贷款损失准备计提与商业银行经营风险相关性研究 ——基于经理自主权视角

贷款损失准备的计提作为商业银行调节会计利润的手段,是否对商业银行经营风险有影响,是一个值得探讨的问题。基于我国上市商业银行2007-2017年的数据为研究样本进行实证分析,研究结果表明：贷款损失准备对商业银行经营风险有正向信号传递作用。其中,基于经理自主权计提的自由裁量部分能缓释经营风险,非自由裁量部分对经营风险产生加速放大效应,从而证明了自由裁量贷款损失准备能增强银行风险承担能力,为商业银行经理人员和监管者合理规范计提准备金提供新思路。     

2011年中国货币市场展望

2010年,货币政策向常态回归,市场流动性总体较为宽松,但流动性和利率的波动幅度加大。展望2011年的中国货币市场,由于商业银行超额存款准备金率已降至低位,银行开始调整资产结构,预计法定存款准备金率的上调空间将低于2%;商业银行可用资金呈中性偏紧态势,预计隔夜回购利率均值在2.1%～2.3%;央票利率基于其价格引导作用在短期内不会超过定存利率,而扩大公开市场规模则有利于应对流动性变化。     

存款准备金政策与货币供给

存款准备金政策通常被认为是中央银行调控货币供给的有效工具。但是,从理论和实践可以证明,这一政策工具对货币供给的影响是很有限的。在商业银行有充裕的超额准备金时,法定准备金比率的调整只改变商业银行的准备金构成,而不改变准备金的总额,因而对基础货币和货币乘数都没有影响,或影响都很小;而当商业银行没有超额准备金或只有很少超额准备金时,法定准备金比率的上调将使准备金总额增加,从而使货币乘数缩小,但使基础货币增加。于是,货币乘数缩小对货币供给的影响将被基础货币增加对货币供给的影响所抵消。     

Bank Mergers, Competition, and Liquidity

We model the impact of bank mergers on loan competition, reserve holdings, and aggregate liquidity. A merger changes the distribution of liquidity shocks and creates an internal money market, leading to financial cost efficiencies and more precise estimates of liquidity needs. The merged banks may increase their reserve holdings through an internalization effect or decrease them because of a diversification effect. The merger also affects loan market competition, which in turn modifies the distribution of bank sizes and aggregate liquidity needs. Mergers among large banks tend to increase aggregate liquidity needs and thus the public provision of liquidity through monetary operations of the central bank.     

Why Commercial Banks Held Excess Reserves: The Japanese Experience of the Late 1990s

We investigated, empirically, why Japanese banks held excess reserves in the late 1990s. Specifically, we pin down two factors explaining the demand for excess reserves: a low short-term interest rate, or call rate, and the fragile financial health of banks. The virtually zero call rate increased the demand for excess reserves substantially, and a high bad loans ratio largely contributed to the increase in excess reserve holdings. We found that the holdings of excess reserves would fall by two-thirds if the call rate were to be raised to its level prior to the adoption of the zero-interest-rate policy, and the bad loans ratio were to fall by 50%.     

Does Competition Affect Bank Risk?

Although policymakers often discuss trade-offs between bank competition and stability, past research provides differing theoretical perspectives and empirical results on the impact of competition on risk. We employ a new approach for identifying exogenous changes in the competitive pressures facing individual banks and discover that an intensification of competition materially boosts bank risk. With respect to the mechanisms, we find that competition reduces banks’ profits, pricing power, and charter values and increases banks’ provision of nontraditional, riskier banking services and lending to riskier firms.     

Equilibrium Dynamics in an Endogenous Growth Model of Money and Banking

We construct an analytically tractable endogenous growth model of money and banking where money provides "liquidity services" to facilitate transactions and banks convert non-reserve deposits into productive capital. We examine both the long- and short-run effects of changes in the money growth rate or the reserve requirement ratio. In response to a change in the required reserve ratio, the inflation rate and the growth rates of capital, real balances, and consumption need not adjust monotonically along the transition path. While the balanced growth equilibrium may be either a saddle or a source locally, the global dynamical system exhibits flip bifurcation.     

