Tax efficiency in selected Indian states

This paper attempts to measure pure tax efficiency of fifteen major Indian states (Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Bihar, Haryana, Gujarat, Karnataka, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Orissa, Punjab, Rajasthan, Tamilnadu, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal) for the period 1980–81 to 1992–93 in a manner that allows this efficiency to vary both across time as well as across states. It is discovered that there is a moral hazard problem in the design of central grants in that higher grants by the central government to the state governments reduce efficiency of tax collection by these states. The less poor states are more efficient in tax collection. The rankings of states by tax efficiency for the various years do not converge. An index of aggregate tax efficiency is calculated and it appears that this index has been stagnating. It is argued that the weight placed on tax effort in the formula determining central grants to state governments should be increased to improve tax efficiency of state governments. First version received: November 1997/final version received: November 1998     

Tax bases,tax rates and the elasticity of reported income

Tax reforms usually change both tax rates and tax bases. Using a panel of income tax returns spanning the two major U.S. tax reforms of the 1980s and a number of smaller tax law changes, I find that the elasticity of income reported on personal income tax returns depends on the available deductions. This highlights that this key behavioral elasticity is not an immutable parameter but rather that it can be to some extent controlled by policy makers. One implication is that base broadening reduces the marginal efficiency cost of taxation. The results are very similar for all income categories indicating that the rich are more responsive to tax rates because tax rules that apply to them are different (their tax base is narrower). The point estimates indicate that the Tax Reform Act of 1986 reduced the marginal cost of collecting a dollar of tax revenue, with roughly half of this reduction due to the base broadening and the other half due to the tax rate reduction. As a by-product, the analysis in this paper offers a reconciliation of disparate estimates obtained by previous studies of the tax responsiveness of income.     

控制权性质影响税收敏感性吗?——基于企业劳动力需求的检验

西方学者研究表明企业所得税是劳动力需求的重要影响因素,这一理论在中国是否适用?中国大部分上市公司为国有控股企业,这一特殊的制度背景是否会影响企业所得税与劳动力需求的关系?本文基于2007年企业所得税改革这一外生政策变化,在检验西方企业所得税与劳动力需求关系的理论在中国是否适用的基础上,就不同控制权的性质是否会影响企业劳动力需求的税收敏感性进行了检验。研究发现企业所得税税率降低和"就业税盾"增加提高了企业劳动力需求,但这种税率和"就业税盾"的变化对国有控股企业劳动力需求变化的影响要显著小于非国有控股企业。这表明税收是影响企业劳动力需求的重要因素,但国有控制权使得这种税收敏感性变弱。本文的研究结果不仅丰富了相关领域的国际学术文献,而且对我国就业政策的制定具有政策含义。     

税务代理制度建构与税收通则法条文设计

税务代理涉及纳税主体权利保护、征税主体的行政效率以及一国税制的有效运行和完善,我国《税收基本法（税收通则法）》应该对其加以规范,学者对此也有不同建言。文章通过对税务代理制度建构的法理分析,对照典型国家税务代理立法例,分析了我国现有税务代理制度运行中存在的主要矛盾和问题,提出了完善我国税务代理制度的建议,并拟订了《税收基本法（税收通则法）》有关税务代理的具体条款。     

Tax liability side equivalence in gift-exchange labor markets

Tax Liability Side Equivalence (tax LSE) claims that the statutory incidence of a tax is irrelevant for its economic incidence. Tax LSE is predicted to hold in gift-exchange labor markets if workers' effort choices exclusively depend on the net wage, but breaks down if they partially depend on the gross wage paid to workers. This is the case if the tax is perceived to be external to the gift-exchange relationship. We experimentally test tax LSE in a gift-exchange labor market and find that it holds very well.     

