在职消费粘性与媒体监督——基于产权视角的实证检验

本文以2010-2014年我国A股上市公司为样本,实证检验了上市公司高管在职消费粘性的存在性以及媒体监督对在职消费粘性的影响.研究结果表明,我国上市公司普遍存在在职消费粘性,且国有企业的在职消费粘性程度更高;媒体监督能够显著降低企业高管,尤其是国有企业高管在职消费的粘性程度.本文对于丰富在职消费与企业业绩关系的认识、从媒体角度加强在职消费治理具有重要的参考价值.     

国有企业薪酬管制的再检验:2007—2011

转型期,政府薪酬管制是否会影响国企高管薪酬激励效率,引起理论界和实务界的广泛关注。利用2007—2011年我国A股上市公司数据,运用严谨的计量方法,实证分析了国企薪酬管制及其经济后果。研究发现:相比于非国有企业,国有企业存在薪酬管制,并且薪酬管制效果与政府干预能力显著正相关;就薪酬管制的广度和深度而言,薪酬管制只存在于负向非正常相对薪酬的国企中,负向非正常相对薪酬绝对值越大,薪酬管制程度就越高;在控制样本选择偏差后,受管制的国企高管货币薪酬与职务消费之间存在显著的替代关系;负向非正常相对薪酬对国企绩效产生显著的负面影响。上述发现表明,政府薪酬管制并没有很好地实现旨在维护分配公平的规制目标,同时还造成国企高管薪酬激励的扭曲。     

在职消费的影响因素及其对企业经营绩效的影响——来自中国上市公司的经验证据

以2007—2011年中国A股上市公司为研究样本,构建计量经济学模型,实证检验高管人员在职消费的影响因素及在职消费对企业经营绩效的影响。研究结果表明:国有企业和民营企业的在职消费水平相当;在职消费显著降低了民营企业的公司业绩,但这种影响在国有企业中并不显著;员工工资的提高并未带来国有企业在职消费水平的提升,却能使业绩得到提高;在民营企业中,员工工资的增加对在职消费和公司业绩均有促进作用,且对业绩的积极作用超过了由此带来的在职消费的负向作用。     

薪酬管制能促进企业“脱虚还实”吗?——基于“限薪令”的准自然实验

将2015年实施的“限薪令”政策视为衡量薪酬管制的准自然实验,基于2012—2022年A股非金融上市公司数据,采用双重差分模型检验“限薪令”对企业金融化的影响,探究薪酬管制对企业“脱虚还实”效果。研究结果表明：薪酬管制政策显著抑制了国有企业金融资产的配置行为,主要通过抑制国有企业金融化的“蓄水池”动机和降低管理层风险偏好两种机制降低企业金融资产配置比例,促进企业“脱虚还实”;薪酬管制政策对金融资产类型和金融渠道获利存在结构性差异,表现为对投机型和保值型金融资产以及风险型金融渠道获利抑制效果更为明显;薪酬管制政策通过积极影响企业核心业务与实体投资,促进企业资源优化配置。     

薪酬管制与企业盈余持续性

基于薪酬改革的制度背景,以2010-2018年沪深A股上市公司为研究样本,考察了薪酬管制对企业盈余持续性及其组成部分的影响.实证结果发现:薪酬管制对企业盈余持续性及其组成部分的持续性皆具有显著的负面影响.同时,企业产权性质不同时,二者之间的负向关系也存在差异,薪酬管制对国有企业盈余持续性的影响相较非国有企业更为显著;且对中央国企盈余持续性的影响也相较地方国企更为显著.进一步的研究表明,管理层权力会显著增强薪酬管制与盈余及其组成部分持续性之间的负向关系.研究结论不仅拓展了薪酬管制对企业长期发展的影响研究,而且为推进我国企业薪酬制度改革,完善薪酬管制政策提供了经验证据.     

生命周期、高管薪酬激励与企业创新投资——来自创业板上市公司的经验证据

本文以2009~2016年创业板公司为样本,从企业发展生命周期的动态层面研究高管激励中的货币薪酬激励、股权激励和在职消费三种薪酬激励模式与企业创新投资之间的关系。研究结果表明,我国创业板上市公司的创新投资水平普遍偏低,创业板企业高管薪酬激励对创新投资具有正向作用,而且不同生命周期下高管薪酬激励对创新投资的影响存在一定差异。在企业生命周期的成长期阶段,主导的薪酬模式是货币薪酬激励和在职消费,且两者在促进创新投资方面具有互补效应;在成熟期阶段,三种薪酬激励模式对企业创新投资都有促进作用,三种薪酬激励模式两两间存在互补效应;在衰退期阶段,在职消费成为主要的激励模式,三种薪酬激励模式中任意两者间也存在互补效应。因此,企业可以利用高管薪酬激励机制提升企业创新投资力度,针对企业不同生命周期阶段采取不同的薪酬激励组合策略,进而发挥三种薪酬模式对企业创新投资的激励和促进作用,提高企业经营绩效和价值创造力。     

