高技术产业集群的信任与声誉机制研究

高技术产业集群的“竞合关系”表现出“合作关系占主导,竞争关系为辅助”的关系结构;高技术产业集群内部经济主体具有长期合作的主观倾向;高技术产业集群的网络治理机制可以分为正式机制与非正式机制。从关系结构与网络成员的机会主义行为分析入手,对高技术产业集群非正式网络治理机制——信任文化和声誉机制进行了研究;高技术产业集群的信任体系结构包含五个层次,信任是网络型组织的基本运行机制,建立高绩效网络的最重要的要求是信任或社会认同。信任机制可以降低组织之间的交易成本;高技术产业集群以企业为主体的网络具有开放性,声誉机制的扩散效应更为明显,高技术产业集群声誉机制的重要含义在于拓展了交易范围与交易空间,为技术创新提供了更多的资源选择,使潜在交易对象可以演变为现实的可利用资源。     

外部网络化与企业组织创新

网络是各种行为主体之间在交换资源、传递资源活动过程中发生联系而建立的各种关系的总和。网络化则是指构建网络这种组织结构的动态过程。网络中的各个主体之间不仅仅是一种交易 ,还应在比较高的信任度基础上进行相互学习和协作。网络中成员间的高度信任能够使交易过程中的谈判成本、监督成本降低 ,机会主义行为减少。网络比市场机制的协调能力更强 ,又比科层组织决策更灵活。外部环境的复杂性和不确定性要求企业能够迅速准确地把握市场需求 ,外部网络化这种组织创新形式 ,为那些以迅速革新为特征的企业提供了强有力的组织支持     

关系网络与雇主机会主义行为的实证研究

在相同的司法体系下,为什么不同地区和不同类型企业的劳动争议数量和频率仍会有很大的差异？本文从关系网络的角度,分析作为第三方实施的社会实施机制--关系网络对经济主体行为的约束.员工拥有越多当地的社会关系网络,关系网络对雇主机会主义行为的约束力就越大.因而,一个地区外来劳动力越多,雇主的机会主义行为就越猖獗.一个地区外来雇主越多,雇主的机会主义行为也越多.本文用中国2000年31个省区的横截面数据验证了以上命题.     

理解企业外包决策的一个概念框架

企业在进行外包决策时，应该比较外包的总成本与内部生产的总成本。总成本由生产成本、谈判成本和机会主义成本构成。谈判成本和机会主义成本统称治理成本，其大小取决于产品的复杂性、市场的可争夺性和资产专用性三个因素。按照产品复杂性和资产专用性的不同，可以将企业的外包环境分成四种类型，在不同类型的外包环境下，外包企业应该采取不同的措施。     

媒体监督、内部控制质量与预算卸责——基于外部和内部治理机制的视角

预算卸责是预算执行中的机会主义行为,其广泛存在于企业中,对企业价值产生了重要负面影响。本文从外部和内部治理机制视角出发,研究了媒体报道和内部控制质量与预算卸责之间的关系,以及它们抑制预算卸责行为的治理路径。     

基于网络关系的公司治理

公司治理已由“股东至上”的产权治理演进为“利益相关者”的超产权治理,由单一企业的内部法人治理结构治理向网络关系的公司治理演进.企业价值评价也由财务指标逐渐转向非财务指标.在以网络关系为基础的公司治理中,企业当着力构建公司的价值网络关系、社会网络关系和顾客网络关系,并以利益相关者的公司治理理论为基点,根据不同的网络关系,实施分类治理,协调、维护好各种网络关系,使各类利益相关者协调发展.公司利用各种网络关系攫取企业发展所需的各类资源,致力于企业“Key Stone”角色的建设,保持企业的“常青基业”,以实现企业和社会效益的最大化.     