环境创新税收政策解构与重构：由单一工具转向组合工具

税收政策工具内置的行为诱导、社会公平、经济发展等性能，使其成为激励环境创新的重要手段。税收政策工具可以解构出环境税与税收优惠两大核心政策工具。其中，环境税将污染行为的外部成本内部化，向企业传递价格压力信号，迫使其作出缴税、减产抑或投入环境创新的抉择，本质上是一种反向压力工具；税收优惠则是一种正向鼓励工具，以减轻税负的方式将应收税款让渡于创新研发，将污染企业向投入环境创新的方向引导。两个政策子工具虽然作用机制相反，但政策目标一致，通过科学、精细的税制设计，实现不同政策功能协同互补，以发挥组合工具“1+1＞2”的政策效应，最大化提升企业环境创新积极性。此外，还应统筹税收政策工具与其它政策工具的组合使用。     

基于DEA方法的税收征收效率研究──以湖北省国税系统为例

税收征管效率是税务部门的征税以尽可能低的税务行政成本,取得尽可能多的税收收入,这就需要将征税的"产出"与"投入"结合起来综合考量,DEA分析方法正是进行相对效率研究的有效途径。本文在审慎选取输入指标和输出指标的基础上,利用湖北省国税系统的统计数据,通过DEA模型,得出税收征管效率的评价与改进,并给出相关政策建议。     

Corporate taxation and the efficiency gains of the 1986 Tax Reform Act

Summary The 1986 Tax Reform Act (TRA) had little effect on the overall U. S. effective capital income tax rate. However, TRA significantly reduced differences in effective taxation of corporate and noncorporate capital for a number of U. S. industries. The Mutual Production Model developed in Gravelle and Kotlikoff (1989) can be used to study the efficiency gains from the reduction in corporate tax wedges within industries. Unlike the Harberger Model, the Mutual Production Model permits both corporate and noncorporate firms to produce the same goods and, therefore, to coexist within a given industry.This paper develops an 11-industry-55-year dynamic life cycle version of the Mutual Production Model. We use this model to study the steady-state efficiency gains associated with the new law. While we do not simulate the economy's transition path, our steady-state welfare changes are those that arise from compensating transitional generations for the first-order redistribution of income associated with the Tax Reform.We find that the 1986 Tax Reform law reduces excess burden by 85 percent of our model's economy's present value of consumption. This efficiency gain reflects the Tax Reform's reduction in corporate-noncorporate tax wedges, particularly in those industries with significant noncorporate production. Measured as a flow the 1988 estimated efficiency gain from the Tax Reform Act is $31 billion.The opinions expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress, Boston University, or The National Bureau of Economic Research. We are particularly grateful to Alan Auerbach, Oldrich Kyn, and an anonymous referee for very extensive and critical comments. We also thank Don Fullerton, Yolanda Henderson, Tom Woodward, and a referee for their very helpful suggestions.     

A Model of Tradeable Capital Tax Permits

Standard models of horizontal capital tax competition predict that, in a Nash equilibrium, states set tax rates inefficiently due to externalities—capital inflow to one state corresponds to capital outflow for another state. Researchers often suggest that the federal government impose Pigouvian taxes to correct for these effects and achieve efficiency. We propose an alternative incentive‐based regulation: tradeable capital tax permits. Under this system, the federal government would require a state to hold a permit if it wanted to reduce its capital income tax rate from some predefined benchmark. These permits would be tradeable across states. We show that, if the federal government sets the correct number of total permits, then social efficiency is achieved. We discuss the advantages of this system relative to the canonical suggestion of Pigouvian taxes.     

Electronic filing,tax preparers and participation in the Earned Income Tax Credit

In 2002 more than 18 million low-income individual taxpayers received the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC). Despite its size, non-participation in this program is a concern and substantial effort is devoted by the IRS, local governments and many non-profits to address it. Using variation across states in the introduction of state electronic filing programs, we show that the introduction of electronic filing had a significant effect on participation in the EITC. Our results are robust to accounting for other welfare, EITC and IRS reforms introduced during the same period. We speculate that the impact of this policy change on the tax preparation industry played an important role in increasing participation.     

The effects of economic conditions and tax structures on state tax revenue flow

Tax portfolio literature has focused on deriving the optimal composition of the tax structure for a particular state. However, tax revenue flow is influenced by both tax structure and economic conditions which are unique for each state. Therefore, the literature has been unable to generalize the characteristics of optimal tax structures. This paper examines the contribution of a state's economic condition, as well as the tax structure, to the growth and variability of tax revenue flow. In addition, the optimal tax portfolio is studied for changes in revenue growth targets and economic conditions.     

