Signaling in Political Budget Cycles: How Far Are You Willing to Go?

A key assumption in the literature on political cycles with rational voters and opportunistic politicians is that opportunism is common knowledge. In this framework, political cycles have been interpreted as a signal of competency. However, if opportunism is not common knowledge, cycles may no longer indicate competency, but rather opportunism. This is because highly opportunistic incumbents are willing to go farther to be reelected. Since political cycles require discretionality to reallocate budget items, a decrease of discretionality curbs cycles. It may also make elections more effective at selecting competent incumbents.     

以德报怨策略与企业机会主义行为:基于高新技术企业的研究

基于自我执行协议理论及交易属性,集中探讨企业采取以德报怨策略应对合作者剥削行为的驱动因素以及企业以德报怨策略如何影响合作者机会主义行为。通过对173个中国高新技术企业买方数据问卷调查,采用PLS对假设进行检验。结果显示,交易属性中的交易可观察性是以德报怨策略的前因变量,并且受交易复杂性的影响。同时,以德报怨策略能够减少交易双方的机会主义行为。     

Asset Specificity and Vertical Integration

Asset specificity is usually considered to be an argument for vertical integration. The main idea is that specificity induces opportunistic behavior, and that vertical integration reduces the cost of preventing opportunism. In this paper I show that asset specificity can be an argument for non‐integration. In a repeated‐game model of self‐enforcing relational contracts, it is shown that when parties are non‐integrated, increasing degrees of asset specificity make it possible to design relational contracts with higher‐powered incentives.     

Investors Facing Opportunistic Governments: Is it Really Good to “Know the Market” before Investing?

When a government cannot commit to future policies, investors face the risk of opportunistic behavior in addition to uncertain market conditions. We show that although reducing market uncertainty is sometimes essential for investment, it may aggravate problems of opportunism. The better informed the investor is before investing, the more information the government can infer from observing that investment takes place, in turn enabling more efficient rent extraction. This signaling effect can dominate; if the investor receives "too accurate" information before investing, the only equilibrium is the one in which no investment occurs.
JEL classification : D 82; L 51     

Election cycles and mining-sector governance in post-conflict Kosovo

Political business cycles are typically linked to the manipulation of fiscal or monetary policy instruments. In a recent article, Imami, Lami and Uberti (ILU) argue that opportunistic politicians may also choose to manipulate non-fiscal/non-monetary policy instruments. Here, we extend ILU’s study using time-series data on mining-sector licensing from post-conflict Kosovo (2001–2018). We find robust evidence that is consistent with electoral opportunism in the allocation of mining permits, despite the checks-and-balance mechanisms introduced by Kosovo’s international administrators in an attempt to reduce the politicisation of licensing. That said, the cycle effect is only observed prior to scheduled, as opposed to early, elections. Disaggregating the data by licence type, in addition, we find that the observed election cycle is driven primarily by the manipulation of licences for the mining of construction materials. We argue that, in the context of post-conflict Kosovo, this is the category of licences whose strategic manipulation offers the greatest pay-off to the incumbent. The results raise some questions about the feasibility of fighting political opportunism (and, relatedly, corruption) by establishing formal check-and-balance mechanisms.     

金融监管制度与机会主义行为机理研究

由于金融市场的信息不对称和外部性难以根本消除,致使机会主义行为难以避免。金融监管制度的演变即是保障存款人利益、预防和化解金融风险维护金融系统稳定的过程,也是对金融机构和监管机构及相关代理人机会主义行为规避和治理的过程。本文以委托代理模型为起点,分析金融机构经营信息已知和未知两种状态下监管机构和金融机构各自的效用函数,通过引入监管制度和代理人风险偏好变量分析其对机会主义行为的影响。研究发现：信息状态转变会引起监管契约从强制型契约向合作关系型契约转变,机会主义表现形式也随之变化;不对称信息下绩效挂钩的监管收入激励模式会同时增加监管者和金融机构代理人的机会主义倾向;信息结构变化要求监管制度也应发生变化才能适应监管有效性要求。     

Forms of Opportunism Between Principals and Agents

The purpose of the paper is to discuss the development of the theoretical approach to a rating of the opportunism between the principals and agents within the framework of the neo-institutional theory. The matrix of the opportunistic forms between the principals and agents designed. On the basis of the carried out experimental research of firms of the Ural region of Russia, such opportunistic forms of the agents such as flubbing, negligence, and malversation were investigated. The experimental dependences of an opportunistic level of the agents from a level of wages, level of non-financial stimulus, effectiveness of punishment, share of creative element of labor, and degree of labor specificity are defined. Financial support for the grant from the Russian Humanitarian Scientific Fond, No. 05-02-83214a is acknowledged.     

