Impact of corporate governance and related controversies on the market value of banks

Effective corporate governance of financial institutions, particularly in the banking sector, is vital for the stability of the financial system and the prevention of financial crises. Thus, this study examines the impact of corporate governance and related controversies on the market value of banks. For this purpose, we utilized Refinitiv’s corporate governance scores, including management, shareholder value, and corporate social responsibility (CSR), as well as its corporate governance controversies scores to analyze their impact on the market value of 242 banks in 43 countries. Using Refinitiv’s ESG database from 2017 to 2021, we conducted a path analysis and found a positive and statistically significant relationship between the CSR strategy scores and the market value of banks as well as between the management scores and the market value of banks. Moreover, there is a statistically significant relationship between the corporate governance controversies scores and the market value of banks.     

Target CEO age,ownership decisions,and takeover outcomes

This paper examines the effect of target CEO age, in association with target corporate governance mechanisms, on the ownership decisions and takeover outcomes in eight East and Southeast Asian countries. The results show that acquirers are more likely to select partial-control acquisitions of target firms managed by older CEOs, and that the impact of target CEO age on the partial-control acquisition propensity is much stronger in emerging markets relative to developed economies. The study further finds that target CEO age leads to a lower probability of obtaining desired equity ownership levels compared to unmatched ownership achievements, controlling for target corporate governance structures. The findings also run robustness checks regarding variations in the compulsory acquisition cut-off in the sample countries. Overall, this paper adds to the growing of mainstream corporate governance literature regarding the relevance of CEO personal characteristics in agency problems for corporate decisions.     

境外上市背景下治理机制对公司价值的影响——基于融资决策传导效应的研究

本文从财务管理的环境起点论出发,在分析境外上市①对治理机制和公司价值影响的基础上,尝试深入研究改善治理对提升公司价值的传导效应。本文认为在治理机制、理财决策和公司价值之间存在着一条纽带将三者紧密地联系在一起。以在香港主板上市的中资公司为样本,本文研究发现融资决策是治理机制与公司价值之间的中介变量,即中国公司的境外上市改善了其治理机制,而良好的治理机制通过优化公司理财决策,促进了公司价值的增长。     

公司治理质量、投资者信心与股票收益

投资者信心保持和提振是一国资本市场获得持续稳定发展的基础。公司治理质量会影响外部投资者的信心吗?投资者信心影响股票收益的机理是什么?本文运用中国A股公司2006-2009年数据进行研究,结果表明,投资者信心是市场层面因素和公司层面因素共同作用的结果。公司治理质量越高,外部投资者信心越强;投资者信心变化通过投资行为形成溢价对股票回报产生影响,这种正向影响在治理质量高的公司中得到增强,在治理质量高的公司中,投资者信心越强,股票回报越大。     

公司治理影响公司财务风险吗?

绩效和公司价值往往为学术界和实务界所重视,而风险这一反映企业行为的经济后果以及企业质量的重要指标往往被忽视。这样的一个结果是,一些看似业绩很好的公司一夜之间轰然倒塌。从已有的文献看,公司治理具有改善公司业绩及公司价值的作用,同样,我们认为,公司治理应该具有风险效应,即它可能影响到公司的风险。本文以我国证券市场2002-2005年的上市公司为研究对象,研究了公司治理对企业财务风险的影响。实证结果表明,我国上市公司的公司治理结构对企业财务风险具有一定的影响。本文的研究为人们深入认识公司治理的作用以及通过合理构建公司治理结构来有效降低企业财务风险具有一定的启示意义。     

Corporate governance and firm value: International evidence

In this paper, we investigate the relation between firm-level corporate governance and firm value based on a large and previously unused dataset from Governance Metrics International (GMI) comprising 6663 firm-year observations from 22 developed countries over the period from 2003 to 2007. Based on a set of 64 individual governance attributes we construct two alternative additive corporate governance indices with equal weights attributed to the governance attributes and one index derived from a principal component analysis. For all three indices we find a strong and positive relation between firm-level corporate governance and firm valuation. In addition, we investigate the value relevance of governance attributes that document the companies' social behavior. Regardless of whether these attributes are considered individually or aggregated into indices, and even when “standard” corporate governance attributes are controlled for, they exhibit a positive and significant effect on firm value. Our findings are robust to alternative calculation procedures for the corporate governance indices and to alternative estimation techniques.     

Do corporate governance characteristics influence tax management?

This paper investigates how corporate governance plays a role in long-run tax management and contributes to the existing literature in several ways. First, we add insight into the horizon problems related to executive and director compensation and show that incentive compensation provides long-term incentives to improve performance by establishing a link between higher pay-performance sensitivity and lower taxes. Second, this is one of the first papers, to our knowledge, to empirically examine the role of governance in corporate tax management from a long-term perspective in order to better understand the lasting effects of governance. We find that incentive compensation drives managers to make investments into longer-horizon pay outs such as tax management. Furthermore, we find that this investment into tax management benefits shareholders; better tax management is positively related to higher returns to shareholders. We also address the endogeneity issues of corporate governance and performance measures. Finally, our paper is unique in examining which type of tax management strategy (domestic or foreign) different firms focus on. Our results shed light into how governance can improve firm performance and increase shareholder value in the long run.     

