中国的主权信用评级是否被低估?北大核心CSSCISSCI

本文以1986至2009年期间120个国家的宏观经济数据和三大评级机构的主权信用评级结果为研究对象;运用面板数据的多元回归模型和有序Probit概率模型研究中国的主权信用评级是否被低估的问题。通过对三大评级机构的定量分析模型进行模拟与验证发现,中国的主权信用评级在20世纪90年代和2001年至2002年前后的确被低估,但2003年以后,随着穆迪、标准普尔等评级机构相继调高我国的主权信用等级,目前我国的模拟评级与实际评级已经基本持平。     

中国的主权信用评级是否被低估?

本文以1986至2009年期间120个国家的宏观经济数据和三大评级机构的主权信用评级结果为研究对象;运用面板数据的多元回归模型和有序Probit概率模型研究中国的主权信用评级是否被低估的问题。通过对三大评级机构的定量分析模型进行模拟与验证发现,中国的主权信用评级在20世纪90年代和2001年至2002年前后的确被低估,但2003年以后,随着穆迪、标准普尔等评级机构相继调高我国的主权信用等级,目前我国的模拟评级与实际评级已经基本持平。     

从欧洲主权债务危机看信用评级机构监管

目前,工业化国家进入资本市场被看做理所当然,但新兴市场进入国际资本市场是不稳定的、多变的。对于新兴市场,信用评级扮演着最关键的角色。主权信用评级是由信用评级机构对中央政府的债务所做的风险评估。主权信用评级在决定国家进入国际资本市场的程度和条件上起着关键的作用。一些研究发现,信用评级的变化对主权债券利差有显著影响。主权信用评级被用做国家违约可能性的总体测量。     

主权信用评级调整的经济影响北大核心CSSCISSCI

通过总结主权信用评级调整经济影响的相关研究以及国际三大评级机构的评级实践,本文勾勒出主权信用评级调整的主要冲击路径和原理。对于近期我国主权评级被穆迪下调事件,本文认为此次下调在现阶段对中国的影响有限,其最主要的影响在于增加国内企业海外融资成本,未来需重点防范评级机构在短期内集中下调评级所产生的叠加效应。     

发展我国主权信用评级面临的问题及对策

自美国次债危机和欧债危机爆发以来,如何发展我国主权信用评级,建立符合我国国情且科学完善的现代主权信用评级体系,使其为我国的金融安全和金融稳定服务是目前最为关注的焦点。但目前,我国的主权信用评级更多地是处在自主评级的阶段,面临我国主权信用评级缺乏市场话语权,收费经营模式存在缺陷和监管和规范评级机构行业的法律法规滞后等问题,因此本文建议应从提高主权信用评级的评级质量,加速改造目前存在利益冲突的商业模式和建立规范信用评级机构的监管制度和法律法规等方面解决面临的问题。     

关于发展独立主权信用评级机构的博弈分析

主权信用评级关乎着一个国家金融体系的稳定。在国际上,主权信用评级业务几乎被美国的三大评级机构所垄断,继欧债危机爆发后,越来越多的国家认识到三大机构的信用评级对其经济所造成的震慑作用,并对其评级的公允性与独立性产生质疑。本应作为独立的第三方的信用评级机构如果不能为投资者提供客观的决策参考,而是为利益所动,那么由其提供的评级结果不具有独立性,会给被评级国家和其企业带来巨大的经济损失。本文将从博弈的角度、运用"共谋"与"防共谋"的博弈模型来分析信用评级机构缺失独立性的危害以及对一国而言发展独立的主权信用评级机构的重要意义。     

主权信用评级对国债发行成本的影响研究——兼议国际主权信用评级的合理性

自美国次贷危机爆发以来,国际三大评级机构的主权信用评级结果备受国际投资者的质疑。文章以中国和美国在2008年8月至2018年9月期间发行的固定利率附息国债为研究对象,通过建立真实利息成本模型来分析主权信用评级对中美两国国债发行成本的影响。实证检验结果表明,标普信用评级的变动并未对国债发行成本产生预期影响。进一步,文章结合2017年9月标普下调我国主权信用评级的案例,对现行国际主权信用评级体系的不合理性及破除主权信用评级霸权的重要性进行剖析,并提出提升我国在主权信用评级市场上话语权的政策建议。     

