The economics of trade agreements in the linear Cournot delocation model

Existing theories of trade agreements suggest that GATT/WTO efforts to reign in export subsidies represent an inefficient victory for exporting governments that comes at the expense of importing governments. Building on the Cournot delocation model first introduced by Venables (1985), we derive new results from this model and use these results to develop a more benign interpretation of efforts to restrain export subsidies in trade agreements. And we suggest that the gradual tightening of restraints on export subsidies that has occurred in the GATT/WTO may be interpreted as deriving naturally from the gradual reduction in import barriers that member countries have negotiated. Together with existing theories, the Cournot delocation model may help to provide a more nuanced and complete understanding of the treatment of export subsidies in trade agreements.     

US–Brazilian cotton policies

Brazil filed a lawsuit with the WTO against the United States for providing cotton production and export subsidies, and the WTO ruled in favour of Brazil. Brazil threatened to impose retaliatory tariffs if the United States does not comply with the WTO rulings. After a prolonged litigation stretching from 2002 to 2010, both countries agreed to a negotiated settlement wherein the United States paid Brazilian cotton producers to compensate for any adverse effects. This study develops a political economic model to theoretically analyse US cotton policies, Brazil's threat of retaliatory tariffs and the negotiated settlement between the two countries. The theoretical results show that the volume of cotton output, supply price response, politicians' apathy for the public welfare, elasticities of excess supply/demand and the magnitude of US transfers play a crucial role in determining US policies. This study contributes to the literature by being the first to model political economic aspects of the complex system of trade and domestic policies in the cotton industry using a three-country framework, tariff retaliation and transfers between the countries.     

Dispute Settlement at the WTO: Impacts of a No Deal in the US‐Brazil Cotton Dispute

On the day before Brazil was to start imposing retaliatory sanctions against the United States in the WTO dispute settlement case regarding unfair domestic and export upland cotton subsidies, the parties have reached a preliminary concession aimed at settling this eight‐year‐long trade dispute. In this paper, we explore the economywide impacts of a no deal with specific emphasis on intellectual property retaliation in a computable general equilibrium framework. As awarded by a WTO dispute settlement panel, Brazil would have been entitled to $591 million in retaliatory sanctions in goods sectors and $238 million in intellectual property sanctions. We find that retaliation by Brazil would have led to welfare gains for all countries except the United States. Most importantly, however, had Brazil not been allowed to retaliate in the form of suspension of intellectual property rights, the impact of trade retaliation alone would have been negative for both Brazil and the United States, a case of shooting oneself in the foot to shoot at the other person's foot.     

Can Export Restrictions be Disciplined Through the World Trade Organisation?

A number of major agricultural exporting countries responded to high food prices from 2007 to 2011 by imposing export restrictions on agricultural commodities in efforts to constrain domestic food price inflation. These restrictions reduced the volume of internationally traded food and exacerbated international price spikes. Net food‐importing countries were faced with growing import bills, and non‐governmental organisations that target food security scaled‐back programme commitments and appealed for increased funding. There have subsequently been a chorus of calls for the development of a formal international framework that could discipline the use of agricultural export restrictions; the agreements of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) have been targeted as possible fora for such disciplines. We present a framework in which the efficacy of such disciplines can be analysed and conclude that constraints on agricultural export restrictions are not likely to be effective within the WTO's Dispute Settlement Understanding for two reasons. First, the timelines for dispute settlement in the WTO are too long to be useful in disputes about export restrictions during periods of high food prices. Second, the withdrawal of tariff concessions, or trade retaliation, that could be authorised in such cases would not be a credible response for many complainant countries.     

Rethinking international subsidy rules

Geo-economic tensions, notably associated with the rise of China, and global collective action problems—climate change and the COVID-19pandemic—call for international cooperation to revise and develop rules to guide both the use of domestic subsidies and responses by governments to cross-border competition spillover effects. Current WTO rules dividing all subsidies into prohibited or actionable categories are no longer fit for purpose. Piecemeal efforts in preferential trade agreements and bi- or trilateral configurations offer a basis on which to build but are too narrow in scope. Addressing spillover effects of subsidies could start with G20 countries launching a work programme to mobilise an epistemic community concerned with subsidy policies, tasked with building a more solid evidence base on the magnitude, purpose and effects of subsidy policies. The need for such cooperation has become even more pressing by the COVID-19 pandemic and associated increase in the use of subsidy programmes in major economies.     

Antidumping and retaliation threats

We propose and test two ways in which retaliation threats may dampen the antidumping (AD) activity we observe. First, the threat of retaliatory AD actions may make a domestic industry less likely to name a foreign import source in an AD petition. Second, the prospect of a GATT/WTO trade dispute may make government agencies less likely to rule positive in their AD decision. Using a nested logit framework, we find evidence that both retaliation threats substantially affect US AD activity from 1980 through 1998.     