The role of corporate governance in shaping accruals manipulation prior to acquisitions

Based on stock swap transactions involving public acquirers originating from the UK between 1998 and 2011, this paper investigates the role of corporate governance in shaping accruals manipulation prior to stock swap deals. In contrast to common claims that strong corporate governance constrains accruals manipulation, my results show that well-governed acquirers engage more aggressively in income-increasing accruals manipulation than those with weak governance. This finding is consistent with a role of corporate governance that incentivises managerial actions in the interests of firms’ shareholders. Overall, this finding highlights the setting-specific nature of the earnings management and corporate governance relation. My results are robust to different discretionary accrual models, differences in the firm's growth structure, merger and acquisition control variables, a control group of 100% cash acquirers, an analysis of buy-and-hold abnormal returns, and potential sample selection problems.     

公司治理与社会责任:被动回应还是主动嵌入

随着社会责任理论与实践的发展,将社会责任落实到公司治理机制中已是大势所趋,然而传统以委托代理关系为核心的公司治理理论体系无法为二者的融合提供坚实理论基础,导致实践中表现为公司治理对社会责任的 "被动回应"。在价值创造导向下重新审视公司治理理论体系,可以突破委托代理关系为核心的局限,将公司治理界定为服务于企业价值创造目标的制度安排,而在价值创造过程中,企业社会责任又是一种日益重要的因素,因此,公司治理与社会责任之间便具有了严格的内在逻辑关系,公司治理应将社会责任 "内生嵌入"于其理论和实践体系中。     

The Value Relevance of Transparency and Corporate Governance in Malaysia Before and After the Asian Financial Crisis

This paper investigates whether the value relevance of financial reporting transparency and corporate governance in Malaysia increased after the Asian financial crisis of 1997. Our sample comprised 94 companies listed on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange in both 1996 and 2001. The disclosure indexes were significantly value relevant for 2001 but not for 1996. Our corporate governance measure was also significantly value relevant for 2001 but not for 1996. Accordingly, it would appear that after the Asian financial crisis, investors have become more sensitized to transparency and corporate governance issues.     

Management accounting and corporate governance: An institutional interpretation of the agency problem

Challenging the dominant economic agency theory of corporate governance with a new discourse drawn from institutional theory, the paper analyses how management accounting is implicated in corporate governance. The proposed institutional theory of agency links the micro-institutions of the organization that are informed by the practices of management accounting with external institutional players and stakeholders. The paper identifies emerging narratives in which the management accounting profession has recognised a distinctive, post-Enron set of sensibilities. Although techniques drawn from strategic management accounting can be adapted to embed better corporate governance practices, the institutional theory of agency identifies tensions between the heroic CEO narrative and the routinization of strategy implicit in strategic management accounting.     

Corporate governance and the value of cash holdings

We investigate how corporate governance impacts firm value by comparing the value and use of cash holdings in poorly and well-governed firms. We show that governance has a substantial impact on value through its impact on cash: $1.00 of cash in a poorly governed firm is valued at only $0.42 to $0.88. Good governance approximately doubles this value. Furthermore, we show that firms with poor corporate governance dissipate cash quickly in ways that significantly reduce operating performance. This negative impact of large cash holdings on future operating performance is cancelled out if the firm is well governed.     

中国内部控制的社会认同度研究

严格严密的内部控制制度是现代公司治理实现其基本目标的前提条件。对经营权的有效控制并使之与股东利益保持动态一致,只有在内部控制制度的全力保障下,才有可能成为现实。一个社会对公司治理、一个公司对自身治理的关注和重视程度,直接体现在其对公司内部控制制度的关注和重视上。本文从法律法规的制定、公司自身、会计师事务所和投资者四个角度考察了中国社会对内部控制的关注程度,借以对中国公司治理认同度问题做出大致判断。基于对内部控制关注程度的研究发现,公司治理在我国仍缺乏应有的认同,从而使得公司治理在我国的实践中可能只是一种徒具驱壳而缺乏实质内容和实在效果的时髦理论。     

公司治理 激励机制与业绩评价

本文强调公司治理、激励机制与业绩评价三者的联系对应关系,分析了在不同的公司治理模式下激励机制与业绩评价的特点和内涵。在此基础上,对当前公司治理的国际趋势及其给激励机制与业绩评价带来的影响做进一步展望。     

Diversification,corporate governance and firm value in small markets: evidence from New Zealand

We find that diversified firms in New Zealand are associated with a value discount of 19–42 per cent relative to single‐segment (undiversified) firms. Although several competing explanations have been offered in the literature, we find that the strength of corporate governance explains between 15–21 per cent of this discount. Specifically, board size, busyness of directors, CEO ownership and whether or not compensation of directors includes equity‐based components collectively explain a large part of the reported discount. Our results from companies trading in New Zealand complement recent findings in the US by not only confirming the existence of a diversification discount but also emphasizing the role of poor governance in destroying shareholder wealth by pursuing a value‐destroying corporate strategy. All our results hold after controlling for potential endogeneity in the decision to diversify and the choice of corporate governance structure by employing two‐way fixed‐effects and dynamic‐panel generalized method of moments regression techniques.     

