the impact of changes in six categories of regulation conditional on the country-specific regulatory environment for 26 OECD countries. We overcome problems of modeling a large set of institutional interdependencies by applying a machine learning type model selection approach. We provide evidence for the existence of higher-order institutional interdependencies. We further document that especially for changes in employment protection and the unemployment benefit system the impact on unemployment is mixed across countries.     

Uber’s early entry decisions in the US

ABSTRACT

Early entry decisions of the firm are crucial to its success. Ride-sharing businesses developed due to technology and government regulation. With the advent of the ride-sharing technology, firms like Uber, Lyft, etc. were faced with the decision of which markets to enter first. For this paper, a model is developed of a profit-maximizing firm constrained from entering all markets simultaneously. The entry decision of Uber into the 50 most populous US metropolitan statistical areas (MSA) is examined. The results suggest Uber’s entry decision was constrained and affected by both revenue potential and regulation in the local taxi industry.     

FDI流入对绿色技术创新的影响及区域比较

基于中国2007-2015年省级面板数据,将命令-控制型规制和市场激励型规制分别纳入中国FDI流入对绿色技术创新的非线性面板门槛模型中,探讨了东中西部地区两种环境规制门槛的时序变化情况,实证分析了FDI流入与绿色技术创新的复杂非线性关系。结果表明：样本期间东部地区绿色技术创新水平最高,中部次之,西部最差,故应着力发挥东部地区先发优势的带头作用;东、中、西部地区均存在显著的命令-控制型规制双重门槛,并分别存在市场激励型规制单一门槛、双重门槛和双重门槛,因此各地区应根据规制工具门槛特征,有效发挥环境规制驱动绿色创新的关键作用;各地区研发人员投入、自主研发创新和政府调控能力显著正向影响绿色技术创新,基于此,政府应鼓励创新人才引进,加大研发人员及资金投入力度,提高地区宏观调控能力。     

Ex post bidding and efficient coordination unemployment

Abstract.  We study the implementation of constrained‐efficient allocations in labour markets where a basic coordination problem leads to an equilibrium matching friction. We argue that these allocations can be achieved in a non‐cooperative equilibrium if wages are determined by ex post bidding. This holds true even in finite‐sized markets where the equilibrium‐matching process has decreasing returns to scale – where the 'Hosios rule' does not apply – both with and without heterogeneity. JEL classification: D83, J64     

Killing the Goose That May Have Laid the Golden Egg: Only the Data Know Whether Sabotage Pays

A lively debate has developed concerning the incentive for a price-regulated input monopolist to engage in non-price discrimination if it vertically integrates into downstream markets. This paper identifies the key industry characteristics that determine whether such discrimination is likely, and studies both theoretically and numerically the tradeoffs among three important characteristics in the simplest extant model. The incentive to discriminate is theoretically ambiguous, but data for the US telecommunications industry indicate that discrimination is likely in the absence of policy-induced countervailing incentives. Countervailing policies include direct penalties for discriminatory behavior, forcing vertical autonomy, and fostering upstream competition.