财政分权对地方政府财政赤字规模膨胀的影响——来自分税制改革后中国省级的观察和经验证据

本文从理论和实证两方面探讨了分税制改革以来确立的财政分权模式对我国地方政府财政赤字规模日益膨胀的影响。理论分析表明,地方政府日益膨胀的财政赤字规模是现行财政体制下财权和事权割裂、公共池问题、横向策略互动以及政治锦标赛引发的激励扭曲和为增长而过度竞争等因素的综合产物。基于全国1998～2006年省际面板数据,本文的实证研究支持了我们的理论预期,即中国式财政分权对地方政府财政赤字规模的膨胀具有显著的正面激励作用。     

Determinants of discretionary fiscal policy in Central and Eastern Europe

This paper explores economic, political and institutional determinants of discretionary fiscal policy in 11 Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries from 2000 to 2013 and compares discretionary fiscal reactions before and during the global economic crisis. We find that fiscal policy was procyclical to the output gap both before and during the crisis, while no fiscal reaction to the absorption gap was captured. Our results also indicate a negative relationship between the level of public debt and deficits over the entire period and the pre-crisis period, suggesting that rising public debt represented a brake on future deficits. We also find that election cycles affect the fiscal deficit, but only during the pre-crisis period, while no evidence of a relationship between fiscal policy and government fragmentation was captured. We find some evidence that in the pre-crisis period the CEE countries with a fixed exchange rate regime ran lower deficits than those with a floating regime, whereas during the crisis no impact of the exchange rate regime on the fiscal deficit was found. There is also some evidence that an arrangement with the IMF was associated with lower deficits for the entire sample period. However, no impact of EU accession on the fiscal stance was identified.     

INDEPENDENT FISCAL AGENCIES

Abstract.  There has been a considerable literature regarding the incentives of policymakers as a prime reason for persistent fiscal deficits and a variety of fiscal rules have been proposed as a remedy. However, the often inadequate flexibility of rules and the success of policy delegation in the monetary realm have motivated a small but growing number of studies that suggest delegating some aspects of fiscal policy to what will here be called 'independent fiscal agencies'. This paper surveys the related literature with a focus on three aspects: the motivation for the establishment of such agencies; their potential design; and the experience with these types of institutions.     

Do independent fiscal institutions cause better fiscal outcomes in the European Union?

This paper explores the budgetary implications of the independent fiscal institutions (IFIs) in the European Union (EU). We employ a dynamic panel model for the period 2000–2019 and find that these fiscal watchdogs have a positive and significant influence not only on government budget balance for the EU member states, resulting in smaller government budget deficits, but also on countries’ compliance with fiscal rules, results that hold across alternative fiscal balances. IFIs appear to have a beneficial impact on fiscal performance and compliance with numerical targets in countries with poorly designed fiscal responsibility norms but weaker influence when fiscal rules are less binding (well-designed fiscal rules). The findings remain significant regardless the year of accession to the EU (old vs. new members) or euro-area status (euro-area vs. non-euro-area members). However, we document that IFIs play a larger role in countries that established these monitoring bodies before 2013, indicating that experience matters in IFI performance. Also, our findings show that the influence of IFIs remains if we take into account institutional reforms in which their mandates were extended with different powers and tasks, which has a positive and significant effect on fiscal balances. Moreover, we find that, under the circumstance of systemic and banking crises, these institutions are associated with improved fiscal outcomes, reflecting their increased concern about the path of public finances and their role in reducing budgetary forecasting biases. Our results are robust to a variety of specifications and models, including alternative measures of the government budget balance and after controlling for a set of institutional characteristics and for potential endogeneity in the estimations.     

中国财政政策规则及其体制稳定性分析

本文构建了内生捕捉我国财政政策体制变化的财政规则,并对产出缺口稳定动机和债务稳定动机反应进行了分析。基于马尔科夫转换财政政策反馈规则的实证估计表明,不同体制下,财政赤字与政府债务和产出缺口之间存在不同的政策反应关系;与基于不变参数识别的规则相比,体制转换财政规则能更好地追踪我国财政赤字的时间序列行为。这意味着,假定财政政策体制总是固定的货币政策规则研究以及基于不变财政体制框架VAR度量财政政策冲击高频率效应的实证研究都应慎重。     

Second generation fiscal federalism: The implications of fiscal incentives

First generation fiscal federalism (FGFF) studies the performance of decentralized systems under the assumption of benevolent social planners. Second generation fiscal federalism (SGFF) studies performance based on the fiscal and political incentives facing subnational officials. The paper focuses on three aspects of SGFF. First, it considers the design of intergovernmental transfers. While FGFF emphasizes correcting vertical and horizontal equity, SGFF emphasizes the importance of fiscal incentives for producing local economic prosperity. SGFF extends FGFF approaches by showing how non-linear transfer systems can produce both equalization and high marginal fiscal incentives to produce local economic growth. Second, the paper raises the fiscal incentive approach, showing how different tax systems produce different fiscal incentives for political officials to choose policies. Third, the paper discusses the interaction of democracy and fiscal federalism.     