基于贝叶斯分类器的纳税评估模型研究

纳税评估是集纳税服务和纳税管理于一体的税收管理方式。评估模型是纳税评估工作的关键所在。在总结纳税评估基本原理的基础上,针对企业的综合纳税评估问题提出了评估分析指标体系,构建了基于贝叶斯分类模型的纳税评估方法,并结合现实数据做了实证分析。实证结果显示,贝叶斯分类纳税评估模型具有很高的现实应用价值。     

Dividend taxation and household dividend portfolio decisions: evidence from the U.S. Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003

This study examines the dividend clientele hypothesis by focusing on the preferential tax treatment of qualified dividends provided by the 2003 Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act (JGTRRA) in the United States. Using the Public Use Tax File data, the author finds that the ratios of dividends to long-term capital gains before the 2003 tax act significantly declined with household tax rate differentials between dividends and long-term capital gains, but such a negative tax effect on the ratios disappears afterwards. This seemingly tax-inefficient composition of dividends and long-term capital gains after the tax act arises from households’ ability to reduce their tax burdens on stocks by exploiting the new preferential tax treatments on qualified dividends under JGTRRA. That is, households in the upper tax bracket hold significantly greater shares of qualified dividends relative to ordinary dividends after the tax act.     

Worldwide Tax Reform ‘How Does Australia Compare?’

Drawing principally on the English-speaking countries, where tax reform has proceeded furthest, the common characteristics and causes of the worldwide tax reform movement of the 1980s are examined. Tax reform reflected the change in economic philosophy — disillusionment with state intervention and a revival of belief in the efficacy of markets.
The causes and content of tax reform in Australia have much in common with those elsewhere except that the reduction in marginal rates of income tax was achieved with no real change in the tax mix. The success of tax reform is assessed using as criteria: (i) how far the outcome matched the objectives specified by the reformers themselves — in particular tax neutrality; (ii) the sustain-ability of the reforms; and (iii) how far 'undesirable' consequences (especially distributional effects) were avoided. Applying these criteria to Ireland, Canada, the United Kingdom, the United States, New Zealand and Australia, it is concluded that in all these countries there are deficiencies, but Australia comes second to New Zealand in the success league. The notable Australian deficiencies are the lack of a broad-based consumption tax (Australia is now the only OECD country without one) and the fact that lower marginal rates of income tax have been achieved mainly because of falling real thresholds of the tax brackets.     

税制改革与公司投资价值相关性

本文以我国2009年增值税转型为基础,结合2008年公司所得税税制改革,检验了增值税转型过程中公司投资决策的价值相关性变化趋势。研究结果表明,增值税转型对投资价值相关性的影响,存在投资补贴的正面效应和所得税负面效应。实证结果发现,2009年的增值税转型中,公司投资补贴的正面效应大于所得税负面效应,这在整体上增加了公司投资价值相关性;而且所得税税率越低,增值税转型对投资价值相关性的促进作用越大。因此,我国的税制改革在整体上提高了资本市场的资源配置效率。本文的研究结果为深入分析我国当前税制改革的作用,提供了重要的理论依据。     

Tuition Fees and the Dual Income Tax: The Optimality of the Nordic Income Tax System Reconsidered

Abstract. We examine the optimal tax and education policy in the case of a dual income tax. Incorporating an educational sector and endogenous capital taxation, we show that the results in Nielsen and Sørensen's study are vulnerable with respect to assumptions on the elasticity of unskilled labor supply. Tax progressivity results residually, whereas educational policy guarantees an optimal tax wedge on, but not necessarily efficiency in, educational investment. The less elastic are the unobservable educational investment and skilled labor (the latter relative to unskilled labor supply), and the more educational policy cares about the skilled labor supply, the more progressive the tax system will be. Education will be subsidized on a net basis if the complementarity effect on the skilled labor supply is strong and important; however, there is also an offsetting substitutability effect of the unskilled labor supply at play.     