产业集群知识创新系统失效及治理研究--基于声誉及信息传递视角

本文从知识溢出的双面效应、知识价值评估困难、知识同质化风险3个方面,对产业集群知识创新系统的失效原因进行了深入研究,在此基础上,提出了声誉治理机制,并运用博弈模型,对声誉及信息传递在产业集群知识创新系统失效治理中起到的关键作用进行了定量化分析。分析结果表明,声誉机制能够有效抑制知识溢出和知识价值评估困难导致的机会主义行为,并且通过集群内的信息传递,达到声誉的充分传播,不但强化了声誉在知识创新系统中的作用,而且使企业在系统中可以有更多的协同伙伴选择,降低路径锁定和知识同质化的风险。     

产业链治理架构及其基本模式研究

全球化的发展使得产业链日益成为竞争的主要形式,公司治理已由企业治理、企业集团治理,发展到了产业链的治理。现有产业链治理模式的研究还是侧重于管理模式方面,而对于产业链层面的董事会、经营层等内部治理架构研究方面则存在不足。本文首先界定了产业链的三种基本类型,即资源驱动型、市场主导型和技术主导型,提炼出资源、市场、技术、协调四种关键要素;然后在此基础上构建产业链治理的架构及三种基本治理模式,重点是产业链董事会和经营层的结构安排和机制设计,对其构成要素和运行机制进行了系统阐述。案例实证以三种基本治理模式为基础,针对最复杂的技术主导型产业链治理的实现问题,以上广电和比亚迪为例从正反两方面进行论证;两种基本产业链组合的治理问题,则选取中粮集团资源驱动型产业链、市场主导型产业链治理的典型案例展开分析。     

基于关键资源视角的垂直网络组织及治理机制

当企业生产所需关键资源需专属关系投资,且这些资源的可转移性又是有限的,及所需的中间投入品具有高度不确定性等特征时,产业链上经济活动的组织出现了一种不同于企业和市场的治理结构:垂直网络组织。它是由产业链上服务于既定任务的企业群体所形成的一个组织集。在垂直网络组织结构中,有一个企业扮演集成者的角色,一方面,通过关系权力对与它有直接(和或间接)的关系进行配置和组织;另一方面,通过关系租金激励其他成员进行专属关系投资,降低交易费用,提升产业链竞争力。集成者的重要功能是产品定义和设置交易关系、关系内容和空间区位等多层次治理机制来对嵌入于产业链上主体间的交易结构进行调适、控制和保护。     

高技术企业的权变治理、管理者更替与企业永续发展

高技术企业的治理与规范化公司的治理存在很大的差异,甚至是本质上的差异。这种差异主要来自于高技术企业的人力资本价值和团队合作价值。但从企业长期发展来看,高技术企业必须平衡权威治理和企业永续发展的关系问题。本文运用企业权力主体竞争力模型分析高技术企业控制权结构,剖析了高技术企业的“两人治理结构”现象,揭示出保持高技术企业永续发展的两大主题——权变治理和管理者更替问题。     

The impact of culture on the relationship between governance and opportunism in outsourcing relationships

To address concerns of opportunism, outsourcing firms are encouraged to deploy contractual and relational governance. The individual and collective effects of these mechanisms have been previously examined but not in specific contexts. This study examines the effects of contractual and relational governance on provider opportunism, incorporating the moderating influence of a “shift parameter”—national culture. Our results reveal that contractual governance is more effective in individualistic and low uncertainty avoidance cultures. Relational governance is more effective in collectivist and high uncertainty avoidance societies. The individualism–collectivism dimension also moderates the joint effect of these mechanisms. While the mechanisms are generally complementary in mitigating opportunism, a singular focus on either contractual or relational can be just as effective under situations of high individualism and collectivism, respectively. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Choice and performance of governance mechanisms: matching alliance governance to asset type

