金融消费者保护监管主体研究

本文以金融消费者保护监管主体为视角，在总结英美等发达国家金融消费者保护监管经验以及国内监管实践的基础上，提出了完善我国金融消费者保护监管的建议。     

Macro prudential governance and central banks: Facts and drivers

The Great Crisis has highlighted the importance of establishing macro prudential architectures to address problems of financial stability. Central banks are always part of macro prudential settings, but their role is far from being homogeneous across countries, reflecting the fact that according to economic theory there are pros and cons in extending central bank influence to macro prudential supervision. The issue is then genuinely empirical: are there any meaningful drivers explaining the actual choices made by policymakers about the central bank's role in macro prudential governance?We identify three potential drivers – micro supervision involvement, monetary policy discretion, overall institutional independence – and test for their relevance, by analysing current institutional settings in 31 advanced and emerging market economies. We find that central bankers already in charge of micro supervision and less politically independent are more likely to get extended macro prudential powers; the same is true, if they have low monetary policy discretion, being constrained by a monetary stability objective. We interpret these results by using a political economy perspective.     

A Study on Designing a Financial Supervisory Institution in Taiwan

This paper investigates world trends in financial supervision, including the separation of treasury and finance and the shift from departmental regulation to functional regulation. Based on the trend toward integration in financial supervision and examination, this paper proposes the adoption of a functional approach to financial supervision and the problems that may occur when we restructure the financial supervisory framework in Taiwan. This paper also discusses various financial supervisory institution models and weighs their advantages and disadvantages. Finally, it advances other issues concerned with the restructuring of the financial supervisory system, including the repositioning of the Central Deposit Insurance Corporation (CDIC), and adjustments in the powers conferred upon the Central Bank to conduct examinations.     

Exploring governance of the new European Banking Authority—A case for harmonization?

In the context of the proposed EU financial supervisory reforms, this paper focuses on the governance of the network of national supervisory banking agencies and the newly established Community supervisor (European Banking Authority, EBA). We assess to what extent lack of governance convergence nationally and with EBA could undermine the incentives for cooperation among supervisors. Convergence should particularly focus on (i) the issue of the presence of politicians on decision-making bodies; (ii) the need for clearly defining dismissal procedures of heads of supervision; (iii) autonomy from government in regulatory matters; (iv) supervisory autonomy in matters of licensing and withdrawing licenses; (iv) mechanisms for judicial accountability; (v) legal protection for supervisors handling in good faith. In the absence of full centralization of prudential supervision, early harmonization of national governance arrangements towards best practice would better align supervisors’ incentive structures and, hence, be beneficial for the effectiveness of European supervision.     

论金融科技的穿透式监管

金融科技作为信息技术驱动的金融创新,正改变金融市场格局。但伴随金融与科技深度融合,综合性的金融主体、技术泛化的金融产品与异化的金融权利却诱致复杂的金融风险。由于传统金融监管在应对上述风险时存在对象错配、方式滞后与机制失效的局限,穿透式监管成为回应现实需求的最佳选择。金融科技的穿透式监管应坚持以实质重于形式为核心,突出对金融数据、内置算法与金融科技机构的多向穿透,并遵循适应性原则、系统性原则与比例原则指导具体监管实践。在实践中,金融监管层不仅应利用智能化、嵌入式的监管科技和全面、严格的信息披露刺破金融科技的复杂结构,还应搭建统一的监管协调体系、制定详尽的监管规范、划定主体的责任边界,以落实穿透式监管理念,提高金融科技监管有效性。     

Modernizing Financial Regulation: Implications for Bank Supervision

Reducing payments and settlement risk should be pursued where economically possible, but will not obviate the need for bank supervision. Governments regulate the banking sector because they are the intermediaries that transform short-term liabilities into long-term loans. Bank supervision needs to be supplemented with improved disclosure, greater market discipline, and in many countries, increased, not decreased, supervisory resources.     

论我国农村金融监管制度的改革与完善

对我国农村金融监管制度的完善应紧密结合我国农村金融自身所具有的鲜明特性。金融监管应追求安全与效率的和谐统一。金融监管的方式应从单纯的合规性监管、统一监管更新为以风险性监管和分类监管、差别监管为主。在健全农村金融监管法规的基础上应有针对性地对民间金融合法化。多元化的监管体系和足够的监管资源、均衡投入的监管力量也是成熟的农村金融监管制度必不可少的。     

中国对外资银行的监管制度分析——以相关外资银行管理条例为视角

外资银行是中国银行业的重要组成部分,中国于1994年、2001年和2006年先后颁布的三个外资金融机构管理条例及其相应的实施细则,集中体现了中国对WTO承诺的履行和外资银行监管制度的发展,也标志着中国银行业(中国加入WTO过渡期最长的一个行业)从此进入完全开放的时代.2006年12月,中国在入世过渡期结束时采用的新《中华人民共和国外资银行管理条例》在市场开放、履行WTO承诺等各方面有了很大进展.不过中国仍然需要在对外资银行的审慎监管、法人银行导向、国民待遇落实和统一监管等问题上做出进一步的努力.     

