锦标机制理论下企业低碳经济发展激励机制研究

低碳经济是当前世界范围内都在积极提倡并发展的经济模式，这是建立在当前能源资源危机加剧，生态环境不断遭受破坏，全球变暖不断加速的社会发展现状基础上的。为了能够更好的促进企业支持并执行低碳经济的发展理念，可以采取一定的措施和手段来激励企业。现本文中主要以锦标机制理论为理论基础，来研究了企业低碳经济发展的激励机制，并探讨了推行该激励机制时应当注意的几点事项，以供参考。     

基于三阶段锦标制度的系统集成知识创新激励机制研究

异构信息系统集成建立在知识创新的基础上,但项目主体因知识创新投入不能有效补偿而消极参与知识创新,构建有效的知识创新激励机制成为必然要求。文章将知识创新划分为知识共享、集成方案制定以及集成方案实施三阶段,将传统的两阶段锦标激励演变为针对知识创新的三阶段锦标激励,提出分阶段激励、分阶段确定奖励比例以及分阶段确定奖励额度的激励机制。最后介绍这一机制的应用案例。     

能源系统动力学应用研究综述

对系统动力学理论在国内外的发展过程以及其在不同领域的广泛应用进行研究,概括了能源系统动力学的实质是系统动力学理论与SD模型在分析各类能源问题的实证研究与应用,报告了能源系统动力学国内外研究现状,总结了系统动力学在能源领域的应用以及其对环境保护、经济发展、社会进步等方面的贡献,并在此基础上展望了能源系统动力学在大数据时代与数据挖掘及GIS等理论结合研究的方向.     

我国利益相关者管理现状及政策建议

本文从利益相关者理论入手,从利益相关者管理是企业价值最大化的最优选择、一种信号传递机制、影响公司经营业绩的一种作用机制三个方面分析了利益相关者管理的必要性;同时,介绍了当前我国利益相关者管理发展现状,主要对管理观念的片面解读、内部治理环境不完善、外部治理环境不完善、信息披露不积极等方面进行剖析;最后,依据利益相关者理论、针对我国利益相关者发展现状对我国利益相关者管理发展提出几点政策建议,以期提高我国的利益相关者管理水平.     

股权结构对银行经营业绩的影响分析

银行股权集中度与治理结构有着密切联系,股权集中度影响银行经营业绩.运用委托代理理论,对我国上市银行股权集中度对激励机制、监督机制、约束机制绩效的影响进行分析,并通过实证检验,得出结论.     

基于外部性的产业集聚与集聚经济研究——国外城市经济理论研究综述

城市经济理论在空间外部性假设下,研究产业集聚的形成机制及产业集聚的经济效应,与新经济地理理论共同构成产业集聚与集聚经济研究的主流理论.本文从研究范式与特点、空间外部性的提出与发展、空间外部性来源的理论研究与实证研究、集聚经济的实证检验等几个方面出发,对基于外部性假设的产业集聚与集聚经济研究的历史脉络、最新进展及主要结论等做了系统回顾和总结.     

金融发展对江苏省工业制成品比较优势和国际贸易结构的影响

在相关研究的基础上,探讨了金融发展与工业制成品比较优势与贸易结构的内在关系。采用VAR模型与Johanson协整检验,脉冲响应、方差分解,以江苏省数据为例,实证检验了江苏省金融发展的三种不同指标与工业制成品比较优势及江苏省贸易结构的关系,检验结果表明金融发展与工业制成品比较优势存在协整关系;在短期内,金融发展对贸易结构的优化贡献度较小,金融中介的投资储蓄转化率对工业制成品比较优势的影响最大,并在此基础上,根据实证结论提出相应的政策建议。     

盈余管理的原因、动机及测度方法前沿研究综述

盈余管理已经成为公司金融领域最活跃的研究热点问题之一,受到学者们的广泛关注。本文对20世纪80年代中后期以来关于盈余管理理论发展和实证研究的主要脉络进行全面回顾,并总结了国外最新的研究成果。本文的综述主要集中在三个方面:(1)基于“契约磨擦”与“沟通阻滞”分析了盈余管理产生的内在机理;(2)分别从资本市场动机、契约动机和政治成本动机总结了关于盈余管理的实证研究成果;(3)对应计利润分离模型、特定应计利润模型和频率分布模型三种盈余管理检验方法的具体应用进行了分析,并对其优点和不足之处进行了评价。     