Formal and relational governance mechanisms are used in strategic alliances to coordinate resources and mitigate the risk of opportunistic behavior. While recent work has shown that these approaches are not mutually exclusive, we understand little about when one approach is superior to the other. Using data on the governance choices and subsequent performance of alliances in the German telecommunications industry, we find that the optimal configuration of formal and relational governance mechanisms depends on the assets involved in an alliance, with formal mechanisms best suited to property‐based assets and relational governance best suited to knowledge‐based assets. Furthermore, a mismatch between governance mechanisms and asset type can harm the performance of the alliance. Our findings contribute to transaction cost economics, the literature on relational governance, and recent work studying their interaction. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Relational governance as an interorganizational strategy: An empirical test of the role of trust in economic exchange

We develop a model of relational governance as a specific form of interorganizational strategy that is distinct from the traditional modes of markets and hierarchies. We conceptualize this form of strategy in terms of structural and processual dimensions and derive a model of its determinants through arguments drawn from transaction cost economics and the sociological exchange literature. Hierarchical regression modeling is employed to test the theoretical model on data collected from a sample of 329 independent insurance agencies. We include the relational variable of trust and demonstrate that the combined model explains relational governance better than a model with the traditional determinants of governance form alone. Further, we observe that governance structure and process are related and discuss implications of the dynamic link between them. Directions for extensions are developed for strategic management research and practice.     

The determinants of relational governance and performance: How to manage business relationships?

It is the aim of this study to assess the influence of the determinants of the transaction, dyadic, and business environment level on relational governance and ultimately performance. We build an integrated framework for relationship management drawing from literature of transaction cost economics, marketing channels, and business networks. Dutch suppliers of potted plant and flower products (N=174) provided data for the empirical analysis. Our results show that joint planning, one of the constructs of relational governance, is positively influenced by interorganizational trust, information obtained from the network, physical transaction-specific investments (TSIs), and by fixed lines as the exchange mode. Joint problem solving, the other construct of the governance, is solely influenced by the two dimensions of trust. These two constructs of relational governance effect positively our performance measures. Managers should consider carefully each of the determinants of relational governance for the management of a relationship. As shown in our study, the success is dependent on some of the determinants of the three analytical levels of our integrated framework.     

Do formal contracts and relational governance function as substitutes or complements?

Relational exchange arrangements supported by trust are commonly viewed as substitutes for complex contracts in interorganizational exchanges. Many argue that formal contracts actually undermine trust and thereby encourage the opportunistic behavior they are designed to discourage. In this paper, we develop and test an alternative perspective: that formal contracts and relational governance function as complements. Using data from a sample of information service exchanges, we find empirical support for this proposition of complementarity. Managers appear to couple their increasingly customized contracts with high levels of relational governance (and vice versa). Moreover, this interdependence underlies their ability to generate improvements in exchange performance. Our results concerning the determinants of these governance choices show their distinct origins, which further augments their complementarity in practice. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

基于再造、外包和关系能力的供应链再设计

通过流程再造、外包和创造关系能力来进行供应链再设计，可以达到提升供应链网络整体竞争优势的目标。关系能力的发展是这一再设计方法中的核心环节。在具体的供应链再设计过程中应注意几个关键问题，包括通过内部分析和关系分析决定外包业务，注重供应链流程整合，注重关系能力的衡量。按照核心企业业务活动的竞争力水平和对企业战略目标的贡献不同，供应链网络中关系能力可以沿着不同的路径发展．关系能力的发展会强化企业内部能力，最终通过塑造内部竞争优势和关联性优势，而使供应链网络整体竞争优势得到提升．     

Formal governance mechanisms, relational governance mechanisms, and transaction-specific investments in supplier-manufacturer relationships

This study addresses the question of how to design governance mechanisms so that local suppliers are encouraged to make transaction-specific investments in foreign manufacturing firms. Suppliers' transaction-specific investments can increase the efficiency of production for foreign manufacturing firms operating in a host country. However, it can be difficult to induce suppliers to make specialized investments, because of the numerous hazards associated with such investments. Basing its conclusions on the results of a survey of Taiwanese firms using Chinese suppliers, this study examines the effectiveness of both formal governance mechanisms (i.e., contractual agreements and financial commitments) and relational governance mechanisms (i.e., calculative and benevolent trust) in inducing suppliers to make specialized investments. We find that both formal governance and relational governance mechanisms affect suppliers' tendencies to make specialized investments. Additionally, we find that calculative trust acts as a moderating factor in the relationship between formal governance mechanisms and transaction-specific investments.     

