财产保险合同中保险利益的转移与保险合同的效力

新《保险法》第12条规定：保险利益是指投保人或者被保险人对保险标的具有的法律上承认的利益。第13条规定：投保人提出保险要求,经保险人同意承保,保险合同成立。依法成立的保险合同,自成立时生效。投保人或者保险人可以对合同的效力约定附条件或者附期限。     

我国《保险法》不可争辩条款制度：问题与对策

不可争辩条款制度通过约束保险公司撤销保险合同的权利,强化保障保险消费者的保险合同权利,但同时也可能诱发保险消费者的道德风险。本文重点围绕我国保险法关于不可争辩条款制度的规定,结合他国立法例,论述我国不可争辩条款制度存在的问题,提出了完善该制度的建议。     

航空旅客意外伤害保险条款

第一条 保险合同的构成 航空旅客意外伤害保险合同(以下简称本合同)由保险单或者其他保险凭证及所附条款、批注、附贴批单、投保单以及有关的投保文件、声明、其他书面协议构成。 第二条 投保范围 一、凡持有效机票乘坐客运航班班机的旅客,可作为被保险人参加本保险。     

财险公司应收保费有关问题的探讨

根据《保险法》的有关规定,投保人提出保险要求,经保险人同意承保,并就合同的条款达成协议,保险合同成立。保险人应当及时向投保人签发保单或者其他保险凭证,并在保单或者其他保险凭证中载明当事人双方约定的合同内容。应收保费是保险公司经营过程中,根据保险合同约定应向保户收取但未收到的保险费。从部分保险公司目前的经营情况来看,由于公司内外诸多方面的原因导致近年来应收保费急剧增加,其中相当一部分形成无法收到的呆坏账,严重地影响了保险公司经济效益的提高和资产结构的优化。由于寿险公司存在宽限期应收保费等特殊性,本文仅就财险公司应收保费的有关问题进行探讨。     

浅谈“交通违法”除外责任

【案情简介】甲于2010年7月参加某保险公司（以下简称“保险公司”）的一款“驾乘人员意外伤害保险”（团体）,成为该保险合同项下的被保险人。保险公司在该意外保险条款中规定：“被保险人在驾驶或乘坐7座（含）以下非营运车辆期间因遭受意外事故,     

避免保险纠纷四大秘诀

正想要避免保险纠纷,加强自己的保险知识储备,了解一些保险公司投保和理赔的基本流程,才是维护自身保险利益的最佳武器。1 秘诀一:抓住要点解读"天书保单"投保前,代理人通常会将保险利益描述得比较简单,而在签署投保单之前,消费者往往还没有拿到保险合同条款。一旦拿到了保险合同条款,大部分人却又会将其如天书一般束之高阁。而真正发生理赔纠纷时,才发现条款中的"文字陷阱"很多,惊呼"怎么有这么多的内容我以前都不知道!"有位客户在朋友的推荐下买了一份重疾险。2014     

谈谈投保方的法律义务

《财产保险公司同条例》第三条规定：“财产保险的投保方（在保险单或保险凭证中称被保险人），应当是被保险财产的所有人或经营管理人或者是对保险标的有保险利益的人。投保方向保险方申请订立保险合同，负有交纳保险费的义务”。保险费是投保方为了灾后能够获得经济补偿是交纳给保险方的费用，交纳保险费是投保方最`了主要的义务，只有在投保方同意支付或者已支付保险费的情况下，保险方才承担保险合同规定的经济补偿责任，保险合同才能有效。因此，交纳保险费是保险合同产生法律效力的重要条件，也是首要条件。     

保险条款的用词应规范

保险条款是构成保险合同的重要文件之一,保 险条款中的内容特别是保险责任和责任免责条款以及名词的释义应规范和科学。但由于长期以来保险公司设计条款的人员多以保险专业为主,因而不免一些涉及医学等方面的用词显得不够规范和科学。这在健康险条款中较为普遍。保     

浅析《〈保险法〉司法解释二》对保险人明确说明义务的新要求

明确说明作为保险人的一项法定义务,可追溯至1983年颁布的《财产保险合同条例》,该条例第7条第1款规定：“在订立保险合同时,保险方应当将办理保险的有关事项告知投保方.”1995年《保险法》从法律层面规定了保险人的明确说明义务,该法第16条第1款规定：“订立保险合同,保险人应当向投保人说明保险合同的条款内容.”第17条规定：“保险合同中规定有关于保险人责任免除条款的,保险人在订立保险合同时应当向投保人明确说明,未明确说明的,该条款不产生效力.”     