论政府控制的上市公司经理薪酬对过度投资的影响

文章在代理理论框架下,基于中国国有企业薪酬管制的制度背景,就经理薪酬对投资过度的影响进行了理论分析,并以我国国有上市公司2003-2007年的数据为样本,实证检验了经理薪酬在企业资本投资决策方面的治理效应。结果发现,当薪酬契约无法对经理的工作努力和经营才能作出补偿和激励时,有更多的证据表明,政府控制的上市公司存在着因薪酬契约失效导致的投资过度现象。上述研究发现,对理解中国国有企业经理薪酬管制的经济后果具有重要意义。     

政府控制、经理薪酬与资本投资

本文在代理理论框架下,基于中国国有企业薪酬管制的制度背景,就经理薪酬对投资过度和投资不足的影响进行了理论分析,并以我国上市公司2000—2004年的数据为样本,实证检验了经理薪酬在企业资本投资决策方面的治理效应。结果发现,当薪酬契约无法对经理的工作努力和经营才能作出补偿和激励时,有更多的证据表明,地方政府控制的上市公司存在着因薪酬契约失效导致的投资过度现象。上述研究发现,对理解中国国有企业经理薪酬管制的经济后果具有重要意义,也为当前关于国有企业产权改革和薪酬改革的争论提供了一个有益的视角。     

管理者权力、外部薪酬差距与公司业绩

外部薪酬差距因引导管理层行为而具有一定的激励作用,管理者权力又是影响薪酬激励有效性的重要因素.本文选取2006-2010年的上市公司为样本,结合管理者权力,研究了外部薪酬差距对公司业绩的影响,并从在职消费的视角探讨了管理层行为在外部薪酬差距影响公司业绩中所起的中介作用.研究结果发现,我国上市公司管理层外部薪酬差距与公司业绩正相关,外部薪酬差距具有正面的价值激励效应,但是管理者权力抑制了外部薪酬差距的激励效应.进一步拓展检验发现,外部薪酬差距能够抑制管理层的在职消费,但管理者权力弱化了外部薪酬差距对在职消费的抑制作用.     

上市公司高管层货币性报酬影响因素实证研究

在委托代理理论的框架下,对我国国有企业薪酬演变制度背景进行了分析。利用2001年￣2004年沪市上市公司的数据,对高管人员货币性薪酬的影响因素进行了检验。结果表明:货币性薪酬水平与公司期初资产总额、规模、总资产报酬率是正相关关系;与国有股比例是负相关关系,报酬激励受转轨经济中的管制约束;与主营业务收入增长率关系为负。     

货币薪酬能激励高管承担风险吗

有关“风险承担”（risk taking）的研究是近年来特别是全球金融危机背景下财务学研究的热点问题之一。本文研究结果表明：（1）货币薪酬激励的增加能提升高管承担风险的水平;（2）最终控制人性质和公司成长性会影响两者之间的关系,在国有企业以及公司成长性较低的公司,货币薪酬激励与风险承担之间的正相关关系较弱;（3）风险承担水平的提高能促进公司绩效的提升;（4）进一步研究发现,风险承担在高管薪酬激励与企业绩效之间发挥中介效用作用。这些结论在采用两阶段最小二乘法（2SLS）和三阶段最小二乘法（3SLS）处理内生性问题等稳健性测试后依然成立。因此,本文从“风险承担”这一新的视角深化了有关高管薪酬激励降低代理问题并提升公司绩效的研究,也为中国上市公司尤其是国有上市公司高管薪酬契约设计的有效性提供了借鉴和参考价值。     

多元化战略对管理层激励的影响--来自中国资本市场的经验证据

本文利用2001-2004年中国上市公司的数据,使用面板数据模型,对中国上市公司多元化与管理层激励之间的关系进行了检验.结果表明:现金薪酬水平与公司价值负相关,高管人员持股比例与公司价值之间是非线性关系,激励并没有发挥其应有的作用;多元化对公司价值的影响并不显著.当控制了影响多元化的公司内部因素后,我们发现国有股占主导地位的公司,多元化程度与现金薪酬之间是负向关系;多元化程度与管理层持股比例之间是正向关系.多元化程度与在职消费正相关.多元化决策是管理当局希望从多元化中获取更多的剩余收益和隐性的私人利益.     

The impact of privatization on efficiency and profitability

Over the past three decades, China has undergone tremendous economic and social change as a consequence of the transition from a centrally planned to a market economy. This paper examines a key feature of this transition – the privatization of the state‐owned enterprises (SOEs) – through both a theoretical model and empirical analysis. Using newly collected primary data from a variety of sources, we study how privatization of listed SOEs affects employment, wages, profits and other aspects of economic performance at the firm level. Our major finding is that privatization results in substantial downsizing of employment, increased labour productivity and rising profitability.     

国有企业支付了更高的职工工资吗?

