国有企业薪酬制度存在的问题及解决对策研究

薪酬制度是企业人力资源管理的重要组成,薪酬制度改革是国有企业深化改革的重心和难点。我国国有企业薪酬制度仍存有“计划经济”色彩,难以在激烈的市场竞争中为国有企业提供前进动力,不能适应新时代市场发展的需要。近年来国有企业薪酬制度所暴露的种种问题,亦说明国有企业薪酬管理制度的改革势在必行。文章笔者首先指出国内国有企业薪酬制度存在的主要问题,并提出以“人才”为中心的改进国有企业薪酬制度对策。     

股票薪酬于我国上市公司的适用性浅析

股票薪酬是高级经理人员薪酬的主要组成部分之一。由于其主要形式是公司股票,因此必须是股票在公开的股票交易市场上买卖的公司才能采用而我国这类上市公司大部分为国有企业,国有企业固有的问题在很大程度上影响了股票薪酬实施的效果。要使股票薪酬制在发挥它应有的作用,我国的上市公司还需完善企业制度,同时应注重外在制度环境的规范。     

浅谈国有企业薪酬制度存在的问题及其改革

国有企业的薪酬制度一直是大家关注的焦点,薪酬制度对人才的吸引和留住有着重要的影响,影响企业的竞争力和发展。2010年年终,国企内部收入分配制度改革再次引起了人们的热议,本文针对国企传统的薪酬制度存在的问题,对国有企业薪酬制度改革进行探讨。     

国有企业改制中的薪酬管理误区和优化策略分析

薪酬管理是国有企业人力资源管理中的重要组成部分,是国有企业制定战略性发展目标的重要依据,与国有企业的长远发展有着密不可分的关系。就目前我国社会发展状况而言,国有企业传统的薪酬管理制度无法适应新形势的要求,因此我国国有企业纷纷开始进行制度改革,但就制度改革的整体效果来说还不够理想,为了保证国有企业薪酬管理的时效性,本文就国有企业改制中薪酬管理误区及相关优化策略进行了分析。     

期股制：冲击中国——透析期股制

党的十五届四中全会决定建立和健全国有企业经营管理的激励和约束机制,并且提出可以对经营管理给予股权激励。借此改革之东风,作为薪酬制度的“经理股票期权”这个舶来品,目前已成为理论界和众多上市公司关注的焦点。     

对国有企业薪酬制度改革的探讨

国有企业传统薪酬制度的种种弊端,使企业显得羁绊重重而缺乏竞争力。把薪酬管理与绩效相结合,逐步拉大高级管理人员、关键岗位人员与一般职工的收入差距,使薪酬制与市场机制接轨是国有企业薪酬制度的改革方向。     

刍议高质量发展时期国有企业薪酬制度改革

新常态下我国经济发展由高速发展转向高质量发展,国有企业作为国家经济发展的重要组成部分,面对高质量发展要求,积极深化改革,全面参与市场竞争,有利于我国优化经济结构、培育具有全球竞争力的世界一流企业,文章立足于国有企业高质量发展,从薪酬制度改革角度,梳理目前国有企业薪酬制度存在的问题和面临的困境,并根据国家高质量发展要求,提出促进国有企业高质量发展的薪酬制度改革策略。     

对我国国有垄断企业高薪酬问题的探究

目前我国国有垄断企业职工薪酬明显高于非国有企业职工,行政垄断、所有者缺位、现行工效挂钩制度及劳动力市场分割等都是造成国有垄断企业高薪酬的主要原因。有效规范垄断行业职工高薪酬问题,需采取改革国有企业工资总额管理办法,完善国有企业内部职工薪酬管理和激励机制,深化国有企业股份制改革等措施加以解决。     

提升国有企业竞争优势的薪酬战略

随着市场竞争的日益加剧,国有企业不断受到外来企业和私营企业的冲击,市场地位已逐渐被动摇。国有企业缺乏竞争力和吸引力的薪酬导致大量人才的缺失,从而间接影响了企业的长远发展。在薪酬日益受到重视的今天,很多企业都在薪酬设计上花费了不少心思,对薪酬战略的呼声也越来越高。本文通过分析我国国有企业的薪酬现状及所处的困境,建议采用渐进的方式改革和完善现有的薪酬制度,把薪酬战略引入国有企业,有针对性的提出了一些建议和改革措施。     