The Prudential Supervision of Financial Conglomerates in the European Union

Abstract

Around the world, the formation of financial conglomerates is gaining importance. In the United States, the provisional agreement between Congress and President Clinton’s administration to break down the barriers between banking, insurance, and securities firms by repealing the Glass-Steagall Act is no less than revolutionary. Meanwhile, in the European Union (EU), where the establishment of financial groups working in all three sectors has long been permitted, the Financial Services Action Plan (COM 1999),¹ as endorsed by European Heads of State at the Köln Council, identifies the further development of prudential rules for financial conglomerates as a top priority for EU financial services legislation in the coming years.

The focus of EU prudential legislation is on individual financial services undertakings, that is, on the bank, insurance company, or securities undertaking and not on the position and operation of the conglomerate as a whole. From this angle, the potential danger is one of a growing mismatch between the prudential approach, which looks at the individual legal undertakings separately, and the business approach, which manages and controls the conglomerate as a whole in different product and geographic areas. For this reason, the basic EU prudential framework has been supplemented to address the conglomerate dimension.

This paper presents an overview of financial services prudential legislation in the EU. It explains the role of the European Commission and gives a summary of the basic prudential framework for financial services, focusing on the single passport concept and the principle of mutual recognition. It examines the recent history of financial concentration and conglomeration in Europe and discusses general prudential issues arising from financial conglomerates. The paper also examines existing EU prudential legislation on financial conglomerates and how this might be developed in the future. Finally, some conclusions are drawn. It is hoped that this brief overview of how the European Union has tackled and is tackling the difficult issue of financial conglomerate supervision might be of interest to North American readers at a time when the United States is changing its prudential legislation to permit the development of financial conglomerates.     

On International Consumption Risk Sharing,Financial Integration and Financial Development

This article investigates the empirical link between international consumption risk sharing, financial integration, and financial development for a group of twenty-nine developed and developing countries in the G7, the Euro area, and the OECD. Estimation results indicate that (1) risk sharing in the Euro area is higher than those in the G-7 and the OECD, and (2) a higher degree of risk sharing is associated with a greater degree of financial integration and a lower level of financial development. These results suggest that more financially integrated countries might be better able to insure themselves against idiosyncratic income shocks and countries with more developed financial markets might tend to engage in less consumption risk sharing with other countries thanks to their own sophisticated financial markets. Holding financial integration and financial development equal, countries in the Euro area engage in significantly more risk sharing than the ones in the G7 and the OECD.     

Banks' Strategic Responses to Supervisory Coverage: Evidence from a Natural Experiment

U.S. bank supervisors conduct frequent and comprehensive loan-level exams of the syndicated loan market. These exams are costly as adverse exam loan ratings may increase supervisory scrutiny and reduce bank capital. Relying on an unexpected change in supervisory coverage in 1998, we estimate that the cost of bank credit for borrowers excluded from supervision decreases by approximately 18%. We show that large lenders use the coverage change to exclude deals from supervision, especially riskier deals. Strikingly, small lenders shift their lending to increase supervisory coverage, suggesting the potential importance of supervision in reducing information asymmetries within lending syndicates.     

Financial supervision regimes and bank efficiency: International evidence

There exists a lively debate as for the appropriate architecture of the financial supervision regime, with a long list of theoretical advantages and disadvantages associated with each one of its key dimensions. The present study investigates whether and how bank profit efficiency is influenced by the central bank’s involvement in financial supervision, the unification of financial authorities, and the independence of the central bank. The results show that efficiency decreases as the number of the financial sectors that are supervised by the central bank increases. Additionally, banks operating in countries with greater unification of supervisory authorities are less profit efficient. Finally, central bank independence has a negative impact on bank profit efficiency.     

论商业银行集团化经营的法律风险及其防控机制

集团化是现代银行最突出的特征之一。银行的集团化发展,可达到协同经营的目标,打破传统金融机构的竞争格局,使集团获得经营一体化带来的好处。但另一方面,复杂的股权关系、组织结构、内部往来、业务合作,也使得银行集团暴露于特殊的法律风险当中。在金融危机后,金融监管的严格化和法律环境的快速变化,使得银行集团面临的法律风险更为严峻。     

Lessons from the Tequila Crisis

This paper draws several important lessons from the Tequila Crisis of 1994 and 1995. The overriding lesson is that the dynamics of financial crises in emerging market countries differ from those in industrialized countries because institutional features of their debt markets differ. Several policy lessons for emerging market countries also emerge from the analysis: (1) pegged exchange-rate regimes are extremely dangerous, (2) strong prudential supervision of the banking system is critical for prevention of financial crises, (3) financial liberalization must be managed extremely carefully and (4) different policies are needed to promote recovery in emerging market countries than those that are applicable to industrialized countries.     