现代主流经济学对制度“设计”的误导和扭曲——从法律对强者机会主义行为的约束谈起

基于自然主义思维,现代主流经济学不仅用供求博弈均衡来为这种现状提供合理性解释,而且根据力量博弈均衡来设计社会制度,结果,经济学从热衷于对社会正义的关注和社会制度的改造蜕变成为既得利益和现实制度进行辩护的保守学说,并扭曲了立法的根本目的。事实上,法律的现实功能在于抑制机会主义行为以保障社会契约的履行,而强势者因拥有违反契约的更强能力而具有明显的机会主义倾向,因而立法的直接目的就是抑制强势者的机会主义行为。而且,法律本质上是为了理顺公共领域的社会关系,保障人民的应得权利,因而不应该是参与方之博弈均衡的简单体现。     

Realitic and Analytic Syntheses of Macro- and Microeconomics

We study the impact of employer's opportunism on wage rigidity in capitalist companies by arguing that the need to fix wages is crucially influenced by the asymmetric distribution of decision-making power and information in favor of the stronger contractual party — the employer, and against the weaker contractual party — employees. The capitalist entrepreneur can make decisions, whose negative consequences are borne by workers in terms of lower wages and more intense work pace. Excessive wage reductions in the face of negative exogenous shocks or too risky investment decisions represent the main instances of such opportunistic behavior. Fixed wages can represent workers' best response to the emerging risk of the employer moral hazard, but this implies a heightened risk of layoffs since wages and employment levels cannot be fixed at the same time. Besides discussing piece rate contracts, profit-sharing and codetermination as counterexamples, we observe worker cooperatives which depart from the presence of contrasting interests and private information in the principal-agent framework. Indeed, several empirical studies have shown greater employment stability and wage flexibility in worker cooperatives vis-à-vis the capitalist firm.     

项目导向型供应链跨组织合作行为激励机制

在假定项目型组织平等合作的基础上,运用委托-代理理论和博弈论,纳入总承包商给予专业分包商基于监控信号的奖惩结构,构建了基于监控信号的项目导向型供应链跨组织合作激励模型,并与传统激励模型进行比较,通过数据模拟与模型算例,研究了监控信号对激励契约设计的影响。研究表明：通过引入监控信号,总承包商可以收集到更多有关专业分包商行为选择的信息,通过调整对专业分包商的奖励和惩罚力度,可以促进专业分包商采取合作行为,降低其机会主义行为,也可以降低总承包商对专业分包商激励的盲目性。     

基于Moran过程的PPP项目承包商机会主义行为演化动态

在PPP项目中,由于政府部门和承包商的目标不一致以及信息不对称等原因的存在,使得在其全寿命周期过程中,承包商的机会主义行为屡见不鲜。本文基于随机演化博弈理论,建构基于Moran过程的博弈模型,旨在探讨推动PPP项目承包商不采取机会主义行为策略的有利条件。研究表明,承包商数目不断扩大,通过降低承包商之间的举报成本,增大惩处力度,可使降低机会主义行为发生概率的效果显著。进一步,借助数值算例,对研究结果进行验证并给出相应的管理对策。     

论市场经济的局限性

财产的专属性、投机行为妨碍了市场经济的正常运作，而人类的有限理性又限制了人们借助于完全合同来预防投机行为的发生，由此暴露了市场经济的局限性，即不能适用于垄断性的市场和信息不完全的市场。为了完善市场这个重要的交易形式，必须引入信誉机制来规范交易者行为。     

Opportunism in labour contracting: An application of the ‘organisational failures’ framework

The ‘Markets and Hierarchies’ framework provides a basis for the analysis of employment relations. However, it fails to take the possibility of bilateral opportunism into account and in consequence exaggerates the ease of obtaining consummate cooperation. Once bilateral opportunism is admitted, the resolution of contractual problems becomes indeterminate, depending upon the preference and relative power of the parties. These preferences can be modelled,analysis of technological change issues reveals that such a model has some explanatory power. The implication of this approach is that the removal of opportunism implies relatively organisational surgery.     