对国家主权信用评级的决定因素的实证研究

经过金融风暴的洗礼,许多国家开始面临财政危机,部分国家的主权信用评级被调低。这将削减这些国家继续融资的能力,使其陷入更深的经济困境,同时波及其他国家从而产生世界范围的影响。主权信用评级对一国具有重要意义,然而国内对其研究很少。本文通过建立线性回归模型,利用44个国家的7个宏观经济指标,对主权信用评级的决定因素进行分析。     

主权违约幽灵再次降临

进入2009年12月后．由于财政赤字不断恶化,越来越多的欧洲国家面临着主权信用危机——继希腊主权信用遭降级后。美国信用评级公司标准普尔又将西班牙主权信用评级前景从“稳定”下调至“负面”,并警告说西班牙将面临长期经济不景气。 至此,至少4个欧洲国家在最新一轮的主权信用危机中被点了名。更令人担心的是,摩根士丹利已预言。英国最早2010年就可能爆发财政危机。 主权债务的可持续性问题沉重笼罩着债券市场,威胁着经济及金融稳定的前景。     

后危机时代我国信用评级法律制度的完善——以金融安全为视角

美国次贷危机证明了信用评级在现代金融体系中的关键作用,一旦信用评级出现问题,将给整个金融系统造成严重冲击。信用评级是金融行业标准制定者,是整个行业的战略制高点,更与国家金融主权和经济安全密切相关。金融危机后各国纷纷立法加强对信用评级机构及信用评级业的监管。基于金融安全的考虑,我国亟需完善信用评级法律制度,大力扶持本土信用评级行业发展。     

基于逆周期的主权信用评级指标体系研究

现行国际主权信用评级呈现出明显的顺周期特征而广受诟病。在对评级指标体系优化的基础上,采用90个主权国家2005~2012年经济数据进行面板随机效应和门限效应回归,对主权信用评级决定模型进行估计,运用欧债危机发生前后的数据进行模拟评级,结果表明：优化后的指标体系显示出较好的逆周期特征。     

Differences of opinion in sovereign credit signals during the European crisis

Motivated by the European debt crisis and the new European Union regulatory regime for the credit rating industry, we analyse differences of opinion in sovereign credit signals and their influence on European stock markets. Rating disagreements have a significant connection with subsequent negative credit actions by each agency. However, links among Moody’s/Fitch actions and their rating disagreements with other agencies have weakened in the post-regulation period. We also find that only S&P’s negative credit signals affect the own-country stock market and spill over to other European markets, but this is concentrated in the pre-regulation period. Stronger stock market reactions occur when S&P has already assigned a lower rating than Moody’s/Fitch prior to taking a further negative action.     

美国资信评级行业监管及启示

美国信用评级业发展已有一百余年的历史,资信评级机构也一直引用声誉理论说明其在评级过程中会保持足够的执业谨慎,但安然破产、次贷危机、欧洲主权债务危机等事件使监管者认识到,仅靠“声誉”无法保证评级机构勤勉尽责,必须加强监管。该文对美国资信评级监管历史进行了简要回顾,分析了资信评级行业存在的主要问题,讨论了多德法案对资信评级行业的监管重点,介绍了多德法案之后资信评级行业监管的后续进展,并对完善我国资信评级监管提出相关建议。     

国际信用评级体系改革与中国评级业发展展望

国际金融危机和欧洲主权债务危机的爆发,凸显出现行国际信用评级体系存在的种种弊端。该文指出,现行国际信用评级体系的根本缺陷在于高度垄断,为此应通过加强内部治理和外部监管推动现有评级行业的改革,并推动国际信用评级行业新秩序的建立。中国应从宏观政策层面出台措施,扶持和推动本国自主信用评级体系的做大做强,并参与到国际信用评级体系的重建中。     