论国有企业中层管理人员薪酬激励制度

中层管理人员薪酬激励是国有企业员工激励制度中的一个重要组成部分。虽然年薪制的实施已经解决短期激励的问题,但总的来看经营者的薪酬激励还有许多工作可以做。从分析当前国有企业中层管理人员薪酬激励现状入手,对如何改革中层管理人员薪酬激励制度提出了对策措施。     

对商业银行管理层激励与约束问题的思考

商业银行管理层激励与约束机制要根据商业银行自身的特殊性来设计,选择低报酬--业绩敏感性的经理层报酬补偿激励机制、完善的经理人市场、健全的现代企业制度以及外部监管.     

董事会特征与公司成长性关系的实证研究——基于创业板上市公司经验数据

以创业板上市公司2010-2013年为研究区间,以主营业务收入增长率为公司成长性指标,选择董事会规模、独立董事比例、董事长与总经理两职设置、董事学历水平、董事薪酬变量作为反映董事会特征的变量,建立多元线性回归模型,对创业板上市公司董事会特征与公司成长性惯性进行实证分析。研究表明:创业板上市公司董事会规模与公司成长性线性负相关,董事薪酬与公司成长性正相关,而独立董事比例、董事长与总经理两职合一、董事学历水平与成长性没有相关性。为进一步完善创业板上市公司董事会治理机制,提高董事会治理效率,我国应控制董事会规模,进一步完善薪酬体系和激励制度,持续完善独立董事制度,以期提高创业板上市公司的成长能力。     

How Economic Incentives May Destroy Social,Ecological and Existential Values: The Case of Executive Compensation

Executive compensation has long been a prominent topic in the management literature. A main question that is also given substantial attention in the business ethics literature—even more so in the wake of the recent financial crisis—is whether increasing levels of executive compensation can be justified from an ethical point of view. Also, the relationship of executive compensation to instances of unethical behavior or outcomes has received considerable attention. The purpose of this paper is to explore the social, ecological, and existential costs of economic incentives, by discussing how relying on increasing levels of executive compensation may have an adverse effect on managerial performance in a broad sense. Specifically, we argue that one-dimensional economic incentives may destroy existential, social, and systemic values that influence the manager’s commitment to ensure responsible business conduct, and have negative spillover effects that may reduce the manager’s performance. There are well-documented findings that demonstrate that reliance on sources of extrinsic motivation (such as economic incentives) may displace intrinsic motivation. Our perspective is a holistic one, in the sense that we will explore the influence of sources of extrinsic motivation on the manager’s intrinsic commitment to different types of values. We will in particular investigate how it may influence the manager’s ethical reflection and behavior or lack thereof.     

国外CEO权益报酬研究的进展与启示

对管理者、特别是CEO的报酬和激励是公司治理的一个重大问题.文章在总结国外众多关于CEO权益报酬的文献基础上,主要从权益报酬激励及其效应、CEO股票期权的价值确定、CEO权益激励水平的决定、关于权益报酬有效性的争议等方面就国外的最新研究进行了综合评述,在此基础上分析了对我国公司的高管人员实行权益报酬的借鉴和启示.     

薪酬外部不公平性与非效率投资--基于社会比较理论的解释和经验证据

在高管薪酬体制扭曲现实背景和社会比较理论视角下,引入心理学和行为学研究成果,关注薪酬外部不公平性对高管心理感知及行为选择影响。研究发现,薪酬外部不公平易引发高管“黑嫉妒”心理,导致其寻求替代性补偿激励而增加非效率投资。这一现象在民营企业更为突出,主要是因国有企业报酬体系异化所致。宏观经济形势和公司所在地区对薪酬外部不公平性与非效率投资之间关系有显著调节作用。研究还发现受自我期望值、归因模式及注意力基础等因素影响,高管对薪酬外部公平性问题的心理感知存在显著性别差异,女性高管治理有助于缓解男性高管主导的“黑嫉妒”心理和抑制非效率投资。     