Leverage and firm value

Three highly cited studies with over 6000 citations collectively report a negative relationship between the market value of the firm and leverage. Such empirical findings clearly contradict the hypothesis of leverage adding value to the firm and an optimal capital structure that maximizes firm value—these findings have yet to be resolved. Employing a sample of 3,768 firms consisting of 39,015 observations, a stochastic frontier analysis was used to assess the relationship of leverage among other capital structure factors with firm value. It was found that in general the use of leverage promotes firm value, consistent with the trade-off theory and that the inverse relationship between leverage and firm value was a temporary occurrence and is likely attributable to firms employing tax loss carrybacks in response to the 1986 Tax Reform Act. The estimates of technical efficiency indicate that many firms can do more to increase their value, the sample as a whole improves efficiency (value) over the sample period. The findings reconcile the reports of leverage decreasing firm value as reported in Baker and Wurgler, Fama and French, and Habib and Ljungqvist. The empirical findings suggest prior observation was a due to a decline in the value of the tax shield generated by leverage after the Tax Reform Act of 1986. Specifically, tax carrybacks extended the pre-Tax Reform Act of 1986 tax shield value to 1991 and after 1991 the tax shield value declined.     

Schumpeter's crisis of the tax state: An essay in fiscal sociology

Schumpeter'sCrisis of the Tax State and other fiscal writings are summarized. His crisis theory and its relation to his prognosis of capitalist decline is explored, along with Goldscheid's earlier model. Both are found to have underestimated the resilience of the tax state and its ability to sustain expanding budgets. Schumpeter's view of the income tax as appropriate for a minimal state is assessed along with subsequent tax development. His fiscal model is placed in the context of his understanding of sociology as a social science. Some conjectures on his response to the subsequent course of fiscal sociology are added.The Editors invitation to revisit the Crisis of the Tax State coincided with my intent to review Schumpeter's recently publishedEssays in Economic Policy, 1991, C. Seidl and W. Stolper, eds., Princeton University Press. Spanning Schumpeter's economic and fiscal writings for three decades, this volume provides a rich addition to his initial vision, so that these pages may serve both tasks.     

不完全税权、政府竞争与税收增长

本文在一个同时包含了政府间横向和纵向竞争的框架内分析了中国税收增长路径的内生决定机制。在名义税率不变,但存在较大征管空间的情况下,横向竞争倾向于压低实际均衡税率,纵向竞争则恰恰相反。分税制改革以来的税权向上集中趋势,以及中央对地方财政收入的规范化进程等因素,使得纵向竞争效应趋强,横向竞争效应相对趋弱,最终体现为十几年的税收持续超经济增长。当前,减税以及相关的分权、分税体制改革可作为增进社会福利的备选方案。     

State investment tax incentives: A zero-sum game?

Over the past four decades, state investment tax incentives have proliferated. This emergence of state investment tax credits (ITC) and other investment tax incentives raises two important questions: 1) Are these tax incentives effective in achieving their stated objective, to increase investment within the state?; 2) To the extent these incentives raise investment within the state, how much of this increase is due to investment drawn away from other states?To begin to answer these questions, we construct a detailed panel dataset for 48 states for 20+ years. The dataset contains series on output and capital, their relative prices, and establishment counts. The effects of tax variables on capital formation and establishments are measured by the Jorgensonian user cost of capital that depends in a nonlinear manner on federal and state tax variables. Cross-jurisdictional differences in state investment tax credits and state corporate tax rates entering the user cost, combined with a panel that is long in the time dimension, are key to identifying the effectiveness of state investment incentives.Two models are estimated. The Capital Demand Model is motivated by the first-order condition for a profit-maximizing firm and relates at the state level the capital/output ratio to the relative user cost of capital. The Twin-Counties Model exploits both the spatial breaks (“discontinuities”) in tax policy at state borders and our panel dataset to relate at the county level the relative user cost to the location of manufacturing establishments. Using the Capital Demand Model, we find that own-state capital formation is substantially increased by tax-induced reductions in the own-state price of capital and, more interestingly, substantially decreased by tax-induced reductions in the price of capital in competitive-states. Similarly, using our Twin-Counties Model, we find that county manufacturing establishment counts around state borders are higher on the side of the border with the lower price of capital, but the difference is economically small, suggesting that establishments are much less mobile than overall capital. Extensions of the Capital Demand Model also reveal that state capital tax policy appears to be a zero-sum game among the states in that an equiproportionate increase in own-state and competitive-states user costs tends to have no effect on own-state capital formation.