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在董事会结构与公司绩效间关系的研究中,动态内生性问题通常被忽略。本文以2002-2011年410家上市公司为样本,在动态内生性的框架下,运用动态面板的System GMM估计方法,研究了董事会结构与公司综合绩效间的关系。结果表明:董事会结构与公司绩效间存在动态内生性问题,当期董事会结构与公司绩效没有显著的相关性,前期的董事会结构与公司绩效间存在显著的正相关关系,且前期公司绩效对当期董事会规模产生了显著的正向的反馈效应,但前期公司绩效并未对当期董事会的独立性产生显著影响。 相似文献
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本文以2002—2011年716家上市公司为样本,在动态内生性框架下,运用动态面板System GMM估计方法,在考虑了高管薪酬与其他治理机制间的交互作用情况下,研究了高管薪酬与公司绩效间的动态关系。研究结果表明:(1)前期高管持股比例与公司绩效呈负相关,前期高管货币薪酬与公司绩效呈正相关;(2)前期公司绩效对高管薪酬产生了显著的反馈效应;(3)高管薪酬与其他公司治理机制间存在"交互效应",即高管薪酬与其他治理机制间的相互作用对公司绩效产生了显著的影响;(4)高管薪酬与公司绩效间存在动态内生性。 相似文献
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以上交所和深交所2002--2009年上市公司为样本,运用动态面板的System GMM估计方法,同时考虑三种内生性,以动态性的视角研究公司治理机制与公司非效率投资跨时期的相互作用,得到以下结论:不仅当期公司治理机制对当期公司非效率投资有显著的影响,而且前期公司治理机制对当期公司非效率投资也有显著的影响,并且前期公司非效率投资对当期公司治理机制有显著的反馈效应,公司治理机制与公司非效率投资间存在动态内生性。此外,公司的监督机制与激励机制在抑制公司的非效率投资方面存在替代关系。 相似文献
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企业改革30年:管理层激励效应——基于上市公司的样本分析 总被引:8,自引:0,他引:8
本文先以2002~2004年数据为基础,检验了中国管理层持股的内生性,并确认了管理层持股对公司绩效存在倒U型影响,同时对公司风险存在正U型影响。在证监会颁布《上市公司股权激励计划管理办法》之后,以2007年数据为基础,考虑了股票期权的影响,使用非参数Matching方法对股权激励方案的有效性做了进一步的检验,认为激励方案的内生性增强,对公司绩效和风险都有正向的影响。 相似文献
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本文以716家上市公司为样本,在动态内生性的框架下,运用动态面板的系统GMM估计方法,同时考虑了三种内生性,以动态性的视角,不仅研究了当期股权结构对当期代理成本的影响,还研究了股权结构与代理成本间的跨时期相互作用。通过研究,我们发现:(1)不仅当期股权结构对当期代理成本有影响,而且前期股权结构也对当期代理成本有影响,股权结构对代理成本的影响有持续期;(2)前期代理成本对当期股权结构有反馈效应;(3)股权结构与代理成本间存在动态内生性。 相似文献
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管理层薪酬和持股激励效应的行业性差异分析--来自我国上市公司的实证证据 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
李玲 《中央财经大学学报》2006,(4):81-86
本文的研究以我国上市公司不同行业的实际数据为考察样本,运用实证分析方法验证我国上市公司不同类型行业管理层薪酬和持股与公司绩效之间的相关关系,分析结果表明:我国上市公司管理层薪酬和持股激励效应存在着较大的行业性差异,并提出不同行业企业应该根据自身特点和性质以及管理层薪酬和持股激励效应的大小,相机选择薪酬激励或股权激励,制定出详细周密、客观有效、切合实际的企业管理层激励方案,从而使其激励效应最大化。 相似文献
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企业风险治理机制是通过一定的风险治理手段或风险管理策略合理规制剩余索取权和控制权的安排和调整,以使企业内的不同利益主体特别是股东(委托人)和管理层(代理人)形成有效的自我约束和激励机制。以管理层激励和风险管理策略为核心的风险治理机制对公司价值的影响效应是企业风险管理理论和实践的重大课题。本文以中国2007~2011年间的金融类上市公司作为研究样本,运用联立方程组控制主要变量之间的内生性问题,实证检验了风险治理机制中风险管理策略和管理层激励对公司价值的影响作用和互补效应。考虑控制人属性的影响,风险管理策略和管理层激励的互补效应在国有企业和非国有企业中有所差异,表明不同性质企业的风险治理对公司价值的影响效应存在明显差别。 相似文献
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Kenneth K. Yung 《Journal of Business Finance & Accounting》2002,29(1&2):55-75
In this paper, we examine the impact of managerial self-interest on the value of multinationality. Since agency theory also suggests that a divergence between the interests of managers and shareholders can be aligned by effective managerial incentive, we also examine the effect of managerial compensation on the value of multinationality. Our results show that for high- Q (Tobin's Q > 1 ) firms, investors do not associate the spending of free cash flow on multinationality with the problem of overinvestments. For high- Q firms, it is also found that the value of multinationality can be enhanced by effective managerial incentives. For low- Q firms (Tobin's Q < 1 ), it is found that the concern of managerial self-interest overwhelms the benefits of internalization, making multinationality a value-decreasing event. For low- Q firms, managerial compensation is also ineffective in promoting value-enhancing foreign direct investments. 相似文献
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Robert Kim 《Accounting & Finance》2023,63(2):1983-2012
This paper investigates whether managerial ability is associated with non-GAAP earnings quality. I find that the quality of non-GAAP earnings is greater for high-ability managers than low-ability managers. I also find that investors consider non-GAAP earnings released by high-ability management to be informative. Additional tests show that the positive association between managerial ability and the quality of non-GAAP earnings is stronger when return volatility or managerial stock ownership is greater. The results are robust to alternative measures of managerial ability and non-GAAP earnings quality and to controlling for endogeneity bias. Overall, this paper provides evidence that managers of high ability use non-GAAP reporting as a signalling tool to reduce information asymmetry. 相似文献
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In this study we use estimates of the sensitivities of managers' portfolios to stock return volatility and stock price to directly test the relationship between managerial incentives to bear risk and two important corporate decisions. We find that as the sensitivity of managers' stock option portfolios to stock return volatility increases firms tend to choose higher debt ratios and make higher levels of R&D investment. These results are even stronger in a subsample of firms with relatively low outside monitoring. For these firms, managerial incentives to bear risk play a particularly pivotal role in determining leverage and R&D investment. 相似文献