Internal bargaining and strategic innovation in the theory of the firm

The transaction cost analysis of the firm has identified asset idiosyncrasy and the risk of ex post opportunism as key determinants of organizational form. Simultaneously, several writers have modeled the distribution of quasi-rents among input suppliers as a bargaining game. These complementary ideas are used to formalize the notion of strategic innovation, where capital and labor attempt to redistribute firm income after specialized assets are in place, through unilateral modifications in production technology. Because strategic behavior can enlarge the quasi-rent component of fifirm income, this process may persist in equilibrium. Asset idiosyncrasy therefore creates room for an autonomous theory of organizational dynamics, partially insulated from events at the market level of analysis.     

基于道德风险的校企合作创新序列机制设计:一种不可再协商契约的视角

在不可再协商契约条件下,通过设计契约中的序列机制,实现校企合作双方真实披露其私人信息,从而减少机会主义行为,促使研发投资达到最优。合作创新序列机制能够提供诱因(或威胁),促使双方自觉放弃投机行为,产生有效的交易结果,使双方的专用资产投资达到最优水平。     

Does the expectation or realization of a federal election precipitate Canadian output growth?

Abstract This paper asks whether Canadian data is consistent with the predicted effects of political opportunism, partisanship, and political competition on real output growth since Confederation. Using annual data from 1870 to 2005 we find new support for an opportunistic electoral cycle in Canadian data but only if the actual election date used in most studies is replaced by an estimate of the incumbent governing party's subjectively held likelihood of an election arising. In our case the estimate is generated from a Cox‐proportional hazard model. The paper explores in detail the issues raised by using a generated regressor to approximate a subjectively held expectation versus an observable proxy and argues that these conditions are met in our case. Finally we also find evidence consistent with partisan cycles in the data but much less evidence consistent with the hypothesis that changes in the degree of political competition have affected real output growth.     

知识与跨国公司进入模式选择——一个不同于交易成本的框架

交易成本理论在分析企业进入模式的选择时,将机会主义作为关键的假设,但这种分析忽略了知识是以各种方式结合在一起的,这种结合减弱了机会主义的威胁,因此一种不同于交易成本的框架——知识为基础的框架建立起来了。这个框架将知识为基础的能力区分为建构能力和组合能力,它们影响着进入模式的选择。企业的知识战略对进入模式的选择也有直接或间接的影响。     

渠道成员间为什么需要“同舟共济”?——双边专用性投资的作用机理研究

本文综合交易成本理论、关系交换理论和组织间学习理论,分析了渠道成员双边专用性投资对渠道关系绩效的三种作用机制,并以中国企业为研究对象,通过实证研究检验了在中国市场环境下不同作用机制的影响。研究表明,双边专用性投资可以同时通过降低合作中的机会主义行为、提高双方的信任水平以及促进关系学习提高关系绩效;机会主义行为、信任与关系学习起到完全中介作用,其中信任机制作用最突出,并对学习机制具有强化作用。本文研究丰富和发展了资源基础理论,并对我国企业渠道管理实践具有重要的指导意义。     

供应链的交易成本分析及供产双方的博弈

本文通过传统供应链中供应商和制造商的讨价还价模型分析,论证了交易双方的交易成本不同,造成供应商和制造商之间的相互依赖关系不同,从而双方的机会主义行为倾向也不同.制造商可以通过与高质量的供应商建立长期的诚信的战略合作伙伴关系,以减少为讨价还价消耗的交易成本,同时也减少了双方机会主义行为所造成的损害.     

Political budget cycles and reelection prospects in Greece's municipalities

This paper considers the presence of political budget cycles in Greece's municipalities. We construct a new dataset from primary sources and we find strong evidence of pre-electoral manipulation through increased expenditures and excessive borrowing. We use a dynamic panel data approach producing evidence of opportunistic behavior in local government finances. Our results are robust in the face of a series of controls including mayors running for reelection, their political alignment with the central government, and prolonged terms. Moreover, the results are robust to the exclusion of small sized municipalities and to the restriction of the time range of our investigation to the post-Maastricht period. We also consider whether opportunistic policies influence incumbents' reelection prospects finding that increased expenditures and election year opportunistic excesses are electorally rewarding. Our findings provide a characterization of opportunistic public finance management in Greek municipalities where electorally motivated budgetary decisions appear impervious to the various municipal reform attempts.