我国应对国际服务贸易壁垒的策略

近年我国企业深受国际服务贸易壁垒的困扰,这也是造成我国巨额服务贸易逆差的原因之一。我国中央政府、地方政府、行业协会和企业应协同配合,运用WTO谈判机制、贸易政策审议机制、争端解决机制和自由贸易区协议等途径积极争取我国服务贸易发展权,必要时采取对等措施反制;未来还要积极推动完善WTO现存体制和FTA协议,以遏制服务贸易壁垒的发生。     

贸易争端背景下特朗普政府农业贸易补贴政策研究

美国长期实行农业补贴政策,其中农作物保险、农业风险补贴和价格损失补贴是补贴的主要形式。特朗普政府上台以后,美国同中国等一些国家发生贸易争端,美国农业出口面临关税报复和贸易壁垒的困境。为保持农业稳定发展,特朗普政府在原有农业补贴形式的基础之上新增了农业贸易援助计划,该计划主要包括市场促进项目、食品采购和分配项目、农业贸易促进项目。这些援助计划在稳定农业生产的同时,也扭曲了市场。美国在2019年度的农业补贴可能会超过其对世贸组织承诺的"黄箱"补贴上限,从而导致违反世贸组织规则。如美国长期执行该政策,我国应采取对美施压措施。     

Trade policy: Home market effect versus terms-of-trade externality

We study trade policy in a two-sector Krugman (1980) trade model, allowing for wage, import and export subsidies/taxes. We study non-cooperative trade policies, first for each individual instrument and then for the situation where all instruments can be set simultaneously, and contrast those with the efficient allocation. We show that in this general context there are four motives for non-cooperative trade policies: the correction of monopolistic distortions; the terms-of-trade manipulation; the delocation motive for protection (home market effect); the fiscal-burden-shifting motive. The Nash equilibrium when all instruments are available is characterized by first-best-level wage subsidies, and inefficient import subsidies and export taxes, which aim at relocating firms to the other economy and improving terms of trade. Thus, the dominating incentives for non-cooperative trade policies are the fiscal-burden-shifting motives and terms-of-trade effects.     

Strategic trade policies with first-mover and second-mover advantages in a vertical structure

With strategic trade policies, we consider first- and second-mover advantages in a vertical structure given the two-part tariff contract (composed of the input price and the fixed fee) of an upstream firm, where a home and a foreign final-good firms export to a third-country market. We find that the upstream firms’ and governments’ preference orderings over sequential versus simultaneous play and over free trade versus a regime of subsidies contrast with early results in the strategic trade policy. Thus, the endogenous market structure is that (i) the potential leader chooses the Leader role with quantity strategies, and the equilibrium trade regime is unilateral subsidy regardless of the nature of goods; (ii) with price strategies, the potential leader chooses the simultaneous timing, and the equilibrium trade regime is bilateral taxes (free trade) when goods are substitutes (complements).     

Developing Countries as Plaintiffs and Defendants in GATT/WTO Trade Disputes

Developing countries have been increasing their participation in the formal institutions and proceedings of the multilateral trading system. A prominent example is their more frequent involvement as defendants and plaintiffs in GATT/WTO trade disputes. This paper provides an initial economic appraisal of developing country performance in the GATT/WTO dispute settlement system. We measure the economic resolution of these disputes through trade liberalisation gains, and our results suggest that developing country plaintiffs have had more success under WTO disputes than was the case under the GATT. We also document evidence on potential determinants of this success: the capacity for plaintiffs to make credible retaliatory threats and the guilty determinations by GATT/WTO panels. Finally, there is also some evidence that developing countries have recognised the importance of retaliatory threats and have responded by changing their pattern of dispute initiation under the WTO to better take advantage of the instances in which they have sufficient leverage to threaten retaliation and induce compliance with GATT/WTO obligations.     

服务贸易协定承诺的覆盖率对制造业增加值出口的影响

文章借助WTO与世界银行联合建立的Integrated Trade Intelligence Portal数据库构建服务贸易协定承诺的覆盖率指标,选取Trade in value-added数据库2005年至2015年27个国家(地区)制造业增加值出口的国内增加值和国外增加值数据,通过实证分析,得出结论:(1)服务贸易协定生效在短时间内对制造业国内增加值和国外增加值出口存在显著的促进效应,且随着生效年限增加,促进效应也在加强;(2)服务贸易协定承诺的覆盖率越高,对制造业增加值出口的促进作用越强。根据国家收入水平对服务贸易协定进行分类的异质性分析结果显示:(1)发达国家(地区)与其他国家(地区)签订服务贸易协定对其制造业增加值出口的提升没有显著正向影响,甚至表现出负面影响;(2)发展中国家(地区)之间签订的服务贸易协定能够在生效2年后显著促进发展中国家(地区)制造业国外增加值出口。     

博弈论视角下贸易保护主义盛行的原因及中国的对策

在各国面临不同的经济复苏进程的环境下,世界经济范围内利益的交织引起的贸易摩擦是不可避免的.通过对不完全信息条件下贸易政策选择的博弈模型分析可知,当一国预知采取保护策略可能给本国带来的收益越大,以及对方采取的报复性设置越小时,将会有较强的动机进行贸易保护.当前,我国受到贸易保护主义的严重冲击,对此,我国应加强政府间的沟通和协调,突出企业在应诉和维权中的作用,加快国内产业结构的优化升级,避免授人以柄和加强贸易反制,维护我国出口行业的正当利益.     