轻松读懂保险合同

在笔者多年的工作和生活中,经常会听到有人抱怨保险合同生涩难懂。正是生涩难懂的保险合同,为一部分保险代理人提供了误导客户的温床,从而造成一部分客户因不了解保险条款而错买保险。同时,生涩难懂的保险合同还使一部分人不了解自己所购买的保险所涵盖的保险责任,当发生风险事故时未能及时地维护自己的利益,抑或事故本不属于保险责任,却盲目地起诉或者与保险公司进行争执。     

比较法视域下公司董事赔偿责任保险立法问题研究——基于日本第二次《公司法》修改的比较考察

D&O保险的立法问题是我国司法实践中一个亟需澄清的问题,同时亦是保险法学界关注较多的基础理论问题。本文通过考察D&O保险合同在公司治理中的价值,细致分析在2019年日本第二次《公司法》修改之际学界对D&O保险规则立法与否的争论及立法演进历程,并对增设D&O保险合同规定的初衷以及在决定该保险合同内容时的决策程序进行系统阐释。研究发现,增设D&O保险合同规定、明确公司有权全额负担保险费用,有助于提高管理层的风险承担水平和管理效率,进而促进企业创新。在探讨我国《公司法》是否应当构建D&O保险规则这一问题时,应注意到公司法上的补偿制度是D&O保险存在的前提。就D&O保险合同内容的信息披露问题,一方面,为防止公司费用无限地用于提升填补限额,可采披露D&O合同信息的手段;另一方面,就具体的信息披露事项,不可盲目“照搬”美国做法。     

Optimal Tax Deductions for Net Losses Under Private Insurance With an Upper Limit

Kaplow (1992b) shows that governments should not provide a tax deduction for net losses when a private insurance contract is available. However, his findings rest on the assumption that the private insurance is proportional coverage. We find that Kaplow's conclusions may not hold when the private insurance contract contains an upper limit. The findings of our article show that Kaplow's conclusions are sensitive to the assumption that the insurance contract is available in the private market.     

Insurance Contract Design When the Insurer Has Private Information on Loss Size

This article examines the optimal indemnity contract in an insurance market, when the insurer has private information about the size of an insurable loss. Both parties know whether or not a loss occurred, but only the insurer knows the true value of the loss and/or to what extent the losses are covered under the policy. The insured may verify the insurer's loss estimate for a fixed auditing cost. The optimal contract reimburses the auditing costs in addition to full insurance for losses less than some endogenous limit. For losses exceeding this limit, the contract pays a fixed indemnity and requires no monitoring. The optimal contract is compared with the contracts obtained in cases where it is only the insured who can observe the loss size.
     

Die Arglistanfechtung des Versicherungsvertrags bei fehlender textförmiger Nachfrage nach Gefahrumständen

The article treats the issue of disputing an insurance contract for reasons of malice in the event of an insurance company failing to comply with the requirements pertaining to the risk-issue-conversation provided by the VVG. According to §19 Abs. 1 VVG, the policy holder is merely required to answer questions about risk issues that are presented to him in writing and timewise before the policy holder has submitted his offer respectively in the time frame between submission of the offer by the policy holder and the acceptance by the insurance company. It is contentious whether an insurance company that has violated §19 Abs. 1 VVG may nevertheless dispute the insurance contract for reasons of malice in case of misrepresentation or omission of information on part of the policy holder. The article argues for an application of §241 Abs. 2 BGB in conjunction with §123 Abs. 1 BGB in addition to §19 Abs. 1 VVG—and thus in favor of an insurance company’s possibility to dispute the insurance contract. The protection of the policy holder’s rights is not an issue in the problem of applying the correct provision. They must rather be considered when determining the requirements of the contract dispute.     