REAL‐TIME DATA AND FISCAL POLICY ANALYSIS: A SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE

This paper surveys the empirical research on fiscal policy analysis based on real‐time data. This literature can be broadly divided into four groups that focus on: (1) the statistical properties of revisions in fiscal data; (2) the political and institutional determinants of projection errors by governments; (3) the reaction of fiscal policies to the business cycle and (4) the use of real‐time fiscal data in structural vector autoregression (VAR) models. It emerges that, first, fiscal revisions are large and initial releases are biased estimates of final values. Secondly, strong fiscal rules and institutions lead to more accurate releases of fiscal data and smaller deviations of fiscal outcomes from government plans. Thirdly, the cyclical stance of fiscal policies is estimated to be more ‘counter‐cyclical’ when real‐time data are used instead of ex post data. Fourthly, real‐time data can be useful for the identification of fiscal shocks. Finally, it is shown that existing real‐time fiscal data sets cover only a limited number of countries and variables. For example, real‐time data for developing countries are generally unavailable. In addition, real‐time data on European countries are often missing, especially with respect to government revenues and expenditures. Therefore, more work is needed in this field.     

Party alternation,divided government,and fiscal performance within US States

The literature on US state government fiscal performance has examined the role of institutional factors such as budget rules and divided government, but has largely ignored the impact of party alternation. This paper primarily focuses on whether party alternation in the governor’s office affects fiscal performance. Our hypothesis is that frequent party changes create a political environment that impacts fiscal performance. To further assess the impact of party alternation on fiscal performance, we consider our primary hypothesis in conjunction with the degree of division that exists between the governor’s office and the legislature. Using panel data from 37 states between 1971 and 2000 we test the hypothesis that frequent party alternation can be expected to affect fiscal performance and find strong support for the hypothesis. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 2005 Public Choice Society Meetings. The authors would like to thank the conference participants, William Shughart, Charles Register, Jocelyn Evans, John D. Jackson, Amihai Glazer, and two anonymous referees for their comments. We would also like to thank Craig R. Stiller for his help in the collection of data. Any remaining errors remain the responsibility of the authors.     

Fiscal Policy in the New Open Economy Macroeconomics and Prospects for Fiscal Policy Coordination

Abstract.  This paper reviews the literature on the effects of fiscal policy in new open economy macroeconomics (NOEM) models, complementing it with additional results that attempt to clarify the importance of the exchange rate regime (fixed or flexible) and of the type of policy (balanced budget or debt‐financed). Fixed exchange rates only seem to postpone the costs from the short to the long run, but the type of policy is crucial in determining the welfare impact of fiscal expansions. The paper also reviews the recent literature on fiscal policy coordination and shows that there is already some evidence that the gains from coordination in this area can be potentially large but draw attention to the need for reflecting more on the role of fiscal policy as a stabilization tool and on possible interactions between fiscal and monetary policy.     

不同资本账户开放程度下的中国财政货币政策效果分析

研究目标：分析不同资本账户开放程度下的中国财政货币政策效果及福利效应。研究方法：将内生化的政府支出（税收）政策以及包含汇率的价格（数量）型为主的混合货币政策一并纳入一个小型开放的DSGE模型。研究发现：随着资本账户的逐步放开，财政政策方面，减税政策刺激经济增长和促进就业的效果越来越好，政府支出政策刺激经济增长和促进就业的效果越来越差；货币政策方面，国内货币政策的调控效果及利率上升的跨期替代效应减弱。从社会福利损失的角度分析表明：无论是与内生化的政府支出（税收）政策组合还是与财政赤字政策组合，价格型为主的混合货币政策始终优于数量型为主的混合货币政策。研究创新：考察在高、中和低三种资本账户开放背景下中国不同财政货币政策组合的相互作用和经济效应。研究价值：为资本账户放开过程中合理地使用财政货币政策组合提供理论参考。     

The politics of cutback management in thirteen European countries: statistical evidence on causes and effects

The politics of fiscal consolidation in thirteen European countries are statistically analysed. Based on the political economy literature, political factors are identified that explain for the consolidation. Variables are selected representing strength of government and political orientation, and fiscal consolidation is distinguished into spending cuts and cuts in administration. The statistical analysis of political explanations for cutbacks hardly yields significant results and nor does the analysis of fiscal and economic effects of consolidation. The analysis of political effects of consolidation does lead to significant results. Some earlier political economic findings are not supported for our sample of thirteen European countries.     