The Interaction of the IFRS 9 Expected Loss Approach with Supervisory Rules and Implications for Financial Stability

This paper examines the interaction of the International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) 9 expected credit loss (ECL) model with supervisory rules and discusses potential implications for financial stability in the European Union. Compared to the incurred loss approach of IAS 39, the IFRS 9 ECL model incorporates earlier and larger impairment allowances and is more closely aligned with regulatory expected loss. The earlier recognition of credit losses will reduce the build-up of loss overhangs and the overstatement of regulatory capital. In addition, extended disclosure requirements are likely to contribute to more effective market discipline. Through these channels IFRS 9 might enhance financial stability. However, due to the reliance on point-in-time estimates of the main input parameters (probability of default and loss given default) IFRS 9 ECLs will increase the volatility of regulatory capital for some banks. Furthermore, the ECL model provides significant room for managerial discretion. Bank supervisors might play an important role in the implementation of IFRS 9, but too much supervisory intervention bears the risk of introducing a prudential bias into loan loss accounting that compromises the integrity of financial reporting. Overall, the potential benefits of the standard will crucially depend on its proper and consistent application across jurisdictions.     

金融监管框架与监管体制发展趋势

世界各国为保障金融业稳健经营 ,依据金融法规 ,采取合规监管、风险监管等方式 ,加强金融监管与服务 ,提高金融机构抗风险的能力。经济全球化和金融机构的混业经营趋势 ,促使各国改革监管体制和方式 ,以提高监管效率。     

关于宏观审慎监管框架下逆周期政策的探讨

理论和实务界总结此次国际金融危机的经验教训,一致认为应当对金融监管理念和方式进行重大调整。加强宏观审慎监管,并将其与微观审慎监管进行有机结合,将成为后危机时代各国金融监管的主要发展趋势。本文认为,现阶段实施宏观审慎监管的一项重要任务,就是要针对金融体系的顺周期性,特别是对资本监管、贷款损失准备计提和公允价值会计准则等外部规则强化金融体系顺周期性的机理进行研究,一方面对这些规则进行修改完善,降低其顺周期效应;另一方面引入逆周期政策工具,如逆周期资本要求、杠杆率指标和前瞻性的拨备计提规则等,在金融体系中建立适当的逆周期机制,从而通过降低信贷活动、资产价格以及整个经济的周期性波动来减小金融失衡,缓解系统性风险,最终达到维护金融稳定的目标。     

对证券期货监管合作中委托监管的思考

探索对基层证券期货机构实施委托监管是一项金融监管工作创新,对深入推进银证监管合作,发挥金融监管合力具有重要意义。本文从法律角度出发。分析了在证券期货监管合作中委托监管的法律支撑点、委托监管的可能内容、人民银行接受委托监管面-临的问题。并据此提出对策建议。     

Bank regulation and supervision in the context of the global crisis

We provide novel evidence on regulatory and supervisory practices around the world in the context of the global financial crisis, using data from a new World Bank survey covering 143 countries. Analyzing differences between crisis and non-crisis countries, we find that crisis countries had less stringent and more complex definitions of capital but exhibited lower actual capital ratios, faced fewer restrictions on non-bank activities, were less strict in the regulatory treatment of bad loans, were less able to demand banks to adjust their equity, provisions or compensation schemes, and had greater disclosure requirements but weaker incentives for private agents to monitor banks. Comparing regulatory and supervisory practices before and after the global crisis, there is evidence of few changes. While capital ratios increased, bank governance and resolution regimes were strengthened, private sector incentives to monitor banks deteriorated.     

Do bank regulation,supervision and monitoring enhance or impede bank efficiency?

The recent global financial crisis has spurred renewed interest in identifying those reforms in bank regulation that would work best to promote bank development, performance and stability. Building upon three recent world-wide surveys on bank regulation (,  and ), we contribute to this assessment by examining whether bank regulation, supervision and monitoring enhance or impede bank operating efficiency. Based on an un-balanced panel analysis of 4050 banks observations in 72 countries over the period 1999–2007, we find that tighter restrictions on bank activities are negatively associated with bank efficiency, while greater capital regulation stringency is marginally and positively associated with bank efficiency. We also find that a strengthening of official supervisory power is positively associated with bank efficiency only in countries with independent supervisory authorities. Moreover, independence coupled with a more experienced supervisory authority tends to enhance bank efficiency. Finally, market-based monitoring of banks in terms of more financial transparency is positively associated with bank efficiency.