临时保险制度：赔付理由、期间及其限制

我国《保险法》未规定临时保险制度,本文建议,我国的临时保险制度应当分为强制临时保险与自愿临时保险两种,在保险人预收保险费的情况下,根据履行提前、对价平衡、合理期待等理论,保险人应当对临时保险事故予以赔付,此种临时保险的期间自投保人交付保险费之时起算,于正式保险生效之时或投保人收到拒保通知书并由保险人退还保险费之时终止;...     

Disappointment and the Optimal Insurance Contract

This paper studies the optimal insurance contract under disappointment theory. We show that, when the individuals anticipate disappointment, there are two types of optimal insurance contract. The first type contains a deductible and a coinsurance above the deductible. We find that zero marginal cost is just a sufficient but not a necessary condition for a zero deductible. The second type has no deductible and the optimal insurance starts with full coverage for small losses and includes a coinsurance above an upper value of the full coverage.     

Competitive Insurance Markets and Adverse Selection in the Lab

We provide an experimental analysis of competitive insurance markets with adverse selection. Our parameterised version of the lemons’ model of Akerlof in the insurance context predicts total crowding-out of low risks when insurers offer a single full insurance contract. The therapy proposed by Rothschild and Stiglitz consists of adding a partial insurance contract so as to obtain self-selection of risks. We test the theoretical predictions of these two models in two experiments. A clean test is obtained by matching the parameters of these experiments and by controlling for the risk neutrality of insurers and the common risk aversion of their clients by means of the binary lottery procedure. The results reveal a partial crowding-out of low risks in the first experiment. Crowding-out is not eliminated in the second experiment and it is not even significantly reduced. Finally, instead of the predicted separating equilibrium, we find pooling equilibria. The latter can be sustained because insureds who objectively differ in their risk level do not perceive themselves as being so much different.     

Effects of Competition on Insurance Contract Formation

For an insurance transaction between a single risk-averse buyer and single risk-neutral seller with positive transaction costs, it is well known that the buyer will prefer a policy contract with an ordinary deductible. More detailed results demonstrate the Pareto optimality of an insurance contract characterized by a deductible (followed by coinsurance) for a single risk-averse buyer and single risk-averse seller. In the present work, we employ a market-game model to solve for the equilibrium insurance contract. This formulation, which approximates the behavior of excess property insurance and property catastrophe reinsurance markets, reveals that the equilibrium policy is described by full insurance up to a given policy limit, with no deductible or coinsurance. Our analysis shows further that this solution persists regardless of the numbers of buyers and sellers in the market, and in particular that the market-game equilibrium does not converge to a Pareto-optimal result because of boundary constraints on the number of sellers. Finally, we test our price-formation mechanism against an important generalization, and find that the policy-limit contract persists.     

Contracting with Present-Biased Consumers in Insurance Markets

Present bias challenges consumers with self-control problems when they implement precautionary efforts in insurance markets. To explore how rational insurance companies respond to this bias, this paper analyzes a contract design problem in a monopolistic insurance market with ex ante moral hazard. We consider two types of consumers with this bias: the “naifs”, who do not foresee the present bias and make decisions in a myopic way, and the “sophisticates”, who foresee the bias and incorporate it in the decision process. Relative to the benchmark case where consumers are time-consistent, we show that (i) present bias reduces the monopoly profit, regardless of the consumer type; (ii) present bias can either reduce or increase the coverage of the profit-maximizing insurance contract depending on the extent of the bias; and (iii) when present bias is severe, the insurance company can profitably exploit naifs but not sophisticates. These results still hold when consumers are heterogeneous and their types are unknown to the insurance company.     

Die Akzeptanz von Versicherungsdienstleistungen im Internet

There is not much known about the factors that determine online demand for insurances. This current study is a first attempt to locate the variables that affect the acceptance of online-purchase of an insurance policy from existing research and empirically verify them. Results show that good terms coupled with online purchase-experience is the most important cause for acceptance. Additionally, convenience (i.e., easy access to information through internet sites of insurance companies and easy and fast contracting), perceived barriers when transferring from a traditional insurance contract to an ?online contract“, information quality of the internet offer, perceived personal risk as well as perceived transaction risk are significant factors driving online demand for insurances.