The determinants of austerity in the European Union 2010–16

This paper aims at decteting what drove the adoption of austerity policies over the period 2010–16 in a panel of 28 European countries. Austerity is identified by year increases in the ratio between the structural primary balance and potential GDP. By means of principal component factor analysis we select the aggregate factors that might affect austerity, namely (i) fiscal consolidation (correction of high deficits and debts), (ii) market discipline (high sovereign spreads, low ratings), (iii) rule-based fiscal discipline (compliance with the Eurozone rules), and macroeconomic stabilisation (consideration for the cyclical position of the economy). Then we estimate a dynamic panel model with the system-GMM method. Results show that the most important contributions to austerity are provided by the market discipline and fiscal consolidation factors together with Excessive Deficit Procedures, with no significant role played by concomitant macroeconomic conditions. Overall, governments complied with orthodox fiscal principles and rules.     

Following the money: The political determinants of E-fiscal transparency in US states

ABSTRACT

This research utilizes a unique panel data set (2009 to 2013) on the evolution of US state fiscal transparency websites and explores the political determinants of E-fiscal transparency. The dynamic panel data analysis reveals that divided government and Democratic governor exert a positive effect on state e-fiscal transparency, while the effect of political polarization is shown to be negative. Furthermore, there is some evidence to show that the fiscal variable of debt stock moderates the relationship between democratic political ideology and state E-fiscal transparency. Finally, there is a positive spillover effect in state E-fiscal transparency.     

Information distortion and competitive remedies in government transfer programs: The case of ethanol

This paper reconsiders the analogy between competitive markets and the political process that is central to much of the literature on the efficiency of government transfers. The key problem is that property rights in politics are much less well defined than they are in competitive markets. As the paper outlines, obtaining accurate information about the benefits and costs of transfers is likely to be much more difficult than envisioned in the literature. Investigators, as well as general voters, often must rely on the government and competing parties for provision of information about underlying program parameters and functional relationships. We argue that politicians and the affected interest groups have incentives to limit and distort the information that is released to voters and that political competition is unlikely to be an effective counter. In developing the argument, a theoretical framework is provided and applied in a case study of the ethanol transfer. The documented efforts to disguise the actual costs and benefits of the program are important for gaining a broader understanding of the functioning and costs of government transfers in the economy.     

THE IMPACT OF FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION: A SURVEY

In this paper, we offer a comprehensive and updated review of the impact of fiscal decentralization on the economy, society and politics. Our first target is the examination of two crucial and yet unsolved issues in the empirical literature on decentralization: the proper measurement of decentralization itself and its potential endogeneity in econometric estimates. Then, we discuss the main existing findings on the effects of decentralization on a relevant list of socio-economic issues. The impact of fiscal decentralization reforms on political institutions and public policies is also considered. Complete answers on the impact of fiscal decentralization are not likely to be certain but, overall, there are reasons to be optimistic about the net positive result. Our survey by necessity has to be selective but it presents a balanced view of what is known and what is not yet known opening room for further research and practice on fiscal decentralization.     

Growth,deficits and uncertainty: Theoretical aspects and empirical evidence from a panel of 27 countries

We examine the relationship between fiscal deficits and per-capita income growth in a panel of 27 European countries, allowing for perceived risks, in terms of fiscal sustainability, associated with additional government spending. Such risks are proxied by the conditional variability of manufacturing production and stock market returns and by the unconditional variability of two survey-based economic-sentiment indicators. To help clarifying how fiscal variables impact on growth and to provide a point of reference for the interpretation of the empirical results a structural growth model is first identified. We find evidence of an asymmetric relationship, in that fiscal deficits give rise to adverse growth effects if they coincide with high uncertainty regarding the prospects of the economy and no significant negative growth effects in the low-uncertainty case.     

THE EFFECTS OF DISCRETIONARY FISCAL POLICY ON MACROECONOMIC AGGREGATES: A REAPPRAISAL

Abstract Fiscal stimuli to recover? A cascade of academic and layman articles debate the effectiveness of fiscal policy in stimulating the economy backed up by different economic models and empirical support. This paper surveys the theoretical predictions and recent empirical vector autoregression evidence on the short‐run effects of discretionary fiscal policy on macroeconomic aggregates.     

Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth

This paper surveys the literature on fiscal policy and economic growth. We present a unifying framework for the analysis of long run growth implications of government expenditures and revenues. We find that several tax rates and expenditure categories exhibit a direct impact on the growth rate of the economy. In a creative synthesis we have assigned the relevant literature to the twelve introduced policy variables. Due to the equivalence of some policy variables we are left with six degrees of freedom, where we need four to internalize the model's intrinsic externalities, leaving two instruments to conduct short run fiscal policy.     

On the speed and boundaries of structural adjustment when fiscal policy is tight

Governments of transition economies are subject to fiscal constraints (e.g. credit constraints). However, exaggerated fiscal discipline might feed into the structural adjustment process. The government designs and times the privatisation programme, yet may find itself in a fiscal squeeze because restructuring moves costs from firms to the public budget. This paper models this problem in a simple dynamic set-up. Several distinct reform strategies, which differ in the speed and level of structural adjustment, are identified. Tight fiscal discipline in early stages of transition may delay or halt privatisation. A different sequencing of policy or different taxation, benefits, and privatisation sales rules, can rectify this problem.