对职工个人层面的研究表明,股权性质显著影响职工平均工资,但已有文献对于企业层面上股权性质如何影响职工平均工资尚缺乏深入探讨。以1999—2009年间我国A股上市企业为样本,本文深入考察了国有股权性质对职工平均工资的影响。研究结果表明,从整体上看,样本期间国有企业支付了更高的职工工资,而且这一结论在控制了行政垄断、企业规模和职工教育背景等因素之后依然成立。进一步区分国有企业控制级别和职工工资类别后发现,与非国有企业相比,国有企业普通职工工资显著更高。其中,中央政府控制的国有企业普通职工工资显著高于地方政府控制的国有企业,而地方政府控制的国有企业又显著高于非国有企业;国有企业高管薪酬与非国有企业并无显著差异,但中央政府控制的国有企业高管薪酬显著高于地方政府控制的国有企业和非国有企业。上述研究结论有助于理解转轨经济背景下国有股权性质对职工工资的影响,丰富了职工工资的相关研究,并对推进我国国有企业工资体制改革具有借鉴意义。     

You are suffocating me: Firm-level analysis of state-owned enterprises and private investment

Literature on whether government spending crowds out or crowds in the private sector is large, but still without an unambiguous conclusion. Using firm-level data from Ukraine, this paper provides a granular empirical investigation to disentangle the impact of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) on private firm investment in Ukraine—a large transition economy. Controlling for firm characteristics and systematic differences across sectors, the results indicate that the SOE concentration in a given sector has a statistically significant negative effect on private fixed capital formation, and that the impact of SOEs is stronger in those industries in which SOEs have a more dominant presence. These findings imply that private firms operating in sectors with a high level of SOE concentration invest systematically less than businesses that are not competing directly with SOEs.     

Pyramidal structure,risk‐taking and firm value

This article investigates the relationship among pyramidal layers, risk‐taking and firm value using a sample of local state‐owned enterprises (SOEs) in China. We find that state‐pyramidal layers have a positive and significant impact on firm risk‐taking and firm value, suggesting that the pyramidal structure formed by the state protects SOEs from political intervention. Risk‐taking is conducive to enhancing firm value and is one of the important channels through which state‐pyramidal layers increase firm value. By exploring the role of state‐pyramidal organizational structures in improving SOEs' risk‐taking, our results contribute to both corporate governance and corporate finance literature.     

Employee relations and innovation: an empirical analysis using patent data

This paper investigates the relationship between employee relations (ER) as tracked in the environment, social, and governance (ESG) database provided by MSCI Inc., and innovation as measured by patents and patent citations. Some ER policies, such as broadly based profit-sharing plans, stock option plans, and stock ownership, create a direct link between a firm’s performance and employee compensation and might therefore be expected to encourage successful innovation. In addition, some other aspects of ER, including good pension plans, good union relations, and a variety of specific benefits (such as flex time) might improve innovation performance through their effect on employee morale or institutional loyalty, or simply by creating incentives to stay with the firm. We find that both of these categories of ER – financial incentives and non-pecuniary motivations – have a positive effect on innovation as measured by patenting and patent citations.     

Liquidity Shock,Credit Constraint and the Development of Private vs. State-Owned Enterprises

Based on firm level data for the period of 1998–2007, this paper attempts to explain the growth differences between private enterprises and state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in China, in the context of liquidity shocks, and institutional and financial environments. It is found that (1) when liquidity tightens, the private enterprises face stricter credit constraints than SOEs, which restricts the development of private enterprise; (2) when liquidity becomes abundant, private enterprises face fewer financial limitations and grow much faster than SOEs; (3) the effect of liquidity shocks on the growth rate gap between private enterprises and SOEs has weakened during the period 2002–2007. These findings reveal that the credit discrimination against private enterprises can be mitigated by improving institutional and financial environments, which weaken the effects of liquidity shocks on firm growth.     

From central planning towards a market economy: The role of ownership and competition in Vietnamese firms’ productivity

This paper examines the role of ownership and market competition in Vietnamese firms’ total factor productivity (TFP) from 2001 to 2011. Making use of a large panel dataset of manufacturing firms, we find that, on average, both foreign-owned enterprises (FOEs) and state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have performed better than privately owned enterprises (POEs) in terms of their TFP levels. However, while FOEs’ TFP ranked the highest in the period 2001–2006, SOEs “closed the gap” in the period 2007–2011. Moreover, we find that market competition has been effective in enhancing average firm productivity and in reducing the gaps in efficiency across ownership types. SOEs’ remarkable performance may be linked to several concurrent factors experienced during the period 2001–2011, namely, the process of restructuring the state sector during the 2000s, the increased economic integration due to the country's accession to the World Trade Organization (2007) and, finally, the preferential access to financial capital and land granted to SOEs. While some evidence supports SOEs’ equitization as an explanation for their remarkable productivity performance, WTO accession and cheaper access to inputs do not fully explain it.