Governance and takeovers: are public-to-private transactions different from traditional acquisitions of listed corporations?

Using a unique hand-collected dataset comprising 96 public-to-private (PTP) transactions and 258 acquisitions of listed corporations by existing corporate groups completed during the period 1998 to 2000, this paper investigates the extent to which PTPs have different internal and external governance and other characteristics from traditional acquisitions of listed corporations by existing corporate groups. The paper analyses acquisition activity during a period in which three new features were present: the decline in hostile takeovers, the increase in the adoption of governance Codes of Best Practice and the growth in PTP activity. PTPs are usually a response to takeover threat (Lehn and Poulsen, 1989) and so the paper analyses the acquisition decision from two perspectives: first, takeovers as a disciplinary mechanism which substitute for weak internal governance and second, as part of a non-disciplinary perspective where takeovers are complementary to internal governance mechanisms. We find support for the argument that improved internal governance and non-disciplinary takeovers, that is takeovers where the motive is not as a response to under-performing management, are complementary. PTPs are more likely to have higher board ownership and are likely to have duality of CEO and chairman. They are also more likely to have lower growth prospects and lower valuations. However, they do not have sub-optimal internal corporate governance structures in terms of lower proportions of outside directors. With respect to external governance, they are not more likely to experience pressure from the market for corporate control in the form of greater takeover speculation and are also not more likely to suffer hostile threats. We find that PTPs involving management buy-outs (MBIs) have fewer non-executive directors and a greater incidence of duality. MBO also have higher board shareholdings. We find no evidence that management buy-ins (MBIs) have different characteristics. Our results suggest that going private by MBO may result from management's knowledge of private information that leads them to believe that the market has an incorrect perspective of the company's prospects.     

Bank Corporate Governance,Beyond the Global Banking Crisis

Following up on the publication of the Walker Report ( 2009 ) in the United Kingdom, international organizations such as the Basel Committee ( 2010 ), the OECD ( 2010 ), and the European Union ( 2010 ) have proposed guidelines to improve bank corporate governance and, more specifically, risk governance. These international reports vary widely on what the prime objective of bank corporate governance should be, with one group recommending a shareholder‐based approach, and the other a stakeholder‐based one. Moreover, the focus of these reports is exclusively on risk avoidance, with little guidance as to how an acceptable level of risk should be defined. Drawing on insights from economics and finance, this paper is intended to contribute to the debate on bank corporate governance. Our four main conclusions are as follows. Firstly, the debate on bank governance should concern not only the boards but also the governance of banking supervision with clearly identified accountability principles. Secondly, since biases for short‐term profit maximization are numerous in banking, boards of banks should focus on long‐term value creation. Thirdly, board members and banking supervisors should pay special attention to cognitive biases in risk identification and measurement. Fourthly, a value‐based approach to risk taking must take into account the probability of stress scenarios and the associated costs of financial distress. Mitigation of these costs should be addressed explicitly in the design of bank strategy.     

Corporate Governance and Mergers and Acquisitions Performance in Banks: Evidence under the Special Regulatory Environment in Taiwan

In this study, we focus on the relation between bank governance and bank merger results under Taiwan’s special regulatory environment in 2000. Adopting governance variables (executive remuneration, managerial ownership, and board diversity), we find that managerial ownership is positively related to bank merger results and that board size is negatively correlated with bank mergers’ performance. This study supports sound governance mechanisms to prevent banks from pursuing a value-loss merger and acquisition (M&A). Our results offer the insight that internal bank governance structures have a bigger impact on the value effects from bank mergers. Thus, regulators may elevate the performance of bank M&As by enhancing corporate governance codes.     

A tale of two cities: Economic development,corporate governance and firm value in Vietnam

This study examines the moderating effect of financial and economic development on the relation between corporate governance and firm value in Vietnam, which has two exchanges, one located in the business center in the South, and the other located in the center of government in the North. This unique setting allows an investigation of corporate governance dynamics controlling for legal jurisdiction. The results show a positive relation between corporate governance and firm value in Ho Chi Minh City but not in Hanoi. The finding suggests that financial and economic development play critical roles in enhancing the benefits of corporate governance in emerging markets.     

Does “Vote No” Change Corporate Governance and Firm Value? Evidence from the Shareholder Activism of the Korean National Pension Service

In this paper, we analyze the effect of shareholder activism on firm value through internal corporate governance in an emerging market. We investigate the shareholder activism by the National Pension Service (NPS) of Korea, the fourth-largest pension fund in the world in 2010. We investigate stock price reaction to a “vote no” press announcement and find that the market does not react in the short run, which reaction is inconsistent with the results from developed countries. We also find that firms experiencing “vote no” and improved internal corporate governance have higher firm valuation. Shareholder activism by the NPS is effective in increasing target firm value through improving internal corporate governance.