WTO subsidy rules and tariff liberalization: evidence from accession of China

Countries increasingly rely on subsidies to assist their producers leading to concerns about their potential misuse. The WTO regulates its members’ subsidies by defining subsidies that are permissible, as well as by providing means to retaliate against subsidies of partner countries if these subsidies hurt one's interest. However, these subsidy rules might have an unintended effect. As both subsidies and tariffs are substitute instruments of protection, tighter subsidy rules might lead to a decrease in the pace of tariff liberalization. In this paper, we present first empirical evidence in support of this prediction. Using China's accession to the WTO in 2001 as a case study, we show that China's accession to the WTO was associated with a relative increase in its tariffs for products that faced a higher threat of retaliation against subsidies. More importantly, we also show that increases in tariff were larger in products with higher potential costs imposed by retaliation. Finally, we include several robustness tests as well as conduct two counterfactual exercises to verify that the results we obtain are indeed due to perceived threat of retaliation against subsidies.     

The Impacts of Alignment with Global Product Standards on Exports of Firms in Developing Countries

Complying with global standards and technical norms can be costly, making them potential impediments to trade, but it can also expand export opportunities. Two policies available to governments are alignment of domestic technical regulations with international standards and entry into mutual recognition agreements (MRAs). We study the effects of such decisions on the volume of exports to developed markets by firms in developing countries, using data from a World Bank firm‐level survey of awareness of global product norms. Both standards alignment and MRAs are associated with more exports to developed countries, but only MRAs significantly promote exports. This finding is consistent with theoretical predictions that MRAs should reduce the fixed costs of exporting more than standards alignment, permitting more firms to enter export markets in higher volumes. Governments in developing countries hoping to encourage exports may wish to favour the negotiation of mutual recognition of testing and certification procedures with major trading partners as a more affirmative avenue to expanding international sales.     

Inequality and endogenous trade policy outcomes

An enduring puzzle in international economics is why trade interventions are biased in favor of import-competing rather than export sectors and therefore restrict trade. In this paper, we show that if the government's objective reflects a concern for inequality then trade policy generally exhibits an anti-trade bias. Importantly, under neutral assumptions, the mechanism that we analyze generates the anti-trade bias independently of whether factors are specific or mobile across sectors. The mechanism also generates an anti-trade bias between large countries even after they sign reciprocal trade agreements that eliminate any terms-of-trade motivation for the use of trade protection.     

基于报复角度的国际反倾销分析

国内外学者通过研究发现一国(地区)遭受反倾销后,有可能对别国(地区)进行报复性反倾销,这样会导致国际反倾销的日益增加。我们通过整理WTO公布的1995-2010年间的反倾销数据,从反倾销的国别或地区、行业和年份等方面进行了研究,认为:印度、美国、欧盟和阿根廷的反倾销报复能力比较强,已经成为全球反倾销的主要国家(地区),中国和韩国的反倾销报复能力比较弱,已经成为全球被反倾销的主要国家(地区)。进一步地,我们将主要反倾销国家(地区)与主要被反倾销国家(地区)之间的反倾销案件进行比较后,认为一国(地区)遭受反倾销特别是来自于主要反倾销国家(地区)的反倾销时,若没有进行有效的反倾销报复,其他国家(地区)也会加入对该国(地区)的反倾销队伍中来,使其面临更多的反倾销。     

后危机时代绿色壁垒对河南省农产品出口的影响及对策

后危机时代绿色壁垒贸易保护主义又有新发展,表现在其实施范围扩大、实施形式增多、实施国增多和实施更加严格。河南省是农业大省,但农产品出口总量较低,出口产品以低附加值的初级产品和半成品为主,绿色贸易壁垒对其农产品出口带来严重不利影响,主要表现在缩减出口范围,减缓出口增速,影响出口市场的巩固与扩大,不利于开拓新兴市场等方面。为此,需要从政府与企业两个层面采取有效措施构建应对绿色贸易壁垒的政策体系。     

Bilateral agricultural and commodity agreements—protectionism made to measure

While multinational agreements are subject to lively discussions and their negotiations the frequent topic of our news, little is known about bilateral agreements. This despite the fact that their number has greatly increased since the worldwide recession. So alone the USA and the EC have both signed over a hundred bilateral trade agreements to protect them against imports or safeguard their export interests.     

Comment on Fritz Breuss “WTO Dispute Settlement: An Economic Analysis of Four EU–US Mini Trade Wars”

In his excellent empirical analysis of the WTO dispute settlement process, Fritz Breuss has amply demonstrated the undesirability of trade retaliation by applying the CGE model to the transatlantic mini trade wars in the Hormones, Bananas, Foreign Sales Corporations and Steel Safeguards cases. The author's conclusion that tariffs are very bad instruments for countermeasures is uncontested. However, the practicability of a mechanism of direct transfers as proposed by the author may be questionable. The comments also discuss the purpose of retaliation (countermeasures) in the WTO dispute settlement system and summarize Japan's experience with the WTO dispute settlement mechanism.