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Abstract: Using information on 443 UK non-financial companies, this work provides evidence supporting the hypothesis that managerial risk aversion is an incentive to deviate from the optimal hedging position. Conflicts of interest between shareholders and managers are at the centre of the decision about the firm's risk profile but are not relevant as determinants of the decision to hedge. This is rather associated with factors enhancing the firm's expected value (underinvestment, scale economies, tax savings). 相似文献
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Gorm Gabrielsen Jeffrey D. Gramlich & Thomas Plenborg 《Journal of Business Finance & Accounting》2002,29(7&8):967-988
This study employs Danish data to examine the empirical relationship between the proportion of managerial ownership and two characteristics of accounting earnings: the information content of earnings and the magnitude of discretionary accruals. In previous research concerning American firms, Warfield et al. (1995) document a positive relationship between managerial ownership and the information content of earnings, and a negative relationship between managerial ownership and discretionary accruals. We question the generality of the Warfield et al. result, as the ownership structure found in most other countries, including Denmark, deviates from the US ownership configuration. In fact, Danish data indicate that the information content of earnings is inversely related to managerial ownership. 相似文献
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According to agency theory, we hypothesize that underpayment of top management motivates management to overinvest. Using a sample of Chinese-listed companies for the period 2005-10, we assess the effect of managerial compensation on overinvestment and the effect of overinvestment on managerial private benefits, including future compensation and perquisites, as well as on firm performance. We find that underpayment does motivate overinvestment, which increases managerial private benefits but not firm value. 相似文献
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Using data on companies that have implemented private placements in China from 2011 to 2016, we examine the discount on private placements, short-term stock returns, and long-term performance after the placements. Our goal is to determine whether the prevailing certification and entrenchment hypotheses can explain managerial placements. We find that the participation of managerial investors has a significant and negative impact on short-term stock returns. Such a negative effect can also be found on issuing companies’ long-term profitability. Moreover, managerial placements have a higher discount than nonmanagerial placements. Our findings suggest that managerial placement is consistent with the entrenchment hypothesis but not the certification hypothesis. 相似文献
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This study examines empirically the effect of managerial ownership on firms' disclosures. Agency theory predicts that investors' information requirements increase with the agency costs of the firm. Managerial ownership mitigates agency costs and therefore should reduce investors' information needs. This study tests the hypothesis that firms with lower levels of managerial ownership provide more extensive disclosures by examining analysts' ratings of firms' disclosures. In contrast to the proxies used in prior studies that test this relationship, such as the earnings-return correlation and management earnings forecasts, these ratings provide a more direct measure of firms' overall disclosure practices.I find that the relationship between managerial holdings and disclosures depends on the type of disclosure. Consistent with the hypothesis of this study, firms with lower levels of managerial ownership are more likely to receive higher ratings for the disclosures provided in their annual and quarterly reports, even after controlling for size, performance, volatility of returns, the frequency of securities offerings and proprietary costs. The more informal and flexible aspects of disclosures, however, as measured by the investor relations rating, are not influenced by the level of managerial ownership. These results are consistent with prior research that predicts that firms lower their costs of capital by signaling a commitment to maintain a more open disclosure policy. Because annual and quarterly reports are less flexible, and therefore less likely to change, they may represent a more credible commitment to provide more informative disclosures. 相似文献