资本资产定价模型及其在我国证券市场中的实证研究

资本资产定价模型以投资组合理论为基础,描述了证券市场上单个证券或投资组合同系统风险收益率之间的关系,是现代金融理论的核心内容.本文首先简述了CAPM理论及其应用前提,进而概括了CAPM在我国证券市场的实证研究成果,最后从三个方面对影响CAPM有效性的因素进行了分析.     

理工科高校教育科研的局限分析与改进建议

理工科高校存在教育科研专业化队伍缺乏、基础不牢、研究内容狭窄与激励机制不足等问题。利用效用、博弈理论进行机制设计的分析论证揭示了部分理工科高校在教学科研设计中的缺位与弱化。为此,理工科高校教育科研的改进措施是：提高认识;树立服务教学的意识;健全激励与考核机制;确定以实证研究为主导的研究范式;确立方向,稳定队伍。     

CEO还是TMT——民营上市公司高管薪酬差距对于企业研发的影响

本文以手工收集的2012年中国民营上市公司高管薪酬数据为例,以行为理论、锦标赛理论以及堑壕理论为基础,以高管团队规模和控股股东为调节变量,实证分析了公司高管团队（TMT）薪酬差距对于企业研发的影响。本文研究发现,薪酬差距能够提升高管团队对于风险的接受水平,民营上市公司高管薪酬差距与公司的研发支出显著正相关,。此外,本文进一步的研究发现,高管薪酬差距对于企业研发的正向影响会受到高管团队规模以及控股股东持股比例的抑制,表明了锦标赛激励实施的局限性。本文的研究为理解民营企业高管薪酬差距与企业研发的关系提供了新的经验证据。     

我国上市公司管理层内部薪酬差距的影响因素——基于多任务委托代理视角

文章基于多任务委托代理理论,实证分析了上市公司管理层内部薪酬差距的影响因素。研究结果表明,由于政府为了确保国企管理层社会性任务的顺利执行,压低了管理层的薪酬差距。上市公司的第一大股东对公司的控制能力越强,则管理层的薪酬差距越小。文章还发现,上市公司管理层的薪酬差距作为一种激励手段,与股权激励并没有表现出替代性。同时,经典的锦标赛激励模型给出的两个重要假说得到了验证,上市公司管理层的规模确实与薪酬差距正相关,公司外部环境的风险同样与薪酬差距正相关。     

管理层权力、薪酬差距与绩效

已有研究发现，中国上市公司管理层的薪酬差距总体上具有锦标赛作用，即薪酬差距有利于提升绩效。但是，本文的进一步研究发现，相对于其他企业，在管理层权力大的企业中，高管团队内部的薪酬差距以及核心高管与全体员工的薪酬差距都更大。但业绩并没有更好。这些证据表明管理层权力会降低薪酬激励绩效，有必要重视管理层权力问题。研究还发现，高管团队内部的薪酬差距有利于提升绩效，但核心高管与全体员工的薪酬差距没有带来业绩的显著提升，说明公司总体薪酬差距过大可能因失去公平而影响绩效。     

Boundaries of the Tournament Pricing Effect in Asset Markets: Evidence from Experimental Markets

Tournament compensation of asset traders has been shown to promote deconvergence from intrinsic value pricing in an experimental asset market where all traders are so compensated (James and Isaac 2000). This paper explores the extent of this effect as experimental design parameters—proportion of traders facing tournament compensation, details of the tournament contract, and time horizon of the asset being traded—are varied. We find that the original results are replicated using the original parameters, that a tournament contract modified to provide a penalty for underperformance does not necessarily eliminate the effect, and that reducing the proportion of traders facing tournament compensation to half the market largely eliminates the effect.     