Outsourcers’ control mechanisms,vendors’ contract schemas,and project performance in cross-border IT outsourcing: A vendor’s perspective

Relational conflicts are likely to occur in cross-border IT outsourcing between partners with different cultural backgrounds. Extant literature diverges on the role of contract and trust as control mechanisms in managing relational conflicts. Prior studies have examined the effectiveness of the control mechanisms primarily from the outsourcer’s perspective, with little consideration of how vendors interpret outsourcers’ control mechanisms. Based on psychological contract theory, this study addresses the effects of contract-based and trust-based control mechanisms on relational conflicts from the vendor’s perspective and further explores the contingency of the effects on vendors’ psychological contract schemas (transactional contract schema and relational contract schema) towards their relationships with outsourcers. Based on survey data from 180 offshore outsourcing IT projects, the results show that vendors’ transactional contract schema reduces the effect of trust-based control whereas vendors’ relational contract schema strengthens the effect of outsourcers’ contract-based control on relational conflict. Relational conflicts, in turn, exhibit a negative impact on project performance. The findings offer new insights into the role of outsourcers’ contract-based control and trust-based controls in relationship management from a vender’s perspective. The findings also extend the outsourcing governance literature by illustrating the contingency of the control mechanisms on vendors’ psychological contract schemas.     

How businesses should govern knowledge-intensive collaborations with universities: An empirical investigation of university professors

In light of the high relevance of universities as sources of knowledge, university-business collaboration (UBC) offers significant opportunities for businesses with respect to making use of external academic research and innovation support. Unlike knowledge-intensive collaboration with other businesses, UBC has particularities which need to be considered, notably the role of professors as individual decision makers. Additionally, to assign intellectual property rights to knowledge and to reduce the danger of opportunistic behavior, mutually beneficial UBC requires adequate governance mechanisms. As previous research has not investigated the effects of governance mechanisms on knowledge sharing (knowledge combination, learning, and co-poiesis) and the achievement of joint goals in UBC, our empirical study covering 415 German professors examines these relations. We find a positive influence of relational governance and a negative influence of transactional governance on knowledge sharing in UBC. Regarding the influence of knowledge sharing on the achievement of joint goals, we find positive impacts of knowledge combination and co-poiesis and a negative impact of learning on the achievement of joint goals.     

The changing rationale for governance choices: Early vs. late adopters of global services sourcing

Research Summary: This article studies how the logic of firm governance choices varies as a function of the time of adoption of particular sourcing practices. Using data on the diffusion of global business services sourcing as a management practice from early experiments in the 1980s through 2011, we show that the extent to which governance choices are affected by process commoditization, availability of external service capabilities, and past governance choices depends on whether firms are early or late adopters. Findings inform research on governance choice dynamics specifically in highly diverse and evolving firm populations. Managerial Summary: This article considers how firms have chosen delivery models in global services sourcing decisions over time. Based on comprehensive data, we make two major observations. First, we find that firms that began with global services sourcing early, invested mainly in their internal sourcing capacity, while outsourcing only simple tasks to external providers, whereas firms that started later invested more in their capability to outsource various services to increasingly sophisticated suppliers. Second, we find that initial investments in internal or external sourcing capabilities have a strong effect on future choices of delivery models. This explains why, even today, firms vary greatly in how they implement global sourcing decisions, and it suggests that newcomers should learn from their own peer group rather than from highly experienced firms.