宏观审慎评估与商业银行经营转型

近年来金融业的新变化为系统性风险的形成和传播提供了条件,为加强宏观审慎 管理,央行自2016年起将原来的差别准备金动态调整和合意贷款管理机制升级为宏观审慎评 估体系,强化对不同类型金融机构的监管。本文以宏观审慎评估体系为主线,以分析其核心理 念和核心约束为切入点,重点讨论宏观审慎评估如何引导商业银行稳健经营,分析宏观审慎评 估对商业银行经营管理带来直接、间接的影响,结合商业银行管理实践提出如何以宏观审慎评 估管理的精髓为导向,主动调整经营管理策略,坚持稳健发展。     

A note on deposit rate deregulation, Super NOWs, and bank security returns

This paper empirically investigates the effects on the weekly returns of almost 100 banking organizations of the December 1982 authorization of Super NOWs. Examination of excess returns around the announcement date suggests that the announcement of the Super NOWs had a statistically significant (and negative) effect and that the impact differed significantly by type of bank. While returns for money center banks were generally unaffected, excess returns for regional retail banks were highly significant.     

How do banks adjust their capital ratios?

We analyze the dynamics of banks’ regulatory capital ratios. Using monthly regulatory data of large German banks, we estimate the target level and the adjustment speed of the capital ratio for each bank separately. There exists a target level for a substantial percentage of banks. Unlike with panel regressions, we can estimate individual adjustment speeds and find large variation across banks. Adjustments on the liability side are most effective, although adjustment rates on the asset side are higher. Private commercial banks (neither state-owned nor cooperative) and banks with a high level of proprietary trading are more likely to adjust their capital ratio tightly. Banks with a target capital ratio compensate for low target ratios with low asset volatilities and high adjustment speeds. They seem to care mainly about the resulting probability to comply with the regulatory minimum. Assuming low variation of this probability explains most of the large cross-sectional variation of bank capital.     

Bank earning asset behavior and causality between reserves and money: Lagged versus contemporaneous reserve accounting

This paper empirically examines the impact of lagged reserve accounting on large individual bank behavior. Its specific objective is to assess the claim that the institution of LRA has led to a decoupling of the earning asset and reserve adjustment decisions of banks. To accomplish this objective, a system of equations which jointly describe the reserve adjustment and earning asset decisions of banks is estimated and tested for differences in the model between the periods before and after 1968. It is found that bank behavior does not differ fundamentally under LRA. Evidence that banks make their earning asset adjustments promptly and that expected future interest rates are important in their decisions is also presented.     

商业银行效率及其影响因素实证研究

以我国14家商业银行2000～2009年的面板数据为分析依据,采用随机前沿分析(SFA)方法对商业银行效率进行计量,并从公司治理、市场结构、宏观经济政策、金融业结构和经营能力等方面分析商业银行效率的影响因素。结果表明:市场集中度和银行个体市场份额与银行效率反向变动;投资和货币供给对银行效率影响较大;经济周期、通货膨胀和存贷利差对银行效率影响较小;存款准备金率对银行效率影响最小。可以认为,在当前形势下,存款准备金率的调控作用只是暂时的,无法从根本上抑制货币的流动性;存贷利差对银行效率影响不大。因此,为控制通货膨胀实施不对称加息政策,不会对商业银行系统产生较大影响;从银行经营能力考察,传统的存贷业务已不能独立支持商业银行的进一步发展,应大力提倡金融创新,寻求新的业务增长点。     

Bank exposure to market fear

We find that increases in implied market volatility (a proxy for market fear) have a significant impact on returns of bank stocks, above and beyond systematic risk proxied by the expected excess market return during a bad economic regime. Large bank returns are favorably affected by increases in implied market volatility during the crisis, while small banks are adversely affected by increases in implied market volatility. We attribute the different effects among the size-categorized bank portfolios to the perception that large banks are protected by too-big-to-fail policies. Within the sample of small banks, the adverse share price response to increased implied market volatility is more pronounced for banks that rely more heavily on non-traditional sources of funds, use a high proportion of loans in their assets, have a higher level of non-performing assets, and have a relatively low provision for loan losses. The adverse effect of negative innovations in implied market volatility on small bank returns during the crisis is primarily driven by exposure of their loan portfolio to weak economic conditions.     