国有企业高管的薪酬特点的激励效果分析——基于产出制及锦标赛制的视角

本文着重研究了国有垄断型企业高管薪酬结构的两大特点:多元考核目标与锦标赛性质。分别采用边际分析法两大特点及其激励作用进行了阐释。研究结果表明,国有垄断型企业高管薪酬结构的多元考核目标会产生道德风险即高管对产出性绩效目标的投资不足,而且也会出现高管对非产出性目标(如政治目标等)的过分投资,多元考核目标的薪酬体制没有达到激励作用;此外,从锦标赛的观点来看,本文还得出高管对于政治性投资的动力来源来自于高管的薪酬差距。     

The construction of high-speed railway and urban innovation capacity: Based on the perspective of knowledge Spillover

This paper investigates how transportation infrastructure projects facilitate research collaboration across cities and promote innovation. Exploiting the construction of high-speed rail (HSR) network as a plausibly exogenous shock, we find that innovation in less-developed cities significantly and quantitatively improves after the cities are connected to more developed cities through the HSR network. Of all mechanisms considered, incremental research collaboration can explain 2% to 12% of the innovation improvement. The empirical results imply that even under the “promotion tournament model “ of spatial competition structure, cities can still mutually benefit through research collaboration.     

Executive pay in Japan: the role of bank-appointed monitors and the Main Bank relationship

A feature of tournament models is that executive compensation is not independent of the wages paid at lower levels of the corporate hierarchy. Agency models show that compensation based on firm performance is a means by which incentives can be provided to executives once a promotion tournament has been resolved. In this paper, we combine elements of both models and show that the existence of an outsider who monitors the firm’s activities will lower the sensitivity of pay to firm performance for top executives and reduce the importance of tournament-based incentives. Using panel data for 55 Japanese electronics firms, we find support for the notion that bank-appointed Board members help monitor top executives and that tournament considerations are a particularly important feature of executive compensation in Japan.     

Sabotage versus Discouragement: Which Dominates Post Promotion Tournament Behavior?

We explore the behavior of losers of promotion tournaments after the tournament is concluded. We do so with an experiment in which we vary the design of the promotion tournament to determine how tournament design affects post tournament effort. Our design allows us to discriminate between two possible reasons tournaments might lead to decreased work effort among the tournament losers: strategic sabotage and a worker becoming discouraged by the tournament outcome. We examine behavior after the tournament and find evidence suggesting that bad tournament design can lead to workers being discouraged. This discouragement effect is strong for low ability workers but not for high ability workers. Conversely, we do find evidence that some high ability workers engage in strategic sabotage but the incidence does not vary with the design of the promotion tournament and the incidence of it is low.     

转移支付、对外开放与劳动力市场整合——分权下的锦标赛竞争

要素市场整合是实现规模经济效率与增长方式转变的重要途径.本文讨论了转移支付对"发达地区"与"落后地区"参与国内市场分工的差异化激励.具体来说,转移支付为落后地区提供了参与市场分工的财政补偿,促进了市场整合.但因锦标赛模式中的经济绩效导向与"零和"特性,转移支付不利于发达地区在锦标赛中胜出,从而引致其"逆市场"行为.这使...     

The Effects of Incentive Scheme and Task Difficulty on Employees' Altruistic Behavior Outside the Firm

Employer-sponsored opportunities for altruism outside the workplace can improve employee engagement and passion within the firm, enhance the firm's corporate visibility, and improve its recruitment. There is limited understanding of whether and how a firm's management control system on employees' daily tasks can influence employee willingness to engage in altruism outside the workplace. In this study, we investigate via an experiment how the incentive scheme (tournament vs. piece rate) on employees' daily tasks interacts with the difficulty level of these tasks (low vs. high) to affect employees' altruistic behavior outside the firm. Our results indicate that, compared to a piece-rate scheme, a tournament scheme leads to a greater decrease in non-winning participants' altruistic behavior outside the firm when the original, incentivized task is more difficult compared to when it is less difficult. Consistent with our theory, participants' feelings of excessive entitlement partially mediate the interaction effect of incentive scheme and task difficulty on participants' altruistic behavior outside the firm. This study informs firms about how the design of its incentive scheme on employees' daily task inside the firm and the nature of that task can influence employee willingness to act altruistically outside the firm.