归入权的行使与派生诉讼的适用

归入权为公司的法定权利,即根据公司法的规定,公司成员违反对公司的忠实义务时,公司可以将其行为所得收归公司所有。论文从国企改制的案例着手,对归入权的性质、法理基础以及归入权与派生诉讼的关系作了探析,认为公司负责人挪用、侵占公司资金收购的国有股权应为归入权的客体,公司法上的派生诉讼制度虽然是主要针对损害赔偿规定的,但对归入权诉讼也可以适用。     

Executive Pay and Legitimacy: Changing Discursive Battles Over the Morality of Excessive Manager Compensation

How is the (il)legitimacy of manager compensation constructed in social interaction? This study investigated discursive processes through which heavily contested executive pay schemes of the Finnish energy giant Fortum were constructed as (il)legitimate in public during 2005–2009. The critical discursive analysis of media texts identified five legitimation strategies through which politicians, journalists, and other social actors contested these schemes and, at the same time, constructed subject positions for managers, politicians, and citizens. The comparison of two debate periods surrounding the 2007–2008 financial crisis revealed significant differences in the discursive strategies and the corresponding moral struggles linked to legitimation of executive compensation. The analysis highlights a change in moral reasoning by social actors as they adapt their justifications to a changing social context. This study has important implications for our understanding of the ethical aspects and socio-political embeddedness of manager compensation. In particular, it adds to our knowledge of organizational legitimacy by showing how discursive strategies and the corresponding morality constructions used to (de)legitimate business activities can shift quickly as a result of a change in the social and political climate surrounding the legitimation struggle.     

高管薪酬、董事会治理与分类转移

本文研究了高管薪酬和董事会治理对分类转移的影响。研究表明,货币薪酬会诱使高管向上转移利得,股权激励和缺乏区分度的薪酬制度会诱使高管同时向下转移费用和向上转移利得;而勤勉、独立和两职分离的董事会能够在一定程度上识别并抑制这两种不同方式的分类转移;但董事会对分类转移的抑制程度小于高管薪酬对分类转移的诱发程度。进一步地,良好的市场、法制和媒体监督环境能够有效缓解高管薪酬对分类转移的诱发作用,而董事会能够有效弥补法制建设和媒体监督不足导致的分类转移治理缺陷,并在较高质量的审计环境下对分类转移发挥更强的抑制作用。本文首次结合制度背景和媒体监督研究了公司核心治理机制对不同分类转移方式的影响和原因,并创新性地对向上转移利得的程度进行了衡量,为监管部门及公司治理机制、会计准则的制定者提供经验证据。     

PROFIT SHARING IN HEDGE FUNDS

In a new scheme for hedge fund managerial compensation known as the first‐loss scheme, a fund manager uses her investment in the fund to cover any fund losses first; by contrast, in the traditional scheme currently used in most US funds, the manager does not cover investors' losses in the fund. We propose a framework based on cumulative prospect theory to compute and compare the trading strategies, fund risk, and managers' and investors' utilities in these two schemes analytically. The model is calibrated to the historical attrition rates of US hedge funds. We find that with reasonable parameter values, both fund managers' and investors' utilities can be improved and fund risk can be reduced simultaneously by replacing the traditional scheme (with 10% internal capital and 20% performance fee) with a first‐loss scheme (with 10% first‐loss capital and 30% performance fee). When the performance fee in the first‐loss scheme is 40% (a current market practice), however, such substitution renders investors worse off.     

Determinants of chief executive officer compensation following major acquisitions

This study sought to determine whether major increases in firm size, achieved through acquisitions, result in greater chief executive officer (CEO) compensation, given manager versus owner control. A second issue addressed is whether the type of firm—single industry or multiple industry—plays a role in the linkage between acquisition activity and additional compensation. Other variables included in the analysis were CEO tenure and profitability. Annual observations from 1979 through 1986 of 50 firms that had engaged in acquisition activity form the basis of the study. Findings reveal that acquisitions, after allowing 1 year for the full impact of the merger to be felt, led to significant increases in CEO compensation for both owner- and manager-controlled firms. Also, it was found that manager-controlled firms gave their CEOs further rewards for additional years on the job, regardless of performance, while owner-controlled firms were found to reward more on the basis of performance.