The price of liquidity: The effects of market conditions and bank characteristics

We study the prices that individual banks pay for liquidity (captured by borrowing rates in repos with the central bank and benchmarked by the overnight index swap) as a function of market conditions and bank characteristics. These prices depend in particular on the distribution of liquidity across banks, which is calculated over time using individual bank-level data on reserve requirements and actual holdings. Banks pay more for liquidity when positions are more imbalanced across banks, consistent with the existence of short squeezing. We also show that small banks pay more for liquidity and are more vulnerable to squeezes. Healthier banks pay less but, contrary to what one might expect, banks in formal liquidity networks do not. State guarantees reduce the price of liquidity but do not protect against squeezes.     

治理结构与市场结构：一个金融创新的制度视角

金融创新是商业银行通过实现规模经济和范围经济,获得超额利润的必由之路,但是只有在健全的法人治理结构(总行与分支机构间信息对称、监督有效)下,商业银行才有创新的动力;即使商业银行存在创新的内部激励,在当前商业银行寡头市场条件下的“资金上存”机制会削弱其创新积极性;商业银行金融创新必须立足于改革内外激励机制,实现可持续发展。     

Unallocated loss adjustment expense reserving

In non-life insurance, the provision for outstanding claims (the claims reserve) should include future loss adjustment expenses, i.e. administrative expenses to settle the claims, and therefore we have to estimate the expected Unallocated Loss Adjustment Expenses (ULAE) – expenses that are not attributable to individual claims, such as salaries at the claims handling department. The ULAE reserve has received little attention from European actuaries in the literature, supposedly because of the lack of detailed data for estimation and evaluation. Having good estimation procedures will, however, become even more important with the introduction of the Solvency II regulations, which require unbiased estimation of future cash flows for all expenses. We present a model for ULAE at the individual claim level that includes both fixed and variable costs. This model leads to an estimate of the ULAE reserve at the aggregate (line-of-business) level, as demonstrated in a numerical example from a Swedish non-life insurer.     

Liquidity Requirements,Free-Riding,and the Implications for Financial Stability Evidence from the Early 1900s

Maintaining sufficient liquidity in the financial system is vital for its stability. However, since returns on liquid assets are typically low, individual financial institutions may seek to hold fewer such assets, especially if they believe they can rely on other institutions for liquidity support. We examine whether state banks in the early 1900s took advantage of relatively high cash balances maintained by national banks, due to reserve requirements, to hold less cash themselves. We find that state banks did hold less cash in places where both state legal requirements were lower and national banks were more prevalent.     

Excess reserves,monetary policy and financial volatility

This paper examines the real and financial effects of reserves in a Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model with monopoly banking and credit market imperfections. The framework explicitly accounts for the fact that commercial banks hold excess reserves and they incur costs in holding these assets. The model also accounts for imperfect substitutability between bank funding sources and it shows that this feature is an important channel through which reserve requirement shocks can affect real variables. Numerical experiments show that an increase in reserve requirements creates a countercyclical effect for real economic activity. The results also indicate that the combination of an augmented Taylor rule which responds to excess reserves and a countercyclical reserve requirement rule is optimal to mitigate macroeconomic and financial volatility associated with liquidity shocks.     

银保协作、风险自留与银行信用风险补偿——基于银保信贷系统的分析视角

在分析风险自留的内生逻辑基础上,进一步分析风险自留实现银行信用风险补偿的内在机理。研究表明：银保信贷系统通过对贷款企业个体风险与事先设定的平均代偿风险的匹配性甄别,实现对银行信用风险的分级补偿功能。针对银行超预期信用风险,先行实施银行风险拨备机制对银行平均代偿风险进行补偿,然后实施超额风险自留机制对超过平均代偿风险的银行超额风险部分再次进行补偿,超额风险自留补偿基金将由银行与担保机构依据各自的风险均衡配置阈值占比共同筹集,以此来实现银行信用风险分级补偿目标。并以此为依据,设计了银保信贷系统风险自留机制。