中美信用评级市场发展比较与启示

本文结合中美信用评级市场发展脉络,从评级机构、收费模式、监管模式等方面分析两国信用评级市场发展过程中的不同特征,认为美国信用评级市场健康发展的原因在于评级机构重视市场声誉以及监管机构注重加强引导与监管。借鉴美国经验,我国的信用评级机构应该注重加强信用评级机构的内部治理,提高信用评级机构的国内外影响力;同时加强外部环境建设和信息披露制度建设,建立科学统一的外部评级机构管理制度。     

The sovereign-bank rating channel and rating agencies' downgrades during the European debt crisis

We investigate the rating channel for the transmission of changes in sovereign risk to the banking sector, analysing data from Moody's, S&P and Fitch before and during the European debt crisis. Sovereign rating downgrades and negative watch signals have strong effects on bank rating downgrades in the crisis period. The impact is stronger for multiple-notch sovereign rating downgrades, and more pronounced in PIIGS countries. Secondly, we investigate rating agencies' competition in the banking sector during the same periods, finding significant differences in rating policies across the agencies. S&P credit actions tend to be the more independent ones, while Moody's appears to be more cautious, although it is by far the most likely to assign multiple-notch downgrades. In the pre-crisis period, we find no evidence that bank rating actions are linked to sovereign rating signals (nor vice versa) nor to prior bank rating changes by a competing agency.     

An Empirical Study of International Spillover of Sovereign Risk to Bank Credit Risk

The severity and complexity of the recent financial crisis has motivated the need for understanding the relationships between sovereign ratings and bank credit ratings. This is the first study to examine the impact of the “international” spillover of sovereign risk to bank credit risk through both a ratings channel and an asset holdings channel. In the first case, the downgrade of sovereign ratings in GIIPS (Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain) countries leads to rating downgrades of banks in the peripheral countries. The second channel indicates that larger asset holdings of GIIPS debt increases the credit risk of cross‐border banks, and hence, the probabilities of downgrade.     

The Real Effects of Credit Ratings: The Sovereign Ceiling Channel

We show that sovereign debt impairments can have a significant effect on financial markets and real economies through a credit ratings channel. Specifically, we find that firms reduce their investment and reliance on credit markets due to a rising cost of debt capital following a sovereign rating downgrade. We identify these effects by exploiting exogenous variation in corporate ratings due to rating agencies' sovereign ceiling policies, which require that firms' ratings remain at or below the sovereign rating of their country of domicile.     

Governance and bank characteristics in the credit and sovereign debt crises – the impact of CEO power

The global financial sector recently suffered from two interrelated crises: the credit crisis and the sovereign debt crisis. A common question is whether the recent experience with the credit crisis has helped in dealing with the sovereign debt crisis. We study more specifically whether banks with powerful CEOs perform better or worse than other banks, and if there is any difference in this relationship between the two crises. Using unique hand-collected data for 378 large global banks, we find that CEO power has a significant positive relation to bank profitability and asset quality, but also to insolvency risk, during the sovereign debt crisis. Thus, strong CEOs do not appear to be detrimental to bank performance. Our results also support the idea that deposit insurance may have contributed to the credit crisis.     

Variations in sovereign credit quality assessments across rating agencies

We investigate agency variation in credit quality assessment (Standard and Poor’s vs. Moody’s vs. Fitch) employing sovereign ratings data for 129 countries, spanning the period 1990–2006. While we find that the credit rating agencies often disagree about credit quality, it is usually confined to one or two notches on the finer scale. We find that several variables have varying importance in explaining ratings across agencies which leads us to conclude that material heterogeneity exists between them. Also, while watch and outlook procedures are generally strong predictors of rating changes relative to other public data, additional significant variables suggest that it might be possible to augment these agency data to provide better forecasts of future rating changes.